**Attachment 12: Zionists supported the pre-1994 reigning NP South African government and the anti-NP government movement.**

INTRODUCTION

The Crown has instigated strife inside South Africa to create political unrest and civil war by using members from its Zionist Brotherhood. Zionism is a political tool to further the ideal of a One World Order, which is discussed in Attachment 11 The modus operandi of the Crown.

Zionism promotes the ownership of land and assets of a country by the government of that country, and appeals to the poor by indicating that such a government would ensure that the poor are uplifted to the same standard as the wealthy counter-parts of the poor. The stepping stone used to change the government of a country from a system wherein its people are the owners of their wealth, to a system wherein the wealth of a nation is state owned, is ‘National Socialism’. The ultimate goal of National Socialism is Communism. This is discussed further in Attachment 13 - Different systems of governance

Zionists were put into leading positions inside the political arena of South Africa by the Crown by funding their movements of infiltrating and creating different political parties – which mostly rode behind the cloak of other political parties in South Africa over the decades - including the still highly influential Verligte Aksie Group from predominantly White Communities, and the South African Communist Party from predominantly Black communities.

The Crown also made it possible for Zionist leadership to influence the National Party government during the time period of international sanctions against the Republic of South Africa, whereby they ensured that the South African border war, and the civil war within South Africa, was maintained through the ongoing supply of armaments from Israel. Simultaneously, Zionists were prominent within the anti-National Party government, taking leadership positions in the training of MK soldiers for guerilla warfare against the South African nation, as well as taking leadership positions in acquiring donations for the anti-government movements, as well as taking leadership positions during negotiations between the leaders of both the South African government, as well as the anti-South African government pre 1994, ensuring that the interests of the Crown is protected during and after power sharing in government of the two opposing teams in politics.

Zionist leadership found in the opposition to the pre-1994 reigning NP South African government on the one side, and in support of the pre-1994 reigning government on the other side, carried through the golden thread of an elite ruling society in South Africa, which is discussed in Attachment 18 - Impact of the Union of South Africa on the nation created a select elitist ruling society.

Support for the political opposition to the reigning government by reformist Zionists included magnifying a recognizable problem they labeled as ‘Apartheid’ by using the international media as a tool, which boosted the sales of newspapers and magazines which belonged to members of the Crown; collecting funds for the ‘freedom fighters against Apartheid’ internationally and using these funds to sell arms - which were bought from factories which are owned by members of the Crown - to the ‘freedom fighters’ to use against the government. The Zionist Brotherhood trained the ‘freedom fighters’ in warfare, during which time period they used and also destabilized the neighboring countries of South Africa, a factor which helped them to replace the existing governments of those countries with leaders who would be loyal to the Vatican and the Crown.

Support for the reigning South African government by the Zionist Brotherhood included the strengthening of economic ties between Zionist government of Israel, and South Africa. The South African government invested heavily in the expansion of Israel as a country, and raised the economy of Israel significantly through purchasing arms from Israel during the border war against the ‘freedom fighters’.

The Zionist Brotherhood still carries a huge influence in the control of the present political and economic structure of South Africa.

In this Attachment we discuss the following:

Section A: Zionist support for the National Party Apartheid Government

Section B: Zionist Support for anti-Apartheid government organizations

Section C: Apartheid was a money spinner

Section D: The National Socialist led South African Communist Party got into government to further the foundation of Communist rule in South Africa under the cloak of the African National Congress

**Section A: Zionist support for the National Party Apartheid Government**

**Another Man's Genius.**
"This will always be our response to international boycotts and threats against us," said President P.W. Botha as he unveiled the Cheetah, South Africa's advanced combat aircraft. The South Africans said that the plane was a secret project of the government's Armaments Corporation.

Claiming the new aircraft was more than a match for neighboring Angola's MiG-23s, Gen. Magnus Malan, the ‘Apartheid’ government's defense minister, told the assembled industrialists and foreign press corps that the Cheetah "signaled a new era of self sufficiency and enhanced operational capability for the South African Air Force."

It was proof of the technological leadership of the South African arms industry, asserted President Botha.

The Cheetah was also the one major item an international arms embargo had managed to deny South Africa. The South Africans, who in July 1986 were anxiously following the progress of sanctions legislation in the U.S., lost no time in driving that point home.

In its nightly broadcast to North America, Radio South Africa said the "futility" of the UN's 1977 arms embargo was recognized by the UN General Assembly, which called on member countries to stop importing arms from South Africa. After all, they were supposed to be applying an arms boycott against the country...The arms embargo had achieved the opposite of what it was intended to achieve. In the last decade of ‘Apartheid’ governance, the country had built up the tenth largest arms industry in the world, and this achievement was the direct response of the misguided attempt to isolate South Africa and make it more vulnerable to outside pressures.

In all their jubilation, the South Africans omitted one key detail: Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) had played a major role in creating the Cheetah out of the carcass of an aging Mirage III-C. The Cheetah was the latest of a number of projects on which the state-owned IAI and other Israeli weapons manufacturers had collaborated with the South Africans.

**1. The Development of Israel's Arms Industry.**

De Gaulle's halting of the arms flow at such a critical juncture also provided Israel with the impetus to embark on a crash program to develop an arms industry.
In this Endeavour, Israel was not starting from scratch. As early as 1921, Jewish settlers in Palestine had made hand grenades and explosives for use against Arabs protesting their presence. The history of the Jewish state's foundation is laden with tales of weapons obtained abroad by hook or by crook, and of secret workshops in British-ruled Palestine where primitive small arms were constructed.

After the establishment of Israel in 1948 these munitions factories were brought above ground and incorporated into a government-owned military industry.

As the great powers, for varying geopolitical reasons, were slow to sell arms to the new state, the Israelis pressed ahead, producing the Uzi submachine gun in 1952 and by 1965 had developed the rudiments of aviation, munitions, and electronics industries. Israel's objective was a guaranteed source of supply, but as early as 1954 it also began marketing weapons.

In 1967, shaken by de Gaulle's abrupt cancellation of major contracts for aircraft and patrol boats, the Israelis embarked on a crash effort to lower their future political vulnerability by striving toward self-sufficiency in weapons production. They opted to invest funds that had previously been earmarked for purchases overseas, into the indigenous arms industry.

In keeping with the decision immediately after the war to proceed with an intensified effort to develop and enlarge Israel's own weapons industry, cost-benefit calculations were set aside in favour of producing essential items in Israel.

Critical technological inputs from abroad - some arriving in the form of foreign investment and purchase of foreign technology; some pilfered, such as plans for the Mirage combat aircraft which were stolen by Mossad from the French Dassault company's Swiss licensee – made the task of designing and building competitive aircraft possible, such as the Mirage copy Kfir jet fighter, and the arms industry expanded rapidly.

Israeli determination was further spurred by displeasure with the amount of time it took the U.S. to resupply Israel during the 1973 war.

As Israel’s munitions industry grew significantly after 1972, she needed countries in which to offset her products. The export imperative brought its own set of problems, cantering on the overseas markets available to Israel and on its choice of customers from that list.

For varying reasons, Israel was largely shut out of the Eastern Bloc, the Arab world and NATO countries. Thus potential clientele for Israel was to be found on the peripheries: pariahs such as South Africa and Guatemala, the strong-man regimes of Taiwan, Zaire, and Chile, and the occasional government which had become wary of the ‘strings-attached’ arms purchases from the super powers.
Over the years in which Israel has sold weapons, it has become common that along with the weapons come Israeli advisers. Such advisors accompanied arms sales to Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua (under Somoza), Panama, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Rhodesia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Australia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua-New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and a number of European countries and several non-governmental factions. Even the least desirable customers were convinced to engage in arms deals with Israel - greatly detailed stories abound of the huge bribes Israel had used to suborn defense ministries, with the sole objective of nailing down arms deals.

As time went on, an additional problem arose: arms sales became the motor driving Israel's foreign policy. In times of economic crisis it became the supreme exigency. In September 1986, at a press conference, the Israeli defense minister explained what was behind a raft of scandals involving Israeli arms exports and technology thefts. The most frequent of such scandals involved sales to the U.S. Arms scandals have been an inevitable hallmark of this small country, called Israel, attempting to sustain a full-scale armaments industry. "...We cut our orders in our military industries" he said, "and I told them quite frankly: Either you'll fire people or find export markets."

The export markets open to Israel are frequently among the world's most unsavory; indeed, - to be off limits to the superpowers they often are located inside the very gates of hell.

Under international censure for its oppression of the Palestinians in the territories it occupied, Israel's dealings with the scum of the world's tyrants - including the white clique in South Africa, Somoza of Nicaragua, Gen. Pinochet of Chile, Marcos of the Philippines, Duvalier of Haiti, Mobutu of Zaire, the allegedly cannibalistic Bokassa of the Central African Republic - invariably resulted in its further exclusion from more "respectable" circles. "A person who sleeps with dogs shouldn't be surprised to find him covered with fleas”, commented the military correspondent for Israel's major daily newspaper.

Israeli critics, who term the phenomenon "arms diplomacy," warn that the export imperative has motivated a sequence of ad hoc, opportunistic decisions that have precluded the development of a coherent foreign policy, which, in turn, might over the long term mitigate Israel's isolated position in the world. Yet these critics are far from sanguine about the ability of Israel to set itself on a different course.

They point to the power of the "security establishment lobby," comprised of the upper echelon of Israel's political leadership (this has remained remarkably constant since the founding of the state), the top levels of the military, and the officials of the parastatal arms industries. As in the U.S., there is a "revolving door'' within Israel, whereby many of the top figures serve successively in two or all three of the top Israeli sectors.

It is these men who find the clients, and have insider access to the Ministerial Committee on Weapons transfers (MCL). The prime minister and the ministers of defense, trade and industry and foreign affairs make the final decision on every sale. Such decisions are made secretly – even the Israeli parliament (the Knesset), is excluded. The cabinet, too, is often excluded.

Critics of the hegemony of the arms export business say it has relegated the foreign ministry to a subordinate role in Israeli foreign policy making, and they see in its wake grave social and political consequences.
In Israel, a sector has evolved, headed by an elite with identical social characteristics and marked by a fairly high degree of cohesiveness, whose decisions and actions have a significant effect, not only on the country's economy and its foreign and defense policy, but also on its social and value systems. No less important, however, is the issue of whether a closed system has been created, whose activities and decisions undergo less public supervision and scrutiny, than any other area of life in the country.

**(i) A Co-equal Type of Proxy.**

Israeli analysts have argued that Israeli arms sales were dependent on U.S. approval; in a limited sense this is true. The U.S. has blocked, at the behest of Britain, the delivery of A-4 Skyhawks to Argentina, and it has in the past vetoed the export of the Kfir aircraft, leverage it is able to exert because of the Kfir's U.S. engine. However, the Carter Administration was unable to prevent Israeli nuclear cooperation with South Africa.

On the other hand, Israel has often obliged this or that sector of the U.S. government, selling arms where it would be embarrassing or illegal for the U.S. to do so: the contras, the Peoples Republic of China in the early 1980s and the Derg. government of Ethiopia is examples.

In 1975, Israel followed Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's advice and helped South Africa with its invasion of Angola. Even after the passage the following year of the Clark Amendment forbidding U.S. covert involvement in Angola, it appears that Israel considered Kissinger's nod a continuing mandate.

Given the export imperative under which the Israeli government operates, this 1981 proposal from the chief economic coordinator in the Israeli cabinet, Yaakov Meridor, should be taken with great seriousness: “We are going to say to the Americans, don't compete with us in South Africa, don't compete with us in the Caribbean or in any other country where you can't operate in the open. Let us do it. I even use the expression, ‘You sell the ammunition and equipment by proxy. Israel will be your proxy’ and this would be worked out with a certain agreement with the United States where we will have certain markets...which will be left for us.”

**2. The history between Israel and South Africa**

Israel's ties with South Africa has been disturbing to many who follow Israel's international activities.

Israel was castigated its arms sales to South Africa because there had been, for a decade, an arms embargo against South Africa; and second, because of the uses to which South Africa had put the Israeli-supplied weapons.

It has been said that those arms sales are understandable, given the striking similarities between the two countries in their day-to-day abuse and repression of their subject populations, South African blacks and Palestinians under Israeli rule; in their operating philosophies of apartheid and Zionism; and in their similar objective situations: "the only two Western nations to have established themselves in a predominantly non-white part of the world," as a South African Broadcasting Corporation editorial put it. That understanding, however, is somewhat superficial, and the focus on similarities of political behaviour has somewhat obscured the view of the breadth and depth of the totality of Israeli-South African relations and their implications.

Israel's relations with South Africa were different than its interactions with any of its other arms clients. That Israel gave South Africa its nuclear weapons capability, underscores the special nature of Tel Aviv's relations with the white minority government, and begins to describe it a fully-fledged, if covert, partnership based on the determination of both countries to continue as unrepentant pariahs and to help each other avoid the consequences of their behaviour.

For South Africa's sake the partnership was designed to thwart international efforts against apartheid. What South Africa was expected to do for Israel is not as easily delineated; some Israeli critics, in fact, have argued that nothing South Africa can do for Israel is worth the price Israel has paid in international opprobrium.

Beyond the guessing game (due to the strict secrecy maintained by Israel and to a lesser extent by South Africa) into which discussions of Israeli-South African links frequently deteriorate, it is certain that something of value was received in Israel. To Naomi Chazzan, an Israeli critic, that value received is worthless, even negative, as she is holding it up to a standard she describes as "the nature and development of an Israeli ethos" out of what she views as Israel's contradictions.

Chazzan’s image of a liberal, beneficent state of Israel is also the dominant one in the minds of many North Americans. However, during its not quite 70 years of its existence, the liberal, socially progressive state of Israel has existed mostly in the blandishments of fund-raisers and the flattering of the U.S. media.

The Israeli leadership, from the start, was hardened people, who took a hard lesson from the Holocaust and the centuries of Jewish travail that preceded it. The current leadership, where it differs from the founders, almost all of whom have come through the higher ranks of the Israeli military, has not softened.

Their understanding of modern Jewish history, with its themes of the Holocaust and powerlessness, reinforced by long professional military training, causes these elites to be impressed by visible manifestations of power and strength. At the same time they are inclined to be cynical toward false standards of international conduct. Whatever the large, and small, incentives to be found in links with South Africa, Israel's leaders have pursued them avidly.

**(i) South Africa - An Early Zionist Outpost.**

Fifty years before the Holocaust, utterly determined Zionists began going to South Africa to enlist support for a Jewish national home in Palestine. They found support in the flourishing Jewish community and access to key role players in the political arena of southern Africa who represented the British Crown.
Small numbers of Jews had arrived in South Africa in the beginning of the nineteenth century - when non-Christians were first allowed to settle in the Cape Colony. In the wake of pogroms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century’s global migration, a great migration from Eastern Europe - mainly Lithuania - brought the major part of the present day Jewish community to South Africa. A small number of the new immigrants were socialists who considered the idea of a Jewish national home in Palestine a backward notion; the large majority of South African Jews were rapidly won over to Zionism decades before their co-religionists in the U.S. or Europe.
About a hundred years ago, South African Jews began to lobby leaders of the South African government to "persuade them to intercede on behalf of Zionism with the British Government which controlled the fate of Palestine".

At the request of Theodore Herzl, considered the founder of Zionism, the South Africans approached Cecil Rhodes, the Cape Colony premier who took personal responsibility for extending Britain's grasp on Africa, and other prominent figures.

A 1916 approach to General Jan Smuts, who would later lead the South African government, bore spectacular fruit. As a member of the British War Cabinet, Smuts supported the drafting of the 1917 Balfour Declaration, a statement of Britain's commitment to a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Through the years, though British commitment to the declaration wavered, Smuts' support was constant.

He consistently maintained that the strategic safety of Britain's main line of imperial communication through the Suez Canal would be best assured if there were a British-sponsored Jewish homeland adjacent to it...When the Balfour Declaration was being drafted, his immediate consideration was to find "a formula to which the Great Powers would agree, " for staking Britain's claim" to the main role in the future of post-war Palestine in co-operation with the Jews.

In London, Smuts befriended Chaim Weizmann, who would become Israel's first president. In 1943, Weizmann wrote a memo to Smuts outlining a plan to develop industry and agriculture in Africa and the Middle East, capable of competing with U.S. industry. The scheme was "of great importance," Weizmann stressed, "and it is doubtful whether there exists any other scheme of equal importance for the future of the empire".

Although the British Empire was about to collapse, their contacts Weizmann and Smuts foresaw the realization of their peoples' futures through the British Empire, and Smuts' continuing attachment to Zionism - as premier, the South African leader, would remain a stalwart supporter of the Zionist movement, often acting as a fundraiser for Zionist organizations - generated significant momentum for the drive for Jewish statehood.

Many other South African leaders were attracted to the Zionist cause. In 1962, the cabinet of the Union of South Africa passed a resolution pledging support in international forums for "a National Home for the Jewish People in Palestine - an object which it regards as an important contribution to peace and civilization."

In 1934, South African Jews formed Africa-Israel Investments to buy land in Palestine. Later owned by Israel's Bank Leumi, Africa-Israel Investments owns choice residential and industrial real estate. South Africans remain as minority shareholders, and company debentures are sold in South Africa.

In the late 1940’s, Prime Minister Smuts permitted South African Jews to send money and supplies to the Jewish forces in Palestine, as well as permitting a great number of enthusiastic South African volunteers to join the fight to establish the state of Israel.

South African Jews have long been the highest contributors to Zionist causes and Israel on a per capita basis.
In May 1948, Prime Minister Smuts extended de facto recognition to the new state.

**(ii) The history of relations between the South African Government and Israel included funding for a Zionist governed Jewish State.**

In 1948, the end of the British Mandate and the concurrent establishment of the State of Israel coincided with the accession of a new set of leaders in South Africa. The Afrikaans-speaking Nationalists who had supported the Nazis in the recent war, and who defeated the Smuts government, created a great concern to South African Jews. However, the Nationalist Premier, Daniel Malan, publicly assured Jews that there would be no discrimination against them.
Malan allowed the money and supplies sent by South African Jews to Israel to continue and even turned a blind eye to the departure of Jewish volunteers.
He extended ‘de jure’ recognition to Israel in 1949, and in 1953 became the first foreign head of state to visit Israel.
According to James Adams, Malan's cordiality to the Jewish community was "a shrewd move."

The Jews were well aware that a vociferous campaign against apartheid might well result in the Malan government or its successors abandoning previous agreements which could lead to discrimination in some form against the Jewish population in South Africa. They set about affirming their position within the political structure of South Africa and enlisted international funding to open their own political parties such as the South African Communist Party and the ‘Verligte Party’ and infiltrated the Afrikaner political parties such as the National Party, and the springboard from which they gathered their key members, the Afrikaner Broederbond.
Initially, the Transvaal branch of the Nationalist Party continued for several years to bar Jews from membership. And although (spurred by their dislike for the British) Boers had begun in the late 1940’s to identify with the establishment of a Jewish state, their well-wishing was the kind of support so often given to Zionists by anti-Semites. At a time when the displaced person camps in Europe were flooded with homeless Jews, the ‘Transvaler’ newspaper editorialized that it "granted the Jew his ideals in Palestine but, at the same time, desired an increasing exodus of Jews thither and not their increase here”.
General Yigal Allon, who would later be Israel's Foreign Minister, got a warm reception from South Africa's Defense Minister F. C. Erasmus in May 1956.

He warned the South Africans against the Egyptian leader Colonel Nasser when he said, "It would not be many years before South Africa would have to ask permission to cross the Red Sea.” This did not have a great effect on the Afrikaner leaders as South Africa was developing trade ties with Arab nations, and did not have much trade with Israel in the 1950’s.

South Africa did not reciprocate the Israeli establishment of a consulate (in 1949) until 1971, ten years after South Africa was freed out of the Commonwealth of Nations, and eight years after the first serious round of United Nations sanctions against it.

**3. Israel armed and trained neighboring countries of South Africa at the onset of the armed struggle against the Apartheid government**

During the 1950’s, Israel went on to develop other African countries and train them in the art of warfare. During its Africa phase, Israel dipped deep into South Africa's reserve of goodwill. A joint communiqué criticizing apartheid was issued in 1961 by Ben Gurion and the president of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso).

That same year Israel voted to censure remarks made at the United Nations by South Africa's foreign minister. It aligned itself against the West on a General Assembly vote for sanctions that almost passed.

These actions deeply offended the white regime - and alarmed the South African Jewish community, which came under Afrikaner pressure to condemn the Israeli actions.
In 1962, Israel siding with African states on a United Nations vote to impose sanctions on South Africa. Israel, then led by Golda Meir, was hoping to win African support for a United Nations Resolution calling for direct Arab-Israeli negotiations. The effect hereof was that the South African Treasury refused to approve a routine transfer of Jewish donations to Israel. When Jewish officials appealed the denial, the South African Minister of Finance said the currency export privilege had been withdrawn because Israel had "slapped South Africa in the face and ganged up with her enemies."
Leaders of Israel's Labour government argued that reasons of state, specifically the necessity of pleasing Israel's African allies, took precedence over the exigencies of the South African Jewish community.

In 1963, Israel lowered the level of its diplomatic mission in South Africa, and in 1966 it voted at the United Nations to revoke South Africa's mandate over Namibia, the colony formerly known as Southwest Africa.

**4**. **Israel started selling arms to South Africa after other African countries no longer trusted her**

Coming at a time of strengthened African-Arab links, the 1967 war Israel had with the Arab states resulting Israeli occupation of Arab and African territory (i.e. Egypt's Sinai, and substantial amounts of areas in Jordan) brought about the beginning of a shift in African perceptions: Israel was no longer viewed as an embattled underdog, but a powerful aggressor.

After the June 1967 war - four years after the United Nation's first embargo on arms sales to South Africa - Israel began to sell weapons to the white minority South African government. Israel was said to have offered South Africa both its Arava short-take-off-and landing aircraft (used by other customers for counter insurgency warfare, such as in Guatemala) and plans for the Mirage III aircraft, stolen by Mossad in Switzerland. James Adams noted in ‘The Unnatural Alliance’ reports that the Arava had been tried in Namibia. Israel was also said to have offered the Apartheid regime weapons ‘captured’ during the 1967 fighting. The South African Treasury immediately permitted South African Jews to transfer an extra $20.5 million to Israel.

A team of South African military observers is reported to have flown to Israel "to study tactics and the use of weapons".

Israel's war would become one of two battles taught in South Africa's "maneuver schools." In October 1967, the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Air Force, General Mordechai Hod, lectured the South African military on the conduct of the war.

After the French embargoed arms shipments to Israel, South Africa, which had also received a great part of its arsenal from France, "ran an emergency service, supplying Israel with just about all the components it wanted, which included replacement weapons and aircraft to Israel

In 1968, Israeli politicos formed the Israel-South Africa Friendship League. Menachem Begin was president of this organization when he became Prime Minister of Israel in 1977. Simcha Erlich headed the League during the time he served as Israel's Finance Minister.

In 1969, former Prime Minister Ben Gurion paid a high profile visit to South Africa and met with Prime Minister John Vorster. Accompanying Ben Gurion was Chaim Herzog, a future president of Israel.

By 1971, South Africa was manufacturing the Uzi submachine gun under a license arranged through Belgium. In 1971, it was reported that a Greek freighter had brought high explosives from Eilat to Durban. In the same year, Israeli attempt to make a $2,000 contribution to the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) Liberation Committee, which triggered another South African cut-off of Jewish funds.

In 1972, South Africa opened a Consulate General in Israel.
During this period Israel's relations with independent African nations continued to deteriorate. The October 1973 war hastened a mass rupture of diplomatic relations. Between September and November 1973, 22 African governments severed ties with Israel, leaving only 4 independent African nations with diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. (All four, Swaziland, Lesotho, Malawi, and Mauritius, also had relations with South Africa.)

Starting shortly before Israel went to war in the fall of 1973, the frequency of visits back and forth between Israel and South Africa increased in status, as well as in number.

Between stints as Israel's Ambassador to the United States and being Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin arrived on a fundraising mission in 1973; and Moshe Dayan was hosted by the South Africa Foundation in 1974.

Other Israeli visitors to South Africa in 1973 and 1974 included the former Israeli ambassador to Denmark, Israel's Deputy Minister for communications, and Israel's Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren, who met President J.J. Fouché, Defense Minister Botha and other military brass.

South Africans travelling to Israel included the head of BOSS (the since renamed and re-aligned Bureau of State Security) Hendrik van der Bergh, the Mayor of Johannesburg and a team of 15 housing officials led by the director of the building branch of the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research.
The lessons of Israel's recent war took on new significance for South Africa as Portugal was forced to give up its African colonies, and South Africa worried about a military threat from the newly independent Mozambique and Angola. Moreover, the ‘Nonaligned Movement’, then coming into its own as a force of the developing world, was bringing increasing pressure to bear on South Africa.

During the 1973 Israeli war, South Africa again came to Israel's aid. Defense Minister (later State President) P.W. Botha said that practical ways would be found to manifest South Africa's moral support for Israel. It was reported that the South Africans' sympathy extended to Mirage jet fighters and that these were piloted by South Africans eager for combat experience. The Egyptians claimed that they had shot down a South African Mirage.
The war also drew 1,500 Jewish volunteers from South Africa. During this time, the Pretoria government permitted South African Jews to send over $30 million to Israel.

Israel appointed an ambassador to Pretoria in June 1974 - a move reciprocated by South Africa the following year.
Also in 1974 the United Nations began steps that would result in the conferral of observer status on the Palestine Liberation Organization.
In late 1974, Israel's resistance to the United States peacemaking efforts led the Ford Administration to declare an aid moratorium to all countries in the Middle East while Washington "reassessed" its policy in the region. The anxiety this caused Tel Aviv was considerable. (A letter signed by 76 Senators that urged continued United States support for Israel "was a blunt reminder to the President...that should cause him to think twice before making any rash move on the Middle Eastern scene," reflected the level of Israel's consternation at the time).
Because of its intransigent refusal to negotiate a withdrawal from the territories it had occupied since 1967, and the brutality of its occupation of them, Israel was also the object of intense international criticism. In November 1975, the United Nations General assembly passed Resolution 3379 declaring Zionism a form of "racism and racial discrimination." The resolution also condemned "the unholy alliance between South African racism and Zionism."

