**Attachment 14: MK soldiers**

The African National Congress/South African Communist Party alliance incorporated a military wing to their movement which was called ‘Umkonto we Isizwe’, of which the combatants became commonly known as MK soldiers.

The full extent of damage to the economy and the lives of South Africans by Umkonto we Isizwe has never been revealed to the public, nor responsibility for such actions been taken by its leaders and supporters, both nationally and internationally. Not only have the lives of civilians in South Africa been adversely affected by operations carried out by MK soldiers, but the soldiers themselves have suffered adversely by Umkhonto we Isizwe operations.

**The Origin of MKULTRA**

Project MKULTRA, or MK-ULTRA, was the code name for a covert, illegal Central Intelligence Agency human experimentation program, run by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Scientific Intelligence. This official United States government program began in the early 1950’s, continued at least through the late 1960’s, and used United States and Canadian citizens amongst others.

Preceding the Central Intelligence Agency, activists who were used to destabilize governments were very active and used activities which included parachute landing infiltration of countries.

**Operation Paperclip**

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Central Intelligence Agency was established in 1946.

At the time the Central Intelligence Agency was established, it had to accept 500 revolutionaries in the Nazi army from Dr. Mengele. This was known as Operation Paperclip.

One of the effects of Operation Paperclip, was that the Central Intelligence Agency experienced an enormous infiltration of Nazi revolutionary mentality among the American Security Officers.

Central Intelligence Agency plans by the American operators which were paid for by the American tax payers, were often replaced or set aside to accommodate secret operations planned by the Nazi operators within the Central Intelligence Agency, who reported directly to the Dulles brothers - the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. These two men controlled the foreign policies on war of the entire United States, which included the interventions of the Cold War, the Atom Bomb projects, and all other actions during the 1940’s and 1950’s, assisted by Mr. Richard Helms, who was placed as a director of the Central Intelligence Agency after he had been a journalist who had interviewed Adolf Hitler. In effect, the western world was controlled by the mentality and personal views of just a few.

**Project MK- Ultra1**

The Central Intelligence Agency MK-Ultra project was started by Russians. They had politicians in both Russia and in the United States of America, approached by women prostitutes, who lured them into rooms prepared with hidden cameras. Once sexual escapades with these women had been caught on film, politicians would vote any budget put forward by the Central Intelligence Agency.

In the 1960’s Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, the then head of project MK-Ultra within the Central Intelligence Agency, took a plane to Belgium Congo, with a small suitcase full with poison which he intended to administer to Pierre Mulele in the Congolese. Although his mission failed, the Belgian Special Forces absorbed the details of the Central Intelligence Agency experiment, and brought the information back to Belgium.

The African child soldiers were a trainee project of the Central Intelligence Agency and the KGB, their programs from the Nazis’ experimentation in the concentration camps.

Although the United States brought an official end to Project MK-Ultra with the Fran Church Committee in 1975, the hundreds of separate programs from Project MK-Ultra, which included drugs, distortion, torture, Manchurian assassinations and more, had already been distributed throughout the world, including the capital of Belgium, where the United States have their NATO headquarters, and where most of western Europe arms deals, official or clandestine, was concentrated. Arms deals negotiations included drugs and sexual favours, which included women, children and bestiality. These practices surfaced to the Belgium media in 1995 and years later in America, but were covered up after it turned out that the Royal family was implicated.

Of interest is that the Saxe Coburg Gotha family controls 30% of the entire Belgium economy.

To note: There is a lot of clandestine Central Intelligence Agency projects between the 1950-1980 time period that have since surfaced, wherein it has transpired that the Central Intelligence Agency was behind a lot of child kidnapping in the early 1970’s, children they abducted and brought them up under intensive training by psychologists. They bred these young men and women for special projects which involved lying, assassinations and intelligence operations. MK Ultra was one of those projects and a lot of people who were under those clandestine projects are coming up and telling their stories, which project Camelot carries a lot of this information.

**Lines of Command and Accountability within the MK of the African National Congress**

It is important to note that in the report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the representatives of the African National Congress stated the top leadership of their MK Movement was members of the British Crown, quoted as follows:

**Leadership of MK : London RC structure (1976 - 1980)**  

This was led by Yusuf Dadoo with Aziz Pahad as Secretary. Other members were Reg September, Solly Smith, Ronnie Kasrils, Jack Hodgson.

The National Executive Committee (NEC) has always been the African National Congress's highest policy- and decision- making body.

The National Security Council and the Revolutionary Council fell under the Office of the President, various military, political and security structures, committees or departments reporting to the Revolutionary Council.

NAT - as the Department of Intelligence and Security was generally known - was no exception.

**MK leadership were aware that they were creating massacres**

Violent warfare on South Africa by Umkonto we Isizwe was used to change the system of governance. Leadership of Umkonto we Isizwe were aware that they were creating massacres. According to the African National Congress leadership report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the ‘struggle’ had to be intensified; in the period after the Kabwe Conference, less emphasis was placed on avoiding civilian casualties at all costs in pursuit of attacks on legitimate targets. As African National Congress President at the time, OR Tambo, put it:

"I am not saying that our Conference used the word "soft targets". I am saying that Conference recognized that we are in it. It is happening every day. It happened two days before we started our Conference - a massacre in Gaborone. We did not complain that soft targets were being hit, because they have been hitting them, as I say, all the time. What we did was to re-commit ourselves to intensify the armed struggle (...) until the system which makes massacres and conflicts necessary, is abolished..."

This report continues to display ambiguity. On the one hand, it stresses that the MK soldiers of Umkonto we Isizwe were trained extensively. On the other hand, any acts of violence by MK soldiers which are frowned upon as not acceptable in warfare by international standards as set out by Geneva Conventions, occurred because the MK soldiers were not trained adequately. We quote the report further with regards to attacks by MK cadres on civilians as follows:  
“Whilst the above statement provides a clear articulation of the ANC's position, it is quite possible that ambiguity in some of the formulations on this subject may have given the impression to some cadres that they should totally disregard the possibility of civilian casualties in the course of their operations.”

**The African National Congress defended the MK leadership calling for actions which could injure or kill civilians even though they were aware of the effects thereof.**

In response to the bomb let off in Amanzimtoti by MK cadres, we refer to a comment by the then African National Congress President OR Tambo as follows:

"Massacres have been perpetrated against civilians: Mamelodi, a massacre. Uitenhage, a massacre. Botswana, a massacre. Queenstown, a massacre... certainly, we are beginning to see South Africans of all races (burying) their loved ones who have died in the South African situation. The whole of South Africa is beginning to bleed...”

Referring to the Matola raid, the Maseru raid and the SAAF bombing of Maputo, OR Tambo added:

"This means the conflict is escalating. We always thought it was going to be a bitter, brutal, vicious struggle, almost as a necessary precondition for the liberation of South Africa. We have to go through that. The conflict is reaching new levels. There is to be much destruction, much suffering, and a lot of bloodshed which will not be confined to South Africa. (...)”.

**The African National Congress condoned the killing of Councilors**

An April 1987 article published in Sechaba on the Sharpeville Six, who had been convicted on the doctrine of common purpose for the killing of a councilor, expressed the attitude of the African National Congress towards this murder as follows:

"The ANC stands absolutely with the Six, and with all others facing the same fate, and does not discriminate between those who identify themselves consciously with the ANC and those who do not.”

**The African National Congress justified attacks on the lives of civilians.**

In their defence during theTruth and Reconciliation Commission, the African National Congress defended life threatening action by their members and made various excuses as to why such behaviour should be accepted without recourse.

**(i) The ANC leadership said that explosions made sense.**

During the Truth and Reconciliation Commission tribunal, the African National Congress representative said that life threatening explosions made sense, in the following words:   
“At other times, an attack would take place in support of campaigns or other struggles taking place within the community - such as strike action, mass retrenchments, a rent or bus boycott. An explosion at an office block, factory or chain store makes sense in this context, although the timing of the blast could go wrong for a range of reasons and result in unintended civilian casualties.”

**(ii) The ANC blamed faulty intelligence and devices for attacks on civilian targets**

During the Truth and Reconciliation Commission tribunal, the African National Congress representative blamed faulty information from their intelligence services as well as faulty devices for attacks on civilians by MK cadres in the following statement:

“At times attacks which appear to be aimed at civilian targets were nothing of the sort - the cadre may have had information to the effect that an South African Defence Force or South African Police group would be present at a particular railway station or hotel or restaurant a particular time, but due to a range of difficulties - ranging from faulty intelligence to devices which malfunction and accidentally go off at the wrong time - an explosion occurs, apparently senselessly, in a civilian area.”

**(iii) The ANC blamed incorrect timing for attacks on civilian targets**

During the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the African National Congress representative blamed incorrect timing of bombs and relaying messaged for the loss of lives placed by MK cadres in the following statement:“In some cases, cadres were entirely correct with regard to the political reasoning behind their choice of target but placed a bomb at an inappropriate time which resulted in unnecessary civilian casualties. In addition, they did not have sufficient capacity to convey the intentions of their actions, or were blocked from doing so by censorship.”

**(iv) The ANC blamed insufficient training for attacks on civilian targets**

During the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the African National Congress representative blamed insufficient training of the cadres whom they provided with arms and bombs for the destruction of civilian lives in the following statement:“At times insufficient training could have resulted in situations in which cadres were not able to ensure that explosions took place at the intended time, or accidents occurred. Technical failures also occurred, resulting in unintended civilian casualties.” 

**(v) The ANC made the excuse of attacks on any inner-city location as valid targets because South African Police or their affiliates may have been found inside such locations**

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that comments made by leadership of the African National Congress such as Chris Hani and Steve Tshwete, when confronted on attacks and blasts on the lives of civilians and in ‘soft-target’ areas such as the Ellis Park bomb of 1988, appeared to imply that "any inner-city location could represent a legitimate target because of the possibility that the police or army may have located an office in an ostensibly innocuous-looking building”.

**(vi) The ANC made excuses for their followers who endangered lives of civilians as acts of justified anger**

During the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the African National Congress representative excused the aggressive behaviour of their members who endangered the lives of civilians as acts of anger, which was justified as it stemmed from social ills incurred through the Apartheid system, when he said that some attacks occurred because of anger... as in the case of the Amanzimtoti bomb..”

**(vii) The ANC blamed ‘wrong decisions’ for attacks on civilian targets**

During the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the African National Congress representative admitted that cadres made wrong decisions and referred to the Silverton bank siege and the Goch Street incident as examples. Such wrong decisions were blamed on ‘unexpected difficulties’ in their following statement:   
“When unexpected difficulties arose, cadres had to decide on their feet: and sometimes they made wrong decisions.”

**(viii) The ANC blamed difficulties in gathering information for attacks on civilian targets**

During the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the African National Congress representative drew attention to the difficulties cadres experienced while gathering information with regards to targets, which was explained in the following statement:  
“Gathering tactical intelligence was the responsibility of units on the ground; faulty intelligence to devices which malfunction and go off at the wrong time - an explosion occurs, apparently senselessly, in a civilian area. The Magoos Bar attack falls into this category...”

**(ix) The ANC blamed technical difficulties for attacks on civilian targets**

During the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the African National Congress report titled a section of their defence as “Technical difficulties and insufficient training” in which they blamed defective timing mechanisms for some incidents which resulted in civilian casualties, and named the Krugersdorp Magistrate's Court bomb as a case in point.

**(x) The ANC justified attacks on civilian targets as support for other campaigns and struggles taking place in South Africa**

During the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the African National Congress representative mentioned that an operation in support of campaigns or other struggles taking place within the community - such as strike action, mass retrenchments, a rent or bus boycott – would ‘make sense’ for an explosion at an office block, a railway line, factory or supermarket to take place.

**(xi) The ANC classed other opposition political parties as supporters or collaborators of the South African government, and justified attacks on such targets**

The MK cadre operations included attacks on the lives of politicians who were in opposition to the Apartheid government.In 1988, the home of Allan Hendrickse, leader of the Labour Party, was the target of a hand grenade attack. Various attacks on the Inkatha Freedom Party also took place before and after governance was handed over to the African national Congress in 1994, which led to the deaths of tens of thousands of Zulus suspected to be Inkatha Freedom Party members.

**The African National Congress leadership was vague on a number of questions during the Truth and Reconciliation Court**

The African National Congress has never admitted to the South African nation the full extent of the damages they caused to the country as a whole during the ‘people’s war’ they waged, neither have they apologized nor made any reparations to the victims of this war.

**(i) Information sealed in amnesty applications**

The African National Congress frequently made amnesty applications with regard to their operations. With regard to the Ellis Park car bomb in 1988, about which the Truth and Reconciliation Court had asked a number of questions, the information required was not revealed as it was contained in an amnesty application.

**(ii) Investigations into attacks were not opened**

Although the Truth and Reconciliation Commission took place many years after most of the MK operations had been completed, the MK leadership and African National Congress did not seek details of many of these operations. To point, an ANC official in Lusaka stated that the explosion in Roodepoort outside a branch of Standard Bank in 1988 was intended to damage a nearby SAP station, and that civilians were not the target of this attack. Yet to date, more than twenty years later, we have no details as to what operational problems arose which injured, maimed and killed civilians in the street. At this stage the African national Congress still does not know who was responsible for this attack, even though they have had use of all the security services the country has to offer, and their cadres were assured of amnesty in this regard.

The African National Congress also offer the need for ‘security’ as the reason for them not keeping record of their actions, as noted in their report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as follows:

“It is not possible to give a detailed account of every MK operation, as requested by the TRC. We did not keep records of this nature, mainly for security reasons.”

**Fusion of militant Apartheid government members and the African National Congress militant leadership**

The South African government under control of the National Party at the time when the African National Congress alliance was unbanned, also did not investigate actions taken by UMkonto we Sizwe during its so-called ‘peoples war’ against the South African nation. In fact, the South African borders were opened and any person claiming to have been involved in the struggle against the Union was allowed safe passage into South Africa, and was issued with South African identification papers.

The integration of certain members of MK into the South African army and police - as the MK commander, Joe Modise, and his second in command, Chris Hani, did not present any problems after the ban on the African National Congress was lifted, as they were all considered to be South Africans. Captain Dirk Coetzee, head of the Apartheid regime's assassination squad, was welcomed into the African National Congress, similar to the decision which was taken by the Swapo government in Namibia - to appoint a number of top South African security policemen, including the former chief of police in the Ovambo region, Derek Brune, to head its secret organs of coercion.

**(iii) The African National Congress tried to hide facts on actions taken by their supporters.**

The report made to the Truth and Reconciliation Committee by the African National Congress leadership tried to deny some of the attacks made on South Africa by their supporters, even though they had stated clearly during their operations that they would stand by any member of the public who took part in actions to support the armed struggle and also had given their cadres on the ground permission to act on their own volition according to their own judgment. To point we refer to their report made to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, wherein the African National Congress escape responsibility for attacks on civilian targets by not recognizing membership status of MK cadres as bona fide, or other ‘operational difficulties’, as follows:

“Please note: This list includes all incidents we have found in press reports and from SAIRR annual surveys which cannot be classified according to the target categories used in the appendix headed "list of known MK operations". In addition, we are uncertain as to whether these attacks were carried out by bona fide MK cadres. Some appear to be the result of operational difficulties; others very probably "false flag" operations.”

**The African National Congress did not make adequate provisions for MK cadres to re-establish themselves in South Africa**

Although the African National Congress placed some of their MK cadres into employment positions with the South African government at the time they were given the control thereof, the bulk of these soldiers were not provided for adequately after the ‘People’s War’ against South Africans had been called off officially by the leadership of the African National Congress.