A scandal breaking in 1975 over CIA "dirty tricks" in Angola led Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to suggest to Israel that it help South Africa with its invasion of Angola. Israel complied with Kissinger's request by sending counter insurgency weapons and instructors.

In July 1975, a former Israeli intelligence chief said that senior Israeli military officers were giving South African troops counter-insurgency training. The Economist said Israel had stopped short of sending the troops which Kissinger had wanted, but that the Israelis took his suggestion as a green light for developing a closer relationship with South Africa.

**5. A Jewish Conspiracy cost South Africa dearly.**

In 1975, the Jewish South African Oscar Hurwitz set up a plot which would embarrass the South African government and which became known as the “Muldergate Scandal’, which cost the South African State Treasury at least $100 million in at least half a dozen countries - buying newspapers, setting up front organizations, running junkets for politicians or buying them outright - in a fruitless attempt to improve South Africa's image. The Mulder gang was ultimately charged with flagrant "financial irregularities" and forced out of office in a 1978 power play that won P.W. Botha the right to succeed the retiring Premier John Vorster.
In the 1975 meetings in Israel, the Labour government under Yitzhak Rabin agreed to play a consultative role in the Mulder-Rhoodie Pro-South African information offensive. (It also appears that they agreed to let the South Africans operate Project David in Israel, which funded propaganda and brought South African sports teams to Israel.)

They recruited Arnon Milchan, an Israeli arms dealer, who was also used to funnel weapons to South Africa and to launder the funds from South Africa. Milchan has admitted that he agreed to play this role and said that on one occasion he put 66,000 pounds sterling into a Swiss bank; the money was then withdrawn and used to purchase the London-based magazine West Africa, later sold.

In March 1976, then Defense Minister Shimon Peres made a secret visit to South Africa and invited the South African prime minister to visit Israel. John Vorster arrived in Israel the following month for his first official visit to a democratic state. South Africa, with its gold and minerals, and its complement of Jewish owned transnational corporations, proved to be a worthy ally.

**6. South Africa became Israel’s Nuclear Apprentice.**

"The most powerful reason for Israeli willingness to bear the undesirable consequences of expanded and more open trade with South Africa may be her desire to acquire material necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons," wrote a military analyst in 1980. To that must be added Israel's great desire to test the nuclear weapons it already had, and the attractions of South Africa's vast territory and proximity to even vaster uninhabited spaces - the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
Then at the point in its nuclear development where it was fashioning sophisticated bombs (devices which use less nuclear material but have infinitely greater explosive force than the "primitive" bomb dropped by the U.S. on Hiroshima), Israel would find it particularly helpful to observe the performance, explosive force and fallout of a detonated weapon.
Since 1984, Israel had been operating a plutonium extraction plant in a secret underground bunker at Dimona in the Negev Desert. Built by the French in the late 1950’s, the Dimona plant also included facilities for manufacturing atomic bomb components. At the time of the 1976 accords, Israel was preparing to build an adjoining plant for the extraction of lithium 6, tritium and deuterium, materials required for sophisticated thermonuclear weapons.

Israel's reasons for devoting what had to have been a significant portion of its scant resources to such an ambitious nuclear weapons program - nuclear experts have recently ranked it as the world's sixth nuclear power, after the U.S., the USSR, Britain, France and China - have been variously offered as the desire to develop a credible deterrent to attack by its neighbors, and the desire to substitute that deterrent for at least part of the costly conventional arsenal that Israel, with one of the world's most powerful military forces, maintains, and also (with much less frequency) as an "umbrella" over a partial withdrawal from the occupied territories. However, these are by way of superficial rationales. The decision to develop nuclear weapons was taken in the earliest days of the state, and has been doggedly pursued for over a quarter of a century.

Israel's determination suggests that it has always been directed toward establishing and expanding its borders by force, and appears to believe that its existence can only be guaranteed by maintaining the entire Middle Eastern region in a state of fearsome disequilibrium. The Middle East as tinderbox has become a cliché, while Israel's own track record of flagrant aggression - since 1981 Israel has bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor, invaded Lebanon, bombed Tunisia, and tried to persuade India to conduct a joint raid on Pakistan's nuclear research facility - does not recommend Tel Aviv as a mature guardian of the ultimate weapon. Moreover, it is quite possible that Israel has accumulated estimated 100-200 warheads for political purposes.
Dr. Francis Perrin, the head of the French nuclear program from 1951-1970, during which time France collaborated with Israel on building an atom bomb and built the Dimona reactor/plutonium plant, explained: We thought the Israeli bomb was aimed against the Americans, not to launch it against America but to say "if you don't want to help us in a critical situation we will require you to help us, otherwise we will use our nuclear bombs."
South Africa is not thought to have been as highly motivated as Israel to acquire nuclear weapons capability. Given its reasonable expectation of a domestic uprising, perhaps aided from neighboring states, South Africa's first priorities were Israeli weapons and Israeli technological input for its conventional weapons industry. Yet South Africa is magnificently endowed with uranium, and during the 1970’s was striving to manufacture enriched uranium for export. To the South Africans, a nuclear bomb was something of a bonus.
They are thought to have achieved the requisite techniques in 1980, and since then have incorporated nuclear weaponry into their bluster, and perhaps into their military doctrine. In 1977, Information Minister Connie Mulder said, "If we are attacked, no rules apply at all if it comes to a question of our existence. We will use all means at our disposal whatever they may be”.

In 1979, Prime Minister P.W. Botha said, "we have military weapons they do not know about. In 1985, the South Africans let it be known that they were capable of building two bombs a year”.

South Africa's nuclear position roughly paralleled Israel's. The deterrent factor against a threat from the outside, which had become more credible than Israel's with talk among members of the OAU of establishing a pan-African force to aid liberations Africa, this is a somewhat sad turn of events for an organization which made its first demand that Africa be a nuclear weapons-free zone in 1963.

There has been the notion of regional dominance, to which Nigeria had begun to react by striving towards, or that Africa must develop a nuclear counter deterrent.
There is also the distinct possibility that an African government had developed detailed plans to use neutron-type bombs (low-yield devices that kill people without widespread devastation of property). A set of maps was found in the possession of the African National Congress (ANC) which appeared to show population concentrations and fallout radii during their warfare against the ruling South African government pre 1994.

In conjunction with its nuclear weapon "option," the ‘apartheid’ regime appeared to have enriched uranium for export at its Pelindaba plant. Although South Africans had refused to put the plant under international safeguards, it might well be that they cherish hopes of establishing lines of communication with potential Western customers through sales of uranium for nuclear power plants.
During the 1950’s, when "peaceful" atomic energy was in vogue, Israel and South Africa had both participated in United States atomic energy programs. South Africa has had help from Britain, West Germany and France, as well as the U.S. Over the years, though, it had become more and more difficult for both South Africa and Israel to obtain nuclear technology because both refuse to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and each had refused to open all its nuclear facilities to inspection.

In 1965, after South Africa brought its Safari I safeguarded reactor on line, Israeli scientists began advising South Africa on their Safari 2 research reactor. In 1968, Prof. Ernst Bergmann, the "father" of Israel's nuclear program, went to South Africa and spoke strongly in favour of bilateral cooperation on the development of nuclear technology.

According to the authors of an Israeli nuclear program which was barred from publication by the Israeli censor, as early as 1966 South Africa had invited Israel to use its land or ocean space for a nuclear weapons test. Led at that time by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, Israel declined the invitation. However, according to the Israeli authors, whose sources included Shimon Peres, an enthusiastic intimate of the Israeli nuclear program, and Knesset Member Eliyah Speizer, during his April 1976 visit to Israel, Premier Vorster again extended the invitation to Israel to conduct a nuclear test.

It is commonly held that Israel wanted a test venue far from the Middle East in order to uphold its long-time position that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region. This "position," hinging on some arcane reading of the word "introduce," is as meaningless as the endlessly heard term "peace process."
The following year, a Soviet satellite picked up unmistakable signs of preparation for a nuclear test in the Kalahari Desert. Fearing that such a test "might trigger an ominous escalation of the nuclear arms race," the U.S., Britain, France and West Germany joined the USSR in pressuring South Africa to abort the test. As to the bomb that was to be tested, a high-ranking Washington official said: "I know some intelligence people who are convinced with damn near certainty that it was an Israeli nuclear device.'

At three o'clock in the morning on September 22, 1979, Israel and South Africa conducted a nuclear weapons test where the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans merge.

A newly recalibrated U.S. Vela intelligence satellite recorded the characteristic double flash of light. It was a small blast, designed to leave very little evidence. The CIA told the National Security Council that a two - or three-kiloton bomb had been exploded in "a joint South African Israeli test." A Navy official revealed that U.S. spy planes over the test area had been waved away by South African Navy ships and forced to land secretly in Australia. The CIA knew (and later told Congress) that South African ships were conducting secret maneuvers at the exact site of the test. The South African military attaché in Washington made the first ever request to the U.S. National Technical Information Service for a computer search on detection of nuclear explosions and orbits of the Vela satellite.
Almost immediately the Carter Administration convened a special panel to conduct an investigation of the incident. The panel heard reports from the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the CIA; and representatives of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Department of Energy and the State Department presented evidence to the panel supporting the occurrence of a nuclear explosion. Their findings were summarily dismissed by the Carter White House, which after a delay of seven months declared: “Although we cannot rule out the possibility that this [Vela] signal was of nuclear origin, the panel considers it more likely that the signal was one of the zoo events [reception of signals of unknown origin under anomalous circumstances], possibly a consequence of the impact of a small meteoroid on the satellite”.
Moreover, as new information became available, it was simply ignored. In one critical instance, evidence of radiation observed in the thyroid glands of Australian sheep was discounted. The initial lack of this "smoking gun," traces of radiation, suggested to a Los Alamos scientist that the low-yield weapon tested had been a neutron bomb. However, the Carter panel had used the absence of radiation as a prime excuse in its cover-up.
Many who had been involved with the investigation were aghast and wondered why the Carter White House was "equivocating." Some within the government said that the Carter Administration was hiding behind the "zoo" theory to avoid dealing with the political headaches that would accompany acknowledgment of the test.

An affirmative report might have affected the ongoing negotiations over the creation of Zimbabwe, in which South African cooperation was needed, and upset the lust negotiated Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt. Carter also had reason to fear "complications in garnering Jewish votes during the upcoming Democratic Party primary campaign against Sen. Edward Kennedy."
But beyond that, as a State Department official explained, coming clean on the test "would be a major turning point in our relations with South Africa and Israel if we determined conclusively that either had tested a nuclear bomb. It makes me terribly nervous just to think about it." Of course by deciding to ignore reality, the Carter administration - and following in its footsteps, the Reagan Administration, which went on record May 21, 1985 as upholding the Carter "verdict" - destroyed the already tattered credibility of the non-proliferation posture of the U.S.
There was no challenge forthcoming from Congress. Quite the contrary: in 1981 representatives Stephen Solarz and Jonathan Bingham withdrew legislation they had introduced, calling for a cut-off of U.S. aid to nations manufacturing nuclear weapons after they learned from the State Department "that such a requirement might well trigger a finding by the Administration that Israel has manufactured a bomb. The U.S. government turned its back on the potential victims of Israeli and South African nuclear aggression, and stuck its head in the sand like an ostrich.

Five years later, the Washington Office on Africa Educational Fund in cooperation with Congressman John Conyers (D-MI), the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation and the World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, issued a report on the 1979 nuclear weapons test. Based on documents obtained from the government under the Freedom of Information Act, the report detailed scientific evidence not taken into account by the Carter panel. It demonstrated conclusively that a cover-up had been perpetrated by the Carter Administration. Written by Howard University Professor Ronald Waiters, the report warned that the cover-up, "coupled with the Reagan Administration's subsequent allowance of an increase in nuclear aid to South Africa has serious implications for international peace and security."
The sponsors of the report urged that the investigation be reopened under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineers, and also called for a Congressional investigation and "the release to the public of all pertinent information."
Although it came at a time of heightened anti-apartheid activity, the report was largely ignored. Small, dutiful articles about a Conyers press conference appeared, but generated none of the official (or activist) response that might have kept the issue alive.

In July 1985, during debate on the 1986-87 Foreign Aid Authorization bill, Rep. Conyers offered an amendment stipulating that "United States foreign assistance may not be provided to any country having a nuclear relationship with South Africa." Howard Wolpe, Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, persuaded Conyers to withdraw the amendment, promising instead that upcoming hearings on nuclear proliferation would consider the implications of South Africa's nuclear capability. As 1985 wore into 1986, and while Congress spent itself in a literal orgy of anti-apartheid legislation, the promised hearing was never scheduled.

A second test in December 1980 was reported in the same area, with another CIA sighting of South African ships nearby.

A British authority on nuclear weapons, Dr. David Baker, said that the weapon fired in this test was probably a 155 mm nuclear shell, fired from a special howitzer which the Israelis had helped the South Africans acquire.

In 1981, it was reported that South Africa had hired Israeli consultants "to advise on the safety aspects of its first two commercial reactors." As those reactors were being built by the French company Framatome, some thought it odd that Israeli, rather than French, scientists would be hired.

The Israeli advice, which according to intelligence officials "could assist the Government there to acquire the technological expertise to build nuclear weapons," came in exchange for uranium. Although South Africa has its Koeberg commercial reactor under international safeguards, these are lax, "making diversion of materials for nuclear weapons possible if a government so chooses."

In 1986, Mordechai Vanunu, a technician who had worked nine years at the Dimona installation, told reporters that South African scientists and metallurgists had regularly worked at Dimona.

In 1985, the BBC reported that Israel and South Africa had tested an Israeli-made Jericho II (nuclear-capable) missile in South Africa.

Late in 1986 South African scientists working on remote Marion Island, halfway between Antarctica and the southern coast of South Africa, disregarded SA orders to remain silent, and reported that Israeli and South African military officers had been visiting the island.
Experts said that the two nations were undoubtedly in the process of developing a nuclear missile-testing range in conjunction with a $6 million mile-long airstrip South Africa was planning to build on the island, and that this "important military asset" could also be used as a base for anti-submarine warfare.

The scientists said they had gone public out of fear that their meteorological station would be used to cover such activities. They discounted South African excuses that the airstrip would be useful for resupply, medical evacuation and rescue activities. The scientists said there was little shipping, fishing or aviation in the area.

The environmental organization Greenpeace, at the time setting up a research station to monitor the large Antarctic wildlife population, issued a statement opposing the airstrip. A Greenpeace spokeswoman at the organization's Washington office said the organization was also opposed to use of the island for military purposes by Israel and South Africa. (The Greenpeace statement noted that Marion Island was near the site of their 1979 nuclear test). If work was begun on the runway, she said, "it will definitely engender a response".

 **7. Israel sold armaments to South Africa after sanctions had been called by the United Nations against South Africa.**

Although the 1976 Vorster agreements marked the beginning of a large and systematic commerce in arms, it by no means launched the sanctions-busting commerce in weapons between Israel and South Africa. Israel had already sold to South Africa an assortment of military gear, and, by one account, had imported Chieftain-type tanks from South Africa.

By 1971, South Africa was building the Uzi submachine gun under license. In fact, shortly before the signing of those agreements, the Israelis, acting in concert with "retired" CIA agents and cooperative European companies, played an important role in an elaborate deception that resulted in the delivery of one of the most sophisticated weapons ever to reach South Africa. This was the Space Research Corporation (SRC) 155 mm howitzer, acknowledged at the time to be the most advanced long-range artillery piece in the world. Originally developed by Canadian-American Gerald Bull to launch satellites, the SRC howitzer is also capable of firing miniaturized nuclear shells.

After failing to secure production rights to Bull's invention for themselves (and for resale to South Africa), Israel served as the official "end user" on U.S. papers accompanying conventional 155mm shells through their production process in the U.S. and Canada. According to Britain's Independent Television, the Israeli Cabinet discussed the deal.

In a welter of phony addresses and illicit shipments, the conspirators also accomplished the transfer to South Africa of the SRC howitzer blueprints and the machine tools necessary for its production. South Africa produced and marketed the howitzer as the G5 and G6; it is this artillery piece with its 250 mile range that was apparently used in the 1980 nuclear test mentioned above.
As in the SRC case, as Western nations came under pressure to abide by the United Nations arms embargo of 1963 - and the subsequent United Nations Mandatory Arms Embargo of 1977 - Israel began to act as a funnel for shipments from other Western countries. One notorious case involved the shipment of 11 U.S.- made Bell helicopters from Haifa to South Africa (and thence to Zimbabwe) using Singapore as a phony destination.

Another concerned the shipment from Italy of Oto Melara naval cannon, through Israel to South Africa.

South Africa installed the guns on Reshef patrol boats, which by then it was making under Israeli license.

In 1983, authorities in Copenhagen stopped a shipment of 400 pistols for South Africa. The pistols were then taken to Vienna, as Austrian law permits export to South Africa of "sports and civilian weapons", and from there were to "be dispatched to South Africa via Israel."
The transfer of ready-to-use weaponry, however, is overshadowed by other aspects of Israeli military collaboration with South Africa, which have been instrumental in South Africa's achieving a high degree of immunity from the effects of international sanctions, in part through an extensive weapons industry of its own.

In addition to the famous Uzi submachine gun, the ‘apartheid government’ produced the Israeli Galil assault rifle under license as the R-4. Both the Dabur and the Reshef carry Gabriel missiles, the Israeli-made equivalent of the French Exocet. South Africa produced these under license, calling them the Scorpion. It was with a Scorpion that the South Africans sank a Cuban food ship during a June 1986 attack on the Angolan port of Namibe. These licensing agreements included the future transfer of any Israeli modifications of the systems.

There have been persistent reports of other licensing arrangements between Israel and South Africa, which included submarines and a modern Israeli guided missile patrol boat, but none have been definitively confirmed. Reports of collaboration on the missile boat go back to 1977, when it was described as "a miniature aircraft carrier." James Adams called this the Q9 corvette." A more recent report said that South Africa was "considering buying several new corvettes from Israel."

A four-way deal to construct submarines seemed to have been in the making. South Africa was planning to build submarines at its own yards in cooperation with Chile. Meanwhile, Israel had negotiated with Washington over a submarine to be built jointly by Israel and West Germany, while a West German state-owned shipyard had sold blueprints for submarines to South Africa (resulting in a severe scandal in Bonn, when it was determined that Chancellor Kohl and other top officials discussed the sale).
If there was any substance to the reports of an Israeli-South African submarine project, then in all probability the ship would have been a three-way project including Israel, South Africa and Chile. (Israel performed the same Mirage update for Chile that resulted in the South African Cheetah.)

Israel's submarine project was financed by its U.S. military aid. South Africa could have been a direct recipient of the benefits of U.S. military assistance to Israel. It is a pattern that marks other purported licensing deals as well.
There have been frequent reports that South Africa was a silent partner in the Israeli fighter, the Lavi. The Israelis embarked on this ambitious project in 1977, hoping to advance their own technological base a giant step with copious helpings of the latest U.S. technology. Israel also wanted to produce an aircraft without any U.S. parts, which would make the export of the Lavi not subject to a veto by Washington.
As the evolving design incorporated features of a vastly more sophisticated aircraft, Israeli leaders sought and won U.S. financing for rising costs of the Lavi’s development. By the end of 1986, Congress had earmarked $1.3 billion of Israel's U.S. military assistance for the Lavi. Furthermore, Congress allocated $700 million of that sum to be spent in Israel on the Lavi's development.

As early as 1977, it was reported that Israel was helping South Africa develop a fighter plane within the framework established in 1976: South African financing and Israeli technological input. A top secret trip by Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizmann to South Africa in March 1980 is thought to have been "to discuss, among other things, the joint Lavi fighter project." Weizmann definitely reached agreement with the South Africans over financing the development of the avionics the computerized flight systems for the Kfir aircraft, which the South Africans later obtained for their Cheetah.
An IAI marketing document in the early years of this decade, spoke of an outright sale of the Lavi to South Africa. It projected selling 407 Lavi aircraft to South Africa, Chile, Taiwan and Argentina. In 1984 it was reported that "South Africa is known to be prepared to invest in the...Lavi."

An objective analysis of the Lavi's current status would appear to rule out the possibility that South Africa was kept in on the deal. As the project and the Israeli economy ran into trouble in the mid-1980s, Israel was forced to contract an increasing amount of the work on the Lavi to U.S. firms, and thus raised the amount of leverage the U.S. had over any potential export deals.

The Lavi's avionics have been developed by Israel, and hence are not subject to a U.S. export veto. At one point, the Israelis sought a U.S. partner for the Lavi. The Bet Shemesh engine plant, which was to co-produce the first batch of Pratt and Whitney engines for the Lavi, went into receivership, presumably eliminating the possibility that Israel could pass along the engine for the Lavi to South Africa. Yet the situation surrounding the transfer of Kfir technology to South Africa to produce the Cheetah may be instructive.
It had long been suspected that Israel was about to let South Africa build the Kfir under license (or sell the aircraft outright to the white regime). Israel eventually passed along pieces of Kfir technology and also gave South Africa assistance in producing the engine. It was possible that South Africa received plans for building the Lavi power plant; and also that another country might have been drawn into the scheme, which would have increased the opportunities for legerdemain.
Minister Without Portfolio Moshe Arens - as Defense Minister, head of IAI, and Ambassador to the U.S., Arens made the Lavi his personal "obsession" - recently went to Japan and proposed that Israel share its Lavi technology with Tokyo, which is contemplating co-producing a fighter plane with the U.S. Arens called the Lavi "the most potent new jet fighter in the Western World."
While these scenarios of the Lavi's future were speculative, they are nonetheless germane. For all the $1-plus billion it had designated for the Lavi with such alacrity that it initially provided $150 million more than Israel could spend. Congress has ignored a number of problems associated with the plane, as well as the reports of South African collaboration. It had not dealt with the prospects of the Lavi as an export, even though it had been pointed out repeatedly that the I, Lavi would compete with the U.S.-built Northrop F-20 Tigershark.

The F-20, which had no federal funds for its development, was abandoned in November 1986 after failing to find U.S. or foreign buyers.
The Israelis have assured Washington "categorically" that they were not developing the Lavi for export, but some U.S. officials remained skeptical. Pentagon efforts to persuade Israel to scrap the Lavi project because its rising costs would impair other Israeli military programs - the Pentagon said the finished aircraft would cost $22 million per plane, the Israelis claimed it would be $15 million - were ignored by Congress. Instead, eight U.S. Representatives wrote a letter to the Departments of State and Defense, and to the White House, urging that the next installment of $70 million for the Lavi be released."
In an editorial calling into question the fiscal soundness of the Lavi project, the Oakland Tribune also suggested: "...If Congress does extend further aid, it should insist on guarantees that none of the technology will leak out to South Africa."

In 1979, the U.S. allowed Israel to use $107 million of its military aid to develop its main battle tank, the Chariot, or Merkava, in Israel. (This precedent, spending foreign aid outside the U.S., would later be used to justify the far larger sums the U.S. permitted Israel to convert to its local currency for the Lavi.)
Meanwhile, South Africa's help was enlisted in the production of the armor plating for the tank. Israel obtained rare steel alloys from South Africa, and also in a rare turnaround - South Africa's advanced steel manufacturing technology. In return Israel supplied the formula for fabricating the plating and refitted all of South Africa's tanks and armored vehicles. The armor is said to be the hardest in the world. The production was handled by Iskoor - a jointly owned steel company located in Israel.

**8. Israel helped the South African Apartheid government establish an arms industry after sanctions had been called by the United Nations against South Africa.**

In addition to permitting South Africa to build its systems under license, Israel gave South Africa direct assistance in the establishment of its arms industry: The Haifa shipyard helped establish South Africa's virtually non-existent shipbuilding industry by supplying personnel to the Sandock-Austral yard [in Durban] and advising on the organization of an efficient production line.
Representatives of Israel's major military electronics producers, Tadiran, Elbit and IAI helped South Africa establish its own electronics sector. Thereafter South Africa produced - and smugly claimed credit for developing - a range of military communications gear.

**It is clear that South African police and military, the ‘enforcers of apartheid’, benefitted directly from state of the art Israeli electronic technology in their daily routines, it is equally clear that the so-called "dual-use" communications gear used by the police and military must be included in the category of military goods that should have been denied to South Africa (by both the U.S. and Israel).**

In 1981 South Africa began recruiting Israeli engineers, and electronics and computer specialists. Many of the 20,000 Israelis who were living in South Africa in 1990, (a number that has increased from 5,000 in 1978) are believed to have been involved in the high tech and military sectors.

From surrounding a township to mounting an invasion of Angola, the ‘apartheid’ government had the advantage of sophisticated and secure communications.

In May 1985, a South African commando captured by Angolan troops while preparing to bomb the Gulf Oil installation in the enclave of Cabinda, explained how an emergency escape into neighboring Zaire would have been handled: “If the situation arise that we have to go to Zaire, then by means of that radio over there, we can talk to Pretoria, who will then exactly tell us which people will meet us there.”

**(i) Plane crash of Mozambican President Samora Machel from Zambia**

South Africa's capacity for havoc and destruction was underscored by continuing speculation that a sophisticated decoy radio signal was responsible for the crash of the airplane carrying Mozambican President Samora Machel from Zambia to Mozambique on October 19, 1986 at 9:15 in the evening. Coming in for a landing at Maputo, the plane instead flew into a mountain just over the South African border.
Machel, revered within and far beyond his own nation, lay dying in the wreckage, while South African police and soldiers, who arrived immediately after the crash, drove off medical volunteers and prowled through the wreckage, trampling bodies, searching by flashlight for documents (the South Africans later displayed notes from the meeting which they said discussed a plan to overthrow the government of Malawi, where South African backed mercenaries attacking Mozambique have found refuge) and asking "Where's Samora?"

The foreign minister himself, Pik Botha, came to the crash site. Later, recounted one of the passengers who lay in the wreckage with both legs broken, South African vehicles and helicopters arrived. The vehicles ringed the crash site and then turned off their headlights, their drivers joining the search with flashlights. It wasn't until the following morning that the first survivors were taken to a hospital. Later the South Africans would say that Machel's heart and brain were "not present due to the violence of the accident."

Amidst a consensus that South Africa was generally to blame according to President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia "because apartheid is responsible for all our distress in this region" - it was quickly established that South Africa had the ability to send decoy radio signals. Careful studies of the flight's last moments led analysts to believe that a decoy beacon from South Africa led it astray.

The South Africans themselves said that the pilot was "disoriented" by a powerful omnidirectional beacon transmitting from Swaziland.

It is worth noting that Zairian President Mobutu was at the meeting Machel was attending on the southern shore of Lake Tanganyika, in a remote area of Zambia. **Mobutu's personal guard has been trained by Israelis**; and what the South African Foreign Minister said the day of Machel's funeral, as he expressed regret that in possible lawsuits, not to mention "hundreds, if not thousands, of jobs in Israeli military industries". Israel's friends raised questions in the press about whether Congress might accept the continuation of licensing deals and sales of "semi-military" items." With a deafening silence from both the White House and Capitol Hill, Israel decided on a: "deprofilization" of [its] presence in South Africa. In other words, the special relationship between the two nations, particularly in what is called "strategic affairs"-will continue, but in a much less visible manner and with less direct involvement of the military, so as not to clash with the will of Congress.

**(ii) The Undisclosed aspect of Israeli collaboration**

Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin was dispatched to South Africa - the South Africans were threatening to "tell all" about some yet undisclosed aspect of Israeli collaboration - where he gave reassurance and urged the de Beers conglomeration to keep their heads down. Shamir told United States reporters that Israel would keep its "commitments" to South Africa.

The impression was left floating - through intentional news leaks - that Israel might phase out existing agreements and not enter into new ones, but there was no evidence of any intention to put that offer into effect. Moreover, six weeks before the report was due to be submitted to Congress, it was clear that Congress would not cut off Israel's $1.8 billion annual military aid, and Israeli officials had begun concentrating on preventing political backlash [that] could, nonetheless, be very damaging. Shamir and his colleagues hoped that both the Reagan Administration and Congress would stop short of any public condemnation of Israel, based on assurances that it will gradually end its military relationship with South Africa.

Before Section 508 of the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 pried out the information that Israel did hundreds of millions of dollars per year of military business with South Africa, Israel always denied any arms dealings at all. The assertion of Defense Minister Rabin, that "whatever happens Israel has to maintain its credibility with the U.S. and Israel has never played tricks with the U.S.," is less than satisfying after the Iran-contra revelations and the Pollard spy case.
There was no voice in Congress to question Israel's word, much less to wonder aloud if the people of Southern Africa were not owed some kind of reparations from the people of the U.S., whose client Israel has contributed so greatly to their death, suppression and suffering. Instead, Israel's efforts to keep the lid on its continued lethal supply lines to South Africa, and Congress' efforts to keep its own dereliction of duty out of the minds of its constituents, are both greatly assisted by the almost blanket censorship imposed by the South African government.

The notion of South Africa's "self-sufficiency" should not obscure the degree of integration between the two arms industries. Adams called it their "joint arms industry." Iskoor, the steel partnership, is one example of this integration. A joint Scorpion helicopter operation involved initial construction in South Africa at the Cape Town firm of Rotoflight Helicopters, and then final assembly at Israel's Chemavir-Masok- Yet another example that Israel permit South Africa construction companies to bid on a military complex in the Negev Desert.

**9. Israel co-ordinated exports with the Apartheid government after sanctions had been called by the United Nations against South Africa.**

The integration of military industries also appears to have led to some degree of integration of foreign operations. Tadiran, and the South African firm Consolidated Power, had established an electronics enterprise in Guatemala.
A 1982 report noted that South Africa was delivering rush orders of parts for Israeli Gabriel missiles and the Nesher (an early version of the Kfir) to Argentina, then engaged in the Malvinas/Falklands war with Britain.

Although the full extent of coordination between Israel and South Africa is impossible to know, both have supplied arms to the governments of Sri Lanka.

There was an international embargo on oil shipments to South Africa, and Israel often used violations of the embargo by Middle East governments, to support its claim that it should not be singled out for its dealings with South Africa.

Although many of the shipments to South Africa that originated in the Gulf were purveyed to the ‘apartheid’ regime by private dealers such as fugitive Jewish financier Marc Rich, it appeared (although the news accounts seem mainly to emanate from the London newsletter Euro money Trade "Finance Report” that Iran and Iraq were directly involved in such deals.

Visitors to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic have seen South Africa weapons which the Polisario Front had captured from Morocco in its battle for control of the formerly Spanish Western Sahara. Polisario also said that South Africa trained Moroccan militia. Following a visit of Prime Minister Shimon Peres to Morocco in July 1986 - described in terms of the (interminable) "peace process" - Israel reportedly pledged to provide Morocco with sophisticated arms and training.

In the past, Israel had sold tanks and armored personnel carriers to Morocco. Israeli officers had been sighted near the wall King Hassan II was building to try to maintain the fiction that he controlled the territory claimed by the SADR, and took part in the "African Eagle" military exercises staged by the U.S. and Morocco in November 1986.

**10. Southern Africa was being formed according to an Israeli Model of subjugation of neighboring countries.**

In foreign military operations, which strengthened both countries and challenged the confines of their international isolation, Israel had generally been the facilitator, possessing the entre to such adventures as Guatemala and Sri Lanka. South Africa has also looked to Israel for help and inspiration.
Many parallels in the tactics and strategies employed by Israel and South Africa have been noted. Partly this is a result of collegiality: the military attaches of Israel and South Africa used to "consult frequently on counterinsurgency tactics." Yet there was an unmistakable teacher-student pattern in the communication of the very techniques, which drew international criticism on both. As in the direction of the technology flow between the two nations, the imparting of repressive techniques usually casts Israel in the mentor's role.

The South Africans greatly admired the Israeli raid on Entebbe airport. "South African generals now consciously emulate the flamboyance of the Israeli generals," wrote a specialist on the South African military”.

Even before 1976, South Africans had looked to Israel for techniques they might adapt. Describing the lecture given by Air Force General Mordechai Hod during his 1967 visit to South Africa, a member of the select military audience said, "It was an intensely interesting lecture, which made it apparent that the tactics employed by the Israeli Air Force were brilliant. The Israelis seem to have been as clever as a cartload of monkeys”.

The South Africans began teaching the lessons of Israel's 1967 war at their maneuver school, and in the Vorster agreements discussed earlier; Israeli advisory services for South Africa were institutionalized.

Senior army officers in Israel confirmed that IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] personnel had been seconded to all branches of the South African armed forces, and according to senior sources in the Israeli defense establishment, there were some 300 active Israeli servicemen and women on secondment in South Africa. These included army, navy and air force personnel who helped train the South Africans, border security experts...counter intelligence experts... and defense scientists who cooperate on the development of new weapons systems. In addition, there were several hundred South Africans in Israel at any one time, being trained in weapons systems, battle strategy and counterinsurgency warfare.

The ‘apartheid’ government's practice of domestic counterinsurgency combined outright military brutality, with the extensive use of informers and collaborators. It is impossible to know how many refinements of these age-old techniques were borrowed from the Israelis' occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights.

The Israeli system of village leagues were obviously comparable to the hated town councils imposed on segregated townships by the ‘apartheid’ government.

The collective punishment employed by the Israelis, such as the destruction of a whole family's home when one of its members were arrested as a suspect in an act of resistance, was matched during the later offences against aggressors by the South African military by sealing off townships, and assaulting entire funeral processions. What was perhaps more salient was the South African victims' perceptions of Israel's involvement in their oppression and how readily that perception is communicated. At a party in Santa Cruz, California, a South African student passed around a photograph of a street scene in Soweto, the large black township outside Johannesburg. Somewhat reproachfully he called attention to the white policeman in the picture and the Uzi he was holding.

Nobel laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu was more direct when he told guests at a San Francisco breakfast sponsored by the American Jewish Congress, that he was troubled by reports of Israeli collaboration with South Africa, "with a government whose policies are so reminiscent of Nazis”. (While quick to point out the contributions of individual Jews to the struggle against apartheid, Tutu has in the past lambasted Israel for its "monopoly on the Holocaust.")

Even those South African blacks willing to cooperate with Israel; have publicly called on Israel to stop selling arms to South Africa. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, a great favourite of Israel, told reporters there that he favored an international arms embargo against South Africa. '"One member of a group of black South African "activists" brought to Israel for a training program told the press that Israel was "among the countries that sell weapons to South Africa, which kill [sic] blacks with them, including three-year-old children."

"Israel," wrote a reader to the City Press (a black South African paper), "has chosen to support the South African Government - thereby sanctioning the brutal suppression of our people."

It should also be noted that South Africans – along with other people around the world - regard the activities of Israel as an extension of U.S. policy.

If Israel's role in the internal repression meted out by South Africa (including the active Israeli role in the Bantustans) is a matter of perception, evidence is accumulating, despite strenuous attempts to maintain a lid of secrecy, of Israeli involvement in South Africa's foreign aggressions against Namibia and the Frontline states.

**(i) Namibia**

Israeli specialists had been "permanently based" along South African border areas for over a decade. Numbering "more than fifty" in 1984, their assigned tasks included to advise the South Africans on preventing cross-border infiltration. In the late 1970’s, uniformed Israeli soldiers were reported active in Namibia, the former colony of Southwest Africa, which was under South African protection, against fighters for SWAPO, the South West Africa People’s Organization, which had an extensive following in Namibia. One of these reports noted that uniformed Israelis had been seen in the capital, Windhoek, and that "they were constructing an electrified barrier the length of the [Namibian] frontier with Angola."

In 1981, Ariel Sharon, at the time Israel's Minister of Defense, spent 10 days with South African troops in Namibia on the Angolan border. Uri Dan, a close associate of Sharon who accompanied him on that visit, wrote of his experience: “36-year-old Col. Lamprecht does not talk as an army man, but as someone in charge of civilian administration in an area under military rule...When I look at the South African officers, talking Afrikaans or English, and during operations, I get the feeling that they will soon begin giving orders in Hebrew. Their physical appearance, their freshness, their frankness, their conduct on the battlefield, reminds one of Israeli officers. And I didn't say this about the American and South Vietnamese officers I met 11 years ago in Vietnam..."Don't underestimate the influence the example of the Israeli army as a fighting army has on us," a senior officer told me in Pretoria."

In the guise of development assistance, Israel had also helped the South Africans establish control of the population in Namibia.

In 1984, at a time when even South Africa's staunchest Western supporters took a hands-off position in response to a South African challenge to take Namibia off its hands, the Israeli Ambassador to Pretoria went to Windhoek, and told South African radio that "Israel would not insist on a precondition that the territory first become independent before agreeing to help it in its economic development."
In response to the ambassador's invitation, a team of high ranking officials of the South African colonial government paid a twelve-day visit to Israel the following April. They were there to look at what Israel had to offer in the field of "agriculture, water management and water supply, community development and regional planning."

A second visit to Israel the following year brought the Health and Education ministers to Israel. They issued a long report when they returned to Namibia, prattling on about Israeli integration of peoples from "non-industrial cultures into an industrial and technical culture, including the accompanying social, language and unemployment problems" and the Israeli labour unions and health systems. Their report promised specific proposals for Namibia.

Namibian recruits were taking courses in Israel at Histadrut's Afro-Asian Institute in early 1986.

The true definition of "community development" programs in contested areas is "pacification," as practiced unsuccessfully by the U.S. in Vietnam - and as practiced with increasing effect by Israel. As elsewhere, the object of these programs in Namibia is to destroy indigenous and/or revolutionary forms of social organization and to construct a repressive, regimented system that monopolizes provision of social services and compels participation "winning hearts and minds," it is called - and thereby establishing political control.
In the case of Namibia, much of which was under a dusk-to-dawn curfew, and occupied by more than 100,000 South African troops (compared to a white Namibian population of 76,000) the benefits to South Africa of long-term control of the population was obvious. The South African regime, which established a puppet regime in Namibia in June 1985, clung to the former German colony both for its wealth of natural resources, and as part of its drive for dominance over Africa.

Israel's doctrine of pre-emptive attack has served as a model for South Africa.

Its 1982 invasion of Lebanon - Israeli officers briefed the South Africans on their operations there - inspired South Africa to attack Mozambique in 1983 and to invade Angola in 1984. A somewhat imprecise term, "invade," as South Africa had occupied part of Southern Angola almost constantly for a decade. (As with Israel's wars, South Africa's constant aggressions enabled officials to boast that their export weapons are "battle-tested.")

**(ii) The Frontline States**

The South Africans noted that their May 1983 aerial attack (dubbed "Operation Shrapnel") on Mozambique's capital, Maputo, was analogous to Israel's attack on Beirut the previous summer. One analyst, Joseph Hanlonl, believed that one of South Africa's objectives in the attack was to see how its version of events would play in the media. It was received very well indeed, according to Hanlon, with the Western press accepting South Africa's claim that its attack was in "retaliation" for an ANC attack and that ANC "bases" were hit.
Instead, the South African Air Force hit a childcare centre and private houses with "special fragmentation rockers," leaving 6 dead and 40 wounded. This followed the Israeli practice in Lebanon of speaking about PLO installations while civilians are the actual targets, and attacking with particularly heinous anti-personnel weapons-cluster bombs and phosphorous bombs.
The victims of South Africa's angst are not blind to the similarity of attacks - or motives.
President Samora Machel likened the Israeli Government to the Apartheid regime. He said that because of its inability to contain the fury of the Palestinian people led by the PLO, the Zionist regime is trying to transfer the war to other regions. So reported Mozambican radio shortly after Israeli aircraft bombed PLO headquarters in Tunisia in October 1985.
The model provided by Israel, which punished every internal act of resistance, and violent act outside its jurisdiction, with a bombing raid on Palestinian targets in Lebanon - almost always refugee camps cynically identified by the Israelis as "terrorist bases" or "headquarters" - has served South Africa well.

In January 1986, the ‘apartheid’ government's radio delivered a commentary on "the malignant presence" of "terrorism" in neighboring states, and said "there's only one answer now, and that's the Israeli answer." Israel had managed to survive "by striking at terrorists wherever they exist."

In May 1986, South Africa demonstrated that it had assumed the right to attack its neighbors at a time and on a pretext of its own choosing. The chosen time was during a visit by the Eminent Persons Group of the Commonwealth of Nations, which was attempting to establish negotiations between the apartheid regime and its opposition. The victims, Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe, all Commonwealth members, were chosen for their alleged harboring of "terrorists"; the real victims were South African exiles and an employee of the government of Botswana. The South Africans said they had attacked "international terrorism" and compared their raids to the Israeli attack on Tunisia and the U.S. attack on Libya in April 1986.

The attack was similar in style to Israel's 1985 attack on Tunisia. Initially, the Israelis had been threatening Jordan, and perhaps because King Hussein of Jordan was at the time on an official visit to the U.S., the Israelis chose to take revenge for the killing of three Israelis (believed to be top Mossad agents) in I, Larnaca, Cyprus on the PLO in Tunisia.

Two weeks after its three-pronged attack on its Commonwealth neighbors, South Africa attacked the Angolan harbor of Namibe, firing their version of the Israeli Gabriel missile.

Israel has also been connected with the mercenary forces deployed by South Africa against Angola and Mozambique. In the 1970’s, Israel aided the FNLA (Angolan National Liberation Front) proxy forces, organized and trained by the CIA to forestall the formation of a government led by the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola - now the ruling party of Angola). John Stockwell, who ran the CIA operation against Angola, recollected three armament shipments Israel made in cooperation with the CIA: a plane full of 120 mm shells sent via Zaire to the FNLA and Unita; a shipment of 50 SA-7 missiles (all of which were duds); a boatload sent to neighboring Zaire in a deal that the Israelis had worked out with President Mobutu, even though the Zairian strong man had broken ties with Israel two years earlier.

When Israel re-established relations with Zaire (in 1982) and began to train Zairian forces in the Shaba border province, Angola had cause for concern. The leader of the FNLA had been Holden Roberto, brother-in-law of Zairian president Mobutu, Israel's new client. In 1986, it would be established that Zaire acted as a funnel for "covert" U.S. military aid for the Unita forces of Jonas Savimbi.

In 1983, the Angolan News Agency reported that Israeli military experts were training Unita forces in Namibia. Since Zaire began receiving military aid and training from Israel, Angola was ill at ease. Its worries increased after discovering that: “Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon was personally involved in the organization, training and equipping of "commando" units of the army of Zaire, especially organized for missions along the borders of the RPA [Angola]”.
In 1984, the Financial Times (London) wrote of "joint Israeli-South African support for Unita forces." Other sources also reported the transfer of Israeli arms and financial support to Unita.

In 1983, Angola's President Jose Eduardo dos Santos told Berkeley, California Mayor Eugene (Gus) Newport, that an Israeli pilot had been shot down during a South African attack. The Angolan President showed Newport pictures of captured Israeli weapons. The following year, Luanda reported the capture of three mercenaries who said they had been trained by Israeli instructors in Zaire.

Israel had also been involved with the Mozambican "contras," the South African -backed MNR (Mozambique National Resistance or "Renamo"), which brought great economic and social distress to Mozambique. Renamo had a particular reputation for ideological incoherence, being regarded by most other right-wing insurgents as a gang of cutthroats. For several years there had been stories coming from Southern Africa of captured mercenaries of Renamo, who say they were trained in neighboring Malawi - one of the four nations to maintain relations with Israel after the Organization of African Unity (OAU) declared a diplomatic embargo in 1973 - by Israelis.

More than one reporter told of "substantial Israeli aid" to the MNR, thought to have been funded by the CIA and Saudi Arabia, as well as South Africa and former Portuguese colonialists.

In late 1986, "intelligence reports" from Southern Africa confirmed the reports of Israeli training and attributed the MNR's "greatly improved tactics" to the Israeli trainers. Around the same time, found among a number of white men left dead after an attack on Zimbabwean troops on duty in Mozambique, was a man wearing a Star of David.

There were at least two earlier reports of Israelis captured in Mozambique. One, a pilot captured in the late 1970s, might have been included in an east-west spy swap in 1978. The other, 27-year-old Amikam Efrati of less certain occupation was held for three months by Mozambique, and released after Israeli Laborites asked members of the French Socialist Party to intervene. A warm welcome was prepared for Efrati on his Golan Heights kibbutz.

**11. Israel continued economic co-operation with South Africa after sanctions had been called by the United Nations against South Africa.**

In addition to South Africa's cash and strategic mineral contributions to Israeli-South African military undertakings, the two countries had forged economic links that were as strategic as they were profitable - so well concealed that Israel was able to claim that its trade with South Africa was insignificant.

Well before grassroots campaigns in the U.S. and Britain prompted the exodus of big business from South Africa and the imposition of economic sanctions, Israel qualified in many ways as South Africa's most important trading partner. This determination was reached by adding the undisclosed amounts of the weapons Israel sold to South Africa, and the diamonds it obtained from the ‘apartheid’ state.

Invisible in the published statistics of trade between the two nations were revenue from joint military and civilian enterprises of Israel and South Africa.

The known civilian undertakings were Zimcorn, a shipping company, and South Atlantic Corporation, a fishing enterprise. A range of business activities were carried out by one in the economy of the other. Iskoor, the Israeli-South African steel company which makes tank armor, was owned by South African Jews and Israel's Histadrut trade union federation, and operates in Israel.
Thus, although the revealed statistics of trade between Israel and South Africa seemed rather paltry in the 1980’s at $66.4 million Israeli exports to South Africa, and $187 million exports from South Africa to Israel - it is important to bear in mind that they reflect only trade in items both sides are willing to make public. These include coal, steel, base metals, timber, tobacco, hides, wool, paper, minerals, and foodstuffs from South Africa, and from Israel finished products such as computer software, agricultural and other types of machinery, textiles, pharmaceuticals, electrical goods, and "safety and security products."

Although trade grew by a multiple of ten between 1970 and 1979 (from $20.9 million to $199.3 million) the numbers on paper certainly do not seem large enough to explain the existence of dynamic Israel-South Africa Chambers of Commerce in Tel Aviv and Johannesburg, or the annual meetings of finance ministers under the framework of the ministerial committee set up during the 1976 Vorster talks. By contrast, Israel exported $2.2 billion worth of goods and services to the U.S. in 1985.

The unrevealed and hence uncalculated scope of Israeli-South African economic cooperation goes well beyond weapons and diamonds, falling under the broad category of investment in each other's economies, was most notably directed to help South Africa escape the rigors of the sanctions which, in an effort to force the white minority government to dismantle apartheid, the international community had begun to impose.

**(i) Israel was an economic springboard for South Africa in countries where her products were unwelcome**

Although Israel's economy hit the skids in the 1980’s, South African businessmen had a compelling motive for continued investment in the Jewish state: Israel provided a tried and true "springboard" into markets where South African products were unwelcome. Since the late 1970’s, South Africans had been establishing joint ventures in Israel where their cheap-labour products are brought for final assembly, and marked with a "made in Israel" label. Shipped abroad, these products enter U.S. and European markets under Israel's duty free entitlement. Israel has a Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. under which all tariffs were removed in 1995; a similar agreement with the EEC allowed duty-free entry for all Israeli non-agricultural products.

In the 1970’s and early 1980’s, such an opportunity was particularly attractive to South African businessmen, as their own highly protected economy was faced with steep tariffs by Western trading partners.

In 1977, in conjunction with the South Africa-Israeli Chamber of Commerce, the Universities of Tel Aviv and Stellenbosch presented a series of seminars in South Africa entitled "Israel: Crossroads of International Trade," to acquaint South African businessmen with the benefits of exporting via Israel.
In 1979, South African industrialist Archie Hendler, whose joint venture in Israel manufactured kitchenware, noted that "the main reason for going into Israel is to gain access to the Common Market" on Israel's favorable terms.
In the mid 1980s, as sanctions began to threaten South African exporters, the use of Israel as a springboard or back door into Western markets, became even more attractive. In 1983, the Israeli Finance Minister went to South Africa with specific proposals for joint industrial ventures that the South African Government could establish with Israel.

As the anti apartheid movement in the U.S. gathered force via local and union boycotts of South African products, and the local and institutional divestment from corporations involved in South Africa, legislation pushed sanctions to the top of the Congressional agenda in 1985 and 1986 pushed sanctions legislation to the top of the Congressional agenda. Israel and South Africa both stepped up efforts on this type of sanctions busting.

Despite mounting pressures from international circles, and within its own ruling establishment -a former director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry urged Tel Aviv to downplay "the public aspect of the South Africa connection," and also to resist "the pressures of] some South African businessmen" and their Israeli counterparts "who have their links with influential politicians here" to act as an export conduit for South Africa, Israel continued to respond to the ‘apartheid’ government's needs as if helplessly in its thrall.

In late 1986, both Israel and South Africa were embarrassed by an advertisement placed in the Johannesburg paper ‘Business Day’ offering "unconventional trade" services, including "trans-shipments, re-invoicing, document recertification, temporary warehousing, bartering and buy backs." The Voyager Corporation in Tel Aviv placed the advertisement. Its South African agent said it had been placed in error by United States associates (to note, it is of interest to notice that the United States was also involved in this).

In June 1986, in an effort to head off demonstrations marking the 10th anniversary of the Soweto uprising, the ‘apartheid’ government instituted a state of emergency. At the last moment, Israel followed other Western governments in a 24-hour closure of its Pretoria embassy. The Israeli Knesset took the opportunity to issue some elegant statements condemning apartheid. One of these claimed, "Israel as the state of the Jewish people is committed to stand at the head of those who negate apartheid and fight for human rights. Prime Minister Peres said, "We know it is impossible to compromise with racial discrimination."
Less than two months later, with one official privately warning "In the end, we're going to have to pay a heavy price for this," a delegation departed for South Africa, under the leadership of the director general of the Finance Ministry. The director general said that the annual agreements with South Africa were about to expire, and Israel justified the trip by pointing out that the delegation was, for the first time, not headed by the finance minister himself.
The talks were said to concern Israel's fishing rights in South African waters, a better deal on credits for its coal imports, and, most significantly, increased South African investment and trade with Israel. The talks "highlight[ed] Israel as a potential weak link in the chain of international sanctions against South Africa."

The trip made international headlines and prompted intense speculation on the role of Israel (and the South African Jewish community) as "South Africa's insurance policy against isolation”. A statement issued after the talks, said they had been held in "a friendly atmosphere," and, "were fruitful and continued trade and financial cooperation is considered to be in the interest of both countries". It was also announced that South African investment in Israel would be allowed up to about $15 million during the coming year. Meanwhile, to revive its beached economy, Israel banked on a more sophisticated and aggressive marketing campaign for its exports to the U.S., and specialization in high technology development and exports, another area of vital concern to South Africa.

Agreements signed between the pre-1994 South African government and Israel includes cooperation in the coal which Israel received from South Africa.

**12. Israel invested in South Africa after sanctions had been called by the United Nations against South Africa.**

Israel does not compare in size of investment to United States and European participation in the South African economy, as the latter occurs through national and multinational corporations. However, Israeli investment in South African enterprises shot up in the 1980’s. In 1983 and 1984, Israeli investment in South Africa was trailed only Taiwanese investment, and included investment in South African steel enterprises, with ten new Israeli enterprises reported in 1984.

A 1985 report said Israeli investment in South Africa had grown "tenfold" in two years. Meanwhile, United States and European firms were leaving South Africa in droves.

What the Israeli investment might lack in volume, it made up by being concentrated in two key areas: high technology and the Bantustans, the austere tribal reserves to which the ‘apartheid’ government had exiled more than half of the black majority.
Scientific cooperation - in the civil as well as the military sphere - was a major element in the 1976 Vorster agreements, and what had been provided on a commercial basis (with either private or parastatal enterprises) were in close conjunction with the bilateral undertakings.

Visiting Israel in the fall of 1986, S. Kruger, director of the South African Department of Trade and Industry, noted that "Israel could provide much of the high-technology needed by South Africa."

Although much of the collaboration in technology had seen South African money going to the Israeli industrial sector, some energy was directed toward providing thede Beers conglomerate with their own industrial applications.

The 1983 agreement, according to the South African Finance Minister Owen Horwood, covered joint projects already tackled, and still to be tackled, by the two countries. It also made provision for the free flow of money between the two countries, and the setting up of mutual trade, credit and cooperation in the spheres of agriculture, technology and research.