In returning to South Africa, the African National Congress had the advantage of the Namibian experience before them. They needed an organization of relatives to welcome back the MK cadres, along the lines of the Committee of Parents in Namibia, and an organization of former prisoners themselves, such as the Political Consultative Council of Ex-Swapo Detainees (PCC).

The MK ex-detainees who returned to Johannesburg in April tried to form an association of 'parents of those who died or were detained in exile' themselves.2   
Compared with the Namibian experience3; South African conditions were less favorable for the MK cadres. Unlike in Namibia, the churches in South Africa were not fully supportive of the MK cadres, renowned for their torturous behaviour.

A letter from the group in Nairobi was sympathetically received by the Rev Frank Chikane, secretary of the South African Council of Churches. Archbishop Desmond Tutu met the ex-detainees when he was in Nairobi early in April and arranged for them to get accommodation at the YMCA there, paid for by the All-African Council of Churches. (Up to that time they had first been in prison in Kenya, since they had arrived absolutely without documents, and had then been living rough). The Archbishop later took up the mutineers' demand for a commission of inquiry with the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress. He got no response.   
Sympathetic organizations joined with MK ex-detainees in demanding that the African National Congress set up an independent commission of enquiry into the atrocities perpetrated in the Umkhonto we Isizwe camps.  
Although Nelson Mandela acknowledged publically that torture had taken place within the African National Congress military structures, the MK ex-detainees' demand for action against top leaders of the African National Congress was left unheard. The full extent of the actions and knowledge of Joe Slovo - general secretary of the South African Communist Party and chief of staff of MK in the days of Quatro – has never been revealed. 4

In this Attachment, we have divided information on MK soldiers, commonly known as cadres, as follows:

**Section A Treatment of the MK soldiers**

**Section B Terrorist operations by the MK soldiers against the lives of South Africans**

**Section A Treatment of the MK soldiers**

The report given by the African National Congress to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission stated that MK cadres conducted crash courses for eager volunteers inside the country. They added that some of these recruits had sketchy political understanding of the nature of the struggle in comparison with those cadres who had gone through the intensive political and military training offered in camps in exile. In this section, we investigate the training given to the MK soldiers.

The MK soldiers were the children of the ANC/SACP. It is important to consider how the ANC/SACP treated their own, the youth who were prepared to die for their leaders.

**“Freedom now, Education later”.**

Many of the MK soldiers were still school-going children at the time they were sent to training camps outside of South African borders, the rhetoric logic that was told being “freedom now, education later”. Their missions were life threatening, physically, mentally and emotionally hazardous.

Some of the MK soldiers have been integrated into the work force of South Africa by the African National Congress after governance of South Africa was handed over to them. Some of these positions include top leadership positions. As discussed in Attachment 17 - The African National Congress in government, there has been abject corruption and incompetence within the South African government by members of the African National Congress who were active members of UMkonto we Isizwe. This corruption and incompetence affects the daily lives of South Africans and is a threat to the future of their existence.

In this section, we discuss the training of MK soldiers which includes the MK structures by which these soldiers were trained, the living conditions of these soldiers as well as the discipline they were subjected to.

**1. The training of MK soldiers**

According to the reports handed in by representatives of the African national Congress to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the training of MK soldiers (“cadres”) was structured and well organized.

**a) Military training courses.**

Military training courses were designed to produce a cadre with a broad range of skills, well equipped to execute the various tasks of the ‘liberation’ struggle. Lectures were conducted on political science, and the art of warfare.   
  
The following military subjects were taught in African National Congress training camps:

1. Military topography
2. Military Engineering
3. Military Tactics
4. Physical Training
5. March and Drill
6. Firearms
7. Artillery
8. Political Education
9. First Aid
10. Anti-Air Weaponry.
11. Military Combat Work (i.e. underground or clandestine methods of organization, and methods of planning insurrection)

Courses ran for three weeks, three months, six months, and nine months or longer depending on the mission/tasks for which the individual or unit was being prepared.

Sam Mngqibisa, an Umkhonto we Sizwe soldier, describes the education of an Mbokodo officer in a poem he presented to the Commission of Inquiry into human rights abuses in African National Congress detention camps, as follows: *Give a young boy —16 years old— from the ghetto of Soweto,   
an opportunity to drive a car for the first time in his life.  
This boy is from a poor working class family.  
Give him money to buy any type of liquor and good, expensive clothes.  
This boy left South Africa during the Soweto schools uprising in 1976.  
He doesn't know what is an employer.  
He never tasted employer-exploitation.  
Give him the right to sleep with all these women.  
Give him the opportunity to study in Party Schools and well-off military academies in Eastern Europe.  
Teach him Marxism-Leninism and tell him to defend the revolution against counter-revolutionaries.  
Send him to the Stasi to train him to extract information by force from enemy agents. He turns to be a torturer and executioner by firing squad.  
All these are the luxuries and the dream-come-true he never thought of for his lifetime...  
This Security becomes the law unto itself*

Over the years thousands of cadres were produced, among them commanders, commissars, instructors and specialists in various military fields. Some would remain to staff the camps and continue to train other cadres; many infiltrated the country for various tasks; yet others joined the diplomatic corps to run the many external missions of the liberation movement. 

**b) Leadership of the MK soldiers was from both inside and outside South Africa.**

**(i) The KGB in Africa**

In his book5 on black politics in South Africa since 1945, Tom Lodge showed that the Soviet KGB had the most power in Umkonto we Isizwe within his following statement:

“In 1968 a batch of Umkhonto defectors from camps in Tanzania sought asylum in Kenya, alleging that there was widespread dissatisfaction within the camps. They accused their commanders of extravagant living and ethnic favoritism. The first Rhodesian mission, they alleged, was a suicide mission to eliminate dissenters. In political discussions no challenge to a pro-Soviet position was allowed.”

His book also shows how the prison systems to which MK detainees were subjected during the 1980’s, were the same as those in Africa during the late 1960’s used by the KGB against Africans to destabilize countries such as Angola.

Two South Africans who had fought in the first MK guerrilla operation in mid-1967, described an operation which took them across the Zambezi River into the Wankie area of Rhodesia, along with guerrillas from the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), then led by James Chikerema. (The ZAPU president, Joshua Nkomo, was in detention at that time). The two men described how they had eventually succeeded in escaping from Rhodesia, and how their criticism of the operation had led to their imprisonment in an African National Congress camp in Tanzania. An article on the theme appeared the same year in the British radical newspaper ‘Black Dwarf’ then edited by Tariq Ali. This article shows that from 1968 to 1990, nothing basic altered in the MK camps, except that in the high noon of the Brezhnev era it operated parastatal powers under civil war conditions in Angola, where after a large Cuban and Soviet presence permitted the African National Congress security apparatus to 'bestride the narrow world like a Colossus.'  
  
From the account of ex-mutineers, African National Congress administrative bodies ruled over its elected bodies; the security department ruled over the administrative organs; and KGB-trained officials – in the same way the government of South Africa is controlled today by members of the SACP - who ruled over the security apparatus.

In effect, Umkhonto we Isizwe functioned as an extension in Africa of the KGB.

The primary role of Umkhonto we Isizwe in the civil war in Angola was to serve as a surrogate to Soviet foreign policy interests, to such an extent that when the African National Congress cadres proposed that their fight be diverted to South Africa this counted as unpardonable cheek by the KGB, which called for ruthless punishment of these cadres.

Over its own members, the African National Congress security apparatus ruled with all the arrogance of a totalitarian power.

**(ii) Collaboration between the ANC members who approved of necklacing in South Africa and the KGB**

There was a direct line of connection between the African National Congress reign of terror in its prisons, and the 'necklace' killings exercised by African National Congress supporters within South Africa, especially during the period of the 1984-86 township revolt, later revived against oppositional groupings such as Azapo. (The African National Congress's' necklace' politics was also a definite contributory element provoking the carnage in Natal).

This connecting line from leadership outside the South Africa to inside the country can be noted by the deaths of two former African National Congress prisoners, Similo Boltina and his wife Nosisana, who were necklaced on their return to South Africa In 1986, after having been repatriated by the Red Cross. 6

The direct line connecting African National Congress behaviour within the borders of South Africa and that of its leadership outside the South African borders is significant in the ‘Winnie issue.' When on 16 February 1983, leaders of the Mass Democratic Movement publicly expressed their 'outrage’ at Winnie Mandela's 'obvious complicity’ in the abduction and assault on 14 year-old Stompie Mocketsi Seipe, leading to his murder, this was in response to very widespread and very well-founded revulsion among Soweto residents - especially African National Congress supporters such as members of the Federation of Transvaal Women (Fetraw). They were enraged by the jackboot politics of the so-called Mandela United Football Team, whose 'coach‘ - to the satisfaction of Fetraw members – was then convicted of Stompie's murder.  
  
This squad of murderers, posing as Football Team members, was based in Mrs. Mandela’s house. Their actions within Soweto were the same way in which the ANC/SACP security acted abroad in Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Uganda. (According to ex-detainees, the KGB-apparatus in the ANC even sent its troops to Rhodesia in 1979 to fight against the guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANU, which was not a Soviet client).

**c) Leadership structures of the MK soldiers**

Reporting directly to the Soviet KGB was the Security Department of the African National Congress.

**(i) The Security of the African National Congress**

In the early 1960’s, the African National Congress developed a Military Intelligence Department tasked with creating security for Umkonto we Isizwe which included undertaking reconnaissance missions to find routes for the infiltration of trained MK cadres; the establishment of reception areas inside the country for these cadres; and the selection of inanimate targets for armed propaganda attacks.   
The Military Intelligence Department also attended to the physical security of the African National Congress President.

The report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by the African National Congress states that in the 1960's, cadres were carefully recruited or selected by African National Congress branches inside South Africa before they were sent abroad for military training. However, the screening and selection process had no counter-intelligence capacity to exposure of agents in their midst. 

At the Morogoro Conference, held in 1969 by the leadership of the African National Congress, the Revolutionary Council was established and was instructed by the National Executive Committee to concentrate on the home front: developing internal structures, gaining publicity for the African National Congress, and waging armed struggle.

It was also decided at the Morogoro conference that a Department of Intelligence and Security should be formally established, tasked with the protection of human and material resources of the African National Congress. Moses Mabhida, who was appointed head of this Department, was also head of MK's Training and Personnel section. This unit became known as ‘NAT’ and was tasked with establishing military training camps in Africa, and with arranging courses in military training in sympathetic countries.   
Tasks of NAT extended to include:

* Roles of Military Intelligence;
* Counter-Intelligence;
* Military Police;
* VIP protection, and
* Correctional services

**SDUs**

The African National Congress tasked some members of MK Military HQ to attend to issues relating to Self Defence Units (SDU’s), their organization, training and the provision of weaponry. Although the report to the Truth and Reconciliation Committee by representatives of the African National Congress held that it was made clear that SDU’s would be exclusively for the purpose of self-defence, it became clear within the planning of their operation’s communities were used extensively by MK cadres to recruit soldiers for Umkhonto we Isizwe and communities were also used in which cadres could hide between operations. Furthermore, cadres were used to spread African National Congress propaganda within South African communities, and to encourage any counter government action communities took part in. Hence SDU’s in communities did not only serve as defence devices for these communities, but also as destabilizing factors.

**Cadres were sent to Soviet countries for Intelligence training**

During the 1960’s, cadres were selected and sent for specialized training in Security and Intelligence work in various countries, mainly the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, with Security and Intelligence forming only a part of the course. This training and stressed the use of the intellect.

In the period from 1978 – 1979, MK personnel were sent to the Soviet for intensive training in intelligence work. On their return, they joined the 1960's generation of officers, and NAT became a powerful force of Intelligence Operations to be reckoned with. By the late 1970’s, the strategic intelligence capacity of NAT was capable of forewarning the leadership of enemy moves, ensuring that all training camps were properly run, arranging specialized courses, ensuring that only trusted cadres were sent on further training or on missions inside the country, and the investigating of internal incidents such as the deaths of cadres by camp commanders. Furthermore, a screening process had been developed whereby NAT could judge the intention of potential MK cadres.

**NAT Security and Intelligence Services incorporated a screening process to analyze potential MK cadres**

The screening process developed whereby the African National Congress could analyze the sincerity and potential of possible MK recruits included the following:

* Regional structures were reorganised. Reception centres to screen all new recruits were set up in Forward Areas. The Department concentrated on Angola first, where screening procedures had as yet not been formalised;
* A standard questionnaire for all new recruits;

NAT became responsible for the recruitment of activists to the ranks of the African National Congress; the screening of new volunteers and recruits; and the training of operatives who were based inside South Africa. Such training included methods of gathering information in areas of interest to the African National Congress.   
  
At times, NAT knew in advance that certain agents were being sent into the field, and were able to confront them with detailed information as soon as they arrived: in such cases agents confessed to their missions.

NAT would also lure agents of opposing movements out of South Africa, feigning ignorance of the fact that they did not support the actions of the African National Congress, and confront them with information which had been gathered by NAT members on such agents when they arrived.

The recruitment process established by NAT is discussed further in Footnote 1 – The African National Congress Screening Procedure.

**NAT Security and Intelligence Services investigated MK camp incidents**

NAT Intelligence Services had developed their capabilities to such an extent that they were able to solve investigations into matters at the African national Congress camps outside the South African borders such as the poisoning ('Black September') of 1978, and the bombardment of the Nova Katengue camp in 1979.

**NAT Security and Intelligence Services established prison camps**

NAT established prison camps such as Camp 32 (later called the Morris Seabelo Rehabilitation Centre) in 1979 near Camp 13 (Quibaxe) in Angola to contain, rehabilitate and punish MK cadres who had committed offences, and to imprison enemy agents who could not be isolated in the other military camps.   
  
  
**(ii) The National Executive Committee as the Highest Office of Authority of the African National Congress structured NAT**

At the Kabwe Conference 1985, the National Executive Committee decided to establish a Review Board and an Office of Justice, both of which reported to the President's office.

NAT would in future send reports on its investigations into suspected agents to the Office of Justice, which would take over from that point.

The Review Board would broadly act as a court of appeal.

NAT was structured into Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence, Processing, and Security sub-sectors.

The National Executive Committee appointed the Directorate of the NAT Department to include a Deputy Director, Head of the Central Intelligence Evaluation Sector (CIES) Administrator, and a Head of Counter-Intelligence.

By 1989, the NAT at national level had six main sub-sectors: Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence, Central Information Evaluation Section, Security, Technical, and Administration.

The task of Intelligence was confined to investigations, on the basis of which reports were submitted to the officer of Justice. This included plans which were drawn up for a modern prison in Uganda.

The structures and personnel established for the African National Congress before control of the South African government was handed to them, is discussed further in Footnote 3 - ANC Structures and Personnel during the Peoples War.

Of interest regarding the highest level of authority within the African National Congress Structures and Personnel during the Peoples War as noted in Footnote 2 - ANC Structures and Personnel during the Peoples War - is that the Office of the President as mentioned in section 3.b states that their Special Operations was set up in 1979 to undertake high-profile acts of sabotage on key economic installations. This structure reported directly to OR Tambo. The first Special Operations Command consisted men who were not Black Africans, being Joe Slovo, Montso Mokgabudi ("Obadi"), and Aboobaker Ismail ("Rashid").

Furthermore, the only regional structures which were not in Africa, was in London, led by Yusuf Dadoo with Aziz Pahad as Secretary. Neither of them Black Africans either, as mentioned in the same Footnote section 3.k. Neither were the other members mentioned, which were Reg September, Solly Smith, Ronnie Kasrils, Jack Hodgson. To note that Ronnie Kasrils maintained a personal interest in the South African economy and was a major benefactor when the South African rand dropped.