Out of that agreement was born the Israel/South Africa Industrial and Agricultural Research and Development Program. Working under the direction of Saidcor (South African Inventions Development Corporation) and the Israeli Ministry of Trade and Industry, the program established bi-national partnerships for specific projects. Such projects included educational software, computerized water management systems, and an enhancement of the capability of South Africa's Posts and Telecommunications Department.

In 1984, the Israeli minister of science and development, and South Africa's ambassador to Israel, met and announced that Israel and South Africa would strengthen scientific and research ties.

**(i) Israel provided the South African Bantustans with developments and military aid which it charged to the Account of South Africa**

A critical element of Israeli investment in South Africa is a rapacious "private enterprise" interest in the Bantustans, the barren pseudo states that warehouse much of the underdeveloped black society. Bantustans were envisioned as "tribal homelands." The Israeli government provided development and military aid - charged to the expense account of the ‘Apartheid’ government - and a measure of political recognition for the Bantustans accorded by no other government. This has been especially evident in the case of Ciskei, an enclave of 600,000 near Cape Town, which has been described as "one of the most economically underdeveloped areas in the world and also one of the poorest in Africa".

During the 1983 Israeli-South African bilateral economic meeting, the Israeli radio reported: "It was...decided that close ties will be established between Israel and Ciskei, one of the puppet states set up in South Africa for the blacks". The radio quoted South African reports that Israel would also supply weapons to Ciskei. The Israeli government denies it now, but it was reported to have signed an arms contract with Ciskei in I982. A twin engine jet once used by Israeli Prime Minister Begin was sold at a nominal cost, and "special weapons and knowhow" was also transferred to Ciskei. Included in the deal was the gift of a police dog to Charles Sebe, security chief and the brother of Bantustan "President" Lennox Sebe.

During the summer of 1984, a group of farmers from Ciskei studied on Israeli kibbutzim and moshavim (communal and cooperative settlements, respectively).

In late 1982, Ciskei had established a trade mission in Tel Aviv. It appointed Yosef Schneider and Nat Rosenwasser as representatives.

Schneider had previously served as an aide to extremist Knesset Member Meir Kahane.

Rosenwasser was a member of the Herut Party Central Committee Herut is the dominant component of the Likud coalition.

Schneider and Rosenwasser had arranged a number of tours to Ciskei for Israeli notables. Undoubtedly their work encouraged Israeli entrepreneurs, some of them former officials, others with close connections to the highest echelons of the Israeli governing establishment, to avail themselves of the cornucopia of investment incentives offered by the ‘apartheid’ government in Pretoria to lure employers to Ciskei and the other Bantustans.

Ciskei is not the only Bantustan in which Israel and Israelis played a role. In 1985, the president of the Development Bank of Southern Africa, former South African finance Minister Owen Horwood, visited Israel and told reporters that he had come "to evaluate Israel's role in facilitating the economic development of the southern African independent states (i.e. Bantustans)."

An Israeli, Ilan Sharon, served as a "special adviser" for the Bantustan authorities.

The developments in Bophuthatswana by Israel and the defense thereof includes the international Sun City casino, the first of its kind in southern Africa.

In early 1983 the entire "chamber of commerce'' of another Bantustan, Venda, visited Israel.

The Israeli government was pulled two ways over the Bantustans. On the one hand, there was a powerful "lobby" comprised of former officials and their associates who had investments in the pseudo-states. To this must be added the obvious sympathy most Israeli officials must feel for the South African dilemma: no government in the world recognized the benighted Bantustans as independent countries. Israel had the same dilemma, in that not one government (including the U.S.) recognized its claim to the occupied West Bank, to which it had given the spurious names Judea and Samaria, or, for that matter, (with the exception of Costa Rica and El Salvador) to East Jerusalem, which Israel captured from Jordan in 1967 and annexed as its capital in 1980.
In 1984 during ceremonies held in the Israeli-occupied West Bank town of Ariel, twinning that settlement with Ciskei's "capital" Bisho, Ciskei's Israeli representative Yosef Schneider said, "It is symbolic that no country in the world (except South Africa) recognizes Ciskei, just as there is no country in the world that recognizes the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria."

On the other hand, the Israelis were well aware that recognition of the Bantustans would be an unbearable offense to the many African nations they had courted assiduously during the 1980’s. They treaded a fine line.

**13. Israel broke the Sports and Cultural Blockade against South Africa**

Israel made a practice of ignoring international boycotts against South Africa. Since the late 1960,’s a steady stream of athletes and performers had gone from Israel to South Africa. According to a report issued by the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid in 1979, the continuing sports contacts had "strong encouragement by the Government of Israel." In fact, this report chronicled a revealing episode of Israeli policymaking concerning sports and apartheid.

On the 21st of January 1979, amidst rumors that the Soviet Union might try to block Israel's participation in the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics, the presidium of the Israeli Olympics Committee voted unanimously to cut off sports exchanges with South Africa "at least until after the Olympics''. The committee told the Israeli gymnastics team to cancel an upcoming visit.

Two days later, at a plenary session - with the director of the government's sports authority in attendance - that decision was overturned, and it was further decided that any Israeli sports boycott of South Africa would be limited to compliance with the rules of international sports organizations, which have always lagged behind the efforts to isolate South Africa undertaken by many athletes and anti-apartheid organizations. Several days later a representative of the Foreign Ministry told the Knesset that the decision to boycott had hurt Israel's relations with South Africa.

In 1985, the Maccabiah Games (the quadrennial "Jewish Olympics," which brings national Jewish teams to Israel), these two exigencies clashed, then merged in a clever piece of duplicity. (South African teams had been among the largest contingents in the 1973, 1977 and 1981 Maccabiah Games.)

**It is of interest to note that the Zionist Federation approved of sport relations between Israel and South Africa during the times of sanctions against the Apartheid government.**
When Canada and some other countries objected to participating along with a South African team in the 1985 Maccabiah Games, the South African Zionist Federation and the director of the Israeli Maccabiah Committee mounted a vigorous protest of this instance of mixing politics and sports. The South Africans abruptly withdrew "so as to avoid serious problems for athletes from a number of participating countries." In announcing the South Africans' withdrawal, the Israeli Maccabiah director hinted that something would "happen" so that they could attend the games after all. That something transpired in the form of 200 "potential immigrant" visas issued by the Israeli consul in Pretoria to the South African athletes. On the strength of these documents, usually issued to people who want to try out life in Israel, the quasi-governmental Jewish Agency registered the South Africans as "temporary residents." They were then, with legitimate immigrants, formed as a special team of newcomers to Israel.

It was not until the games were almost at an end that one of the phony immigrants blurted out the truth. By the time the ruse had hit the press, the games were over. Only later did it become known that the organizers of the games had plotted the whole subterfuge during a meeting in 1984.

In its own struggle to gain access to international sports, Israel made a great effort to conceal its sports exchanges with the ‘apartheid’ regime. Israel was barred from participation in, among others, the European soccer confederation and the Olympic Council of Asia, an exclusion made all the more bitter by the admission to that body of the Palestine Olympic Committee.

In November 1986, Israel's top three male tennis stars - its national Davis Cup team - went to compete in the South African Open. It was their second trip there in 1986, and their names had been on international boycott lists long before that. One of the three, the young and rising Amos Mansdorf, won the tournament.

Almost immediately the Foreign Ministry sent a "reprimand" to the Israel Tennis Authority. The head of that body retorted that the International Tennis Federation's rules concerning South Africa only apply to teams, not individuals, and that the Israeli players had gone as individuals.
The ministry hit back with phone calls from the political director general, reminding the heads of sports organizations about Israel's "opposition to 'all participation' by Israelis in South Africa." and suggested that private trips in the future should be "coordinated" with the foreign ministry. In an editorial called "The hypocrisy syndrome" the Jerusalem Post wondered why the foreign ministry had professed surprise to discover the tennis players had been to South Africa. Meanwhile, the flow of Israeli entertainers to South Africa continued unabated. A list of 24 of these cultural emissaries covering the period between August 1981 and April 1985, topped by one a similar list of performers from West Germany, one of South Africa's major trading partners and a nation which had a population of 61 million at that time, compared to Israel's 4 million. After 1984, when the international cultural boycott against South Africa became highly effective, Israel continued to supply diversions to the apartheid state. In April 1985 Yardene Arazi, a popular Israeli singer, went to South Africa to organize a celebration of Israel's Independence Day.

In July 1986 - one month after South Africa had called for a state of emergency - Israeli Foreign Minister and Alternate Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, cleared the Israel Chamber Orchestra for a tour of South Africa.

Shamir also recommended that two South African choirs be allowed to take part in a song festival in Israel. One of the South African choirs was a white boys' ensemble; the other was a black group from Bophuthatswana. The festival organizers had urged the decision on the government in advance of the South Africans' request to come to Israel. According to the festival manager, the decision was based on a variation of the old South African standby: "no room to mix music and politics".
The following month South Africans also participated in a puppet festival in Jerusalem.

More intimate than players on the field or stars on stage, Israeli-South African relations also proceeded along that corridor established by governments for people–to-people contacts by their citizens. In late 1984, a Ben Gurion University organization called the Associates of South Africa drew attention for its active promotion of cultural and scientific exchanges. Haifa and Cape Town were sister cities, and there were frequent exchanges of various sorts between the two cities and their universities.

**14. Israel defied international tourist trends with South Africa during the time that sanctions had been called for against the Apartheid government**

Israeli tourism in South Africa defied international trends, growing 50 percent between 1981 and the end of 1985, and rose by 12.5 percent during the first six months of 1985 alone. This was undoubtedly providential, as tourism to South Africa had just about dried up, with 1985 hotel occupancy reaching an eleven-year low. South Africa was the first government to establish a tourism office in Israel.

In 1985, the Italian liner ‘Achille Lauro’ had been hijacked on the way to Ashdod, an event resulting in the murder of a disabled American, Leon Klinghoffer. The U.S. hijacked the plane on which the ship's hijackers were travelling to their negotiated freedom, and the plane was forced down in Italy (this was during the fall of the government of Italy).

Another casualty of that week was Alex Odeh, Southern Regional Director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, who was killed by a bomb, which was planted by the Jewish defense League fanatics, the morning after a television appearance during which he had stressed the desire for peace of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat.

In 1986 world attention was drawn to the tourism event "Malachi’s dream holiday on board the luxurious cruise ship Achille Lauro to South Africa," which sailed November 26 from the Israeli port of Ashdod.

A series of articles, "South Africa Without Prejudice," with phrases about the rapid pace of "reform" underway in South Africa and the "complexities" of the situation, appeared in the Jerusalem Post's weekend magazine in November and early December 1986.

Many citizens in Israel supported Israeli-South African relations.
The Mapam Party picketed a performance by visiting South African entertainers.

Many immigrants from the Soviet Union to Israel waved their banners proclaiming that "South Africa Has Been Israel's Ally."

In late 1985 after Israeli leftists had mounted several attention-getting demonstrations protesting the assignment of a new ambassador to South Africa, 60 supporters of the ‘apartheid’ government met in the presence of the South African ambassador to Israel, and formed an Israeli-South African Friendship League.

**15. The African political leader Buthelezi was victimized after he denounced Israel arms deals with the Apartheid government**

In 1985, Israel was casting about for a way to deflect mounting criticism of its ties with South Africa. Criticism came from liberal Israelis who worried that Tel Aviv's South Africa policy was becoming noticeably out of line with other Western states, and, more quietly, from the U.S., where South Africa's links with Israel were increasingly discussed on campuses and within anti-apartheid organizations, causing dismay on the liberal wing of organized Jewry. A poll of the Congressional Black Caucus underway at the time was revealing that those members of Congress and their constituents believed that Israel was a major backer of South Africa. On August 5, Prime Minister Shimon Peres had been queried by Rep. Howard Wolpe (D-MI), and had assured him that Israel was against apartheid.

In a separate meeting Yitzhak Shamir, then foreign minister, also assured Wolpe of Israel's "objections" to apartheid.

In its August 1985 decision to establish close working ties with Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, chief minister of the KwaZulu Bantustan (a patchwork of settlements in Natal), Israel seemed to have ignored his status as the leader of the Zulu people. In the West this is also frequently overlooked. The loyalty of Buthelezi to the progress of the Zulu nation could not be bought, nor outwitted.

Heads of state as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher had received Buthelezi as a frequent visitor to the West, where he argued against the imposition of sanctions, and raised objections to the mainstream liberation organizations in their support for an ‘armed struggle’ - they presented him as a "moderate" black leader, opposed to the "violent" methods of the outlawed African National Congress (ANC).

Chief Buthelezi spoke eloquently and sincerely against apartheid. According to a long-time friend of the descendant of Zulu royalty, many Western promoters saw Buthelezi as leader of a post-apartheid government.

Although his disagreements with the ‘apartheid’ government were widely heralded, Buthelezi refused ‘independent’ status for his Bantustan, and has refused to participate in ‘negotiations’ over South Africa's future with the ‘apartheid’ regime.
In 1981, the ‘Economist’ noted that: “Shrewd white strategists know that, sooner rather than later, the Afrikaner government will have to negotiate with the only coherent tribe larger than its own, the 5 million-strong Zulu...”

Inkatha is Buthelezi's political vehicle and means of patronage distribution. As polls taken over the years have shown, Buthelezi's following is trifling, even in Natal province, compared to that of the ANC, the United Democratic Front (UDF), or Nelson Mandela. Membership in Inkatha has one million members, and is voluntary, but "strongly recommended for those living in Zululand."

In 1983, the year the UDF was created, the murder of five University of Zululand students was blamed on Buthelezi supporters, in marked contrast to his "nonviolent" label.

Some of the Zulu men, who were Inkatha supporters, organized themselves in self defense units (SDU’s) nick-named ‘impis’, after mass slaughters of Zulu workers on the mines became a regular occurrence. Working thousands of meters underground inside coal mines requires extreme physical exertion. Most of the coal miner positions were manned by Zulus. These mines provided hostels for these workers to live in. Work shifts alternated between day and night at 12 hours per shift. In the early 1980’s, ANC supporters (mostly from the Xhoza tribes) attacked these miners while they were asleep in the hostel rooms during the night. hundreds of miners were murdered per attack. The ‘impis’ took on night vigils and guarded the perimeters of these hostels, as well as the streets of the Zulus in the squatter camps.

However, the ANC supporters filled the media with anti-Inkatha propaganda and all the blame of ‘black-on-black’ murders were placed on Buthelezi followers.

In 1985, a fight broke out between the ‘impis’ (armed with ‘knobkerries’ which were made from wooden clubs and classified as traditional weapons), and MK members (the military wing of the ANC) in the KwaMashu township of Zulu dwellers in Natal. As the fight progressed into a week of strife, the ‘apartheid’ police were called in to restore order. 66 blacks died, of which the police admitted to having shot 36. The others had been "stabbed and mutilated", and the media assumed that these were victims of the Inkatha.

Later that month, with the nation under a lock-down that forbade any gathering, the ‘apartheid’ government allowed Buthelezi to hold a ‘peace’ rally in Soweto, the black township outside Johannesburg. Thousands of Buthelezi's followers attended this event, and a measure of balance was restored between the various black tribes of that area.

The ‘Jerusalem Post’ responded with particular alacrity, in one case credited Buthelezi for preventing a revolutionary explosion in South Africa and asserting that "the wrong South African [then Bishop Desmond Tutu] won the Nobel Prize for peace". It was clear that he perpetuated his critical motif, calling for the enforcement of the UN arms embargo against the ‘apartheid’ government, and diplomatically, Buthelezi developed ties across the entire spectrum of white and black South Africa. He had close links with the white opposition Progressive Federal Party, with which he tried in 1986 to design a multiracial government for Natal Province. Their plan called for a complex system of racial checks and balances, with guarantees for minority groups. Buthelezi has always promised to give whites a veto, as opposed to the ANC demand for universal suffrage - but the ‘apartheid’ government rejected it out of hand.

A wide range of the Israeli leadership held official meetings with the Zulu chief: Prime Minister Peres and Foreign Minister Shamir; former Labour Foreign Minister Abba Eban hosted a luncheon in his honour; Foreign Ministry Director-General David Kimche, Israel's most persistent critic of links with South Africa, also agreed to help him.

The Israeli government and the Histadrut labour federation eagerly responded to Buthelezi's requests for assistance for KwaZulu, regarding the connection as "a new door into African development." Israel offered agricultural aid and a range of training including "leadership and trade union training in Israel, and assistance for women's organizations and cooperatives." Buthelezi said he had been assured that Israeli specialists would soon visit his Bantustan. Yehuda Pat, director of Histadrut's Afro-Asian Institute, made plans with Buthelezi for the establishment of links between Histadrut and labour unions affiliated with Inkatha.
The connection was somewhat odd, even for a labour apparatus like Histadrut, whose companies were active in South Africa, and whose unequal treatment of Arab workers is legendary. Although Buthelezi made no bones about running his Bantustan for the convenience of those who invest there, in March 1986 the KwaZulu "government" announced that the "United Union of Workers of South Africa," ( widely perceived as a challenge to the powerful Congress of South African Trade Unions, or COSATU,) would be launched. The system that was present before this announcement in March 1986 was biased against the rights of the workers. The KwaZulu labour bureau and a labour relations act had been in place. The average wage in 1985 was 100 rand a month (at the time less than $100), and workers who complained to the bureau often found themselves blacklisted.

Israel presented its new relationship with Buthelezi as a look reward the future and a connection with South Africa's Zulu nation. "Buthelezi's visit will give a boost to Israelis who would like to criticize apartheid without breaking off political and diplomatic relations with Pretoria," announced the Israeli government radio. Buthelezi”, explained the state radio, "is more than a puppet”. While he accepted the chief ministership of the KwaZulu homeland, he refused to have it declared independent like Ciskei or Bophuthatswana. Few critical observers find the distinction a meaningful one.

Visiting South Africa in June 1986, Denis Healey, the British Labour Party's spokesman on foreign affairs, refused to meet with Buthelezi. Instead, Healey cited sworn affidavits from vigilante attack victims in the Durban area and showed newsmen a photograph of a member of the Zulu royal family (to which Buthelezi was related) leading "impi vigilantes”.

In December 1986, Inkatha members were blamed for abducting and then shooting to death a shop steward of the Metal and Allied Workers along with another union member, and the daughter of a third.

Nonetheless, Israel's newly forged links with Buthelezi provided its supporters in the U.S. with fresh ammunition to use against critics of Israel's relations with South Africa. "Near East Report" the weekly publication of AIPAC, celebrated Buthelezi's visit as "the first by a leading South African opposition leader", and quoted Buthelezi's parting words: he was "encouraged and inspired by the complete abhorrence which...the Israeli people have for apartheid and the commitment of the Israeli people to its destruction". For AIPAC, which often sets the pace for other U.S. Jewish organizations, the quote was welcome relief from the old chestnut from Andrew Young, which has been used unremittingly for years:
“It is unfair to link Israel to South Africa. If there is a link, you must compare Britain, Germany, Japan, and the United States. All of them have links with South Africa. Israel becomes a too easy scapegoat for other problems we have."
Unlike Young, who left the Carter Administration (only several weeks before Israel and South Africa detonated a nuclear weapon) with the Israeli government in hot pursuit after he had met with the PIO's representative to the United Nations, Buthelezi continued to provide valuable copy. "Israel is indeed a land of miracles," he told a Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA) reporter, who tagged the KwaZulu leader as a possible first black president of South Africa.
The interview Buthelezi gave JTA served to justify Israel's linkage with South Africa, and, as it consisted mostly of a hot diatribe against his sworn rival, the ANC, it delivered the message to the U.S. Jewish community on the respectable pages of such publications as the Washington DC Jewish Week:
"I would say that Libya's Col. Muammar Qaddafi is today part of the ANC. The ANC describes itself as anti-Zionist, not anti-Semitic, like many African groups. But anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism are one and the same thing, I have always found," propounded Buthelezi. Words that proved themselves true in later years.

In a lengthy aside, interviewer Levine informs his American readers that:
“Buthelezi's friendship for Israel is music to the ears of the many South African Jewish leaders, who have grown increasingly concerned over the prospects of an ultimate ANC victory and the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime.”

The Washington "Jewish Week" published the Buthelezi interview as part of a front page spread which delivered a clear message-straight from Israel:

"Israeli officials are reluctant to criticize the ANC publicly for fear of appearing pro-apartheid. Privately, however, they freely share their growing concern over the prospect of an ANC takeover."

**16. The United States President allowed Israel to continue with breaking sanctions against South Africa for as long as possible.**

There was really no "South Africa problem" for Israel as long as Washington was willing to declare, in the face of damning evidence, that the ‘apartheid’ regime was reforming itself, just as there was absolutely no problem for Israel, as long as an avowedly anti-apartheid Congress continued to mumble its self-imposed collective ignorance of Israel's dealings with the apartheid government, and was willing to accept without challenge the Carter Administration's short-circuited investigation of the 1979 Israeli South African nuclear weapons test.

In late 1986, Ronald Reagan's supportive policy of "constructive engagement" was wearing thin, as South Africa declared its cataclysmic June state of emergency and jailed thousands of vigilantes. Before the year was over, Congress, motivated by an almost unanimous citizenry, passed its first real anti-apartheid legislation, and then passed it again over the President's veto.

A little noticed Section 508 of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 contained language that demanded a White House report to the House and Senate within 180 days of the legislation's passage, "containing a detailed assessment of the economic and other relationships of other industrialized democracies with South Africa."
This amendment authored by retiring Republican Senate Foreign Relations Committee member Charles McC. Mathias was "clearly a threat to Israel,'' according to the Jerusalem Post, raising the possibility of a cut-off of Israel's U.S. military aid. It came on the heels of another jolt, a decision by the European Community (EC) to impose an array of limited sanctions on South Africa.

Previously, Israel had temporized on the possibility of sanctions, but the government had frequently alluded to Israel's conformity to the (dastardly) positions of the Western powers: ''keeping in line with what the Western countries are doing, no more no less" was how a senior Israeli diplomat phrased it in July 1986. The West African nation of Cameroon had just been persuaded to establish formal diplomacy with Tel Aviv, and Israel, making urgent efforts to engineer a domino effect, was working hard to convince African countries of the sincerity of its opposition to apartheid.

In late August "a special internal discussion" on Israeli ties to South Africa was convened by the Director-General of the Foreign Ministry David Kimche. Kimche, who had always been a public critic of ostentatious contacts with South Africa and the Bantustans, warned that Israel must prepare for the possibility that the West would impose stringent sanctions on South Africa. Out of these discussions came a reaffirmation of the policy of "staying in line with the Western democracies." A large loophole was left, however, because of Israel's "special" concern for the South African Jewish community.
This concern had frequently been debunked as "patent nonsense" and "inexcusably short-sighted" - during one heated round of discussion on the validity of using South African Jews as an excuse, a former director of Israel's foreign ministry noted that the South African Jewish community itself was "compromised...by passive collaboration with the evil of apartheid" but it remained Israel's second line of defense after its ritual denunciations of apartheid.

Another Israeli concern about sanctions was that once a precedent had been established, Israel would also be subject to an international attempt at behaviour modification. "We have no reason to highlight our relations with South Africa, but we have no wish to join sanctions either, the likes of which have often been employed against Israel," said Prime Minister Shamir.
Rita E. Hauser, an influential figure in the U.S. Jewish community, embedded the identical point in a more sophisticated rationale for a hands-off policy toward Israel and South Africa, reported as follows:
“The sense of embattlement and isolation felt by these two Western-oriented nations comes in no small part from the policies of the Western Alliance. The United States and its NATO allies, in recent years, have not been able to separate clearly the pressures put upon them by black Africa and the Arab states with respect to the internal policies of South Africa and Israel from the external, geopolitical situation now operative in the Middle East and southern Africa. Even if they are correct in the conviction that Israel must yield control over the West Bank to some form of Palestinian nationalism and that South Africa must devise a method of sharing power with the blacks, there is no justification for policies which isolate and weaken these two countries to the detriment of vital Western interests.”
After a time that reassessment was forgotten, only to emerge again with a spurious offer to phase out military contracts with South Africa over the coming years, several weeks before the April 1 date set for the submission of the report stipulated by the 1986 anti-apartheid act. The U.S. followed the EC with the imposition of even stiffer sanctions, and the world learned that Israel had supplied South Africa with refueling aircraft.

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6 <http://mg.co.za/article/2010-05-25-nuke-talks-above-pik-bothas-paygrade>

7 ‘[Israel's Most Illicit Affair](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/24/israels_most_illicit_affair)’ is a book by Glenn Frankel issued 24 May 2010, which reveals Israel’s secret relationship with apartheid South Africa, from which we quote the following:

“Israel reaped big profits, but paid a price in moral standing. By focusing solely on its purported strategic value to the United States, Israel and its supporters have tended to downgrade the country's real case for preserving a special relationship with its staunch ally. Foreign-policy realists argue that the price Washington pays in the Muslim world for its support of Israel far outweighs whatever strategic value the Jewish state provides. The more compelling case has always focused on Israel's character as a robust democracy that shares American values. But the clandestine alliance with South Africa undermined Israel's rightful claim on U.S. admiration and support.”

**Section B: Zionist Support for anti-Apartheid government organizations**

Anti-Apartheid movements in South Africa were supported by many organizations

and countries, of which Russia was the most prominent. Such support is discussed in Attachment 9 - Objections to the formation of the Union of South Africa, Section D: International Objections to the Union of South Africa.

It is of importance to note that this tremendous international support was garnered by Zionists. This we discuss in Part 3 of this section.

It is also of importance to note that Russia was governed by Zionists at the time she supported the anti-Apartheid movements. The government take-over from the Russian Tsar Romanov by the Zionist revolutionaries is discussed in Attachment 11 - The modus operandi of the Crown, Section B.3: The influence of Zionism reformation political strategies on different countries of the world, with reference to Reformist Jews guilty of genocide.

Zionist leaders from both Israel and Russia were supporting anti-Apartheid movements at the same time that the Zionist leaders from Israel were supporting the Apartheid government.

**1. A Zionist Smear Campaign and Frame Up tried to hide the association between the Zionist led South African Communist Party and the African National Congress.**

In May 1986, the Zionist led Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL) had circulated its newsletter to members of Congress with a front page headline promising "A Closer Look" at the African National Congress (ANC). Although the ADL built its reputation on original research on racist hate groups, the article it sent to Congress was simply a collection of clippings on the ANC and "evidence" from testimony given at 1982 hearings conducted by far-right Sen. Jeremiah Denton (R-AL), arranged to "prove" that "the ANC is oriented toward the Soviet Union and its East Bloc allies, who have furnished it with arms, funding, military training and other logistic support."
The ADL did not set forth the context of what it described as the 30-year alliance between the ANC and the Zionist led South African Communist Party (SACP). The article was also in error about the length of the association. "It's been 65 years, not 30," noted Lifford Cengue, a West Coast representative of the ANC, explaining that the alliance between the two organizations goes back to 1921,the year the SACP was founded, and has been public knowledge since that time. Cengue also pointed out that the ANC was founded in 1912, "before the October Revolution."

Of interest is the fact that members of the SACP had been in operation under a different name, the Communist Party of South Africa, since before 1912.

The ADL, article also delved into the ties between the ANC and the PLO, an organization with few defenders in Congress.
It noted that some ANC members "trained in the USSR with PLO cadres", and refers to statements critical of Israeli policy made during the 1970’s by Oliver Tambo.

As have many governments and international organizations, the ANC has long been critical of Israel's treatment of the Palestinians under occupation; its criticism has been informed by Israel's close ties with South Africa. The ADL's assault on the ANC came at a time when Congress members of both parties were calling for the release of imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela, and the State Department was moving toward contacts with the ANC.

The ADL article had great value for friends of South Africa, as well as apologists for Israel's ties to the Apartheid regime. As Smith Hempstone commented approvingly in the *Washington Times*:

‘None of this [the ADL's "findings"] is particularly original stuff. The same points have been made many times by this columnist. But when B'nai B'rith gets into the game, congressmen who know on which side their political bagels are buttered are likely to sit up and take notice.”

In the same issue of Washington's *Jewish Week* that carried the interview with Buthelezi, was a second piece authored by Charley Levine, this one titled to play on a prevalent theme of the times: "Arab Terrorists Aid South African Groups." It was a far more sophisticated job than the ADL's article, admitting, for instance, that Sweden contributed more to the ANC than the Soviet Union.
Levine wrote of instances when the PLO gave military training to the ANC. Of interest was the reference to the training of parachutists and the kind of aeronautical assistance. He added that "Israeli experts on international terrorism have concluded that the ANC's tactics are similar to those of the PLO.”
Soon after Buthelezi's departure, Israel hosted another group of South African Blacks - and again used the opportunity to demonstrate its "anti-apartheid" credentials, without, of course, jarring its vital links to white Pretoria.

**2. Israel formed Political and Cultural Ties with anti-Apartheid organizations**

 It is clear that Israel intended to maintain and expand its foothold of influence in southern Africa irrespective of which political party governed South Africa.

**(i) Friends of Israel hunted for "Authentic" Blacks for Israel to develop for which South Africans paid**

At a gathering in the home of In Los Angeles in 1984, at the home of Tom Hayden - former Chicago Seven radical, and a member of the California State Assembly - and his wife, actress Jane Fonda, guest of honour Bishop Desmond Tutu had lambasted Israel for its support of South Africa, and Jewish guests took issue with his remarks.
Afterwards, a "deeply disturbed" Tom Hayden consulted Prof. Steven Spiegel, a Middle East specialist at UCLA, about a remedy for "an ever deepening antagonism of South African blacks towards Israel."

Four years earlier Speigel had started a think tank, the Center for Foreign Policy Options (CFPO), but in 1986 it was virtually unknown to the Foreign Affairs community in Los Angeles. After talking to Hayden, Spiegel went to Israel, spoke with a variety of leaders, and developed a plan. He selected Shimshon Zelniker, a professor at Beit Berl, the Labour Party's college, to be "field director."

After strenuous attempts, Tom Hayden persuaded Bishop Tutu to meet with Zelniker, whose way the CFPO then paid to South Africa. There, in June 1985, Zelniker met with Tutu and a number of his associates. They were harshly critical of Israel. The Nobel laureate who would later be appointed Archbishop of Cape Town accused the Israelis of having a "monopoly on the Holocaust", ignoring or down-playing the sufferings of other peoples.

Ultimately Zelniker was able to sell the group on CFPO's idea of bringing groups of black South Africans to Israel, for what might loosely be called leadership training. Bishop Tutu refused to become involved.
In January, Shimshon Zelniker went back to South Africa to select trainees. It proved difficult to recruit Black leaders whose authenticity was widely recognized in their communities. Not one of the nine men and eleven women Zelniker signed up, would admit to membership with the legal and mainstream United Democratic Front. Yehuda Pat, Director of the Histadrut's Afro-Asian Institute which ran the program, called them "leaders in the struggle against apartheid." Pat and Zelniker, it should be noted, had also met with Chief Buthelezi when he was in Israel.

In April 1986, the trainees arrived in Israel to take part in a workshop, which, given by Histadrut, was entitled "The Role of People's Organizations in Community Building and National Development." According to Israeli officials, it was designed to provide the students with skills they would need in the event of a transition to Black rule in South Africa. Oblivious - or antagonistic - to the rapidly developing South African trade union movement, the training program Histadrut devised for the visitors "focus[ed] on unionizing the country's 12 million black laborers."
Meanwhile, Tom Hayden and CFPO's fundraiser had been promoting the project in Israel. They gained the endorsement of the Israeli government, and the Israeli foreign ministry defrayed part of the expenses of one of Shimshon Zelniker's trips to South Africa. CFPO also brought Zelniker to the U.S. to describe his work to Jewish organizations.
While the CPFO planned to spend $1 million over a period of two years on the transportation, living expenses and training programs in Israel for 6 to 12 additional groups of South African trainees, many questions remain unanswered about the project's relationship to the South African government, especially since part of its functions appeared to be to propagandize for South Africa in the U.S.
In addition to Prof. Spiegel, CFPO's members included Edward Sanders - an adviser on Middle East and Jewish affairs to President Carter; Osias S. Goren (CFPO's chairman and chief fundraiser) - who headed Jewish efforts for President Reagan's 1980 and 1984 campaigns; and Maxwell F.Greenberg - honorary chairman of the ADL, which had so reviled the ANC.

Tom Hayden's role in the bond between Israel and the ‘Apartheid’ regime was also puzzling. Hayden, whose first foray into California electoral politics was a losing primary race against Sen. John Tunney (ironically, a leading foe of South Africa, whose defeat in the general election was partly attributed to South African contributions to his Republican opponent S.I. Hayakawa), revealed in 1986 that, during his anti-war activities in the 1960’s, he had cooperated with U.S. intelligence agents, and had had intensive talks with CIA agents.
During his three terms in the California state legislature, Hayden gradually eased away from his left-liberal identification. In 1986, he dissolved his Campaign for Economic Democracy (funded by the profits from Fonda's fitness video royalties, it had, charged many critics, become simply an electoral vehicle for "Tom") and set up a new personal organization called Campaign California.

Well ahead of his metamorphosis, Hayden had established himself as a leading promoter of Israel. During the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, he and his wife visited Israeli troops on the front lines. This maneuver, during Hayden's first assembly campaign, was intended to appeal to the great numbers of Jews in his district.
Hayden's involvement with the recruitment of black South African trainees for Israel was not, however, the kind of activity designed for mass voter appeal. It seems more in the nature of a quiet favour.

The CFPO's project was a propaganda success, with all the major North American newspapers covering it extensively and favorably. Through their Histadrut instructors, Israel was able to establish and maintain contact with the trainees - useful for power sharing in the event that should the ‘Apartheid’ government be overthrown, and also useful for sharing intelligence.
The ‘Apartheid’ regime did not object to the Histadrut Endeavour, and did not lift the passports of the attendees prior to their departure.

During the mid-June 1986 state of emergency in South Africa, while Israel was casting about for ways to portray itself as opposed to Apartheid, some of the Israelis were intensely involved with the Histadrut replacement of governance project:
"...we were wary of recommending that Israel adopt any "crisis approach" or abrupt break with Pretoria; the white government's retaliation might mean an end to the new ties with Black organizations before they were properly off the ground.”

As the interactions with Buthelezi and the "leaders in the struggle against apartheid" who came to Israel for training indicate, the exact nature of the political linkage between Israel and South Africa, the ties that bind over and above the military and economic quid pro quos, were concealed. That those ties are close and rich can be gauged by the sports, cultural and diplomatic exchanges countenanced by Israel.

**3. International support for anti-Apartheid movements was garnered by Zionists.**

The support for anti-Apartheid movements against the Apartheid government of South Africa by Zionists was from both within, and outside the borders of South Africa.

From within South Africa, Zionist members who represented the Crown operated through various organizations and political parties to motivate anti-Apartheid sentiments, which are discussed in Attachment 10 - South Africa is bound as a possession by the Crown, Section C: South Africa under Pax Britannica.

The most prominent Zionist leaders who motivated an armed struggle against the South African government operated within the South African Communist Party (SACP).

(i) **The National Socialist Jewish Party merged with Communist parties to form The South African Communist Party**

Jewish Zionists in South Africa formed the Jewish Socialist Party in the early 1900’s. In July 1921, the Jewish Socialist Party merged with several leftist organizations, including the International Socialist League (ISL), the Social Democratic Federation, the Durban Marxist Club, and the Cape Communist Party to form the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA).

(ii) **The South African Communist Party was instructed by Zionist Moscow**

The CPSA affiliated with the Communist International (Comintern), headquartered in Moscow, which provided it with political direction. The party went underground temporarily but strengthened its ties to local nationalist organizations, such as the ANC. During the years it was banned, while the ANC continued to operate legally, the CPSA viewed the ANC as its vehicle to change South Africa to a socialist state under eventual communist leadership. The Comintern's Sixth Congress declared that "the CPSA could now play an active role in the ANC." The party re-emerged in 1953 under the leadership of Joe Slovo and his wife, Ruth First, and changed its name to the SACP.

 The history of the South African Communist Party is discussed further in Attachment 9 – Objections to the formation of the Union of South Africa, Section D: International Objections to the Union of South Africa, Footnote 3: The Origins of the

National Democratic Revolution with reference to the South African Communist

Party**.**

After the SACP and the African National Congress embarked on an armed struggle against South Africa, Moscow supported them in every way possible to overthrow the South African government.

The close ties between the SACP and the ANC, particularly the predominance of SACP members in the ANC, is noteworthy. The SACP leadership took key positions within the ANC’s controlling body and in ANC-affiliated labour organizations, such as COSATU.

When the SACP was unbanned in February 1990, its strength was difficult to estimate because many party members had been underground for years. In July 1990, a party spokesman publicized the names of twenty-two SACP members who were prominent in national politics but said that the names of others would remain secret. In 1991 SACP leaders estimated that the party had 10,000 dues-paying members, but refused to publish the party's membership rolls.

**A. Prominent National Socialist Jewish Leaders were Key Role Players of the SACP/ANC Alliance and Terrorist Activities against South Africans**

Compared to Europe where National Socialist Jewish involvement in radical *‘left wing’* political movements has often been noted and reasonably large Jewish populations, which are, proportional to the rest of the population, often quite small, South Africa has a far smaller proportional population (less than one percent of the total and predictably circa eighty percent of South Africa’s Jewish population are clustered in and around to the urban centers: Cape Town and Johannesburg) of Jews and so a significant overrepresentation of Socialist Jews in a given political movement is both more obvious and significant (i.e. it suggests that there is something that attracts the National Socialist Jews to radical *‘left wing’* political movements as opposed to it just being a reaction against anti-Jewish attitudes in the population.

It is also significant to note that South African government systems have always treated the Jews as *‘Whites’* and they were not discriminated against in any way whatsoever on because they were Jews. Therefore we cannot dismiss their significant involvement in the political arena of South Africa as being a*‘reaction’* to something, but as a ‘desire’ to achieve something.

* 1. **Harry Schwarz:** Co-founder of the *‘Torch Commando’* fighting against the *‘disenfranchisement of the coloured people’*. In the 1960’s he became leader of the opposition party in the Transvaal: the United Party, after Jan Smuts had left the United Party. Harry Schwarz also signed the*‘Mahlabatini Declaration of Faith’*. A declaration committed to opposing Apartheid in a *‘non-violent’* manner. In the 1970's Schwarz acted as Chairman of the Committee on International Relations of the Jewish Board of Deputies. In 1991 he was appointed as South African Ambassador to the United States. He was also a close friend and associate of Nelson Mandela, Joe Slovo, a communist Jew and Jimmy Kantor, a socialist Jew.

**2. Helen Suzman:** Born Helen Gavronsky to Jewish parents and later married a Jewish man named Dr. Moses Suzman. Elected to the South African House of Assembly in 1953 for the opposition United Party. Abandoned the United Party in 1959 and joined the Liberal Progressive Party. Liberalism in South Africa was the key ideology that obtained Jewish support: Suzman was a representative of the Houghton Constituency with the Houghton area, being a primarily Jewish wealthy suburb. Suzman's Progressive Party merged with that of Harry Schwarz (the Reform Party) to become the Progressive Reform Party.

**3. Nadine Gordimer:** A Jewish writer primarily known for her literary activism against Apartheid, as well as her testimony on behalf of 22 individuals deemed to have committed treason against the South African state. Nadine Gordimer was a member of the African National Congress (ANC) and partially wrote Nelson Mandela's speech at the famous Rivonia Trial.

**4. Arthur Chaskalson:** A Jewish defence attorney who defended Nelson Mandela at the Rivonia trial. Note that Nelson Mandela was being prosecuted at Rivonia by the Attorney General; Percy Yutar, who was also Jewish. Chaskalson's activism was primarily as a human rights lawyer in challenging the implementation of numerous Apartheid laws. Chaskalson was also appointed President of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in 1994 and Chief Justice of South Africa in 2001.

**5. Denis Goldberg:** Originally a Jewish member of the South African Communist Party, Goldberg later joined the Congress of Democrats, which allied itself with the African National Congress. With the establishment of the armed wing of the African National Congress; *‘Umkhonto We Sizwe’*, in 1961: Goldberg became one of its technical officers. In 1963 he; along with several members of the armed wing including Nelson Mandela, were arrested and faced justice in the famous Rivonia treason trial of 1964. Goldberg was sentenced to four life terms. In 1985; some twenty-two years later, Goldberg was released from prison and went into exile in the United Kingdom. He resumed his anti-Apartheid activism from the African National Congress headquarters in London and acted as its spokesperson at the Anti-Apartheid Committee of the United Nations. Goldberg was appointed as Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry in 2004.

**6. Ruth First:** The Jewish wife of the Jewish communist Joe Slovo. First assisted in founding the Congress of Democrats: the *‘white wing’* of the Congress Alliance. She assumed control of *‘Fighting Talk’*: a propaganda journal supporting the Congress Alliance. In 1956 First, and her Jewish husband, were arrested for treason with the trial lasting four years and resulting in the acquittal of all but one of the fifty-six accused. She fled to Swaziland after a state of emergency was declared due to the Sharpeville incident, and returned to South Africa six months later, when the state of emergency had been lifted, to continue as the editor of *‘New Age’* (successor to *‘The Guardian’*). During this period she also organized broadcasts of *‘Radio Freedom’* from mobile transmitters in Johannesburg. Detained in 1963 along with several members of the African National Congress’ underground armed wing: *‘Umkhonto We Sizwe’*. First was never tried for treason, but detained instead for ninety days. Following her release she and her children fled to the African National Congress headquarters in London, after her communist Jewish husband Joe Slovo, abandoned her and their children in South Africa. Both First and Slovo subsequently resumed their anti-Apartheid activism in the United Kingdom. First then emigrated to Mozambique after being appointed Professor and Research Director of the Centre for African Studies. She was subsequently killed by letter bomb. Coincidentally First's Jewish father, Julius First, was the treasurer of the South African Communist Party.

**7. Albert Louis ‘Albie’ Sachs:** Sachs’ anti-Apartheid activism was mainly in the capacity of a human rights attorney, defending Jewish and negro clients against what he deemed to be *‘oppressive and unjust laws’*. Sachs went into exile in 1966 in the United Kingdom, but immigrated to Mozambique in 1977. During his stay in Mozambique he was in close contact with Oliver Thambo, who was then the leader of the African National Congress. On April 7th 1988 Sachs lost an arm and an eye when his car; which had been rigged with a bomb, exploded. Sachs was the principal architect of the post-Apartheid South African Constitution and was appointed in 1994 as a judge in the South African Constitutional Court by Nelson Mandela.

**8. Rowley Israel Arenstein:** Joined the South African Communist Party in 1938, becoming the organizer of the Durban district branch. In 1947 he withdrew from active politics, but remained a participant in the Durban branch of the Congress of Democrats during the 1950's. The extent of his subsequent anti-Apartheid activism is similar to that of Albert Louis Sachs as a human rights attorney. In the 70's Rowley Israel Arenstein was banned from practicing law and placed under house arrest for his subversive activities and support of terrorism.

**9. Arthur Goldreich:** Although a transient fixture in anti-Apartheid circles; the short time that Goldreich spent in these circles was highly influential and thus important. Goldreich, a former member of the *‘Palmach’* (the elite arm of the Jewish Zionist terrorist group: the*'Haganah'*), rented a farm near Rivonia, which he then transformed into the headquarters of the armed wing of the African National Congress: *‘Umkhonto We Sizwe’*. Goldreich was among those arrested in the Rivonia incident, but unlike the others, Goldreich along with a fellow terrorist, Moosa Moolla, managed to bribe a young guard on the 11th August 1963 and fled to Swaziland. Goldreich eventually made his way back to live in Israel.

10. **Joe Slovo:**An active Jewish member of the South African Communist Party in the 1940's who became a defence attorney for his politically active Jewish and negro clients. In 1953, Slovo along with his Jewish wife Ruth First, became one of the founding members of the Congress of Democrats. Following the Sharpeville incident: Slovo was detained for a four month period on the basis of being a communist agent under the *‘Suppression of Communism Act’*. Slovo was also one of the earliest members of the armed wing of the African National Congress: *‘Umkhonto We Sizwe’*. In June 1963 Slovo left for an *‘external mission’* and a month later the police arrested the leadership of *‘Umkhonto We Sizwe’*. Slovo resumed working for the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party abroad in the United Kingdom and acted as its Chief of Staff and General Secretary until 1987. In 1977 Slovo moved to Mozambique where he established an operational centre for the African National Congress. He was forced to leave the country following an agreement between Mozambique and South Africa, which entailed economic aid in exchange for a tough position against terrorist groups.

**11.** **Raymond Sorrel Suttner:** A Jewish anti-Apartheid activist who in 1975 was charged with two counts of criminal behaviour to which Suttner pleaded guilty on both counts. The specific charges were: taking part in the activities of an unlawful organization (the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party) as well as undergoing training, inciting or encouraging other persons to undergo training or to obtain information that would be useful in furthering the communist aims or the aims of any unlawful organization. Suttner was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison for his crimes.

**12. Ronald Kasrils:** A Jewish communist who, prompted by the Sharpeville incident, decided to join the African National Congress, and who acted as secretary of the African National Congress aligned Congress of Democrats in Natal, till it was banned as a subversive organisation in 1962. Kasrils was a founding member of the armed wing of the African National Congress; *‘UMkonto We Sizwe’*, and was involved in its first ever operation. In 1963 Kasrils became the leader of its Natal Regional Command. Kasrils; like many of the other Jews involved in the anti-Apartheid movement, fled into exile in the United Kingdom and continued operating on behalf of the African National Congress in some of its international branches (such as those in Swaziland, Luanda and Rhodesia).
Kasrils also received extensive training in the Soviet Union during the 1960’s. Kasrils was given courses focusing on general military training and intelligence operations. He was also trained to be a brigadier in the Red Army. This earned him the position of Chief of Intelligence for *‘UMkonto We Sizwe’*. Ronald Kasrils held many other important positions in both the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party, such as being a member of the African National Congress’ Politico-Military Council in Lusaka from 1985, a member of African National Congress’ National Executive Committee from 1987 and a member of the South African Communist Party's Central Committee from 1985. Kasrils’ wife, Eleanor, was also a member of the African National Congress and *‘UMkonto We Sizwe’*. Kasrils was also related to Jacqueline Arenstein: a member of the South African Communist Party and the African National Congress, and wife of Rowley Israel Arenstein.

SACP chairman Joe Slovo was the most prominent party member in government in 1994. Slovo was a trained lawyer and advocate, a member of the Johannesburg Bar, and one of the original members of MK, the ANC military wing. He served on the ANC's revolutionary council from 1969 until it was disbanded in 1983, became the first white member of the ANC's NEC in 1985, and served as MK chief of staff until April 1987. He was appointed SACP general secretary in 1986, following the death of Moses Madhiba, and continued in that post until 1991, when he became party chairman. Slovo was appointed minister of housing in the Government of National Unity in May 1994 and served in that post until his death in January 1995.

Slovo had been a hard-line communist, a Stalinist, when he joined the party in the 1940’s, but along with others in the SACP had followed Moscow's 1980’s reforms. By 1987, Slovo and his associates espoused the creation of a multiparty state with a mixed economy, and sought to broaden the party's membership base. This liberal philosophy might have explained the SACP's large representation among ANC leaders in the 1990’s. The collapse of the Soviet system in the late 1980’s had weakened the SACP's outside support and appeared to have weakened the appeal of the socialist ideals the party espoused for South Africa. Party activists believed, nonetheless, that the remaining economic disparities among racial groups provided fertile ground for SACP recruitment in the 1990’s.

SACP leaders, considerably weakened by the murder of Chris Hani in 1993, debated the possibility that the party no longer represented a political asset to the ANC, as they prepared for the April 1994 elections. They realized that the SACP could do little to help the ANC broaden its popular support beyond its liberation allies, and public opinion polls gave the SACP, alone, strong support among only about 5 percent of voters. By including a large number of SACP members among the electoral delegates representing the ANC in the April 1994 elections, however, the SACP was able to gain significantly more representation in the national and provincial legislatures and more key posts in the government than it would have, had it run independently.

**References:**

<http://www.mongabay.com/history/south_africa/south_africa-south_african_communist_party.html>

Johann Luther contributed materially to this article with information and advice based on his research on South African history and politics.

<http://semiticcontroversies.blogspot.com/2010/06/twelve-prominent-jewish-anti-apartheid.html>

**Support in political negotiations**

The achievement of the ANC rule in South Africa came about as a result of both elite negotiations and mass action.  An example of the former was the concept of "sunset clauses" put forward by Joe Slovo of the South African Communist Party (SACP).  In a paper entitled "Negotiations: What room for compromise?"" he argued that the white minority should be offered inducements to make them less resistant to majority rule.  These included the constitutional protection of property rights, the retention of apartheid era employees, and a transitional period of compulsory power sharing.  This proposal was adopted by the ANC leadership and formed the basis of its agreement with the National Party.

Reference to the negotiations is madein Attachment 10 - South Africa is bound as a possession by the Crown, Section C: From ‘moderate’ Afrikaner politics to ‘aggressive’ Afrikaner politics, sub-section 4. (iii) The Broederbond members of the National Party acted on behalf of the Crown when they stepped outside the governing laws of South Africa by changing the system of governance.

In 1962, the SACP had acknowledged that a `crisis in the country and contradictions in the ranks of the ruling class' might open up the possibility `of a peaceful and negotiated transfer of power'. But, in 1970, the party had rejected this as a `highly questionable' hope and resolved to use violence.

**Support in physical violence.**

The establishment of the militant wing named “Umkhonto we Sizwe” and known as MK was to enforce the will of the ANC through the civilians onto the reigning government of South Africa was an alternative chosen to political negotiations.

The design and funding for this new section of the ANC was carried out by people who were highly efficient, professional and experienced in the machinations of international terrorism and warfare. However, much of the actual manpower to carry out the actual operations of MK was given over to inexperienced youths and activists.

**(i) Funding**

Much of the funding which was applied to the operations of MK was donated from countries outside of South Africa, derived through active canvassing, media propaganda and campaigns led by Zionists. In this, the Crown had great influence on the group called ‘Comité Zuid Afrika’, the first anti-‘apartheid’ organization in the Netherlands, which was involved with supplying the ANC alliance with arms for the MK. In support of this claim, we quote a paragraph form the article ‘*The Rumor: Berend Schuitema - Anti-Apartheid fighter or a double Spy?’* supplied by Luirink in the Haagse Post/De Tijd, on the 11th of November 1993, as follows:

“...In 1969 Berend Schuitema in Amsterdam tried to become involved in the then existing Comité Zuid Afrika, the first Anti Apartheid grouping in the Netherlands which had, amongst others, members like Ed van Thijn, the rev. Buskes, professor Albeda and Henk Vonhoff - But Berend Schuitema found this group too ambiguous about armed struggle and too confused about ideas which he was bringing - economic sanctions against Apartheid in South Africa. In addition they also did not totally trust him. This appears out of archive material and correspondence between the Comité Zuid Afrika and the International Defense and Aid Fund. *"Keep a distance on him until we know more about him"*, was the advice from London.

**Berend Schuitema**

Schuitema founded his own organization and called it the Dutch Anti Apartheid Movement (AABN).  The group soon established a prominence in the Dutch press by disrupting sports events in which South African teams participated. There were also sensational exposures of Dutch firms trading with the ‘illegal’ Rhodesian regime which were carried extensively in the international press.

This organization offered support to the ANC in exile and influenced the attitude of Dutch public regarding the situation in South Africa hugely through the media.

The AABN also played an important role in the international struggle against ‘apartheid’. It was Schuitema's driving force and total dedication to the work of the AABN, of which he was founding General Secretary, which won it the respect of the radical student movement as well as the Broad Solidarity Movement for Vietnam. The AABN grew out to be one of the most powerful third world solidarity movements in Europe.

Schuitema worked for the ANC as peace monitor during transition 1990-94, and remains in position today as a Community Policing Enthusiast. He remains an avid activist of National Socialism on the social network Facebook, and represents the Untied Socialist State Republic of America. See footnote 1 - Berend Schuitema hosts United Socialist State Republic of America website

Another key role player in the establishment of funding for the MK was Connie Braam. Together with some others, she broke away from the Comité Zuid-Afrika (CZA) to form the more radical ‘Anti-Apartheidsbeweging Nederland’ (AABN).