Likewise, the only regional Politico-Military Councils as mentioned in the same Footnote sections 5.g. and 6.e. which were not situated in Africa was situated in London, and as mentioned in section 5.g.4. was chaired by Aziz Pahad and in section 6.e.5 was Chaired by Aziz Pahad; also Wally Serote – to note that neither of these Chairs were Black Africans.

The power these ranks carried by men who were not Black Africans, is evident within the report by the representatives of the African national Congress to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which included the following information:

“MK HQ sent senior commanders to the forward areas to meet with MK structures there, and convey the messages. When possible these senior commanders also met with units. In cases where meetings could not be held with units, command structures in the forward areas were told to contact all command structures of their units, whether they may have been involved in operations or not.

Chris Hani, Aboobaker Ismail and Keith Mokoape visited structures in Maputo; Lambert Moloi, Chris Hani and Julius Maliba ("Manchecker") met with Zimbabwe structures, and Chris Hani, Aboobaker Ismail, and Lambert Moloi visited Botswana structures. Ronnie Kasrils visited structures in Swaziland.”

**NAT in Angola fell under the Security Structures of the African National Congress**

The National Executive Committee, as head of all African National Congress departments, had declared Angola a military zone between 1983 - 1986. NAT in Angola fell under Military HQ during this period.

In 1986, a meeting was held between MK and NAT, chaired by OR Tambo, in which the vexed question of lines of authority over NAT in Angola was addressed. The delegations committed themselves to ensuring that the NAT Directorate would be in command of NAT cadres deployed in Angola and that they would report only to the NAT Directorate in Lusaka. 

**NAT gathered and analyzed the South African government**

Among other duties, NAT members in the forward areas (the Front Line States) were tasked with the gathering and analysis of information on the strategy and tactics of the South African government, its surrogates and supporters.

**NAT operated inside South Africa with support from intelligence services of the Apartheid government**

By 1986, the African National Congress’s intelligence structures had begun to function within South Africa and was assisted by various MDM networks, and contacts within the intelligence services of the regime. This led to greater confidence, efficiency, and a greatly improved intelligence capacity in general. It became relatively easier to cross-check biographies, follow up on accusations, investigate suspicious tendencies, and obtain advice on possible agents from activists and cadres inside the country. 

**NAT gathered information on agents inside South Africa**

NAT built up an extensive dossier of files on agents; this was not guess-work, but hard information on the names of their handlers, their force numbers, their grading by the SB, their activities and contacts. The dossier was updated regularly with fresh information from inside South Africa. 

**The Judicial System of the African National Congress**

The African National Congress had their own judicial system which did not conform to the judicial system of South Africa, nor did it grant people their human rights as described in the Articles of the Geneva Human Rights Commission.

Although the report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, representatives of the African National Congress mentioned that “the Tribunal followed procedures laid down by lawyers in the ANC's Legal and Constitutional Affairs department, which were in essence the same procedures followed in South African courts,” nothing could be further from the truth.

Key role players of their Tribunal did not carry qualifications pertaining to the legal fraternity, death sentences were called for by their President within a couple of days of hearing a case, most often with no witnesses or concrete evidence investigated by qualified police force members, and such death sentences were carried out within a few months of such a sentence, and not customary years, as was the case in South Africa, which allowed the defendant to appeal against his sentence should additional evidence be found to indicate his innocence.

**The National Peoples' Tribunal (the Tribunal)**

The National People’s Tribunal was the legal system followed by the leaders of the African National Congress to enforce their laws onto their members and society.

**(i) Appointments to the National Peoples' Tribunal**

Members of the National People’s Tribunal were appointed for a period of three years by the National Executive Committee.

The President appointed the Chair from among the members of the Tribunal.

Members of the National Executive Committee and the Office of the President were not required to any carry qualifications pertaining to the legal fraternity.

**(ii) The legal process followed by the African National Congress**

The Tribunal would recommend sentences to the President, who would usually refer such cases to the Review Board. After the Board had dealt with a case, sentence would be confirmed by the President and carried out.

In effect, the President would have the final decision on the guilt and punishment of a suspect. In all its history, the African National Congress has never had a qualified Judge or Magistrate as President of their Party or Movement.

**(iii) The first National People's Tribunal**

The first National People's Tribunal was appointed soon after the Kabwe Conference. Hermanus Loots was the chair, with Shadrack Pekane, and Z.N. Jobodwana as the other members. The latter two were lawyers.

The chair of the Review Board was Dan Tloome; Ruth Mompati and John Motshabi made up the rest of the Board. The Board would from time to time set up groups of senior African National Congress figures to conduct inspections and report back to the leadership.

This structure was tasked with overseeing and making judgments on the basis of investigations carried out by NAT. It was fully independent: there was no formal link between the Tribunal and any other African National Congress structures, including the Office of the President.   
In addition to these structures for justice, there was a Presidential Council to which those whose cases had been considered by the Tribunal and Review Board could appeal if they were unhappy about the decisions of these structures. This council, which consisted of the President, John Nkadimeng, Dan Tloome and later, Joe Slovo could set aside sentences and grant pardons.

In effect, procedure laid down was influenced by lawyers but judgment was given by the President, who was not a lawyer.

**(iv) Judgment by the Tribunal also included the death penalty**

Although the African National Congress has made the clear call that the death penalty should not abandoned and not be re-instated in South Africa, the African National Congress carried the death penalty within their judicial system.

According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission report, the African National Congress stated that persons accused of offences would be summoned to the Tribunal. There were prosecuting lawyers, and every accused would be represented by one or two lawyers, who had access to the charge sheet in order to prepare their defence. At the end of the proceedings both sides would summaries the evidence presented and the Tribunal would adjourn. This process often took two to three days to complete.   
  
The Tribunal could recommend one or a combination of the following lines of action:

That the accused be released;

That the suspect be expelled from the Movement;

In cases where the accused was found guilty s/he could be sentenced to a period of imprisonment at the Rehabilitation Centre (commonly known as an MK prison);

In cases where the accused was found guilty of a capital offence, the death sentence could be recommended.

To note that this all happened within an average of 2 months. In South Africa, the average time period a prisoner spent on death row was 8 years.

In the report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the African national Congress refers to four cadres who were executed for murder and rape of Angolan women between 1981 and 1989. They state that those who were executed for rape and murder were imprisoned for around two months whilst the leadership consulted with the Angolan authorities on the manner in which these crimes should be handled. They were publicly executed with fellow- villagers of the murdered women and local government officials present.

Execution of MK cadres suspected of being agents for the South African government after trial by Tribunal, and a final decision by the NEC., included Justice Tshabalala, Jabu Zikalala, Vusi Mayekiso, Kenneth Mahamba, Dick Khumalo, Escom Maluleka, John Maleke, and Drake Chiloane.

Capital punishment was also carried out on MK cadres at the Pango mutiny in 1984.

**The Review Board**

The sentence recommended by the Tribunal was referred to the President, who would usually refer the case to the Review Board, which was tasked with acting as a court of appeal with the powers to confirm or change the decision of the Tribunal as the members of the Board saw fit. Only after the Review Board had considered the case would sentence be confirmed (or set aside) by the President.   
  
The Review Board was also tasked with regularly reviewing cases and making recommendations to the National Executive Committee as to whether prisoners should be released or not. Their work was considerably facilitated by the adoption of the elaborated Code of Conduct. At this stage it is important to note that members of the Review Board were not required to carry qualifications as qualified psychologists, nor qualified attorneys at law.

**The African National Congress refused to hand over documentation relevant to the work of the Review Board to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission**

To consider that the African National Congress was able to provide the Truth and Reconciliation Commission reports on court cases which their Tribunal handed with full details concerning the dates, places, names of key role players as well as the rank they carried, it is strange that they could not provide the notes on which this information was recorded. In their report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the representatives of the African National Congress stated that “We regret that we have not been able to locate the documentation relevant to the work of the Review Board; if specific questions regarding the work of the Review Board arise, the African National Congress will assist the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in this regard.” 

**(v) NAT prepared for taking control as the government of South Africa**

After 1986, NAT developed policy on the restructuring and reorientation of the existing intelligence services, keeping in mind that a merger of power between the African National Congress and National Party government of South Africa was imminent. . Workshops were held inside and outside the country to discuss the shape and role of a future intelligence service in a new democratic order.

Open meetings were also held in military camps to discuss these issues and contribute to this policy debate.

Towards the end of 1993 preparations for the amalgamation of NAT and the National Intelligence Service began.   
  
Reception centers were established in Angola and in the Front Line States bordering South Africa to receive and screen all new recruits.

**2. The living conditions of MK cadres**

The lives of MK cadres were in a perpetual state of movement between various areas inside and outside the South African borders. The carrying of life threatening weapons constantly on their bodies as well as the knowledge that they were taking part in illegal actions against the accepted norms of the South African society, not only put their own lives at risk, but was also a mental and emotional burden, to the cadres as well as those who loved them.

Scenes of bloodshed, dismembered bodies, and victims of torture by action taken by the cadres and their fellows, as well as people who opposed MK operations, have left indelible marks deep in the psyche of the South African nation as a whole.

Inside South Africa, the MK cadres lived between people who viewed them either as social outcast or heroes, or both. Finding gainful employment was a near impossibility for these cadres as their missions called for them being able to take part in a violent operation at any time called for by the MK leadership.

Outside South Africa, the MK cadres travelled to and from operational training in other countries, or were taking part in various warfare operations.

**MK Camps**

For some cadres, a deep sense of depression set in after spending too many years in camps thousands of miles away from their homes. These camps were established in areas not easily accessible to the public and hidden from the public view. Cadres found themselves totally isolated from the outside world.

There was insufficient provision for cultural activities within the camps, and regular briefing on current events inside the country. Poor management of human resources became an ever increasing scourge, and the belief that unfair decisions regarding deployment were being made was ignored as the concerns of cadres were not being properly conveyed to the leadership.

Over the years, visits to the camps by the leadership also decreased significantly. This has affected not only the national leadership, but also the regional leadership. The latter tended to spend increasingly more time in the towns than in the camps.

Lack of leadership control allowed for some members of camp administrations to abuse their powers, and an intolerance of valid criticism had developed.

Security department officials carried out tasks which were not supposed to be theirs, including the task of disciplining offenders, to the point where it had become a "military police" force within the camps.

**a) Conditions on the’ farm’ and in MK training camps in Angola**   

From the report provided by the African National Congress to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, we draw the following information on the MK farm and training camps in Angola:   
The farm was situated 200 km north of Luanda between two MK training camps, Pango and Quibaxe. On the farm was Camp 32 (also known as ‘The Morris Seabelo Rehabilitation Centre’ or Quatro), where the MK kept their prisoners. Because of the condition of the road, and due to the war situation, it took a full four hours to travel the 200km by car from Luanda to these camps.

**Water**  
None of the three camps had running water. Water had to be fetched from nearby streams; in the case of Camp 32, the nearest stream was 4 km away. 

**Food supplies**  
Food supplies in all African National Congress centers in Angola were at times inadequate, as they relied heavily on donations from sympathetic countries. These supplies arrived by ship irregularly and had to be transported to the camps; Unita bandits specifically targeted these supply lines. Supplies were shared equally amongst those in the camps, including the prisoners. Efforts were made - with mixed success - to improve conditions by growing vegetables and keeping poultry and pigs. Clothing was exchanged with local people for fresh supplies. 

**Medical Care.**  
Inadequate medical care was a problem for all members of the African National Congress in Angola. Malaria was endemic. They relied mainly on medical orderlies who were locally trained. Serious cases had to be referred to hospitals in Luanda, which were ill-equipped because of the war. Adding to all these problems there was a serious shortage of transport, which affected all three camps. 

**The Buildings.**  
The dilapidated buildings on the farm were adapted to suit a prison building at Camp 32. It had no windows but there were ventilation vents. One large room was converted to a cell that could accommodate about 15 people; six other rooms were converted to accommodate between 5 - 10 people and another room was converted to host 4-6 single cells. Inmates used plastic containers as toilets when they were in their cells, and emptied these in the mornings. 

**Overcrowding**  
There was overcrowding at the African National Congress camps in Angola.

**Transport**  
Difficulties with transport, food, water and medical supplies were general in the region, and common to all camps. The only available transport was shared between the three camps. Camp 32 did have a truck, but when it broke down it was not replaced. In the absence of transport, inmates from Camp 32 had to push a water tank to the nearest source of water, a river about 4km away.

**Physical abuse**

The report by the African National Congress to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission included six cases wherein MK cadres died as a result of being beaten to death by their superiors inside MK training camps between 1979 and 1981. They added that “reports on these incidents would be sent to the Camp Commander, and senior officials would meet with the Camp Administration to hold an inquiry into the incident to prevent recurrence of such excessive actions. Measures such as demotion or redeployment would be taken against perpetrators of excessive punishments”.   
To point, Joel Mahlatini was severely beaten on the orders of his Camp Commander, Kenneth Mahamba; he was dead on arrival at Camp 32.

In 1992, several hundred MK cadres who had returned from exile staged a march in Durban to demand an independent commission of inquiry into atrocities committed at the African National Congress training camps. Relevant media articles can be read in Footnote 4 – March by Cadres from exile claiming tortures in ANC camps.

**Investigations into abuses in the camps**

There has been no investigation worth the name into abuses in the camps run by the South West African People's Organization of Namibia (Swapo) in southern Angola, or in camps run by the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in Tanzania and elsewhere.

The Amnesty International report of 2 December 1992 drew more than half its material from information previously published in ‘Searchlight South Africa’ issues 5 to 9. This report compelled the African National Congress at the highest level to acknowledge its imprisonment, torture and execution of members in exile as a means of suppressing critical opinion. It was compelled also to acknowledge the role of ‘Searchlight South Africa’ in exposing these abuses. An article by Searchlight South Africa with regards to investigations into abuses in the MK training camps is provided in Footnote 5 - Searchlight on MK camp abuse investigations.

**International response to abuse of MK cadres in ANC training camps**

After decades of human right activists campaigning against the South African government for their policy of segregation, they kept a stony silence even after they had been informed at the highest level of the human tortures, murders and imprisonment of MK cadres by the African National Congress during the decades in exile. We quote an excerpt from Searchlight South Africa (SSA) Vol 3, No 2: 10 April 1993 with regard to the attitude of the world on the human abuses which took place of MK cadres during the African National Congress people’s war as follows:

**“**The campaign provided a painful lesson in the lack of concern for human rights among socialists and liberals, when relating to nationalist and Stalinist politics in southern Africa. Only one left-wing socialist group in Britain, the Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP), and its affiliated organizations internationally, actively and continuously drew attention to suppression of political dissent by murder, torture and imprisonment by the ANC and by Swapo (now the party of government), during the decades of exile.  
The other Trotskyism groups in Britain, the United States, South Africa and elsewhere nearly all maintained a stony silence. So did the British Labour and Liberal parties, which were informed at the highest level of what had happened in the camps. This was done by Bill McElroy and myself, as coeditor of *Searchlight South Africa*, working together in the umbrella organization, Justice for Southern Africa. The few individuals who read our journal and expressed support for our stand were exceptions to the rule. We welcomed them, but they were as isolated in this matter as was SSA.  
  
These groupings and individuals either justified the methods of Stalinist dictatorship when practiced by the ANC and Swapo, or turned a blind eye. This failure of moral judgment, in countries where press freedom and freedom of association are well established, made the work of exposing abuses extraordinarily difficult. Greater humanity was shown on this issue in Britain by Baroness Chalker at the Foreign Office. It is sad, but true. The extraordinarily comprehensive resistance to the fairly straightforward moral issues posed in this campaign, especially in Britain, indicates a substantial problem in modern society at the level of thought, of philosophy, of intellectual culture and ideology. Hopefully, this can be explored in a future issue.  
  
In one instance, the biggest left-socialist group in Britain, the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), knowingly preserved silence over the assassination in South Africa in June 1990 of Sipho Phungulwa, a former ANC detainee, even though a leading member of the SWP had met Phungulwa in Johannesburg only three weeks previously. This member of the SWP passed information to *Searchlight South Africa*, published in issue number 6 (January 1991), which the SWP excluded from its own press.  
  
At a meeting in the London School of Economics in February 1992, at a discussion on South Africa convened jointly by SSA, the RCP and the journal *Critique*, a leading officer of the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP), suggested from the platform that I 'deserved a bullet' after I had spoken to the meeting about the ANC prison camps. Two thirds of the audience, members and supporters of the RCP, cheered vociferously.  
  
Another Trotskyism group, based in the US, in its weekly newspaper described the editors of *Searchlight South Africa* as 'New World Order socialists' serving the interests of the Bush administration, because of our criticism of the prison camps and the criminality of Mrs. Winnie Mandela.   
  
It was much the same within South Africa. When Baruch Hirson, coeditor of SSA raised the issue of the ANC security department and its prison camps in his opening address to the Conference on Marxism in South Africa at the University of the Western Cape in September 1991, the audience froze. No-one referred to the issue in general discussion. Other attempts to open the discussion at the University of the Witwatersrand never happened: there was apparently no time in the busy academic year for a talk on the subject.  
Frozen out in silence or vilified by the left, *Searchlight South Africa* was simultaneously subject to arbitrary seizures by security officials in South Africa, having been banned for commercial distribution in its first three issues.   
We have no idea how many copies were confiscated or destroyed.  
Individual copies nevertheless percolated through to university libraries in South Africa and to individuals in the townships and suburbs. In particular, the article on the 1984 mutiny in the ANC by Bandile Ketelo and four other former ANC guerrillas in SSA No 5 was widely circulated within the country by *Samizdat*, mainly through extensive photocopying.7 Each copy of this issue entering die country was read by many readers, passing from hand to hand.   
  
The article was later published as a pamphlet by Justice for Southern Africa under the title ***Mutiny in the ANC 1984***. This pamphlet was produced jointly with the WRP in Britain, which sold it through its bookshop in south London.  
To many hundreds of people in South Africa, *Searchlight South Africa* provided the first authoritative account of the mutiny and the fate of its victims. In several instances, SSA and Justice for Southern Africa, working together, provided families with their first glimmer of hope for the fate of relatives whom they had last seen, as youngsters, fourteen or more years previously.  
  
In several instances, we provided friends and relatives with the first reliable account of a death.

In the years immediately before and after the return of the exiles, this was the only South African journal that gave impartial airing to the truth that everybody in the camps knew by word of mouth, or as the brand of servitude on their own backs. Despite a few (very few) inaccuracies, inevitable in the conditions under which the journal is produced, our reporting was and remains trusted by the exiles.  
  
Several prisoners of the ANC in central and east Africa were released as a result of the efforts of Searchlight South Africa and Justice for Southern Africa. Slightly safer conditions of life were secured for former detainees within African states, and more especially in South Africa itself. Our achievements, however, only throw into relief immense continuing unmet needs.  
  
Two former ANC detainees with whom we were directly or indirectly in touch were murdered almost immediately on their return 'home.' These were Sipho Phungulwa (shot dead in Umtata in the Transkei in June 1990, 'allegedly by named ANC officials', as Amnesty states, pl7) and Bongani Ntshangase, 'shot dead by unidentified assailants', as Amnesty records, at Msinga in Natal on 21 May 1992. More details can be found about the lives and deaths of these two men in *Searchlight South Africa* Nos 5, 6, 8 and 9, and in the Amnesty report. The bulk of the former victims of the ANC security department who have returned to South Africa live miserable lives. Some in disappointment and desperation have turned to alcohol.  
  
It has been a chilling experience. We have struggled in isolation to try to save the lives of brave and democratic people in South Africa, for whom existence, as one said recently, in desperation, is merely 'living in arrears'. In this we have received no help of any substance from the left, or from liberals, or from academics, in Britain, South Africa or internationally — rather, obstruction.  
It is an issue that involves a mark of shame on nearly all the socialists and liberals, who uncritically championed the ANC and failed to take the measure of their own convictions. To this general truth an exception must be made in the case of those individuals who, against the current in South Africa, together with the courageous publisher of this magazine in South Africa, Kevin French, gave their support to our protests against the crimes committed by the ANC and by Swapo.”

**b) Administration and Staffing of camps**

During the period from 1976 - 1980, camps in Angola fell under the command of the late Mzwandile Piliso, at the time head of the department of Military Training and Personnel. In 1980, Simon Shekeshe ("Julius Mokoena") was appointed Regional Commander. He was succeeded by Graham Morodi ("Mashego") in 1982. Godfrey Ngwenya ("Timothy Mokoena") was the next Regional Commander until 1985 when he was injured in a UNITA ambush, and then Ali Makhosini took over this post.

To note that Camp 32 was staffed by members of NAT. Staff included drivers, yet the camp had no vehicles, and Recording Officers. More information on the staff of Camp 32 can be found in Footnote 6 - Administration and Staffing at Camp 32

**c) Camps by name**

**(i) Camps in Angola**

The following MK camps were maintained by representatives of the African National Congress in Angola; all camps were closed down by 1989, when military structures were shifted to Uganda and Tanzania:

**Benguela Transit Camp**    
This transit camp was established in mid 1977 for cadres who had been at Engineering Camp and Gabela camp, and who were on their way to open Nova Catengue Training Camp. The numerical strength was around 300 cadres. The camp was closed in 1982.   
Commanders: Simon Shekeshe, followed by "Dlokolo." 

**Caculama (Malanje)**    
Established in January 1981, as described above. Around 400 cadres were accommodated at this camp.

Commanders: Successively, Godfrey N. Ngwenya, Sipho Binda, Thibe Lesole, Dumisane Mafo, Themba Nkabinde, Steven Kobe. 

**Camp 32** (also known as ‘The Morris Seabelo Rehabilitation Centre’ or Quatro)

This facility was opened in 1979 and closed down in 1989, when inmates were moved to a government facility in Uganda.

We quote from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission report the following description of Camp 32 by the African National Congress:

"Quatro was conceived without proper deliberation. It was located in Angola, a country at war, and was staffed by inadequately trained youths of insufficient experience. The first camp commander was only 19 years old. The failure to train adequately and supervise the staff, the lack of clear authority between Mbokodo and MK, and the breakdown in communications between the prison and the Officer of Justice resulted in many abuses of human rights."

###### The African National Congress's Quatro was best described in a terse statement by Zaba Maledza, when he said: "When you get in there, forget about human rights."8 This was a statement from a man who had lived in Quatro during one of the worst periods in its history, from 1980 to 1982.  Established in 1979, Quatro was supposed to be the rehabilitation centre of the African National Congress, where enemy agents who had infiltrated the African National Congress would be "re-educated" and would be made to love the African National Congress through the opportunity to experience the humane character of its ideals. Regrettably, through a process that still cries out for explanation, Quatro became worse than any prison that even the apartheid regime - itself considered a crime against humanity - had ever had.  However harsh the above statement, however disagreeable to the fighters against the monstrous apartheid system, it is a truth that needs bold examination by our people, and the whole of the African National Congress membership.  To examine the history of Quatro is to uncover the concealed forces that operate in a political organization such as the African National Congress.

**Caxito Training Camp**    
This camp replaced Funda camp in 1979. The number of cadres varied from time to time but seldom more than 100 were present. Caxito was in a malaria infested area and was for this reason closed down in 1984.   
Commanders: Successively, Andile Ndzanga, Robert Mandita, Dumile Thabekhulu, and Ben Senokoanyane.

**Engineering Luanda (Transit Camp)**    
This camp opened in late 1976 and was closed in mid-1977. It catered for only two intakes of cadres who were in transit to training camps. The average number of cadres present was 200.   
Commander: Simon Shekeshe, then "Castro" Ramokgopa

**Fazenda Military Camp**    
Fazenda camp was established in 1978. It catered for trained cadres who were undergoing further training courses, including "survival" training. The numerical strength was around 200 cadres at any time. It was closed in 1980 or early 1981 when it was merged with Quibaxe camp.   
Commander: Livingstone Tom Gaza 

**Funda Training Camp**    
Established in 1976, this camp usually had fewer than 100 cadres present at any time. It was closed in 1988. This camp provided specialized training.   
Commanders: Zakes Tolo, then Seeiso Morapedi.

**Gabela Training Camp**    
This was the first training camp to be opened in Angola by the ANC, in 1976. It catered for the first group of 40 MK cadres to receive military training in Angola, and was under the command of FAPLA and Cuban instructors. Gabela Training Camp was merged with Benguela Camp in 1977. 

**Hoji Ya Henda (also known as Camalundi)**    
Founded in 1980, the camp was short-lived and was closed in January 1981, when it was shifted to Caculama and became known as Caculama Camp or Malanje. It catered for around 300 - 400 cadres at any time.   
Commanders: Mzwakhe Ngwenya, then Godfrey N. Ngwenya 

**Nova Catengue Training Camp**    
Established in 1976, this camp accommodated around 500 cadres from the transit camps listed above. The camp was destroyed in an aerial bombardment in 1979, based on intelligence supplied to the apartheid regime by infiltrators within MK.   
Commander: Simon Shekeshe. 

**Pango Camp**    
Founded in 1979 after the destruction of Nova Catengue in April that year. The numerical strength was around 400 cadres at any time.   
Commanders: Successively, Thami Zulu (1979 - 1981), Seremane Kgositsile, Godfrey Ngwenya, Matthews Nkosi, Phillip Sebothoma, Dumile Thabekhulu, Ben Senokoanyane.

**Quibaxe Training Camp**    
Originally a transit camp established in September 1977, it later became a training camp. It accommodated around 200 cadres.   
Commanders: Successively, Parker Tsie (1977 - 1980), Oupa G. Banda, Seremane Kgositsile ("Kenneth Mahamba"), Livingstone Tom Gaza, Herbert Malinga, and Lloyd Mabizela, Sydney Mpila. 

**Viana Transit Camp (also known as Camp 001)**    
Established in 1979, this camp catered for newly recruited members of MK on their way to other camps for military training. The average strength of the camp was around 400 cadres.   
Commanders: Successively, Dan Hatto, Golden Rahube, Steven Kobe, Johnson Langa, Lawrence Madi, Leepo Modise. 

**(ii) Camps other than Angola**

The regional NAT structures responsible for these holding facilities and the rehabilitation centre during the 1980’s were headed successively by Daniel Oliphant ("Mtu Jwili"), Gabriel Mthembu ("Sizwe Mkhonto"), and David Motshweni ("Willy Williams").

**The RC, Lusaka**    
Initially this building was used by Military HQ, and MK cadres who had been found guilty of disciplinary offences would be confined here for limited periods as punishment - a kind of "detention barracks." Later, it was used to hold discovered agents or suspected agents in transit to Camp 32.

The RC was closed in 1987 when Sun City was opened to take its place.

The African National Congress refused to provide the Truth and Reconciliation Commission the number of inmates held at RC and stated that conditions at the RC were good. They added that very few people were held at RC at any time.

The RC did not have a commander as such; those responsible for people held at the RC would be senior MK and NAT officials in the region.

**Sun City, Lusaka**    
Sun City was opened in 1988 and closed in 1991. It was not like Camp 32, with a command structure - it was largely a holding facility, as described above. There were one or two guards, and Jan Mampane ("Reddy Mazimba") of the Regional NAT Directorate was responsible for people held at Sun City. Most of those held were definite suspects who had been isolated for purposes of investigation, and some who could not be held at Camp 32 because it was so badly overcrowded.

**Besides the above named, there were also various holding facilities and the rehabilitation centre known as "The Farm" in Tanzania, as well as the Ugandan prison.**


**3. The discipline of MK cadres.**

Discipline of MK cadres and suspected insurgents took place at various African National Congress camps outside of the South African borders

**a) The African National Congress prison system combined the worst conditions of the Russian and South African prison systems.**

The South African prison system was replicated in the African National Congress prisons even into everyday terminology, above all at Quatro. This is a name that requires becoming common currency in political discourse: it is the Portuguese for ‘No.4' the name used throughout South Africa for the notorious black section of the prison at the Fort. Sneers by warders at soft conditions in 'Five Star Hotels', the common description of punishment cells as 'kulukudu'9 and the whole atmosphere of brutal crassness is quintessentially South African, with the added sadism of the Gulag. The ANC prison system combined the worst of South African and of

Russian conditions fused together, and it is this new social type - as a refinement and augmentation of each - that was then offered to the people of South Africa as the symbol of freedom.

We refer to an article titled “Monrovia, Liberia Skulls Mboodo: Inside MK, by M. Twala” on [www.mbokodo-quatro-uncensored.co.nr](http://www.mbokodo-quatro-uncensored.co.nr) which refers to detainees of Quatro who were buried alive and tortured to death as follows:  
 

**b) Breaches of discipline by MK cadres**

The following actions were considered as breach of discipline which could lead to imprisonment of MK cadres:

Fighting between cadres, abuse of authority, the disregard of camp rules, going AWOL, petty theft, exchanging camp property for liquor, drug abuse (mostly dagga) and illicit liquor brewing.

**c) How punishment for MK cadres was decided upon**

According to the African National Congress report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, cases on ill discipline were fed through by Regional Command structures to the Military Head Quarters. The NEC would call for a trial by Tribunal, and appoint least one senior official to sit on the tribunal with officials from Military head Quarters and the Regional Command. In some cases local authorities were also involved in this process. The tribunal would report its findings to Head Quarters, where a final decision was taken on the matter by the NEC, who then handed the case over to the Office of the President to mete out judgment on the suspect.

**d) Rumors of spy networks caused terror amongst MK cadres**

To discuss the treatment of MK soldiers during the 1980’s, we take information from the book **“**Mbokodo: Inside MK: Mwezi Twala - A Soldier's Story”,10 as follows:

“In 1981 began a time of terror and death for African National Congress members in exile. In February a strong African National Congress National Executive Committee entourage which included President Tambo made the rounds of all African National Congress camps in Angola. Cadres were warned of the presence of a spy network and the need for vigilance was emphasized. Enemy agents and provocateurs were rudely warned by Piliso, in Xhosa, '.. I'll hang them by their balls.' An 'internal enemy' psychosis had been whipped up and whenever African National Congress leaders visited camps they were heavily guarded. Many men and women were apprehended on suspicion of dissidence were to be exterminated in the most brutal manner in the months ahead. Those disillusioned MK cadres who returned from Rhodesia were the first to go.(p.49)  
  
“I became aware of these developments by word of mouth, but I was to discover later on, by personal experience, the terror of Quatro, to name but one death camp. People were removed from amongst us -- taken to Quatro or Camp 13 -- and disappeared forever without reason. Many of them were slaughtered by one means or another and their ultimate destination was a shallow grave. We heard rumors of execution by being buried alive, amongst many other techniques beyond civilized imagination. The purge created great fear amongst all of us, to the point where the smallest criticism, such as of badly prepared food, was seriously reconsidered by every individual, for one could never be certain that a 'best friend' would keep his mouth shut. (p.49)   
  
“Our own security people became exceedingly arrogant, to the point where an innocent slip of the tongue or even a simple gesture could land you in a torture cell at Quatro. Security men of the lowest rank and intelligence -- fourteen to eighteen year olds -- became our masters, with the power of life or death in their hands. They acted on a mood with impunity. (p.49-50)

A regime of terror developed which extended beyond the ANC/SACP prison for its cadres called Quatro. Terror was a necessary element in the total practice of repression and deception, which made the Anti-Apartheid Movement the most successful Popular Front lobby for Stalinism anywhere in the world. No international Stalinist-run public organization has ever had such an influence and shown such stability, reaching into so many major countries, for so long.  
  