In her own words, quoted from a public interview with Wharam, she mentions**:** “Yes, I was chair of the Dutch Anti-Apartheid Movement (AABN) between 1969 and 1994”.

Braam made the connection between Britain and the Netherlands regarding the cocaine market public in her book ‘*The Cocaine Salesman’* which included her research was that cocaine was sold legally to huge pharmaceutical companies, such as Merck and our own Burroughs-Welcome. In the interview with Wharam, she explained what led her to this discovery. She was asked: “What inspired you to write about this particular aspect of WW1?” Upon which her reply was as follows:

Braam: 'The idea came to me when I was researching the history of the Dutch involvement in the opium trade during the same era. While reading about the government-owned opium factory in Indonesia, I discovered that there had been a Dutch cocaine factory and, what’s more, that it had stood around the corner from the house where I had lived for years! I wasn’t really surprised that the factory existed as, cocaine was a legal product at the time and the Dutch, like the English, have many dark pages in their history books. But the fact that the cocaine was used on purpose in the trenches was more than a surprise; it made me very angry and that always gives me a lot of energy for writing. And, of course another reason to write the story was that I'm always interested in these dark pages. Anything that Dutch historians and politicians try to hide interests me. I don’t think that the old activist in me will ever die!”

In 1986, Braam was approached by leaders of the ANC in exile and asked to assist with Operation Vula. Braam went about helping with the setting up of safe-houses inside South Africa and with arranging the smuggling of documents into South Africa. She also made contact with people inside Europe where the ANC could arrange disguises and obtain things they needed. Braam was able to come into contact with many of the prominent ANC members, both as leader of the AABN and in her personal capacity. In 1990 she visited South Africa for the first time.

References: C. Braam, Operation Vula. Amsterdam, 1992; G.L. Klein, ‘De strijd tegen apartheid. The role of the anti-apartheid organizations in the Netherlands, 1960-1995.’ MA- dissertation, University of Pretoria (UP), 2000.

Of interest is her staunch support for globalization, and her communist heritage. Her grandparents were Russian Jews, and her link with the Jewish community who escaped the Holocaust proved very useful in the funding of various ANC projects, which included Operation Vula.

Although Connie Braam vehemently denied that Operation Vula supplied arms to the MK, it has been proven beyond a doubt, and admitted by ANC leaders, that Operation Vula was, indeed, established to provide arms to the MK soldiers in the field, and to establish a direct line of communication between them and the leaders. Operation Vula is discussed in Footnote 2 - Operation Vula, 'Opening the way'

Whereas most other countries saw their Governments spearheading the anti-apartheid drive, in the Netherlands, the Government was more talk than action, and drive against South Africa came mostly from the public, based on the propaganda they heard in the media. Whereas the Netherlands’ government offered 45.000 euro to an organization that gave legal assistance to political prisoners in 1965, many Dutch citizens – such as the head of the now-defunct "Anti-apartheid movement Netherlands," the journalist Connie Braam – actively participated in smuggling weapons and bombs into South Africa from Dutch territory. As the Netherlands do not have any anti-terrorism laws, fundraising and arms purchase by terrorist support groups during the anti-apartheid movement for export to the terrorist cells of the African Nationalist Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) was done openly before 1994. The progress of the ‘anti-apartheid’ movement in South Africa was carefully monitored by their supporters, and adjustments made between the supply of funds needed to intensify propaganda, and the needs to strengthen the military onslaught.

The Dutch as a nation declared the white Afrikaans speakers guilty of ‘apartheid’ as they saw it and not the then governing political party that presented it, the NP.

The ‘anti-apartheid’ movement was a war on the people of South Africa, during which the whole nation suffered, irrespective of color, race or creed. However, it was a money spinner for those that represented the ‘freedom struggle against oppression’.

**Dr. Karel Roskam** travelled to South Africa as a student in the late 1950’s, during the course of which he attended the infamous Treason Trial, meeting many members of the ANC. Upon returning to the Netherlands, he wrote his thesis for the University of Amsterdam in 1960 on racial relations in South Africa, and the international community.  In the fall of 1959, he revived the Comité Zuid-Afrika (CZA). Karel Roskam was a radio journalist with the progressive broadcaster VARA, and interviewed many activists and South African exiles both on radio and on television during the period 1961-1992.  Roskam died at the age of 78.
**FOOTNOTES**

**Footnote 1:** **Berend Schuitema hosts United Socialist State Republic of American**

 **website**

Berend Schuitema host debate: Welcome to USSRA on behalf of United Socialist State Republic of America

[DEBATE]: Welcome to USSRA

**Dominic Tweedie** dominic.tweedie at gmail.com
Thu Sep 11 11:26:29 BST 2008

Hi Berend,

I'm not missing anything. I'm seeing the Roubini (and today's Times editorial, for another example) idea of state centralism, and that this is not different from the idea of the election betrayed. In both cases the expectation is that the state central power can do everything, for better or for worse.

Whereas the real socialism, and the only possible socialism, means power in the hands of an organised and armed people. This is the opposite of state centralism, and it is something which will be a matter of fact and a matter of popular will when it happens. You must have an eye on that, and not spend all your time watching and waiting for Jacob Zuma to do something that you can call a betrayal, so that you can declare that everything is lost until the second coming of Leon Trotsky. I exaggerate, but only to highlight the truth. I hope you get the point.

Lose your fear of street committees!

A Luta Continua!

Domza.

2008/9/11 Berend Schuitema <okhela at iafrica.com>

Bet Zuma will do something of the same. A pen strike pulling to bottom out of asset values, and taking over the debt of the middle classes for the price of an apple and an egg. Certain sarcasm my comrade seems to have missed. Remember this Roubini is one of the favourite establishment mavericks. Much more so that neither Obama Bin Laden of Wacky McCain

Subject: Re: [DEBATE]: Welcome to USSRA

If only!

If only it was that simple!

Revolution by the stroke of a pen: great!

Those who believe that such things are possible are forever burdened with a sense of disappointment and betrayal.

For example, the day after Jacob Zuma takes office they are going to say: Look, he has not made the pen-stoke! He has betrayed us! We must look for Mr Right, or perhaps that's Ms Leftist, so that we can be sure she will sign the decree of socialism on day one!

Domza "Power to the People", VC

 2008/9/11 Berend Schuitema <[okhela at iafrica.com](http://lists.fahamu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debate-list)>:

Comrades Bush, Paulson and Bernanke Welcome You to the USSRA (United

Socialist State Republic of America)

Nouriel Roubini | Sep 9, 2008

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> DEBATE mailing list

> [DEBATE at debate.kabissa.org](http://lists.fahamu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debate-list)

> <http://lists.kabissa.org/mailman/listinfo/debate>

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> DEBATE [mailing](http://lists.fahamu.org/pipermail/debate-list/2008-September/016276.html) list

> [DEBATE at debate.kabissa.org](http://lists.fahamu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debate-list)

> <http://lists.kabissa.org/mailman/listinfo/debate>

Blog at: <http://domza.blogspot.com/>

Communist University web site at: <http://amadlandawonye.wikispaces.com/>

Subscribe for [free](http://lists.fahamu.org/pipermail/debate-list/2008-September/016276.html) e-mail updates at:

<http://groups.google.com/group/Communist-University/>

Library of documents (CU "CD") at: <http://cu.domza.net/>

[dominic.tweedie at gmail.com](http://lists.fahamu.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/debate-list)

**Footnote 2: Operation Vula, 'Opening the way'**

As well as establishing lines of communication between Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela, the 'opening of the way' imported huge quantities of arms into KwaZulu-Natal.

In a new book about Mac Maharaj, Padraig O'Malley writes extensively about Operation Vula, 'Opening the way', the underground operation which was initiated in the late 1980s to facilitate the return of exiled leadership into the country. Commanded by Oliver Tambo, the ANC president in exile, and Joe Slovo, the chairperson of the South African Communist party, Vula was one of the ANC's most effective operations. O'Malley writes that Vula was a sophisticated, secret arms-importation business as well as a propaganda and crisis-management operation in the mass democratic movement. Vula opened lines of communication between Tambo in Lusaka and Nelson Mandela, then in Victor Verster prison, and affected the course of the struggle. Maharaj, as the commander of the operation within South Africa, faced untold intrigue.

The story of Vula is complex: its narratives overlap, intertwine and run off in different directions. They are rich in tension, spiced with comrades' often not-too-kind comments about each other, ringing with the voices of strong personalities, a human drama as much as a political drama. And all under the nose of the Security Branch (SB), which boasted that no ANC operation was beyond its reach, while blithely unaware that it had been penetrated at the highest level. Information from its security files was going directly to ANC intelligence in South Africa, which fed it to Vula before dispatch to Lusaka.

In December 1988, four months after Maharaj and [Siphiwe] Nyanda had crossed the Swazi border into South Africa, Tambo wrote to Mac:

"We need a sustained, ever growing and expanding military offensive. But we are unable to take off in any significant manner. We hit one disaster after another, continuously, year in and year out, precisely because we sought to run before we could walk, and kept on walking.

"Vula must not follow the beaten path - it's a minefield. Vula must strike out on a new road - to lay the indispensable foundations for a viable armed struggle by first creating, building and consolidating a strong, resilient, extensive political network that is self-protective, absorb shocks.

"This is precisely the task Vula has started tackling with startling vigor and effectiveness. In the result much has been achieved but much, much more has yet to be done, especially in consolidating the ground already covered…"

Yet more than a year beforehand, Tambo had instructed Thabo Mbeki to [meet](http://www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za/articles10/vula.html) with a group of Afrikaner "intellectuals" led by Willie Esterhuyse, a Stellenbosch University professor who had contact with PW Botha and other senior South African government officials.

The first meeting took place in October 1987. Over the following 18 months, the Afrikaners and ANC officials, the groups varying in size and composition, met on a dozen occasions at Mells House Park, outside Bath in Britain. On the ANC side, Mbeki and Jacob Zuma were the key players.

The Afrikaners would become proxies for the National Intelligence Service (NIS) in exploring opportunities for a negotiated settlement. The [ANC's] National Working Committee received briefings on the substance of these meetings, although it did not become privy to the NIS connection until October 1989.

Giving his benediction to both Thabo Mbeki and Maharaj in their endeavors reflected Tambo's holistic approach to the struggle. Like any good CEO, he understood that in a volatile political marketplace you diversify your political holdings. Prudence required him to plan for different outcomes.

Thus he had to plan for a seizure of power, as well as for a protracted armed struggle, ways of balancing the four pillars of struggle, strangling the regime through economic isolation, and a negotiated settlement. Each course of action had to be pursued. The various pursuits were interrelated: Maharaj's Vula and Mbeki's Mells House Park talks complemented each other.

Tambo orchestrated the efforts of both and he knew, too, as a result of the visits of Ismail Ayob and George Bizos to Lusaka, that Mandela was in contact with the South African government.

It has sometimes been insinuated that Mbeki opposed the armed struggle as early as the onset of the 1980s. If so, whatever misgivings he may have expressed about it in private were not consonant with his behaviour within party and ANC structures. As one of the six members of the SACP politburo, the party's highest organ, he had a role in formulating and approving "Path to Power", the party's blueprint for destroying the apartheid regime.

"Path to Power" was presented to the party at its conference in Havana in April 1989. Mbeki chaired discussion of the document and did so brilliantly, according to Joe Slovo.

"Path to Power" forcefully advocated seizure of power as a way forward, even as Soviet expansionism was visibly crumbling. It was adopted as the party's manifesto to great acclaim, much of it for the intellectual impresario who had conducted the proceedings with such panache.

At a pivotal meeting of the national executive committee (NEC) in February 1990, within a week of Mandela's release, when there was a wide-ranging discussion of how the ANC should proceed in such circumstances, Mbeki countenanced that "[we] need to correct [the] position that creation [of understanding] will make armed struggle unnecessary".

Nor did Mbeki at any time, either in the NEC or the politburo, or to Tambo or Slovo in private, convey reservations about Vula.

Moreover, after Mandela was released and had taken charge, he authorized that Vula continue its clandestine operations even though the ANC was then legal. Between August 1988 and May 1990 Vula embedded itself in Natal and to a lesser extent the Witwatersrand. Huge quantities of arms were imported and stored across South Africa, ready for the day of insurrection. Vula was probably the ANC's most successful operation. At one point, in response to a report from Maharaj on Vula's activities, Tambo enthused: "The report is remarkable for its scope and its detail. It gives a clear vision of the immense potential of the Vula concept but also its tremendous yield in terms of what has been achieved within a short period of time. To Adam [Mac] and Sylvester [Nyanda], Bravo!"

Vula established a direct line of communication between Mandela and Tambo at a delicate moment in the ANC's engagement with the white regime.

Within the mass democratic movement, a "core committee" was established, including Cyril Ramaphosa, Sydney Mufamadi, Reverend Frank Chikane and Father Smangaliso Mkhatshwa, who "set" the political agenda for Cosatu and the United Democratic Front in consultation with Lusaka via Maharaj. Maharaj smuggled a draft of the Harare Declaration to Mandela and whisked his comments and those of nine other internal leaders back to Lusaka within 10 days. Nyanda trained Umkhonto weSizwe cadres for a people's army - not for present deployment on the ground - and gave them a familiarity of the geopolitical landscape. Vula provided logistical and manpower support for the war in KwaZulu-Natal, and conveyed to Lusaka a copy of Mandela's memorandum to PW Botha before Mandela's meeting with him in July 1989.

In April 1989, Maharaj contained the frenzy that erupted when Mandela was perceived by some senior members of the mass democratic movement to be "selling out".

He provided feedback and analysis on the crisis around Winnie Mandela's involvement in the death of a child activist, a situation that would have caused immense trouble for Mandela on his release, pulling him between his wife and the mass democratic movement that had condemned her.

The accomplishments directly attributable to Vula were real and affected the course of the struggle.

After Maharaj informed Tambo that he could open a line of direct communication between Tambo and Mandela, Tambo withheld approval until Maharaj could satisfactorily assure him on two counts ("Firstly, exactly how would you ensure & be certain that the enemy was not picking up on the disclosure of your response to M [Mandela]? Secondly, how would you demonstrate to M the operation of the secret line and ensure in that in the process the enemy is kept permanently unaware?")

Within weeks Maharaj, who had first proposed opening a line of communication five months earlier, in November 1988, was able to convince the ever cautious Tambo to give him the nod.

Vula also compelled Lusaka to face harsh realities that challenged cherished shibboleths, but at the same time reinforced the need for operations like Vula itself. Vula had to try to disabuse Lusaka of some of its misconceptions about how spontaneous but chaotic youth uprisings could be used. The youth imposed their ideas of revolution, and infighting muddied the waters.

In the absence of a real MK presence, self-armed youth took it upon themselves to impose their rule in townships that by now really were "ungovernable".

The mass democratic movement was at the coal face. It got there not by following some battle plan handed down by the ANC in Lusaka, but by using the people - the grassroots and the instruments the masses used to organize themselves to disrupt, disorientate and engage the regime at street level and on the economic front. But it was vital that such efforts be co-ordinated with those of the ANC, and Vula played a significant role in that process.

The quality of the leadership in the mass organizations was always bothersome and, in one frank exchange, two pivotal UDF leaders bluntly told Tambo and Slovo that a broad-based leadership simply didn't exist.

Both Harry Gwala, a former Robben Island prisoner and veteran Stalinist leader of the SACP and the ANC in the Natal Midlands, and Govan Mbeki, who was released from Robben Island in November 1987, presented problems of a different kind. Gwala, once back in Natal after his release in November 1988 and disgusted with the derelict state of the political organizations, decided to remedy matters on his own terms. The Natal heartland was the scene of some of the fiercest fighting between the UDF/ANC and Inkatha, and Gwala declared a scorched earth policy on Inkatha.

Among all ANC leaders, Gwala came closest to being a warlord in his own right. He was not inclined to take orders from anyone. He ranted about a so-called Indian cabal, and ranted when he learned that Maharaj, an Indian, had been charged with setting up the ANC's underground.

Yet Gwala had to be brought into line. A working accommodation was reached between him and Maharaj, his "loose talk" halted. But, when he finally agreed to meet Maharaj, he did so in circumstances that maximized Maharaj's public exposure.

Govan Mbeki was the first of the Rivonia trialists to be released. He saw himself as the head of the ANC in the country. He immediately became involved with the UDF, its tactics and strategies. Lusaka gave him permission to set up structures in the Port Elizabeth region, but Mbeki, too, was his own man and began to extend his mandate to the whole country, without proper authorization from Lusaka.

He established a National Collective and recruited national figures in the mass democratic movement. This presented Lusaka with problems. Mbeki was an icon of the struggle, especially in the Port Elizabeth region, to which he was now restricted. He was not someone who could easily be told what to do.

Members of the mass democratic movement - unaware of the constraints on his theatre of operation Lusaka was attempting to impose - would follow Mbeki's directions, believing them to have the imprimatur of Lusaka.

Since the Security Branch had Mbeki under surveillance at all times, his more militant actions endangered not only himself but the leadership of the mass democratic movement. He, too, had to be brought into line, but with great subtlety and sufficient deference.

The narrative of Vula and the role it played in the struggle against apartheid is chronicled in the communications (comms) transmitted, via London or Amsterdam, between Vula operatives and Lusaka.

To read them is to see they are part spy novel, part cartoon. There are mix-ups and foul-ups; there are ANC spies spying on ANC spies.

They expose the bureaucratic nightmare of ANC inefficiency in Lusaka, but provide riveting details of the setting up of a direct and secure line between Tambo in Lusaka and Mandela in Victor Verster prison. To succeed, Vula had to become an underground within the ANC itself. But also running through the Vula comms is a tangible sense of excitement: of being behind enemy lines and relaying its movements to the outside.

The comms between Tambo, Slovo and Maharaj are exercises in exquisite minimalism. The voices become interchangeable, harmony of language achieved, the ANC in exile speaking as if it were on the ground in South Africa, the mass democratic movement relaying the same messages to the masses.

‘Shades of Difference; Mac Maharaj and the Struggle for South Africa’ by Padraig O'Malley (Penguin, R240) will be available in stores on May 10

With acknowledgements to Sunday Independent.

<http://www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za/articles10/vula.html>

**Section C: Apartheid was a money spinner.**

The armed struggle against Apartheid could have been ended almost a decade before it actually did, as peace talks had been put in progress in the late 1970’s. However, the struggle was kept alive by the Crown both within the South African government as well as the liberation movements for as long as possible. This is discussed in detail in Attachment 10 - South Africa is bound as a possession by the Crown.

During the armed struggle against the Apartheid government there were four key role players who benefited the most from Apartheid, as follows:
1. The Israeli government who supported the Apartheid government;

2. The South African Communist Party/African National Congress leadership who received international funding for the liberation movement.

3. The Soviet government which sold arms to the liberation movements.

4. The elite National Party government who were paid off to engage South Africa in the armed struggle, to end Apartheid, and hand over governance to the African National Congress.

All four these role players have one thing in common: they support the New World Order ideal of the Crown.

Zionism and Communism as tools to create the New World Order are discussed in Attachment 11: The modus operandi of the Crown.

To bear in mind that the Crown has used the strategy of a controlled conflict since its unexpectedly drawn out three year war against the Boers, and uses Zionism and Communism to achieve their ideal, it is interesting to note that all the key role players in the anti-Apartheid struggle were directly or indirectly under orders from the Crown, and subscribed to Communism or Zionism, or both.

At the time of the Apartheid struggle, the Israeli government leaders were Zionists;

The African National Congress was led by the South African Communist Party of which the principal leadership was Zionists;

The Soviet government of Communism was established by Zionists;

The elite National Party was led by its Military Intelligence services, which was controlled by Cabinet Minister Pik Botha, who subscribed to the teachings of Samuel Huntington, a Zionist. All the National Party Cabinet Ministers had been chosen from the Broederbond group, and the Broederbond was funded, established and controlled by Zionists.

**1. Apartheid was a money making racket for the Zionist government of Israel**

The country which benefitted most from the South African economy during the time period that sanctions had been put in place against South Africa was Israel.

‘Israel's Most Illicit Affair’ is a book by Glenn Frankel issued 24 May 2010, which reveals Israel’s secret relationship with apartheid South Africa, from which we quote the following:

“As bureau chief for the ‘Washington Post’ in Southern Africa and Jerusalem in the 1980’s, I squandered a lot of hours trying to pierce the iron curtain that the two countries carefully drew around their strategic partnership. I reported the various estimates that the arms trade between the two amounted to anywhere from $125 million to $400 million annually -- far beyond the $100 million that the International Monetary Fund reported as total imports and exports in the mid 1980’s. Soon after arriving in Jerusalem in 1986, I asked Ezer Weizmann, a former Israeli defense minister and champion of the secret partnership, about the uncanny resemblance between Israel's Kfir fighter jet -- itself patterned on the French Mirage -- and South Africa's newly minted Cheetah. He just smiled at me and replied, "I've noticed that as well."

Now comes Sasha Polakow-Suransky, who is an editor at Foreign Affairs magazine, a Rhodes Scholar, and an American Jew whose parents immigrated to the United States from South Africa. His singular achievement in his new book, The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa scheduled for publication on May 25, is to have unearthed more than 7,000 pages of heretofore secret documents from the bowels of South Africa's Defence Ministry, Foreign Ministry, and Armscor, the state defence contractor, including the secret 1975 military cooperation agreement signed by defence ministers Shimon Peres and P.W. Botha.

The Israeli government sought to block release of the pact to the author, but the post-apartheid South African government ignored its protests. The black-majority government, led by the African National Congress, "is far less concerned with keeping old secrets than with protecting its own accumulated dirty laundry after 15 years in power," Polakow-Suransky notes. Beyond locating the secret papers, he also interviewed South Africans and Israelis who played key roles in forging and promoting the partnership. The result is the best-documented, most thorough, and most credible account ever offered of the secret marriage between the apartheid state and Israel.

(By way of disclosure, let me add that Polakow-Suransky thanks me in his acknowledgements, although he needn't have; I only bought him a cup of coffee and passed on a handful of names and numbers when he approached me about this project some five years ago.)

Polakow-Suransky puts Israel's annual military exports to South Africa between 1974 and 1993 at $600 million, which made South Africa Israel's second or third largest trading partner after the United States and Britain. Military aircraft updates in the mid-1980s alone accounted for some $2 billion, according to correspondence he obtained. He puts the total military trade between the countries at well above $10 billion over the two decades.”

Close negotiations between the Apartheid government and the Zionist government of Israel is discussed earlier in Section A. 1. Please note the following financial gains which boosted the Israeli economy which resulted from these negotiations as follows:

**A. Israel benefitted by the warfare between South Africa and the anti-Apartheid**

 **opposition by supplying armaments (goods) to the Apartheid government as**

 **well as providing staff for and training in warfare operations (services).**

After the 1967 “Israel’s war” (which resulted in the occupation of substantial areas of Jordan and Egypt) a team of South African military observers is reported to have flown to Israel "to study tactics and the use of weapons". Israel was also said to have offered the Apartheid regime weapons ‘captured’ during the 1967 fighting. The South African Treasury immediately permitted South African Jews to transfer $20.5 million to Israel.

Independent African countries disapproved of the forced occupation by Israel of Arab states. The South African government, almost totally bereft of friends due to her Apartheid government by the late 1960’s, quickly came to Israel's aid. The currency-hoarding South African Treasury immediately permitted South African Jews to transfer an extra $20.5 million to Israel.

The white government itself sent replacement weapons and aircraft. After the French embargoed arms shipments to Israel, South Africa, which had also received a great part of its arsenal from France, "ran an emergency service, supplying Israel with just about all the components it wanted.

After the June 1967 war - four years after the UN's first embargo on arms sales to South Africa - Israel began to sell weapons to the white minority SA government.

While preparing for another war against her neighbors, Israel sought financing. Frequent visits back and forth between Israel and South Africa increased in status, as well as in number, including a fundraising mission by the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in South Africa during 1973. After the war took place in the fall of 1973, Moshe Dayan was hosted by the South Africa Foundation in 1974.

The war also drew 1,500 Jewish volunteers from the Apartheid state. Also, the Pretoria government permitted South African Jews to send over $30 million to Israel.

A scandal breaking in 1975 over CIA "dirty tricks" in Angola led Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to suggest to Israel that it help South Africa with its invasion of Angola. Israel complied with Kissinger's request by sending counter insurgency weapons and instructors.

In July 1975, a former Israeli intelligence chief said that senior Israeli military officers were giving South African troops counter-insurgency training. The Economist said Israel had stopped short of sending the troops which Kissinger had wanted, but that the Israelis took his suggestion as a green light for developing a closer relationship with South Africa.

Although the 1976 Vorster agreements marked the beginning of a large and systematic commerce in arms, it by no means launched the sanctions-busting commerce in weapons between Israel and South Africa. Israel had already sold to South Africa an assortment of military gear, and, by one account, had imported Chieftain-type tanks from South Africa.

**a) The Israeli military industry boomed after the armed struggle against the South African government started**

In 1970, the Israeli military industry was supplying 40 percent of Israel's military needs. Production run solely for the domestic market resulted in high costs per item. The longer production runs necessary to lower unit costs created an imperative to export. The government began a concerted marketing campaign, through diplomatic and military contacts, as well as news releases and exhibits at fairs. In later years a sales force of retired military officers eager for commissions fanned out over the globe.

By the Development of Israel's Arms Industry, Israel found a huge market where to offset her armaments in South Africa after the African National Congress became the face of an armed struggle embarked on against the Apartheid government in 1973.

While the secrecy of the Israeli government makes it impossible to calculate the exact volume of Israel's weapons sales abroad, the sudden surge in sales of armaments by Israel is notable from this period onward. The general consensus of analysts of the international arms trade indicates that between 1972 and 1980 Israel's arms exports soared, particularly in the latter part of that span, rising from $50 million to top $1 billion, and, with the possible exception of 1983, had remained over $1 billion annually. A 1986 estimate puts annual sales at "more than $1.25 billion". Since 1982 Israel has been ranked among the world's top ten arms producers.