In its thirty years' existence, the AAM international collaborative organizations extending to the press, the churches, the bourgeois political parties, the trade unions and the radical, including the ‘Trotskyite' left.

Vital to its success has been a practice of open and covert censorship. The African national Congress's prisoners were its necessary sacrificial-victims.

**e) Mutinies in the MK armies.**

We further refer to the book “Mutinies in the Liberation Armies: Inside Quadro”11a, by Paul Trewhela, for **first-hand testimony by former combatants of Umkhonto we Sizwe about the African National Congress prison regime, together with press reports that began to appear in Britain during March 1984, to understand the operation of the ANC/SACP, which is the machinery that runs the whole show revealed in its actual workings. Trewhela recounted of his experience as follows:**“I became aware of these developments by word of mouth, but I was to discover later on, by personal experience, the terror of Quatro, to name but one death camp. People were removed from amongst us -- taken to Quatro or Camp 13 -- and disappeared forever without reason. Many of them were slaughtered by one means or another and their ultimate destination was a shallow grave. We heard rumors of execution by being buried alive, amongst many other techniques beyond civilized imagination. The purge created great fear amongst all of us, to the point where the smallest criticism, such as of badly prepared food, was seriously reconsidered by every individual, for one could never be certain that a 'best friend' would keep his mouth shut. (p.49)   
  
“Our own security people became exceedingly arrogant, to the point where an innocent slip of the tongue or even a simple gesture could land you in a torture cell at Quatro. Security men of the lowest rank and intelligence -- fourteen to eighteen year olds -- became our masters, with the power of life or death in their hands. They acted on a mood with impugnity. (p.49-50)”

**4. The Nairobi Five**

Those who survived the Gulag system of the ANC/SACP did so knowing that to reveal what they had been through meant re-arrest, renewed tortures and in all probability, death. They had to sign a form committing them to silence.

The Nairobi five were MK guerrilla soldiers who had been detained at the African National Congress prison camp. They displayed immense courage in speaking out publicly, first through the ‘Sunday Correspondent*’* in Britain on the 8th of April 1984, and then on the 11th of April 1984 in ‘The Times’ a*b*out the conditions under which the MK cadres had lived whilst in exile. They also revealed that other prisoners, including Leon Madakeni - star of the South African film Wanaka - as well as Nomhlanhla Makhuba and another person known as Mark, committed suicide rather than suffer re-arrest at the hands of their KGB-trained guardians. Madakeni drove a tractor up a steep incline in Angola, put it into neutral and died as it somersaulted down the hill. 12   
  
Their courage might have contributed to secure the lives of eight colleagues who had fled Tanzania through Malawi, hoping to reach South Africa on the principle that better a South African jail than the African National Congress 'security.' This group, including two leaders of the mutiny in the African National Congress camps in Angola in 1984, arrived in South Africa in April, were immediately detained at Jan Smuts Airport by the security police for interrogation, and then released three weeks later. The day after their release they gave a press conference in Johannesburg, confirming the account of the mutiny published here.

These young people - the Nairobi five are aged between 28 and 33 - represent the flower of the generation of the Soweto students' revolt. This was the beginning of their political awakening. The experience of Stalinist and nationalist terror at the hands of the ANC/SACP represented a second phase in a cruel journey of consciousness. A third phase has followed, in which these young people are required to discover what further changes in society and thought are needed to bring a richly expressive democracy into being in southern Africa

**5. A call for Justice by ex-MK detainees from ANC President Nelson Mandela**

An open letter to the then African National Congress president, Nelson Mandela, by ex-MK detainees who had been with regard to the inhumane treatment they had received by his members who were in leadership positions, was printed in the magazine ‘Searchlight South Africa’ as follows:13

YMCA Shauri Moyo  
P.O.Box 17073  
Nairobi.  
14.04.90  
  
Dear Cde Mandela   
Revolutionary Greetings!  
  
The news through the press about our horrific experiences at the hands of the ANC security organs must have left you in a state of bewilderment. Fully aware of that, we realize the need to write you this letter giving an account of our vicissitudes in combating the enemies of democracy within the ANC and putting across also our incessant efforts to have these problems resolved democratically with the full participation of the entire membership. By this we hope to dispel any misunderstandings regarding our decision to expose this disgraceful and shameful page in the history of our organization, which we hold at high esteem, even at this hour.  
First, it is a fact, undisputable indeed, that the 1984 mutiny was a spontaneous reaction of the overwhelming majority of the cadres of MK to crimes and misdeeds, incompatible with the noble and humane ideals of our political objectives, carried out by certain elements in the leadership of the ANC. These included, among other things, acts of torture and murder through beatings, committed by the ANC Security personnel under the leadership of Mzwandile Piliso; brutal suppression of democracy denying the membership of the ANC any opportunity, for a period exceeding thirteen years, to decide through democratic elections who should lead them; and misleading our people's army by locking it into divisional battles from which our struggle did not benefit, thereby weakening and destroying its fighting capacity.  
  
Second, it remains our firm belief that, had the ANC leadership acted honestly at the very early stages of mutiny, and most of all, had President Tambo responded responsibly to our appeal for his immediate and direct intervention, many lives could have been saved. Regrettably, in a manner identical to our political enemy, the South African regime, the ANC leadership fished out the "ringleaders" and their most plainspoken opponents and unleashed virulent brutalities against them.  
  
Third, having gone through close to five years without trial in the most notorious prison within the ANC, and having endured the humiliating, dehumanizing and hazardous conditions in which some of us perished, we remained committed to the ANC. This was in recognition of the justness of our cause, in honour of men like you and the multitudes in our beleaguered homeland who languished in racist dungeons and got murdered in this noble cause, and lest we forget our comrades whose lives were cut short by those who deceptively made noise and declarations about democracy on behalf of our people.  
  
Fourth, embarrassed at the way the ANC community in Dakawa absolved us by electing us into the political structures in the Tanzanian ANC region, Chris Hani and Stanley Mabizela, acting on behalf of the National Executive Committee, then muzzled us by banning us from participating freely in ANC political life and dissolving democratically elected structures. Our efforts to challenge such an undemocratic action and to explain the causes of the 1984 mutiny for which we were being unjustifiably treated were answered by shouts from Hani himself, taking us down [from] the platform and even calling for armed Tanzanian Task Force Unit to surround the hall.   
  
It's the realization of the last-named factor that sealed and shattered our long-standing commitments and hopes to reform the ANC from within, and we resigned in December last year. But let it be stressed still, that even at that time, we still limited our activities to consulting the internal leadership of our movement to avoiding embarrassing the organization we so dearly loved. We contacted through letters and attempted to send our document (captured at the Dar-es-Salaam Airport by ANC and Tanzanian security) to such stalwarts of our anti-apartheid struggle as Frank Chikane, General Secretary of SACC leadership from prison and Archbishop Desmond Tutu.  
  
Knowing you as a personality who distinguished himself by unflinchingly fighting and standing for human rights and ideals of highest democracy, "we receive with bitterness your praises showered at these corrupt and atrocious elements, whilst a shroud of secrecy wraps around the noblest sons and daughters of South Africa who perished in pursuit of the same ideals as yours[,] at the hands of these fake custodians of our people's political aspirations. It is this that pricks our conscience to remove this shroud. Nothing can be more treacherous than to allow such crimes to go unchallenged and unknown. Nothing can be more hypocritical when some of us even at this hour are languishing in those concentration camps. Even much more disturbing is that these enemies of democracy are to be part of that noble delegation of the ANC to negotiate the centuries-long denied democratic freedoms of our people. What a mockery! What a scorn to our people's sacrifices for freedom! We back your tireless efforts and of all those peace-loving South Africans who see the need for a peaceful settlement of our problems, but we also believe that our people's yearnings for justice can only be competently secured by a morally clean leadership.  
  
We know how difficult it is to accept these bitter but objective truths, and how mammoth the task is of taking appropriate actions against these individuals. But we know also how [undermined ?] they are even within the ANC membership, and we are certain also that, if only they could talk, much more horrific stories will come out of those who tasted the bitterness of the ANC security's treatment. Hence, our sincere call to you and the fighting masses in South Africa and within the ANC to back our demand for a commission to inquire into these atrocities. This, contrary to short-sighted ideas, will not weaken the ANC, but will demonstrate to our people and the world the ANC's uncompromising commitment to justice and democracy. No better guarantee can be made to our people that when our organization ascends to power, their rights and freedoms will thrive in competent and responsible hands.

*Amandla! NGAWETHU!!  
POWER TO THE PEOPLE!!  
Yours in the Struggle,  
Ex-ANC Detainees*

**6. The Truth about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission11**

In September 1991, Nelson Mandela as president of the African National Congress responded to extensive pressure from returned exiles, from leading members who had not been in exile and various other leaders to set up investigations into the alleged abuses within the African National Congress in exile. For this, Mandela named a three person commission of inquiry, which was in effect an inquiry by the African National Congress into itself. This commission was reported in a footnote in ‘Searchlight South Africa’ No 8, January 1992, which stated that, “Political observers and victims of the ANC security apparatus alike expect nothing to come of it', (p 24).

**7. The Skweyiya Commission**

The commission appointed by Mandela was headed by a respected South African barrister, Advocate Thembile Louis Skweyiya, SC. Its official title was “The Commission of Enquiry into Complaints by Former African National Congress Prisoners and Detainees”, and was known as the 'Skweyiya Commission'.

**The Skweyiya Commission Members**

(i) **Advocate Zola Skweyiya**

Zola Skweyiya, was a high-ranking member of the African National Congress's legal department, and brother of Advocate Thembile Louis Skweyiya.

As Officer of Justice in the African National Congress in exile, Zola Skweyiya had been frustrated in his brief to investigate the prison camps, as the camps remained closed to him.

**(ii) Ms Bridget Mabandla**

A second member, Ms Bridget Mabandla, like Advocate Skweyiya, was a member of the African National Congress and a member of its Constitutional Committee.

**(iii) Mr. Charles Nupen**

The third initial member, Mr. Charles Nupen, resigned and was replaced during 1991 by Advocate Gilbert Marcus.  
  
  
**(iv) Advocate Gilbert Marcus**

Advocate Gilbert Marcus gave proof of personal impartiality in a discussion in Johannesburg in October 1991 with the researcher appointed by Amnesty International, who attended some of the sessions of the Commission.

**Powers of the Skweyiya Commission**

The Commission had no powers to subpoena witnesses, or to compel them to answer questions. It was dependent on the willingness of witnesses to come forward, which — given South African conditions — proved in the Commission's words its 'greatest shortcoming'. Its hearings were not in public.

**The Skweyiya Commission Report**

The report from the three person commission set up by Nelson Mandela was only partly conclusive, as in this report the African National Congress had no alternative except to condemn itself out of its own mouth.

What could not be known at the time was that the decision to establish the commission of inquiry, and then later on, the further decision to publish its report, was the result of an intensive struggle within the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress.  
  
A very sharp conflict took place between NEC members who had run Umkhonto we Sizwe and the security department in exile — who desperately tried to prevent any inquiry (and, later, still more, publication of its findings) — and other NEC members who wanted the truth to be known. These were mainly more civic-minded ANC activists who had led the campaign of the United Democratic Front within the country during the 1980’s.

**Exile leaders who adamantly opposed an inquiry**

Exile leaders who adamantly opposed an inquiry were Chris Hani (secretary-general of the South African Communist Party, former deputy commander of Umkhonto and the person most responsible for suppression of the mutiny in Umkhonto), Joe Nhlanhla (head of the African National Congress's Department of Intelligence and Security from 1987, and thus head of security while Quatro prison was in operation) and Jacob Zuma (a leading member of the South African Communist Party in exile, and head of counter-intelligence in Umkhonto from 1987).

The ANC president, Nelson Mandela, gave his support to those in favour of holding the inquiry and, later, of publishing its report; and this grouping prevailed.

**Struggle within the African National Congress on which information to expose in the Skweyiya Commission Report, would determine future leadership style.**   
  
Taking place behind closed doors, the struggle between African National Congress leadership on which information to expose to the public was of immense importance for the future of democracy, and general civic conditions, in the whole of southern Africa. At stake were two different styles of leadership within the African National Congress, the one represented 'external' leaders — deriving from three decades of closed, autarkic, command society in the camps with its model derived from the Soviet KGB and the east German Stasi; the other, of the 'internal' leaders, from the more open and pluralistic culture developed in the trade unions and civic associations within the country during the 1970’s and 1980’s.  
  
A major concern of the 'internal’ leaders was that in a future electoral campaign, under a new constitution, the state security forces would use secret information to discredit the African National Congress because of past human rights abuses by 'external' leaders in the camps. There was no way 'internal' leaders could know the background of their exile colleagues, in advance of the selection of candidates, without an inquiry by the African National Congress itself – these factors decided the matter on which information was to be made public. 

**Nelson Mandela made restrictions on information to be revealed by the Skweyiya Commission Report**  
  
The Skweyiya Commission Report conveyed to Mandela in August 1992, noted extensive concern that the commission was able to only would carry out a 'tame' investigation which included the following reasons:

* A conflict of interest was experienced by investigating members commission to investigate its own party based on principals of loyalty;
* The reluctance of witnesses to come forward;
* The restrictive terms of reference as were set out by Nelson Mandela.

Nelson Mandela had set of terms of reference in a letter to each of the three commissioners, referring them in effect to complaints only by *living* prisoners about their own previous conditions of detention. By definition this excluded what needed investigation at least as much: the murder and disappearances of others. An absurd and arbitrary division was thus created for the Commission from the beginning. Its report was by its very nature partial, flawed and massively inadequate. In the eyes of the commissioners, the brief from the African National Congress placed the central event in the three decades of the exile — the mutiny in the African National Congress in Angola by 90 per cent of its trained troops — out of purview. Put into perspective by Searchlight South Africa, ‘It was as if Hamlet's investigation into the troubles in his family were constrained to omit his father's murder’.  
  
The consequences of this flawed brief were very serious. Of three reports, that of the Skweyiya Commission received by far the greatest attention in the South African press. African National Congress leaders such as Chris Hani were not only exonerated without proper inquiry, but were able to hold up the report afterwards as providing them with a clean bill of health. In this sense, it served the classic function of official fudge.

**The Commission’s credence was threatened by Winnie Mandela, which led to the appointment of a non-African National Congress investigating member, Advocate Elna Revelas**

The Commission's credence as an impartial tool independent from loyalties to the African National Congress leadership was however gravely threatened by the fact that its secretariat was initially in the hands of a young lawyer, Mr. Dali Mpofu, later revealed in the press to be the lover of Mrs. Winnie Mandela, wife of the President Nelson Mandela, and then head of the African National Congress's Department of Social Welfare and a voracious threat to the former detainees.  
  
As the scandal concerning Mrs. Mandela's personal life rose to the boil, Mr. Mpofu left the commission. With him however also disappeared its secretariat, seriously compromising its work completed to date.

The African National Congress had undertaken that it would appoint an 'independent lawyer to conduct investigations, interview witnesses, visit detention camps and lead the evidence before the commission and to do all things reasonably incidental to the foregoing'. Advocate Elna Revelas of the Johannesburg Bar, who was not a member of the African National Congress, was appointed to this investigatory post. A relatively extensive investigation then followed — given the crucial limitation that this was an internal inquiry by a commission appointed by a political party to look into its own abuses. 

**The Conclusion of the Skweyiya Commission**

The Skweyiya Commission concluded that within the African National Congress in exile for the greater part of the 1980’s,'there existed a situation of extraordinary abuse of power and lack of accountability’. Furthermore, it confessed to 'staggering’ brutality by the African National Congress security department, (pp 65, 39). Noted in the Skweyiya Commission report were the following points:

*(i) Those witnesses who were detained without trial should have the allegations against them unequivocally and unconditionally withdrawn... These witnesses deserve, in our view, a clear and unequivocal apology for the wrongs that they have suffered.  
  
(ii) All witnesses who suffered maltreatment while being detained in ANC camps should receive monetary compensation for their ordeal...  
  
(iii) Some of the witnesses who appeared before us were, in our view, in need of medical and psychological assistance. Such should be offered and provided by the ANC.  
  
(iv) Some of the witnesses expressed the desire to continue their education which had been interrupted by long periods of detention. We recommend that the ANC provide assistance in this regard.  
  
(v) Detainees who lost property should be compensated for such loss.   
  
(vi) It is apparent to the Commission that many people suffered in the ANC camps... We suggest, therefore, that consideration be given to the creation of an independent structure which is perceived to be impartial and which is capable of documenting cases of abuse and giving effect to the type of recommendations made in this report..:   
  
(vii) We are aware that allegations have been made concerning the disappearance and murder of prisoners... (The) allegations are of the most serious nature and demand investigation. We therefore suggest that the impartial and independent structure referred to in paragraph (vi) above, or some other appropriate body be charged with the responsibility of investigating all allegations of disappearance and murder.  
  
(viii) We strongly recommend that urgent and immediate attention be given to identifying and dealing with those responsible for the maltreatment of detainees... It is clear that several persons against whom serious allegations of brutality have been leveled are currently employed by the ANC in the security department. A list of such persons will be supplied to the President of the NC. It would be wrong in our view to limit the responsibility to such persons. There are clearly persons in the senior ranks of the security department who were responsible for the situation in the camps and who should not escape the net of accountability. We consider this recommendation to be of the greatest importance, particularly in the light of the role that the ANC is likely to play in a future Government. No person who is guilty of committing atrocities should ever again be allowed to assume a position of power. Unless the ANC is prepared to take decisive action, the risk of repetition will forever be present. The best formula for prevention is to ensure that the perpetrators of brutality are brought to account and are seen to be brought to account.  
  
(ix) [The Commission here recommends that secret ANC internal reports into the death of Thami Zulu in Zambia in 1989, and of the Stuart Commission into the 1984 mutiny in MK, be made public].14  
  
(x) [The Commission finally recommends that in keeping with its terms of reference, its report be released to the public 'as soon as possible’. In the event, this was to take two months, while ANC leaders debated how to handle these damning conclusions.] (pp 68-74)*

**Response of the African National Congress leadership to the Conclusions of the Skweyiya Commission**

Nelson Mandela accepted the Commission’s conclusions - reluctantly, and without grace — at a press conference on the 19th of October 1992. He stated that the African National Congress leadership acknowledged 'ultimate responsibility for not adequately monitoring and, therefore, eradicating such abuses'. (*Guardian Weekly*, SA, 23 October 1992) This was an evasion, as evidence proved clearly that the function of the Skweyiya report served to deflect from the facts that the top leadership in exile, up to the level of Oliver Tambo as president, condoned and participated in the practice of abuses.

**Response on the** **Conclusion of the Skweyiya Commission by Searchlight South Africa**

Response from the editors of Searchlight South Africa to the conclusion of the Skweyiya Commission are relevant because the information on which their response is based, is independent from any political organization, and is also based on their direct interaction with the MK cadres and ex-detainees involved at that time. We quote Anthea Jeffery, author of the historical book ‘The Truth About the Truth Commission’ as follows:

“The Commission's treatment of written evidence was dilatory. As one of the editors of Searchlight South Africa, I posted the history of the mutiny in Umkhonto published in Searchlight South Africa No 5 to Messrs Mashile-Ntlhoro, Attorneys, and the Johannesburg firm representing the Skweyiya Commission, on 19 May 1992. This was despite reservations that the full truth could not be revealed in an internal African National Congress inquiry.   
**a) The African National Congress withheld information**

Having worked for an independent international commission of inquiry since early 1990, I felt it necessary to make it as difficult as possible for an internal inquiry to suppress information. I therefore tried to place this document on record before the Commission, and in correspondence urged former African National Congress detainees to place as much testimony as possible before it as well. I later received a registered letter from Mr. Brian Mashile of Mashile-Ntlhoro, thanking me for providing the Commission with 'valuable information'. The letter added: 'We will be corresponding with you in due course and shall keep you posted of developments.' (Letter, 3 June 1992). No such communication followed.  
  
In the event, the Skweyiya report made no reference to the article on the mutiny in Searchlight South Africa No 5. This was a significant and unjudicial lapse. The article in Searchlight South Africa remains the single most important first-hand published account of repressions within the African National Congress and of the mutiny, which took shape mainly in response to these repressions.  
  
The authors of the article had addressed a letter to Mr. Mandela, then in London, on 14 April 1990. This letter was later reprinted in Searchlight South Africa No 5, where it was available to the Commission. In this letter, Ketelo and his colleagues called on Mandela to support their demand for a commission to inquire into 'atrocities' in the African National Congress camps, (p 68) It was their own first-hand revelations of tortures and killings, published in the British press the previous week, that impelled Mandela to make his first public repudiation of torture by the African National Congress, at Jan Smuts airport on 14 April 1990.  
  
For the Commission, or its attorneys, to neglect this article - written by the individuals who first drew Mandela's attention to the need for an inquiry — was beneath the level of judicial practice. Because of this lapse alone, the investigation was neither 'full' nor 'thorough,' as Mandela had requested.  
The report states that it was 'not within the scope of this Commission to deal with the causes of the mutiny', (p 55) In so far as repressions and maltreatment were a very major cause of the mutiny, the limitation is absurd.  
  
The report adds however that there were a number of published accounts on the mutiny including a chapter in the recently published book by Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba entitled Comrades Against Apartheid. The author’s record that included in the demands of the mutineers was the suspension of the African National Congress security apparatus and an investigation of Quatro. (pp 55-56)

This chapter in the book by Ellis and Sechaba (reviewed in SSA No 9) was heavily based on the article by Ketelo and his colleagues. In this way, despite the neglect of the 'valuable information' placed before the Commission by this journal, the work of *Searchlight South Africa* could not be avoided. 

**b) Witnesses were punished**

In the event only 17 detainees gave evidence to the Commission. One was Pallo Jordan, a leading figure in the African National Congress's negotiating team, who was held in Isolation for six weeks by the African National Congress security department in Zambia in 1983. According to the report, he was arrested following criticism of the security department for conducting itself 'like a repressive police force', (p 66) The Commission was 'eventually also furnished with a copy of the report of the so-called Stuart Commission into the 1984 mutiny in Angola. The Skweyiya Commission noted that the contents of this previous internal African National Congress inquiry had 'never been made public and, it seems, not formally tabled before the African National Congress National Executive Committee', (p 56) This bears out the account published in SSA No 6 of the sinister and farcical nature of the 1985 African National Congress national conference at Kabwe in Zambia in 1985, which, as stated in Searchlight South Africa, neglected to table the Stuart Commission report. 

**c) The Skweyiya Commission vindicated the motives of MK cadres imprisoned as mutineers**

The Skweyiya Commission in fact vindicates the motives of the mutineers, and exculpates them from the charge of having been 'enemy agents'. Ellis and Sechaba, it notes, state in their book that it was widely known that the Stuart Commission 'attributed blame for the mutiny on the excesses of the security department, poor political education, poor recreational facilities and quality of food and the yearning to go home and fight'. The Skweyiya Commission then places its own stamp of verification on these remarks. "These are indeed the findings of the Stuart Commission', it states, (p 56)   
The Skweyiya Commission did not publish the report of the Stuart Commission, though it recommended publication. (So far, this appears not to have been done).

**d) The Stuart Commission clearly identified the brutality in the ANC.**

Revelations quoted from the Stuart report make it plain that ANC leaders imprisoned, tortured and executed those who had been labeled as mutineers in full knowledge that they were innocent of the smear of being South African government agents. The Skweyiya report states that the Stuart Commission had 'clearly identified' the malaise of brutality in the ANC. (p 65) It quotes the Stuart report as having stated that force had become 'the rule rather than the exception' and that coercion was 'indiscriminately used not only as a punishment but even when carrying out interviews and debriefings'.

**e) Oliver Thambo knowingly punished innocent prisoners**

The then ANC president, Oliver Tambo, certainly knew this when he inspected the inmates at Quatro in 1987, as reported in SSA No 5 and confirmed by the Skweyiya Commission, (p 36) Yet neither he nor any other leader relieved the prisoners of their misery, knowing well they were innocent of the charge of being 'enemy agents'. In his report as former president in exile to the ANC national conference in Durban in July 1992, Tambo repeated against the mutineers the brutal and now discredited assertion: 'Enemy Agents!' 15 It was then, as it had been in exile, an incitement to murder and brutality.

**f) The principal blame was put on a single individual**

The principal blame for the conduct of the African National Congress security department was placed by the Commission on a single individual, Mzwai Piliso, head of the African National Congress’s Department of Intelligence and Security until 1987. Piliso admitted personal participation in tortures. His task, in his own words, was to extract information 'at any cost'. The report states that Piliso was 'relieved of his duties' in 1987, and that the views and attitude of his successor at the head of a provisional directorate of security, Joe Nhlanhla, 'contrasted sharply’ with those of Piliso. No evidence is provided for this assertion. Sizakhele Sigxashe, head of the military tribunal which ordered public execution of mutineers at Pango camp in 1984, is cited as a member of the 'new department' which, according to the report, was 'charged with remedying the past', (p 63) There is no reference in the report to Sigxashe's prominent role in ordering executions, which is clearly stated in the article by Ketelo and his colleagues, printed in Searchlight South Africa (SSA No 5. p 52) Nor therefore is there any explanation how a person responsible for ordering executions could be 'charged with remedying the past'. At this point the Skweyiya Commission report becomes whitewash. The failure of the Commission to place on record the 'valuable information' provided by Searchlight South Africa no 5 reveals itself here as prejudicial.

**Response on the** **Conclusion of the Skweyiya Commission by the Weekly Mail**   
  
Within days of its publication of the Skweyiya report, the Weekly Mail newspaper summed up its inadequacy in a major front-page article dated 21 October 1992, under the headline ‘The names the ANC tried to hide'. The article was based on information gathered from MK cadres, Searchlight South Africa, and the Skweyiya Commission report.

In the preceding week, a journalist on its staff phoned the ex-African National Congress detainee Ketelo in Britain to question him in detail about the article.

**a) The names of torturers were confirmed and published**

An interview with Ketelo appeared as part of the three-page investigation by the Weekly Mail. About half of the names and details cited by this investigation of torturers confirmed information published over two years earlier in Searchlight South Africa and posted to the paper at the time.

To note, it was not until after the ANC published the Skweyiya report that the Weekly Mail moved to publish its own investigation, confirming and supplementing Ketelo's article in detail. The Weekly Mail reported that its revelations 'sparked outrage' from the ANC. In their reply to questions put by the ANC, Weekly Mail stated that its report had been based 'on a variety of sources, and no names were included unless they were corroborated by more than one source'. It also argued that where people in authority had knowledge of torture being carried out by individuals directly under their command, this amounted to complicity, when it asked, “If the minister of law and order, the commissioner of police or a senior officer under his command, knew that certain detainees were being tortured in security police detention and chose not to intervene, do we not accuse them of the same crime?”

**b) A much broader investigation should be made into the activities of Hani with regards to the treatment of African National Congress detainees**

The Weekly Mail suggested a much broader scope for inquiry concerning Chris Hani's activities than provided by the Skweyiya Commission. Hani's role, it stated, was 'ambiguous’. It noted that according to several affidavits and accounts by former detainees, he endorsed the decision by the Military Tribunal for the execution of seven of the rebels (which he denied) and was present at the subsequent execution of four others. They also said that he was present when Mwezi Twala was shot in the back in Angola in 1984. They added that former ANC detainees reported that at times Hani suppressed their right to speak and hold office (after their release) and did not keep the promises he had previously made to them. They also said that he did little to help them while they were in detention in Quatro.

**c) Several high-ranking torturers and killers continue to work at the ANC head office**

The Weekly Mail pointed out that several high-ranking torturers and killers continue to work in the ANC security department operating out of party headquarters in Shell House, Johannesburg. These included Nelson Mandela's personal bodyguard, MB Mavuso (Umkhonto traveling name 'Jomo'), a former guard at Quatro who is 'widely alleged to have been directly involved in torture'.  
Another torturer who continued to work at the ANC headquarters, travelling name Sizwe Umkhonto, was a former student at the Moscow Party Institution, trained in intelligence in East Germany and the USSR. Sizwe Mkhonto was camp commander at Quatro for several years, starting while still in his teens. This brutalized youth called the principal leader of the mutiny, Ephraim Nkondo, from his cell in Quatro on Saturday, the 26th of May 1984. This was shortly after the crushing of the mutiny in Pango camp. Nkondo was seen the same day being pulled through the camp with a rope around his neck. The next day he was found dead in his cell, with a rope around his neck.

**Response on the** **Conclusion of the Skweyiya Commission by Amnesty International**

The report by Amnesty International entitled: 'South Africa: Torture, ill-treatment and executions in African National Congress camps', noted that officials of politically impartial human rights bodies in South Africa had informed Amnesty that they would have been 'willing to establish a genuinely independent commission of inquiry had they been approached by the ANC. (p 21) The ANC did not approach them.

**a) Torturers and killers should never be allowed to hold positions of authority**

Amnesty was very forthright that the ANC's torturers and killers should never be allowed to hold positions of authority within the organization or under any future South African administration. In particular, they should never be in a position where they have responsibility for law enforcement or custody of prisoners, (p 26).

**b) The chains of command were not realized**

Amnesty pointed out the failure of the Skweyiya Commission to 'analyze the chains of command within the security department and MK, and between these bodies and the ANC leadership, in order to establish political responsibility for what went on in the camps', (p 23). This is the most sensitive issue for the leaders in exile, and therefore least accessible to an internal closed inquiry.

**c) ‘Travelling names’ continued to hide the identities of both victims and their persecutors**

The Amnesty report further indicated that the ANC's system of providing nearly all its black members in exile with travelling names, or *noms de guerre*, continues to screen the identities of both victims and their persecutors. This is shown by continued effective anonymity of torturers such as Sizwe Umkhonto and of the seven men executed at Pango. (They are not anonymous of course to South African state security officials, or to Imbokodo, only to the general public).  
Amnesty referred to the names of the seven people executed at Pango from Ketelo's article. As these were fictitious travelling names, they served to obscure the fate of these people to their relatives. The best known of these men, referred to in Searchlight South Africaand in the Amnesty report by the travelling name James Nkabinde, was Mlamli Namba. Along with several other members of Imbokodo, Namba resigned from the security department in 1980 in protest at its authoritarian behaviour and because of corruption at ANC headquarters in Lusaka. As stated in Ketelo's history of the mutiny, he had been a personal bodyguard to Tambo in Lusaka. Namba's fate is therefore a personal reproach against Tambo.