According to reports in 1990, the importance to the overall economy of the arms manufacturing sector also increased, with weapons exports estimated to have comprised 31 percent of industrial exports in 1975, up from 14 percent in 1967 and in the early 1980’s 30 to 40 percent of Israel's industrial output. The arms industry employs "anywhere from 58,000 to as many as 120,000 Israelis," or, taking the lower figure, percent of the industrial labour force, with the biggest unit, Israel Aircraft Industries, the nation's largest employer, carrying 20,000 on its payroll.

**b) The sale of Israeli weapons to South Africa**

Before Section 508 of the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 pried out the information that Israel did hundreds of millions of dollars per year of military business with South Africa, Israel always denied any arms dealings at all. The assertion of Defense Minister Rabin, that "whatever happens Israel has to maintain its credibility with the U.S. and Israel has never played tricks with the U.S.," is less than satisfying after the Iran-contra revelations and the Pollard spy case.

Although it is difficult to pinpoint precisely the date of sale of Israeli weapons to South Africa, following the Vorster agreements Israeli military sales to South Africa increased dramatically. Israeli equipment deployed in South Africa includes mortars, electronic surveillance equipment, radar stations, anti-guerrilla alarm systems and night vision devices, "high technology equipment for a squadron of South African helicopters," "a large number of Soviet-made artillery pieces and eight Reshef long-range missile boats, two of which were supplied with helicopter decks and sophisticated electronic gear”.

South Africa also bought six Dabur patrol boats (for $300,000 each) and equipped them (and its own German-built corvettes) with Gabriel surface-to-surface missiles for the Israeli craft.

 South Africa was also thought to have bought Israeli Shafrir (heat-seeking) missiles sometime around 1978.

It is equally difficult to try to pinpoint the amount of money involved in these transactions. A 1976 assessment by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies said that Israel and France were South Africa's "primary suppliers." A 1977 report said Israel had received $100 million worth of orders from South Africa that year. More recent reports have varied between $50 million and $800 million annually.
Nonetheless, with the official curtailment of British and French weapon transfers to the white government, Israel became a lifeline for the apartheid regime - and apartheid became a gold mine for Israel. In its 1981 Yearbook, the respected Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) lists South Africa as the major customer for Israeli arms, taking 35 percent of the total prior to 1980.

After the well documented sales of the 1970’s, and especially with the imposition of the UN's 1977 mandatory arms embargo, secrecy on arms shipments remained nearly absolute until 1986-87 when a great deal became known. Although the statistics suggest the sale of numerous weapon systems in great quantity, very little is known about what has actually changed hands. This is because of the overarching secrecy observed by all facets of the Israeli arms industry, and the obvious need of the South Africans to avoid revealing the source of their imported arms.

Despite this decade of secrecy, a few sales have become known.

The South Africans have been steady purchasers of Israeli electronic "security" fencing. This is the early warning barrier Israel has strung around its own borders. Microwave devices and infra-red devices alert soldiers to those intruders who are not snared by the anti-personnel mines which are part of the package. The South Africans call the system a "ring of steel'' and have said that other border areas near Mozambique and Angola are "riddled with anti-personnel mines manufactured in Israel".
Although the Israelis have variously insisted that they scrupulously respect the 1977 UN embargo, or that their arms sales to South Africa do not include weaponry that could be used for internal repression, a 1986 report on National Public Radio proved them wrong on both counts. Listeners to 'Morning Edition" on January 13 heard a tape of Israeli military industries salesmen making sales pitch to two delegations of South African "security men." Tear gas and smoke gas grenades were being demonstrated. During its almost perpetual state of emergency, South Africa has used a great deal of tear gas.

During the broadcast an Israeli professor told "Morning Edition" that none of South Africa's other trading partners" are quite as intimately involved in security matters, in the preservation of apartheid through force," as Israel is.

Israel has sold South Africa one or more "drones" (remotely piloted spy planes). In 1983, one of these camera- laden aircraft shot down over Maputo, Mozambique still bore its IAI factory markings.

Two leaks about arms shipments in 1986 are indicative of what had passed between Israel and South Africa on a regular basis. One arms shipment included 50 Gazelle helicopters, armored cars, cannons, mortars, 20,000 automatic rifles and 12,000 machine guns purchased from Egypt on Israel's behalf by Adnan Khasogghi, the infamous international arms dealer, after Egypt rebuffed a direct Israeli attempt to purchase them. They were shipped to Israel and from there immediately sent to South Africa. (Another ten helicopters from Zaire were also included in this shipment.)

While the South Africans were probably eager for the helicopters, it was likely that the small arms was passed along to one of the mercenary forces, Unita, or the "Mozambican National Resistance," attacking the Frontline states.

Late in the year, converted Boeing 707 aircraft appeared in South Africa. There were four to six in all, and Israel had outfitted them as dual in-flight refueling platforms and flying electronic warfare stations. Far beyond anything available to any other African government, these aircraft gave South Africa command of the entire continent.

There is no way of gauging the frequency and magnitude of similar sales which escape detection.

The South African publication Interconair stated, "thanks to the friendship which binds us to Israel...we have succeeded in creating a nucleus of modern ships based on fast-attack and missile craft derived from the Israeli Reshef." This appreciation was not merely for Israeli willingness to sell missile boats; nor was it simply to buy and sell weapons outright that Israel and South Africa hammered out their 1976 agreements. Instead, the agreements centered on South Africa's willingness to finance some of Israel's costlier military projects. Israel was to reciprocate by supplying weapon systems and training... Israel was asked to fill [South Africa's] needs for naval, armored, electronic and counterinsurgency equipment.
In the case of the Reshef patrol boats, after selling the first three outright to and training South African officers, the Israelis licensed the South Africans to produce nine. The South Africans call their Reshef the ‘Minister’, or ‘Minister of Defense’ (MOD). Israel also licensed South Africa to produce the 65-foot Dabur patrol boat.

The transfer of ready-to-use weaponry, however, is overshadowed by other aspects of Israeli military collaboration with South Africa, which have been instrumental in South Africa's achieving a high degree of immunity from the effects of international sanctions, in part through an extensive weapons industry of its own.

**c) Nuclear missile sales**

In 1986, experts said that Israel and South Africa were undoubtedly in the process of developing a nuclear missile-testing range in conjunction with a $6 million mile-long airstrip South Africa was planning to build on Marion Island, halfway between Antarctica and the southern coast of South Africa.

Israel served as the official ‘end user’ of armaments such as the Space Research Corporation (SRC) 155 mm howitzer, developed to launch satellites, and also capable of firing miniaturized nuclear shells, which it delivered to the then sanctioned South African government. In a welter of phony addresses and illicit shipments, the conspirators also accomplished the transfer to South Africa of the SRC howitzer blueprints and the machine tools necessary for its production. South Africa produced and marketed the howitzer as the G5 and G6; it is this artillery piece with its 250 mile range that was apparently used in the 1980 nuclear test mentioned above.

**d) The sales of war services by Israel to South Africa**

For more than a decade, the Apartheid government employed more than 20 000 Israeli engineers, and electronics and computer specialists which was a huge boost to the Israeli economy and disinvestment for South Africa.

Israeli Defense Forces personnel had been seconded to all branches of the South African armed forces, and according to senior sources in the Israeli defense establishment, there were some 300 active Israeli servicemen and women on secondment in South Africa. These included army, navy and air force personnel who helped train the South Africans, border security experts, counter intelligence experts and defense scientists who cooperate on the development of new weapons systems. In addition, there were several hundred South Africans in Israel at any one time, being trained in weapons systems, battle strategy and counterinsurgency warfare.

South African navy personnel, on a scale of about 50 to 1, were brought to Israel to train on the boats.

**B South Africa served as a door to Africa for Israel**

In the 1950’s, Israel sought friendship with African countries. Israel and its assistance programs were well received in Africa. Africans identified with Israel as a fellow graduate from British colonialism, and Israel's shirt-sleeve instructors were welcome for their egalitarianism.

The Israelis brought none of the political baggage that the former colonizers inevitably carried. Then too, many African leaders admired the rapid progress Israel had made in the social and technological integration of new immigrants, as well as its agricultural achievements. Along with the civilian expertise, military assistance was frequently given to friendly African governments.
During the 1960’s she signed co-operation agreements with 20 African nations.

By 1970, 2,483 Israeli experts had completed assignments in Africa in fields ranging from rural development to banking and construction; and 6,623 African trainees had come to Israel for training.
Ironically, one of the major fields of emphasis was trade unionism. Israel's labour federation, Histadrut, played a leading role in training African unionists and members of cooperatives.

Evidence began to mount afterwards which indicates that during its halcyon African days, Israel served as a conduit for money from the CIA.

After her attack on her neighbors in 1967, the African nations lost their faith in Israel as a freedom fighter and saw her as a dangerous aggressor.

**Sierra Leone**

A joint South African-Israeli operation called Liat set up shop in the West African nation of Sierra Leone.

**The Bantustans**

Attacks lodged at South Africa through her Bantustans allowed Israel entrance to their economies as it came to the aid of the Apartheid government.

The Israeli government provided development and military aid to the South African Bantustans charged to the expense account of the ‘Apartheid’ government.

**(i) Ciskei**

**Sales to the Ciskei**

In 1982, Israel signed an arms contract with the impoverished Ciskei. A twin engine jet once used by Israeli Prime Minister Begin was sold at a nominal cost, and "special weapons and knowhow" was also transferred to Ciskei. Included in the deal were the gift of a police dog to Charles Sebe, security chief and the brother of Bantustan "President" Lennox Sebe.

**Training given to Ciskei farmers**

In 1984, a group of farmers from Ciskei studied on Israeli kibbutzim and moshavim (communal and cooperative settlements, respectively).

**Israeli business was established in Ciskei**

By July 1984, there were 60 Israeli entrepreneurs operating in Ciskei. Ephraim Poran, former Prime Minister Begin's military secretary, went in with two other major Israeli industrialists to establish the Ciskatex textile factory.

In 1985, there were 200 Israelis-advisers and technicians as well as entrepreneurs in Ciskei.

Israeli investors became involved with auctioning, or subcontracting, of contracts - many of these were awarded without bids, often far above actual cost to South African companies. Many of the Israelis participating in these deals did so through shell companies.

A key contact for the Israelis was Dr. Hennie Beukes, the only white "minister"- his portfolio was "health" in Ciskei's "cabinet" - who was said to have acted as intermediary in many Israeli activities in Ciskei. These included two hospitals built by the Gur Construction Company which Ciskei rejected. (In their off hours, Gur's workers built a bar and swimming pool at Beukes' residence.)
Beukes also arranged for a $10 million pilot training project, which sent 18 trainees to Israel to receive training that critics charged was “inferior and overpriced”. It is unclear whether the training was for commercial or military aviation.

A South African paper noted that Ciskei had two air bases and said Israeli Air Force instructors were to give preliminary training to Ciskeians before they attended pilot classes in Israel.
Beukes also arranged the contracts for Israeli military advisers to work as bodyguards and military trainers in Ciskei. One company, Tammusits - owner a former Israeli artillery officer - made $300,000 a year providing security advisers to Ciskei "President" Sebe. Tammus was one of the first Israeli firms to have its Ciskeian contracts cancelled.

Ira Curtis, the Israeli owner of the flight school, also bribed the Ciskeians to choose U.S. aircraft, which he attempted to smuggle into the South African tribal reserve, over superior French aircraft. The planes were bought for Ciskei by listing Israel on the sale documents.

In 1984, the Israeli government was forced to reassure Pretoria that it was not involved in a scheme for cheap Israeli flights from Ciskei to Israel and on to Europe. Word of the flights, which would compete with the government-owned South Africa Airways, had sparked a South African government protest to Israel. The ‘apartheid’ regime warned that it would not be liable for Ciskei's debts for projects that were not in the category of "urgent development", and expressed its unease "over the intrusion of Israeli entrepreneurs and paramilitary advisers into its sphere of influence in the black homelands." The Israeli government then denied landing rights in Israel to Ciskei - even though Israeli entrepreneurs had convinced Ciskei's rulers to build an airstrip.

**Advantage was taken of cheap labour in Ciskei for Israeli products**

Other enterprises taking advantage of Ciskei's cheap labour were a plant of the apparel company Indian Head, Oren Toys and Classic Cars, an establishment belonging to former Finance Minister Yoram Aridor, which manufactures vintage automobile replicas. Bisho, the "capital" of Ciskei was "rife with stories of the 'fast buck' approach of Israeli entrepreneurs. An explicit look at their activities was provided in 1985, when a scandal burst into the international press as the "authorities" of Ciskei announced - via large advertisements in the Israeli press - that it had closed the Bantustan's trade mission in Israel and fired its Israeli representatives.

**(ii) Bophuthatswana**

During the 1980’s,Israel invested $45 million in Bophuthatswana agriculture, and trained youth in that tribal reserve after the model of its own "Nahal" (a program combining military training with agricultural development).

Israel also developed a television service for Bophuthatswana.

Israeli architects signed contracts for major public edifices.
An Israeli company moved into Bophuthatswana to manufacture sports shoes.

The international Sun City casino conglomerate was the first of its kind on southern Africa. The enormous influence Israel had on the South African government can be seen by the permission they gave for a casino in its area.

Israeli security mercenaries guard the casino tables at Sun City, the "interracial" gambling resort attached to the pseudo-state of Bophuthatswana." However, when Bophuthatswana opened a Tel Aviv office, Israeli officials were embarrassed.

**(iii) Swaziland**

A number of Israeli-joint-South African companies opened operations in Swaziland during the 1980’s.

**C. Israel’s international business relations increased through South Africa**

Sales on the international market by Israel increased as she sold banned South African products under her own name after sanctions against South Africa prevented other countries from buying her products. Israel also inflated its income from the service fees it charged while acting as a broker for South African businessmen.

**a) Oppenheimer sold his products via Israel while he funded the anti-**

 **Apartheid movements**

**Electronics**

Sanctions were called against South Africa because of its Apartheid policies. It is of interest to note that the National Party government was following instructions which Harry Oppenheimer had given them a blue print of on exactly how to govern as is discussed in Attachment 10 - South Africa is bound as a possession by the Crown. Attachment 10 also discusses the fact that Oppenheimer funded the anti-Apartheid movements. At a time when South African businessmen were not able to export their products, Harry Oppenheimer was able to export his products, and therefore diminished South African opposition in the business market, by using his contacts in Israel. Point in fact is Control Logic, which was a large electronics firm in South Africa, owned by the Oppenheimer holding company Anglo American. Control Logic mated with the Israeli Elron group to form Conlog, whose business was to springboard South African products from Israel.

**Diamonds**

Another product which Harry Oppenheimer continued selling during the time that sanctions promoted business relations with Israel, was diamonds. We discuss the fact that Oppenheimer was the major shareholder in both Anglo American Corporation and the De Beers syndicate in Attachment 20 - The Crown has kept control of the South African economy by keeping ownership of the South African Reserve Bank and the De Beers consortium.

Because the diamonds were sold from a London office by the South African De Beers syndicate, the Central Selling Organization, which has a lock on the world market for uncut stones, they did not appear in statistics of two-way trade between Israel and South Africa.

In the 1980’s, polished diamonds were Israel's largest single export item. To note that there is very little value added in the polishing.

In 1986, Israel imported diamonds to the value of $1.25 billion, and exported diamonds in 1986 to the value of more than $1.5 billion.

**b) Israel established sister companies in South Africa to produce more products**

 **for export**

Israel invested in South Africa by opening companies which she could connect to her own economy to increase her production profits. To point, Israel's Histadrut trade union federation, the parent of Koor, established the steel manufacturer in Israel called Iskoor. Iskoor established a sister company in South Africa owned by South African Jews. In South Africa, labour was plentiful and cheap. Products were exported from Iscor and sold as Iskoor products. Iskoor thus represented the South African steel industry in the European Economic Community.

In July 1984, the senior general manager of Iscor Ltd., the South African partner in Iskoor, met with Israeli leaders to discuss the consortium of South African companies and banks proposed to finance - to the tune of $250-$300 million - the completion of the Eilat rail road. "The railway to the Red Sea port city would spark new life into the nagging port facilities and would help speed South African exports to their destinations in Israel."

**c) Israel and South Africa established joint enterprises to create a doorway for**

 **South Africa to export her products through Israel**

 The actual amount of goods Israel has helped South Africa sneak into the market baskets of consumers is difficult to determine - especially since no one has tried very hard to unearth the facts. It has been known that in later cases, products were sold with no labels.

The Hanita kibbutz, which was affiliated with the labour movement, bought drills and other small tools from South Africa and re-exported them to Japan, South Korea, the European Economic Community and the United States. The products were sold with no marks to identify them as either Israeli or South African.

It was reported in 1980 that the Israeli government's agricultural marketing board, Agrexco, had sold South African fruit in the United States.

In 1981, The United Nations published a report containing the names of several companies and their products in which Israel and South Africa had joint interests:

* Koor - owned by Histadrut,
* Sentrachem - a Jewish owned South African fertilizer and chemical concern
* Israel's Polichrom and South Africa's Chemtra - exporting chemicals for

 the paints and plastics industries

* Transvaal Mattresses - exporting with Israel's Greenstein and Rosen
* Israel's Muenster foods, selling the South African brands Honey Crunch, Epol and Vital - but this did not contain the brand names under which South African products were sold abroad.

Zimcorn, an Israeli shipping company, and South Atlantic Corporation, a fishing enterprise, also entered mutually beneficial business projects.

A Johannesburg daily newspaper reported in November 1985 on talks which concerned Israel's fishing rights in South African waters, a better deal on credits for its coal imports, and, most significantly, increased South African investment and trade with Israel. The talks "highlight[ed] Israel as a potential weak link in the chain of international sanctions against South Africa."
The trip made international headlines and prompted intense speculation on the role of Israel (and the South African Jewish community) as "South Africa's insurance policy against isolation”. A statement issued after the talks, said they had been held in "a friendly atmosphere," and, "were fruitful and continued trade and financial cooperation is considered to be in the interest of both countries". It was also announced that South African investment in Israel would be allowed up to about $15 million during the coming year. Meanwhile, to revive its beached economy, Israel banked on a more sophisticated and aggressive marketing campaign for its exports to the U.S., and specialization in high technology development and exports, another area of vital concern to South Africa.

In early 1985, a South African delegation concluded a visit to Israel by secretly signing yet another agreement with Israel for cooperation in science and technology. According to similar reports in "Jane's" Defense Weekly, and the Israeli daily Ha 'aretz, the "joint ventures and projects in high technology fields" stipulated by the contract were worth $5 million. The agreement was negotiated by the Israeli ministries of finance and trade and industry. It was then approved by the Israeli cabinet.
The inclusion in the trade delegation that visited South Africa in August 1986 of a representative from the chief scientist's office points to yet another increase in Israeli cooperation with South Africa in the sphere of civilian technology. Israel and South Africa have held 14 joint scientific symposiums, nine in Israel and five in South Africa. The last one was held in 1984 at Ben Gurion University in the Negev. South African money has also been poured into Israel's Technion, the country's major scientific university. In 1984 the South Africa Advanced Manufacturing Systems Building and Laser Laboratory, financed by $1.5 million from South African, was dedicated.

It is in this institutional context that Israeli investment in South Africa must be regarded. At least a dozen major Israeli companies invested in South African operations, among them the military electronics firms noted above. Afitra, one of many companies owned by the Israeli labour federation Histadrut, who’s giant Koor was a major player in South Africa, marketed some of Israel's most sophisticated products (advanced software, computerized milling machines, emergency lighting systems, etc.) as well as products of Israel's kibbutzim, or collective farms. Another Israeli firm, Agri-Carmel, brought the latest Israeli agricultural developments to South Africa. Agri-Carmel was a partnership of the Israeli parastatal Agridev and the South African company Gerber Goldschmidt.

**d) Israel received at least 35% of the value of goods sold from South**

 **Africa to the United States of America**

In September 1985, the South African Ministry of Trade and Industry released an "Export Bulletin" reminding exporters: “[Companies] can use Israel as a production base from which they can export their goods duty-free to the U.S. provided value added in Israel is at least 35%~ of the article's value when it enters the U.S.”
A Johannesburg daily newspaper said that "Local companies...say they are being encouraged by senior Israeli officials.''

A November 1985 report noted a 53 percent increase of South African exports to Israel between the previous January and May."
Also in November 1985, the ‘apartheid’ government set up an office to coordinate "nonconventional trade" through "other countries". Several months earlier an Israeli businessman, Amnon Rotem, had offered himself to the South African government as "a middleman in channeling South African exports to European and American markets... duty free," and said the scheme would require "a large investment" by the government.

By year's end, "new strategies to counter the challenge on sanctions and boycotts by overseas political lobbies" were in place, and South Africa's exports had risen 44 percent in the first 10 months of the year over the corresponding period the previous year. "During the first two months of 1986, South African exports increased again by 25 percent over the first two months of 1985. Although it is not possible to establish a direct relationship with the increased South African exports, Israeli imports of merchandise did register a gain of 11.4 percent in the first five months of 1986 over the corresponding period in the previous year. In August 1986, the South African minister of trade and industry urged censorship of trade statistics, which "could easily be used by our adversaries...''

**D Israel received uranium from South Africa for payment**

In 1981, it was reported that South Africa had hired Israeli consultants "to advise on the safety aspects of its first two commercial reactors." As those reactors were being built by the French company Framatome, some thought it odd that Israeli, rather than French, scientists would be hired.

The Israeli advice, which according to intelligence officials "could assist the Government there to acquire the technological expertise to build nuclear weapons," came in exchange for uranium.

**E. Israeli put the Apartheid government out of pocket by giving them scandalous**

 **advice**

The ‘Muldergate’ scandal discussed earlier in sub-section 4: ‘A Jewish Conspiracy cost South Africa dearly’ put the South Africa out of pocket by at least $100 million in a fruitless attempt to improve the Apartheid government image when she followed instructions from Israel in 1975.

**F. Israeli entertainers in South Africa generated income for their homeland**

Throughout the time period of sanctions against the Apartheid government, the list of Israeli entertainers in South Africa topped the lists against much larger countries.

In April 1985 Yardene Arazi, a popular Israeli singer, went to South Africa to organize a celebration of Israel's Independence Day.
In July 1986 - one month after South Africa had called for a state of emergency - Israeli Foreign Minister and Alternate Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, cleared the Israel Chamber Orchestra for a tour of South Africa.

**G. Israel used irregularities to ensure South Africa took part in sports events in**

 **Israel**

Israel sold visas to about 200 South African athletes as “potential immigrants” to allow them into Israel to attend the 1985 Maccabiah Games at a time when sanctions against the Apartheid government did not allow South Africans to take part in international sports events.

**H. Training for black leadership in Israel generated millions**

In 1986, Israel provided leadership training to black South Africans which focused on unionizing black laborers. This project was promoted in Israel and in South Africa by Tom Hayden and the CFPO's fundraisers. They gained the endorsement of the Israeli government, and the Israeli foreign ministry defrayed part of the expenses of one of Shimshon Zelniker's trips to South Africa. The South African government carried the biggest part of this expense, which included the $1 million which CFPO planned to spend over a period of two years on the transportation, living expenses and training programs in Israel for 6 to 12 groups of South African trainees.

**I. Israel was able to expand its economy by investing in South Africa after**

 **sanctions were called against the Apartheid government**

Israeli investment in South African enterprises shot up in the 1980’s while American and European firms were leaving South Africa in droves.

**a) The Israeli Bank**

**The Israeli Bank negotiated a $50 million contract to ‘calm hostilities’ near Cape Town**

The Israeli Bank Leumi itself has about 1,000 South African stockholders. At the height of the civil turmoil in 1986, the Africa-Israel Company was negotiating a $50 million contract with the white South African government and a West German firm to build 1,700 units of housing for blacks near Cape Town "in order to calm hostilities there".

**J. Israel enjoyed profits from South African tourism**

Malchi Shipping Tours and Travel Ltd. of Haifa promised stops in the Seychelles and Durban and a tour through Kruger Park, Cape Town, Johannesburg and Sun City, the notorious entertainment complex in the Bantustan called Bophuthatswana. "World known Italian cuisine," enticed Malchi's advertisement, "more surprises every day!" The advertisement bore the logos of SATOUR, and SAA, the South African government's tourism agency and its airline.

There was also a 30 percent increase of South Africans travelling to Israel between July and September 1986. In October 1986 (when detentions under the state of emergency were being estimated in the thousands), the Director-General of Israel's Ministry of Tourism made a secret trip to South Africa. Rafi Farber "met important South African travel agents and discussed with them the possibility of increasing bilateral tourism through a public relations and marketing campaign." Farber also wanted South Africa to increase its investment in Israel's tourist sector.

**K. Israeli infrastructure was advanced through South Africa**

Israel was badly traumatized by the oil price rises of the 1970’s and by the abrupt cessation of its oil supply when the Shah of Iran was overthrown in 1978. It later returned the Sinai oil fields to Egypt under the Camp David Accords.

Although Israel's oil supply was guaranteed by the U.S. and Mexico, and was therefore not subject to the threat of boycott, there was no guarantee that the price would not climb again. Because of its refusal to sign the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, Israel was unable to find a country willing to help it build nuclear power plants. South African coal companies not only signed a series of contracts to deliver increasingly large allotments of coal to Israel for power generation, but South Africa also promised to join Israel in a naval escort should there be a problem with making deliveries. Israel was therefore able to build a new coal-fired generator and unloading facilities, moving aggressively toward coal-fired power plants.

Although originally an exception to South Africa's extraordinarily tight currency and trade laws, the export of Jewish contributions to Israel was expanded under the 1976 bilateral agreements as a unique dispensation for South African citizens to invest in approved projects in Israel. In 1980, the ‘apartheid’ government also gave permission for Israeli government bonds to be sold in South Africa.

While Israel was trying to minimize the extent of their country's economic relations with South Africa, often explaining that dealing with Pretoria enables South African Jews to get their capital out of the country, a South African newspaper pointed out: “...investors in Israel today include names off the company boards of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. For the individual or smaller corporate investor, there exists a handful of Israeli companies whose specific business is to attract [South African] and other foreign investment in joint ventures”.