**Prominent leaders exonerated from their guilt by the** **Conclusions of the Skweyiya Commission**

Top ANC leaders were spared by the Skweyiya Commission's terms of reference and by its decision to place responsibility for investigating details of torture, murders and disappearances, and for naming names, on yet another commission a month after publication of the Skweyiya report. According to the Weekly Mail dated 27 November 1992, the new commission included an elderly South African businessman Mr. Sam Motsuenyane (– a director of loci , president of the Boy Scouts in South Africa and founder and chairman of the National African Chamber of Commerce ), Mr. David Zamchiya (a former Zimbabwean government official) and Ms Margaret Burnham of the United States.

This commission suffered the same defect as the Skweyiya Commission: whatever the merits of its members, it represents an organization investigating its own malpractice. The evasiveness of the Skweyiya Commission did not inspire confidence in the will or ability of the new commission to name names comprehensively, to specify crimes committed and to recommend firm measures for exclusion of the perpetrators from office.

**Further Indemnity Act.**

Both Amnesty International and the independent Douglas Commission deplored the South African government's Further Indemnity Act, which was passed shortly after publication of the Skweyiya Commission’s report. The effect of this act is to provide state protection for its own torturers and murderers and those of the National Party and the African National Congress alike.

**The Douglas Report**

The Douglas report summarizes the results of an inquiry by a Durban advocate, Robert Douglas SC, commissioned by an explicitly pro-capitalist organization based in Washington DC, the International Freedom Foundation (IFF). Its most important section consists of extracts from about 60 sworn depositions made in the second half of 1992, mostly from survivors of the camps. Outside the archives of state security and the ANC itself, they represent the biggest body of first-hand statements yet collected about the life of the ANC in exile. Judging from extracts from witnesses whose experiences were previously recorded in this journal, the material presented as evidence by Douglas does appear to reflect the actual statements of survivors of the camps and generally does not appear to have been falsified. Survivors of the mutiny and victims of the security department think highly of the evidence, though not necessarily of Douglas' method of drawing conclusions.

**Oliver Tambo**  
The report is particularly damaging to the reputation of Tambo. Witness 25 (they are not named) is described as having joined the ANC inside South Africa in 1978, eventually becoming a senior member of the intelligence wing after leaving the country. He states:

“I am fully familiar with the command structure of both the security and intelligence wings in the ANC during those years. At the head of both was Oliver Tambo, the President of the ANC. The security wing was commanded by Mzwai Piliso [condemned by the Skweyiya Commission for his forthright advocacy of torture] and the intelligence wing by Sezekele Sigxashe [head of the tribunal that ordered the execution of the mutineers at Pango]. (p 45)

A former medical officer in the camps, interviewed by Douglas, is also cited as saying that after the influx in 1976, 'President Tambo appointed him to a senior position in the security department to assist with the screening of new recruits'. This witness is then quoted as saying that:

The security system was directly under the President. We reported to the President directly and his secretary Duma Nokwe was the one we first reported to. (pp 58-59)  
  
Tambo has a powerful case to answer. As president he was no remote, purely formal figure in the ANC — that is, principally a figurehead or symbol, like a modern constitutional monarch. He was more in the manner of the president of the United States, head of the executive: and in this case, at the time of the mutiny, an unaccountable and largely unelected executive, unrestrained by checks and balances. As ANC president he was commander in chief of MK and one of the three senior office-holders in the ANC. (The other two were Alfred Nzo, secretary-general after Nokwe, and Tom Nkobi, as treasurer). Directly under his authority came three sub-departments: 1) army; 2) security and intelligence; 3) information and publicity. As president, he thus had more information than anyone else in the whole organization.   
  
Tambo presided over a crucial session of the High Command of MK, meeting in Luanda, either in the last week of January or early February 1984.   
  
This meeting took place immediately after the first stage of the mutiny at Kangandala on the eastern front in Malanje province — when troops refused to go into action against the Angolan rebel movement Unita — and immediately before the second stage of mutiny at Viana camp on the outskirts of Luanda in February, when a Committee of Ten was elected and demands were drawn up.  
Present at this session of the High Command besides Tambo were Nzo; Nkobi; MK commander Joe Modise; MK chief of staff (and SACP secretary general) Joe Slovo; SACP leaders Reg September, Mac Maharaj and Cassius Make; Julius Mokoena, MK chief of personnel; David Moshoeu, regional commander; and a number of ranking military and security officers. (Hani was not present). The meeting discussed the grievances already being expressed by the troops, Tambo taking a leading part.  
  
The top political leaders of the ANC, the SACP, and the top military leaders of MK, most notably Tambo and Slovo, were therefore well apprised of the discontent among the overwhelming majority of the ANC's trained troops. They knew the feeling of the troops, then gathering in Viana, before the outbreak of full-scale mutiny, and took no adequate measures to meet their demands. As Ketelo and his colleagues recorded, these were:

1. *An immediate suspension of the Security Department and establishment of a commission to investigate its all-round activities. Included here is also the investigation of one of the most feared secret camps of the ANC, Quatro.*
2. *A review of the cadre policy of the ANC to establish the missing links that were a cause for a stagnation that had caught up with our drive to expand the armed struggle. [This was in essence a demand to be withdrawn from the civil war in Angola, and to be sent to fight in South Africa against the forces of the state.-PT]*
3. *To convene a fully representative democratic conference to review the development of the struggle, draw new strategies and have elections for a new NEC* (*SSA*, No 5, p 45)

These demands were formulated in a series of open, public mass meetings and purely peaceful gathering at Viana. The High Command of the ANC, acting as a body and headed by Tambo, directed the suppression of this phase of the mutiny principally by summoning the Presidential Brigade of FAPLA, the army of the ruling MPLA party, to storm the camp. Close questioning of all those present at this meeting of the High Command, by commission of inquiry, meeting in open session, is needed to determine precise responsibility for the tortures, imprisonment and deaths that followed.

**Chris Hani in The Work in Progress Journal of June 1992**

Prior to the Skweyiya report, the most serious investigation into abuses in the camps published in South Africa was an article by Hein Marais in the journal ‘Work in Progress’ issue of June 1992.

Next to a photograph of Hani, the journal cover ran the headline: ‘ANC Camps: Hani opens up'. Despite his own role in damning the first ANC detainees to return to South Africa as 'enemy agents' (on South African television, in mid-1990), Hani presented himself as the person most responsible for ending executions in 1984, which he said he had always opposed. He also declared that while certain ANC members should not be part of a new security force in South Africa, and that a parliamentary committee should oversee the security apparatus, abuses in the ANC had happened only 'to a very small extent'.

**Chris Hani in the Skweyiya Commission Report**

Chris Hani was permitted to express his 'feelings of revulsion' at oppressive practices in the ANC as reported on page 60 of the Skweyiya Commission Report, without becoming subject to normal cross-examination. This was particularly important to the reputation of the African National Congress because of Hani's status as secretary-general of the SACP and his former position as Umkhonto chief of staff, with a major following among its commanders.

**Chris Hani in the ex-detainee Ketelo’s report**

There are several explicit references to oppressive conduct by Hani in ex-detainee Ketelo's report. These too were ignored by the Skweyiya Commission, which reported that “Hani told us of his increasing concern for what he described as 'the horrors of Quatro' [in bold type in the report] and how he and others had insisted on the adoption of the Code of Conduct of 1985. [This Code was a dead letter — PT] He described some of the members of the security department as 'really vicious', a description which was amply borne out by the evidence. He felt that the ANC as an organization built upon respect for human rights had an obligation to acknowledge and redress the wrongs of the past and to prevent them from happening in the future, (pp 60-61)”.

The article by Ketelo and his colleagues includes the following references to Chris Hani:

1. In the second stage of the mutiny, during the democratic and peaceful drawing up of grievances at Viana camp outside Luanda in February 1984, Hani "with an AK submachine gun, made his appearance on the side of the loyalists chasing and firing at those who wanted to join the mutineers', (p 44);
2. Standing beside two members of the Liberation Committee of the Organization for African Unity, Hani made a speech to the troops at Viana in which he denounced the mutiny and its demands as 'an adventure instigated by disgruntled elements'. (p47)
3. Hani and the Umkhonto commander Joe Modise 'accompanied a group of security personnel to round up those who had escaped arrest at Viana '. When a captured mutineer tried to explode a grenade in the military vehicle in which Hani and Modise were escorting their prisoner, Hani issued instructions to the security personnel to shoot [the prisoner] on the spot, but Modise intervened saying "he [the prisoner] must go and suffer first"'. (p48) The prisoner, Vuyisile Maseko (real name Xolile Siphunzi) was last known by the authors of the article to have been left in Luanda State Prison when the mutineers were released in December 1988.
4. Mwezi Twala (traveling name Khotso Morena), a member of the Committee of Ten which was elected to lead the mutiny, was 'shot from behind in the presence of Joe Modise and Chris Hani during their round-up of other mutineers', (p 50) Twala survived.
5. Following the decision by the military tribunal headed by Sigxashe to execute seven of the mutineers at Pango camp in the third and final stage of the mutiny, Hani 'endorsed their execution', which he appears to have witnessed himself, (p 53) Another member of the tribunal was Morris Seabelo, 'a former commander and commissar at Quatro and at that time chief of security in the whole of the Angola region of MK'. (p 52) Seabelo (real name Lulamile Dandle) has been described by participants in the mutiny as Hani's 'closest lieutenant'. Prisoners at Quatro were told by guards that Hani was in fact a member of the tribunal himself, and that he was present at the executions, (personal communication) Similar allegations were made to the Douglas Commission, discussed below, Hani denies this. SSA has not been able independently either to verify or disprove these allegations. They are matters that the Commission did not investigate.
6. Finally, together with Stanley Mabizela, a fellow member of the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC), Hani personally suppressed all elected structures at Dakawa camp in Tanzania in late December 1989, in order depose former mutineers who had been freely elected by ANC exiles. These included the chairman and organizing secretary of the elected committee representing all the exiles in Tanzania.

There is a long, extended extract from this article by Ketelo and his colleagues in the Douglas Commission report of the mutiny, which Douglas describes as a 'vivid and detailed account' (pp 20-23), it is the longest quoted passage in the report. 

**Chris Hani in the Douglas Commission Report**

In his report, Advocate Douglas suggests further dimensions of responsibility on the part of the ANC leadership. He quotes a very important passage from the interview with Hani in Work in Progress (June 1992) concerning suppression of the mutiny in its third and final stage at Pango camp in May 1984, wherein Hani states:

“The loyalists (if I may use that term) overran the camps. Lives were lost on both sides. Very sad, because these were all members of the ANC, fellow South Africans. And that was the end of my role. I was never a member of the tribunal which tried them. A tribunal was set up by the ANC to try them, and some of them were sentenced to death. And executed — it was a big number, about eighteen or nineteen, I can't remember. I rushed back to Lusaka and said to the leadership: Stop the executions, (pp 54-55).”

This is the first high-level acknowledgement that the number of people executed at Pango was much higher than indicated in the article by Ketelo and his colleagues. Their account was clearly restrained.   
Secondly, Hani makes plain in this statement that authority for stopping the executions lay with the top political leadership of the ANC at the organization’s headquarters in Lusaka. This suggests primarily Oliver Tambo himself. Hani's statement is the most important public comment on the mutiny so far by any leading figure in the ANC in exile. It is important to note, however, as Army Commissar of MK and as the sole member of the NEC in the region, Hani was himself already the senior leader of the ANC at Pango.   
It was left to a relatively far less influential figure in the NEC, Mrs. Gertrude Shope to relieve the suffering of the prisoners, as reported by Ketelo and his colleagues in Searchlight South Africa No 5. (p 53). As Douglas observes, Hani's statement raises more questions than it answers. Nothing except questioning, in open commission, of all relevant ANC officials can satisfy the need for justice in this matter. No ANC leader of the exile can be trusted with authority until full knowledge of this individual's conduct is made available to the public.

**Maurice Seabelo, Right hand man of Chris Hani**

Maurice Seabelo was among those killed in SADF raids on Maseru in December 1985.16 Seabelo was the first commander at Quatro, which was known formally both as 'Camp 32' and after his death as the 'Morris Seabelo Rehabilitation Centre'. Substantial detail is provided in Searchlight South Africa No 5 about Seabelo, who at the time of the mutiny was chief of security of the whole of the Angola region of Umkhonto. As Hani's closest lieutenant, Seabelo sat on the tribunal which ordered death by firing squad for the seven mutineers at Pango. He later boasted to prisoners in Quatro that he had personally taken part in the executions, blasting his victims with an RPG7 anti-tank bazooka rocket. Survivors were compelled to witness the mutilation of their comrades.

**Joe Slovo in the Douglas Commission**

The Douglas Commission by Advocate Douglas reports that there is conclusive evidence that Joe Slovo, a leading figure in Umkhonto we Sizwe from the South African Communist Party, had extensive knowledge of the system of human rights abuses in the camps, and perhaps actively participated in authorizing it. Slovo is cited in one deposition as having visited Quatro at night, (p 43) Prisoners from the mutiny in Quatro were indeed told this at the time by guards. An Umkhonto soldier, Zondi, whose jaw had been broken at Pango, told fellow prisoners in Luanda State Security Prison that he had been sent to military hospital in Luanda on Slovo's orders, following a visit to Quatro.  Zondi later suffered severely at Quatro, where guards repeatedly hit his still broken jaw, and where he developed epilepsy.

**Ronnie Kasrils in the Douglas Commission**

In the Douglas Commission, Ronnie Kasrils is cited as being responsible for visiting a prison camp at Nampula in Mozambique in 1982 and for incarcerating fourteen Umkhonto soldiers in a basement at Quibaxe in northern Angola, following their refusal to obey orders in 1977. (pp 7,43,60) The prison at Nampula was deep in the bush, surrounded by wild animals and in an area heavily affected by malaria.   
The majority of prisoners were MK veterans of the war in Zimbabwe, where they had fought in the military wing of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (Zapu). When they refused to be transferred to fight in the civil war in Angola, demanding to be sent to fight in South Africa itself, they were confined to Nampula, where some went mad.

Kasrils did not deny knowledge of this camp in a press conference in Johannesburg in January 1993. At this conference, he and two former participants in the 1977 'mutiny' at Quibaxe denied that the men imprisoned in the basement had been affected by noxious fumes, as reported in the Weekly Mail, 29 January 1993.

To note, Joe Slovo and Ronnie Kasrils both bore responsibility as senior officers of Umkhonto. The precise limits and extent of their responsibility for abuses remain unclear.

**8. The re-integration of MK soldiers to the South African society**

**a) The closing down of ANC Camps**

All African National Congress camps in Angola were closed down in 1989, including Camp 32. All but 32 prisoners were released, and these were transferred to a small prison in Uganda after negotiations with that government. In 1991 the group of 32 were also released and allowed to return to South Africa, where several are said to have rejoined their handlers and fronted for the SB-managed stratkom outfit, the "Returned Exiles Co-coordinating Committee".

**b) The return of ex-MK detainees from the Transkei**

Amnesty International cited a report in the South African newspaper City Press in late 1992 to the effect that the office of the Transkei Commissioner of Police had circulated a directive signed by the deputy chief of the Criminal Investigation Department, ordering police not to arrest ANC members on criminal charges without first consulting an Umkhonto liaison officer, (p 18). Even though the Transkei police denied the report, it was a real concern for ex-MK detainees who feared for their lives. To note, the Amnesty International report also revealed that, two and a half years after the political assassination of the former detainee Sipho Phungulwa in the Transkei, nobody was brought to trial, despite the presence of witnesses and ballistic evidence, and the fact that two men were belatedly arrested, charged and released on bail.

**c) Post 1990: Suspension of armed operations**

The Groote Schuur Minute, the Pretoria Minute and the DF Malan Accord determined the future of MK activities.