In fact, raising funds from the Jewish community and boosting business links with South Africa go hand in hand. In 1982, on one of the annual meetings established under the 1976 agreements, Israeli Finance Minister Gideon Pat visited South Africa and: “[took] part in 17 meetings of the emergency [a reference to Israel's invasion of Lebanon that June] bonds fundraising group, will meet with economic officials and will see to increasing investments by South African companies in Israel”.

**South African capital has contributed to major Israeli infrastructural projects:** development projects in the Negev desert, a coal loading facility, a Mediterranean-Dead Sea water diversion project, a major insurance company, tourist and sports facilities, commercial and residential real estate, as well as a railroad linking Tel Aviv with the Red Sea port of Eilat. Other approved areas in Israel by South African investments include film production, oil exploration, and the purchase of shares in Israeli companies to increase production capacity, all areas of obvious benefit to South Africa.

In 1984 the South Africa Advanced Manufacturing Systems Building and Laser Laboratory, financed by $1.5 million from South African, was dedicated.
South Africa had a significant interest in the Israeli economy, providing 35 percent of all non-U.S. investment in the three years prior to 1984. This South African investment, "tens of millions of dollars...had been an important source of new funds for Israeli industry and construction."

**2. South African Communist Party/African National Congress leadership used**

 **international funding for the liberation movement to further their private**

 **enterprises.**

Funding for the anti-Apartheid movement was initiated by Zionist members from both inside

South Africa, and from the international communities, as discussed in Attachment 9 –

Objections to the formation of the Union of South Africa, Section D: International Objections to

the Union of South Africa

Millions of pounds flowed into the anti-Apartheid movement coffers. No records were kept of what these monies were applied for, or who spent it. Some of this money went into private business dealings for the anti-Apartheid struggle leaders, as is discussed in Attachment 17 - African National Congress in government, Section 2) How the African National Congress managed the power and funds entrusted to its care during the liberation struggle.

The anti-Apartheid struggle leaders enjoyed international fame, and hospitality as their air fares were donated to them for holidays in Russia, and various other ‘business meetings’ held in various countries.

**3. The Zionist Soviet government sold arms to the liberation movements.**

Russia benefitted from the anti-Apartheid struggle as it allowed the Soviet a gateway into Africa. African countries who supported the anti-Apartheid struggle, allowed Soviet comrades to enter their borders and set up training camps, storage facilities and various armaments to be used in the armed struggle against South Africa.

Funds donated to the anti-Apartheid struggle was also used to purchase arms, training and

further assistance from Russia. The role Russia played in support of the anti-Apartheid

struggle is further discussed in Attachment 9 - Objections to the formation of the Union of

South Africa, Section D: International Objections to the Union of South Africa.

The benefit Russia gains from the anti-Apartheid struggle is ongoing as the National

Democratic Revolution continues within the South African borders through the SACP/ANC alliance to turn South Africa into a Russian colony. Presently there is intense protests country wide in South Africa, bringing the economy to its knees as it moves from being a Socialist State government to Communist state governance. We quote from an article in IOL news in October 2012 that “the violent protests that have hit the mining, freight and manufacturing sectors – with thousands of workers striking for better pay – were destabilising and would weaken the rand, they said. A tough two years lay ahead.
“Unless we have sensible heads, we’re going to see a downward spiral for the next few years,” said Chris Hart, a senior economist at Investment Solutions. For more information on the strikes in South Africa during October 2012, See Footnote 1 – Destabilizing strikes of the National Democratic Revolution to bring about a Communist State of South Africa.

**4. The Zionist/Communist elite National Party government who were paid off to engage South Africa in the armed struggle, to end Apartheid, and hand over governance to the African National Congress**

Politicians were given financial remuneration for the parts they played in bringing about change in the political arena of South Africa in favour of the New World Order control which the Oppenheimers envisioned for South Africa since 1902.

The roles they played varied from laying the paths along which corruption could take place in South Africa as well as the illegal smuggling of her minerals, wealth and human slavery to creating pathways for leaks of sensitive information regarding the wealth and security of South Africa, up to voting in political structures and politicians who would further the ideal of a New World Order. This is discussed further in Attachment 10 - South Africa is bound as a possession by the Crown

**Footnote 1: Destabilizing strikes of the National Democratic Revolution to bring about a Communist State of South Africa.**

South Africa: Strikes
**SA set up for two years of hardship**
October 5 2012 at 07:46am
By Kevin Lancaster and Sapa
Durban - Analysts have warned of a weaker rand, job losses and business closures as strike action continues to sweep the country.
The violent protests that have hit the mining, freight and manufacturing sectors – with thousands of workers striking for better pay – were destabilizing and would weaken the rand, they said. A tough two years lay ahead.
“Unless we have sensible heads, we’re going to see a downward spiral for the next few years,” said Chris Hart, a senior economist at Investment Solutions
More on [http://www.iol.co.za/business/business-news/sa-set-up-for-two-years-of-hardship-1.1397017](http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iol.co.za%2Fbusiness%2Fbusiness-news%2Fsa-set-up-for-two-years-of-hardship-1.1397017&h=gAQHCO37NAQE7E0GY8dE4p1pkzqUkRHlE4H5qv4G8I7bBeg&s=1)

**Strike closes Amplats smelter**
Article By: Govan Whittles, EWN
Fri, 05 Oct 2012 8:50 AM
Anglo Platinum (Amplats) on Thursday closed its Thobela smelter after more than 1,000 miners marched to its Amandelbult operation in Limpopo.
The workers gathered at a stadium close to the smelter to finalize their demands.
Protest leaders said more than 8,000 Anglo workers are now on strike.

Miners from the Thobela smelter said their demands are in line with that of their colleagues at the Amplats operation in Rustenburg in the North West.
Miners are demanding a basic wage of at least R16, 000 a month.
They said they will make sure Anglo's operations in Amandelbult are brought to a standstill until their demands are met.
Workers also elected a strike committee of five men, who handed over a memorandum to management.
The committee's John Mtlandini said, “If management decides to close the mine that is their problem. From our side, we know that our demands are rational, reasonable and realistic.”
Miners then dispersed.
Police officers are maintaining a strong presence in the area.

**OTHER MINE STRIKES**
Thousands of workers at Gold Fields’ KDC Western mine in Carletonville gathered at a soccer field for a meeting on Thursday.
On Wednesday, the strikers handed over their weapons after they verbally promised to disarm.
Gold Fields spokesperson Sven Lunsche said they want to resolve the wage issue, but only through the proper structures.
“The strikers are, in our view, not organized and their strike is illegal. We want them to get back to work as soon as possible.”
Meanwhile, operations at Anglo Gold Ashanti's six mines remain closed following wildcat strikes. Around 24,000 of the company's 35,000 workers and contractors have been on strike since late September.
(Edited by Zethu Zulu)
[http://business.iafrica.com/news/819915.html](http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fbusiness.iafrica.com%2Fnews%2F819915.html&h=MAQFudRtxAQEpY-pexlE1sY4yau7QD5CiRNVR2xJiYfposg&s=1)

**Coal producers nervous as South Africa strikes spread**
By Jacqueline Cowhig and Agnieszka Flak | Reuters – 19 hrs ago
LONDON/JOHANNESBURG (Reuters) - Wildcat strikes by South Africa's platinum, gold, iron ore and diamond miners could spread to coal, potentially disrupting output from one of the world's biggest coal suppliers.
As many as 75,000 miners, or 15 percent of the industry's workforce in South Africa, are on strike, undermining already shaky growth in Africa's biggest economy and threatening to spread to coal despite big differences between the sectors.
Violent clashes during a six-week stoppage at platinum producer Lonmin resulted in the death of 46 people near the company's Marikana mine, close to the city of Rustenburg.
Coal majors and smaller firms said they are watching developments closely.
"There is potential for some noise (from the workforce), the situation should be manageable, but sometimes logic goes out of the window," said one executive at a mining major.
Some smaller miners said they could be more vulnerable.
[http://news.yahoo.com/coal-producers-nervous-south-africa-strikes-spread-122207204--business.html](http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fnews.yahoo.com%2Fcoal-producers-nervous-south-africa-strikes-spread-122207204--business.html&h=zAQFyt0PMAQGIb4BqO407zOv8UyKIGP4KFfpyuuIhZWpeVg&s=1)

**Three more Amplats mines closed**
October 4 2012 at 10:41pm
By Wendell Roelf
Cape Town - The Toyota Motor Corporation said it had been forced to shut its South African car factory for four days because of an illegal pay strike, the first sign of wildcat mine stoppages spreading into other parts of Africa's biggest economy.
Trade union leaders at the Japanese car giant's Durban plant said workers would return on Friday after winning a 5.4-percent pay rise inspired in part by a hefty increase won last month by strikers at Lonmin's Marikana platinum mine.
“The circumstances are not the same as what is happening in the mines,” said Mbuso Ngubane of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA).
“But it does send a message. It does have an impact to some extent on other workers getting agitated.”
After two months of unrest, at least 75 000 miners, or 15 percent of the sector's workforce, are on strike, compounding already sluggish growth just three months before an internal leadership vote in the ruling African National Congress (ANC).
[http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/three-more-amplats-mines-closed-1.1396793](http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iol.co.za%2Fnews%2Fsouth-africa%2Fthree-more-amplats-mines-closed-1.1396793&h=DAQHEfYp8AQEKctmuc9m3YIrgZZLcbW_l8BTNPHUfiWBJFw&s=1)

**PRODUCTION SUSPENDED AT SISHEN MINE**
Kumba has announced that it has suspended production at the Company's Sishen Mine where approximately 300 striking employees are blocking access to the pit. Production continued until last night from material stockpiles.
The mine has obtained a court order declaring the strike illegal. Efforts to try and engage the strikers are continuing and the Company is supplying them with food and water.
The strike started on Wednesday, 3 October 2012 however; in the absence of a formal engagement process their demands are still not clear. The strike is being handled in line with the Company's labour relations procedure, with due consideration to the safety of the majority of those workers who are not taking part in the illegal action and who wish to return to work. The mine employs approximately 12,700 workers.
[http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page72308?oid=330424&sn=Marketingweb+detail&pid=90389](http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.politicsweb.co.za%2Fpoliticsweb%2Fview%2Fpoliticsweb%2Fen%2Fpage72308%3Foid%3D330424%26sn%3DMarketingweb%2Bdetail%26pid%3D90389&h=tAQF8OlKxAQFvYy84mMnYO5yuKf8XBs0pCrO041FvHYCLIQ&s=1)

**Gold One suspends Ezulwini strikers**
Gold One International
04 October 2012
Company says affected employees invited to make representations against dismissal.

**Gold One Suspends Striking Workers at Ezulwini**
Gold One International advises that on Wednesday 3 October the company issued suspension notices to illegally striking workers at its Ezulwini operation, after repeated requests for workers to return to work were ignored.
The company obtained an interim interdict from the Labour Court of South Africa on 2 October, in terms of which the industrial action that began on 1 October 2012 was declared unprotected and unlawful. The court ruling also interdicted striking workers from participating in further industrial action. Employees on suspension have been invited to make representations on 5 October against dismissal, in accordance with the company's disciplinary code.
The South African Police Service is maintaining a strong presence at the operation to ensure that there are no acts of intimidation or violence. Shareholders will continue to be informed of further developments.
[http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page72308?oid=330434&sn=Marketingweb+detail&pid=90389](http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.politicsweb.co.za%2Fpoliticsweb%2Fview%2Fpoliticsweb%2Fen%2Fpage72308%3Foid%3D330434%26sn%3DMarketingweb%2Bdetail%26pid%3D90389&h=TAQFEQO8nAQHaoLRPEap4WYUmTw9FW3JmWXflVh_jHRu-mQ&s=1)

**Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and Kumba Iron Ore Limited among latest affected by strikes**
Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited (“Harmony”) confirmed yesterday that workers at their Kusasalethu mine near Carletonville, South Africa had embarked on an unprotected strike. Harmony’s Chief Executive Officer, Graham Briggs, urged employees to honour existing collective agreements and bargaining structures and encouraged them to engage through lawful established channels.
Unprotected strike actions also spread to Kumba Iron Ore Limited (“Kumba”), where a small number of workers had downed tools at the Sishen mine in the Northern Cape Province of South Africa. The workers had not presented clear demands and were not represented by any of the recognized unions. Most of the mine was unaffected as the strike actions were limited to one area.
[http://www.africanmining.com/news.php?id=297](http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.africanmining.com%2Fnews.php%3Fid%3D297&h=iAQFRQiJ9AQGQdv9ZOg72Zc781sRlK4WNDcL7cM6pH1wleQ&s=1)

**Update on strikes at AngloGold Ashanti Limited’s South African Operations**
CEO of AngloGold Ashanti Limited (“AngloGold”), Mark Cutifani, has expressed his disappointment in workers that had “chosen to break their commitment to the current wage and collective bargaining structures.”
Strikes commenced at the Kopanang operations and spread to the company’s remaining operations last week, bringing operations to a standstill. Cutifani expressed the company’s firm stance with regards to the unprotected strikes, stating that they would not reward broken commitments and violence. He further warned that the continued strike actions could lead to “premature downsizing” of the company’s South African operations.
[http://www.africanmining.com/news.php?id=284](http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.africanmining.com%2Fnews.php%3Fid%3D284&h=bAQFdwAwyAQEVmX01-BP8_1Vw6-PgCKz1sd2BvXV97StXjw&s=1)

**Miners down tools at Village Main Reef Limited’s Blyvooruitzicht mine**Workers at Village Main Reef Limited’s (“Village”) Blyvooruitzicht gold mine in South Africa downed tools to embark on an unprotected strike on Friday, 28 September 2012. The majority of the 1 700 workers who formed part of the National Union Mineworkers (“NUM”) had failed to report to their duties which prevented the night shift, and the day shift, from taking place.
The company’s management has maintained that it will continue to engage in constructive dialogue with the relevant parties and has expressed that it reserves the right to apply for a court interdict as the strike is considered unprotected.
[http://www.africanmining.com/news.php?id=283](http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.africanmining.com%2Fnews.php%3Fid%3D283&h=2AQGcRgIOAQFyLTqQpZE6fnNF56moMoGlxYFYFkUhZM-eiw&s=1)

**South Africa’s strike wave hits whole mining sector spreads to transport**
By Chris Marsden
28 September 2012
The strike wave that began at Lonmin’s Marikana platinum mine is now engulfing South Africa’s platinum, gold and coal mining industries and has spread to transport and other sectors.
In total, there are more than 100,000 workers on strike across South Africa.
On August 16, police opened fire on striking Marikana workers, killing 34 and wounding 78. The bitter struggle was called off only after the strikers had secured a 22 percent wage increase. Their determined stand has emboldened many more to go into struggle against the employers.
[http://www.wsws.org/articles/2012/sep2012/safr-s28.shtml](http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.wsws.org%2Farticles%2F2012%2Fsep2012%2Fsafr-s28.shtml&h=MAQFudRtxAQGLsSpLf22TrGfeK-YjN_wCj5JyWNcKYFbvfA&s=1)

**NUMSA leadership acts to end Toyota strike**
Mbuso Ngubane, 04 October 2012
Union says unprotected action triggered by an unprocedural increase for some workers
[http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page72308?oid=330503&sn=Marketingweb+detail&pid=90389](http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.politicsweb.co.za%2Fpoliticsweb%2Fview%2Fpoliticsweb%2Fen%2Fpage72308%3Foid%3D330503%26sn%3DMarketingweb%2Bdetail%26pid%3D90389&h=_AQFX8vg4AQHkEgLNDweIw2IxGTjfyWcudjxzoRE1EM5iXw&s=1)

**No sign of end to drivers' strike**
PHILANI NOMBEMBE, NASHIRA DAVIDS and KATHARINE CHILD | 05 October, 2012 00:00
Dozens of striking truck drivers seriously injured two of their colleagues in Boksburg, east of Johannesburg yesterday, setting alight two trucks.
At least four vehicles were torched in Western Cape.
Magretia Brown-Engelbrecht, executive officer of the Road Freight Employers' Association, said yesterday that two days of discussions with the help of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and the minister of labour, had "again failed to deliver a settlement".
Brown-Engelbrecht accused unions of ''shifting the goal posts".
She said no further talks were scheduled. Banks have moved to assure customers they can still withdraw money from ATMs during the strike.
Earlier this week, FNB and Capitec warned of possible cash shortages and advised clients to withdraw money from retailers if cash was not available at ATMs.
Luyanda Tetyana, Banking Association of SA spokesman, said the overall impact on the sector had been minimal because of contingency plans.
By yesterday, all 5700 FNB ATMs were working optimally.
Tetyana said Capitec ATMs were the worst affected.
Capitec spokesman Charl Nel said it had been loading ATMs with money since Monday but things were not yet back to normal.
<http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2012/10/05/no-sign-of-end-to-drivers-strike>

**Strike halts medical deliveries**
by Alistair Anderson, 28 September 2012, 06:14 | 1 Comments
MAJOR medical supplies company has stopped deliveries due to the nationwide strike of more than 20,000 truck and freight drivers.
Transport unions, of which the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (Satawu) is the biggest, are demanding a 12% pay increase. The employer body, the Road Freight Association, is not budging from its 6% offer.
Abbott Laboratories has halted all deliveries of diagnostic medical supplies in Gauteng.
This meant that a vital diagnostic and monitoring pathology services provider, Lancet Laboratories, would have to rely on reserves, its spokesman, Peter de Wet, said yesterday.
Satawu on Wednesday called on its members to intensify the strike, and asked workers in the maritime and airline sectors to join in. So far, those workers have not joined in material numbers.
<http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/labour/2012/09/28/strike-halts-medical-deliveries>

**Section D: The National Socialist led South African Communist Party got into**

 **government to further the foundation of Communist rule in South**

 **Africa under the cloak of the African National Congress**

The government formed by the new State President in 1994 after the inauguration of the African National Congress (ANC) as government of South Africa was not representative of Black majority rule. The government consisted of 27 ministers and 12 deputy ministers, apart from the President and two deputy presidents. Of the 18 African National Congress representatives in the Cabinet appointed by the President, at least 10 were members of the Communist Party, and several more suspected Communists. Of the nine deputy ministers representing the African National Congress at least four were Communists. The significance of this is that the South African Communist Party (SACP) on its own would not have been able to get a single member of parliament elected, yet it is in a commanding position in the government - in the name of majority rule under the cloak of the African National Congress.

**The President's men**

The list of office bearers as at the 1st of July, 1994 was as follows:

President:

Nelson Mandela (Wrote a book on how to be a good Communist, and was member of SACP as well as ANC).

Vice Presidents:

Thabo Mbeki (ANC, former member of SACP);

F.W. De Klerk (NP).

Minister of Justice:

Dullah Omar (SACP).

Deputy Minister of Justice:

Chris Fismer (NP).

Minister of Defense:

Joe Modise (ANC, Former Chief of Staff of uMkonto we Sizwe).

Deputy Minister of Defense:

Ronnie Kasrils (SACP).

Minister of Safety and Security:

Sidney Mafumadi (SACP).

Deputy Minister of Safety and Security:

Joe Matthews (IFP).

Minister of Education:

Sibusiso Bengu (ANC).

Deputy Minister of Education:

Renier Schoeman (NP).

Minister of Commerce and Industry:

Trevor Manuel (Alleged SACP).

Minister of Foreign Affairs:

Alfred Nzo (SACP).

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs:

Aziz Pahad (SACP).

Minister of Labour:

Tito Mboweni (SACP).

Minister of Post, Telecommunications and Broadcasting:

Pallo Jordan (Alleged SACP).

Minister of Health:

Nkozane Zuma (SACP, wife of Jacob Zuma, well-known Communist).

Minister of Transport:

Mac Maharaj (SACP).

Minister of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development:

Roelf Meyer (NP).

Deputy Minister of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development:

Mohammed Valli Moosa (SACP).

Minister of Land Affairs:

Derek Hanekom (Alleged SACP).

Deputy Minister of Land Affairs:

Tobie Meyer (NP).

Minister of Public Concerns:

Stella Sigcau (ANC).

Minister of Civil Service and Administration:

Zola Skweyiya (ANC).

Minister of Housing:

Joe Slovo (SACP).

Minister of Public Works:

Jeff Radebe (SACP).

Minister of Correctional Services:

Sipho Mzimela (IFP).

Minister of Finance:

Derek Keys (NP, but appointed by Mandela).

Minister of Agriculture:

Kraai van Niekerk (NP).

Deputy Minister of Agriculture:

Thoko Msane (ANC).

Minister of Sport:

Steve Tshwete (SACP).

Minister of Home Affairs:

Mangosuthu Buthelezi (IFP).

Deputy Minister of Home Affairs:

Penuell Maduna (SACP).

Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry:

Kader Asmal (alleged SACP).

Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs:

Pik Botha (NP).

Minister of Environment and Tourism:

Dawie De Villiers (NP).

Deputy Minister of Environment and Tourism:

Bantu Holomisa (ANC).

Minister of Welfare and Population Development:

Abe Williams (NP).

Deputy Minister of Welfare and Population Development:

Sankie Nkondo.

Minister of Art, Culture, Science and Technology:

Ben Ngubane (SACP).

Deputy Minister of Art, Culture, Science and Technology:

Winnie Mandela (Alleged SACP).

Minister without Portfolio:

Jay Naidoo (SACP)\*Resigned, replaced by Chris Liebenberg, long standing ANC confidant.

**Indians and Jews**

In this list was that the "majority rule" had four Indians (Omar, Naidoo, Maharaj and Asmal) as ministers and two as deputy ministers: Pahad and Valli Moosa), while Indians as a group would hardly have succeeded in getting so many representatives elected to the 400-strong parliament on a proportional basis. They were all Communists, although Asmal's membership has not been confirmed. Joe Slovo was a Communist Jew, and most probably also Trevor Manuel.

Apart from the equivocal position occupied by Derek Keys, there was only one English South African among the ministers and deputies, Alec Erwin.

The only Afrikaans- speaker representing the African National Congress, Hanekom, (suspected to be a Communist) was later joined by Chris Liebenberg, a nominal Afrikaner, in place of Derek Keys, who saw that it was impossible to reconcile sound financial administration with communist doctrine and the demands of trade union leaders.

**Communist tactics**

Another noteworthy fact is that several appointments of Ministers and deputies were made after the initial announcements of appointments. These were Steve Tshwete, Aziz Pahad, Winnie Mandela, Valli Moosa, Alec Erwin and Ronnie Kasrils. They were all Communists whose membership has been confirmed, except in the case of Winnie Mandela, who was suspected by the previous government of being a Communist. Their appointments were either withheld earlier in order to soften the impression of Communist domination, or they were made under pressure from the South African Communist Party and the more radical section of the African National Congress. This is of particular significance in view of the existence and operations of "the creeping coup" in the South African Communist Party revealed by The International Freedom Foundation in April 1991. It was initiated in the early eighties by Joe Slovo, Mac Maharaj, Ronald Kasrils and the deceased Chris Hani "to capture every senior position within the African National Congress". International Freedom Foundation said that this process was '"virtually complete". The Foundation revealed that only eight of the 35 member National Executive Committee (NEC) of the African National Congress were not Communists before the release of Mandela. After Mandela and Sisulu had joined the NEC the ratio was 26 Communists against ten non-Communists. The operations of this "creeping coup" are probably behind the late appointments of Communists as Ministers and deputy ministers.

**Key position**

Communists were appointed as deputies in key departments to act as watchdogs over the Ministers concerned and appear to had been marked as successors to the then incumbents - Ronnie Kasrils to replace Modise; Aziz Pahad to replace Nzo; Valli Moosa to take over from Roelf Meyer when "the National unity" ended; Alec Erwin to succeed Chris Liebenberg; Penuel Meduna to take over from Buthelezi when the simmering friction between the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party came to a head.

Other key positions were also secured by the appointment of Communists as Ministers. Pik Botha was so well trusted by the ANC-SACP that no African National Congress deputy was appointed to keep a watch on him. The appointment of deputies such as Fismer under Dullah Omar, Schoeman under Bengu, Tobie Meyer under Hanekom, and Joe Matthews under Mafumadi were evidently made as a gesture to the NP and the IFP. They had no authority or influence in the departments concerned, but would have to bear responsibility for whatever policies were applied by their ANC-SACP superiors.

**Money powers**

Mr. Harry Oppenheimer of the Anglo-American Corp is reported to have said that he "likes Mr. Mandela very, very much", which signifies a close relationship between the leader of a Communist dominated terrorist organization and the man who identified himself as the second richest man in the world - after the Sultan of Brunei. Oppenheimer further said that Mandela had sought his approval of two Cabinet appointments - probably those of Derek Keys and Pik Botha, the former having come from one of the companies closely associated with Oppenheimer, and the latter being a Freemason who is a holder of The Order of Malta (in the company of Dr Piet Koornhof, former Cabinet Minister and ambassador).Both departments - Finance and Mineral and Energy Affairs - were close to the heart of the money powers in South Africa and it is most likely that Oppenheimer would have sought to have "his men" appointed. The Order of Malta is discussed further in Attachment 18 - Attachment 18 Impact of the Union of South Africa on the nation created a select elitist ruling society, Sub-section C: The Order of Malta, Page 46

ATTACHMENTS AVAILABLE IN BOOK FORM:

BUNDLE 1: Attachments 1 - 3 <https://www.createspace.com/4392573>

BUNDLE 2: Attachments 4 - 8 <https://www.createspace.com/4398589>

BUNDLE 3: Attachments 9 - 10 <https://www.createspace.com/4416061>

BUNDLE 4: Attachments 11 - 14 <https://www.createspace.com/4400727>

BUNDLE 5: Attachments 15 <https://www.createspace.com/4415962>

BUNDLE 6: Attachments 15a <https://www.createspace.com/4497969>

BUNDLE 7: Attachments 16 - 18 <https://www.createspace.com/4415984>

BUNDLE 8: Attachments 19 - 26 <https://www.createspace.com/4416010>

BUNDLE 9: Attachments 27 - 30 <https://www.createspace.com/4416021>

BUNDLE 10: Brief <https://www.createspace.com/4437109>

BUNDLE 11: Brief Concordance <https://www.createspace.com/4497991>

BUNDLE 12: Attachment 15b, update of

genocide records, 2013 will be available during April 2014 on <https://www.createspace.com/4498007>