In terms of the Pretoria Minute the African National Congress had agreed to stop bringing arms into the country. The DF Malan Accord of 1992 aimed to bring the arms of all the armed forces in the country under control. However, the De Klerk regime interpreted the Accord to mean that this applied only to MK; various negotiations ensued, without resolving the matter.   
  
Most MK MHQ personnel returned from exile for the December 1990 Consultative Conference.

The armed struggle was suspended in August 1990 with the signing of the Pretoria Minute. It was decided that those MK cadres who were outside the country - in camps or in the Front Line States - should undergo further training to prepare them for integration into a new South African Defence Force. Limited numbers of cadres were sent for advanced officers training in conventional warfare. Countries including India, Ghana, Pakistan, Uganda and Tanzania hosted these cadres.

Many ANC cadres, especially those on death row, were only released in 1992 after the signing of the "Record of Understanding". 

**d) The Venda MK**

In 1991, MHQ organized a conference for MK in Venda to inform cadres of the state of the negotiations and to get their views on the future of MK. The conference was attended by representatives of cadres from inside the country as well as those in camps in Tanzania and Uganda.   
The Venda MK conference supported the decisions taken at the ANCs July conference in Durban, and called on the ANC leadership to secure the release of MK combatants who were still in prison. Cadres called on Chris Hani to remain MK Chief-of-Staff. 

**e) Homeland armies were not allowed to hold individual bilateral negotiations with the SADF.**   
  
The Durban conference also called for a reorganization of MHQ with the view to preparing for serious negotiations with the regime on military matters and a future defence force. It was decided that multi-lateral talks would be held with all forces within the country, and that the homeland armies should be discouraged from individually holding bilateral negotiations with the SADF.   
Following the Venda Conference, the ANC re-organized MHQ (details in this regard appear in the appendix on ANC structures and personnel.) Regional structures were established in each of the ANCs 14 organizational regions and cadres appointed to liaise with MK personnel living in these areas.   
  
  
**f) Integration into the SADF and donation of arms stockpiled in other countries as they were not suitable to the SADF**

In December 1993, MK held its final parade. After the elections, the integration of all members of all armed forces into a new SANDF began in earnest in May 1994. Later that year, the weapons that were in MK Ordnance stockpiles were handed over to the SANDF. Other weapons were collected and handed over. The President decided that all MK arms stockpiled in foreign countries should he donated to those countries; they were not compatible with those used in the SANDF.

**The need of protection for ex-MK cadre detainees in today’s society**  
  
In exile, the former detainees fought the battle for democracy under the most difficult and dangerous conditions. They are precious educators of the society about the need for defence of its civil rights, since they opposed both the racist, capitalist abuses of the National Party and the Stalinist abuses of the African National Congress (directed in large part by its guiding brain, the South African Communist Party). As such, they cannot be trusted by either of the future main parties of government. Politicians are aware that the former MK cadre detainees know more than most people who were born in South Africa both pre and after 1994 about the true nature of the South African political arena, and many view these ex-detainees as nuisances. Because these detainees know too much for the comfort of political leaders, they are dangerous for the powers that be, as members of the generation that went from the school students' revolt of 1976 to the ANC mutiny of 1984, and which humorously named the African National Congress’s worst prison after the Fort prison in Johannesburg. ('Number Four' in Sowetan argot, translated into Portuguese, became 'Quatro' in Angola).

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###### 13 July 1990: Bandile Ketelo, Amos Maxongo, Zamxolo Tshona, Ronnie Massango and Luvo Mbengo, Searchlight South Africa: Vol.2 No.1: (p.35-68) ‘A Miscarriage of Democracy: The ANC Security Dept. in the 1984 Mutiny of Umkhonto We Sizwe’

###### [Uncensored: ANC's Mbokodo Quatro Terror Camps](https://www.facebook.com/pages/Uncensored-ANCs-Mbokodo-Quatro-Terror-Camps/216951461731827)

###### 14 The Johannesburg newspaper City Press has stated that the IFF is headed by US Congressman Jesse Helms, whom it describes as 'a renowned ANC-basher and supporter of Renamo in Mozambique, Unita in Angola and other rightwing causes elsewhere in Africa and Latin America.' (18 October 1992)

15 Sunday Star, Johannesburg, 21 July 1992)

16 Weekly Mail, 30 October 1992

**FOOTNOTES**

**Footnote 1: The African National Congress Screening Procedure**

According to the report handed to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by the representatives of the African National Congress, the screening procedure for African National Congress cadres was as follows:    
On arrival, recruits were welcomed by the official in charge, and advised of the rules that would govern their stay in the reception area or centre by the person in charge. The Chief Recording Officer (CRO) would formally explain to the new arrival the necessity of providing the Movement with his or her biography. Recruits had to supply detailed information on their family and educational history, their reasons for leaving the country, reasons for wanting to join the Movement, and details on the political activities in which s/he had been involved. Biographies also served as skills audits, and as a means of gathering valuable information of various kinds.   
  
Completed biographies were collected by the CRO, and handed to another officer to study and prepare for interviewing the recruit. The biography would be evaluated on the basis of information at the ANC's disposal, including information from confessed agents or information on collaborators supplied by other cadres. Biographies were also cross-checked against biographies written by other recruits where there were points of similarity (such as the area from which recruits came, the organizations in which they said they had been involved, and so on.) 

**The preliminary interview**    
  
When possible, an officer who was familiar with the area or region the recruit came from would be deployed to carry out the interview. The objectives of conducting this interview were to clarify any questions arising from the recruit's biography.   
On completion of the preliminary interview, a report would be tabled for a panel which discussed and analyzed the case. In the majority of cases, recruits were cleared immediately. The following categories were used:   
  
Cleared (Category A): the recruit / volunteer was considered to be neither a security threat nor an impostor, and was cleared to join MK, be sent to school, or for immediate deployment inside the country.   
  
Doubtful (Category B): where the volunteer / recruit were considered by the panel to be neither a security threat nor an impostor, but had possibly exaggerated or embroidered her/his biography. They were usually given the benefit of the doubt.   
Confessed (Category C): In this category there were:-

Cases of spontaneous confession. In several cases recruits confessed spontaneously, without being prompted or encouraged, to having been recruited by one or other intelligence structure of the apartheid regime. In a very high proportion of cases, this had occurred in prison, with the SB promising to drop charges in return for working for them. Many of these "agents" had little or no sense of loyalty to their "handlers", and were ill-prepared for infiltrating the ANC. In cases where the panel had satisfied itself that the recruit was telling the truth, and had no ulterior motives, s/he would be cleared.

Cases of confession after an interview in which inconsistencies or untruths were pointed out to the recruit/volunteer (more detail in the next section.)

Implausible "confessions" in which prepared "legends" or cover stories were used in an attempt to deceive the interviewers with regard to the true nature of the agent's connections, and hopefully lay the ground for infiltration of the Movement.

Definite suspect (Category D): in these cases the panel concluded that the person concerned was definitely or highly probably a security threat, since the biography showed significant inconsistencies with other information at our disposal. In these cases, the person concerned would be further interviewed or interrogated. 

**Subsequent interviews or interrogation**    
  
If the panel felt that a biography indicated there was cause for concern, there would be a second (even at times a third) interview in which emphasis would be laid on discrepancies, false claims, or other questions arising. Sometimes people confessed at this stage. Confessions were handled in various ways.   
  
In cases where recruits confessed after being prompted or persuaded to do so, the panel would seek to understand the recruit's motive in withholding this information. In some cases it was merely prompted by fear of the consequences of confessing, without other ulterior motives. The panel would usually clear these cases with the proviso that the recruit would be barred from joining the military until they had demonstrated their trustworthiness.   
  
If concern about the recruit remained unresolved, the suspect would be informed that the interviewers required further information with regard to discrepancies arising in the interview process, and would be moved to a "safe house" for interrogation.   
  
The suspect would be confronted with details of discrepancies that had arisen in the earlier processes of screening and interviews, giving the suspect room to realize that the Department had specific information which was in obvious conflict with what s/he had been claiming, which had to be clarified. In some cases where agents had continued to maintain their innocence through the screening and interviewing processes, it now dawned on their minds just how grave the situation was, and some would confess.   
  
Various techniques were used in interrogation. It was common to ensure that suspects were sitting in uncomfortable positions to put pressure on them. Using force was explicitly against policy, but this did occur at times, particularly in cases where the Department was aware that lives of other people in the field were at stake. There were some cases in which suspects were severely beaten, particularly before 1985.   
  
In cases where the truth had finally come out and had been verified by cross-checking other sources of information, this would be conveyed for assessment to the panel, which would report its finding to the Officer of Justice. After this, the case was out of NAT's hands. The office of Justice would decide whether he felt there was a case, and if so, recommended that the Tribunal hear the case. Confessions or other information extracted under duress were unacceptable.   
  
There were some cases where suspects would continue to flatly refuse to co-operate, or continued to deny, at times in the face of strong evidence to the contrary, that they were working for the regime. These cases would also be referred to the Office of Justice.   
  
of 500 new recruits who arrived in Angola for training in 1987, the breakdown was as follows:

Category A (cleared): 262

Category B (doubtful): 140

Category C (confessed): 26

Category D (definite suspect): 14

(At the time these statistics were produced 58 recruits had not yet been attended to i.e. gone through the screening process.)

**Footnote 2: ANC Structures and Personnel during the Peoples War**

According to the report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, representatives of the African national Congress referred to the structures and personnel of the African National Congress during the war they waged on the Union of South Africa, which they also called the ‘Peoples War’, as follows:

**1. Pre-Morogoro (1969)**    
  
Following the banning of the ANC in 1960, OR Tambo was sent out of the country to represent the ANC abroad; Yusuf Dadoo was deployed to represent the SACP. After the arrests of most members of MK's National High Command, some of those who had evaded arrest left the country. Internal ANC (and SACP) leadership ceased to exist.   
  
Under the leadership of OR Tambo, offices were established in Dar-es-Salaam in 1964 to organize training of MK cadres. From 1964 onwards an office was established in Lusaka; by 1965 the ANC's HQ was in Morogoro, Tanzania, and its main military camp was at Kongwa.   
  
In 1966 the leadership group moved to Morogoro, which became ANC HQ, with MK becoming the ANC's military wing. In 1967, OR Tambo became Acting President, after the death of Chief Albert Luthuli. The ANC's Secretary-General was Duma Nokwe, Moses Kotane filled the post of Treasurer, and Joe Modise commanded MK. The primary task before them was the reorganization of the ANC's severely disrupted structures. 

**1.a. The NEC in exile, 1963 - 1969**    
  
There were no elected members of the NEC until the 1985 Kabwe Conference. People were co-opted to this structure as the leadership saw fit. During the 1960’s, the following people were NEC members:   
Chair: OR Tambo   
Treasurer: Moses Kotane   
Secretary General: Duma Nokwe   
  
Other members:  Mzwai Piliso, Mendy Msimang, Moses Mabhida, Themba Mqota, Mark Shope, JB Marks, Tennyson Makiwane, Ambrose Makiwane, Jimmy Hadebe, Joe Matthews, Alfred Nzo, T.T. Nkobi, Johnny Makathini, Mzwai Piliso, Robert Resha, Dan Tloome, and Joe Modise. 

**2. ANC Structures, 1969 - 1976**    
  
At the Morogoro Conference it was decided to form the Revolutionary Council (RC), tasked with concentrating on the home front, developing internal structures, creating publicity for the ANC, and waging armed struggle. The NEC was reduced to eight members after the Morogoro Conference, and during the period between 1969 - 1985, the NEC and RC (later the PMC) co-opted additional members as seen fit by the leadership. The RC expanded over the years by co-opting new members and developing structures or portfolios, including Communications, Ordnance, Intelligence and Security. 

**2.a. The NEC, 1969 - 1976**    
  
Acting President: OR Tambo   
Treasurer: Moses Kotane, followed by JB Marks   
Secretary-General: Duma Nokwe, succeeded by Alfred Nzo in 1969   
Other members:  John Motshabi, Mzwai Piliso, Moses Mabhida, Themba Mqota, JB Marks, Tennyson Makiwane, Ambrose Makiwane, Jimmy Hadebe, Joe Matthews, Alfred Nzo, T.T. Nkobi, Johnny Makhatini, Robert Resha, Dan Tloome, and Joe Modise.   
  
Members who were co-opted to the NEC during this period included:  Thabo Mbeki, Chris Hani, Joe Jele, Jacob Zuma, Joe Gqabi, John Nkadimeng, John Gaetsewe, Robert Manci, Andrew Masondo, Henry Makgothi, Florence Moposho, and Simon Makana.   
  
The Makiwane brothers and Themba Mqota were expelled in 1972. 

**2.b. The Revolutionary Council, 1969- 1976**    
  
Chair: OR Tambo   
Deputy Chair: Yusuf Dadoo   
Secretary: Joe Matthews (until 1970), followed by Moses Mabhida   
Assistant Secretary: Simon Makana   
  
Other members of the Revolutionary Council, 1969-1976:  Joe Modise, Thabo Mbeki, Jackie Sedibe, Duma Nokwe, Moses Kotane, Tennyson Makiwane, JB Marx, Robert Resha, Ruth Mompati, John Motshabi, Joe Slovo, Andrew Masondo, Mzwai Piliso, Reg September, Jacob Masondo, John Gaetsewe.   
  
Military Operations fell under Joe Modise.   
  
The Department of National Intelligence and Security (NAT) was first established in April 1969 under the leadership of Moses Mabhida. 

**3. ANC Structures, 1976 - 1980**    
  
In 1976 a Central Operations Headquarters of MK was set up, and the process of establishing MK training camps in Angola began. 

**3.a. The NEC, 1976 - 1980**    
  
President (as of 1969): OR Tambo   
Treasurer: Thomas Nkobi   
Secretary General: Alfred Nzo   
Administrative secretary of the NEC: Joe Nhlanhla (in 1978)   
  
Other members: Mzwai Piliso, Moses Mabhida, Joe Modise, Joe Jele, John Motshabi, Andrew Masondo, Robert Manci, Joe Gqabi, Jacob Zuma, Steve Dlamini, John Nkadimeng, Simon Makana, Florence Moposho, Gertrude Shope, Duma Nokwe, Thabo Mbeki, Johnny Makathini, Simon Makana. 

**3.b. Office of the President**    
  
Special Operations was set up in 1979 to undertake high-profile acts of sabotage on key economic installations. This structure reported directly to OR Tambo.   
  
The first Special Operations Command consisted of Joe Slovo, Montso Mokgabudi ("Obadi"), and Aboobaker Ismail ("Rashid".) 

**3.c. The Revolutionary Council, 1976 - 1980**    
  
Chair: OR Tambo   
Secretary: Moses Mabhida   
Assistant Secretary: Simon Makana, followed by Job Tlhabane ( "Cassius Make") in 1977   
  
Other members:  Mzwai Piliso, Moses Mabhida, Joe Modise, Joe Jele, John Motshabi, Robert Manci, Steve Dlamini, Florence Moposho, Gertrude Shope, Duma Nokwe, Thabo Mbeki, Johnny Makathini, Duma Nokwe, Joe Slovo, Yusuf Dadoo, Jacob Masondo, John Motshabi, Chris Hani, "Lennox" Tshali, Peter Dlamini, Bogart Soze   
  
The following members of the RC were co-opted to the structure after 1977:  Joe Gqabi, Mac Maharaj, Godfrey Pule, Jacob Zuma, John Nkadimeng, "Peter" Tshikare, Sizakele Sigxashe, Andrew Masondo.   
  
The following structures fell under the Revolutionary Council: 

**3.d. The Internal Political Reconstruction Committee, 1976 - 1980**    
  
This committee was charged with re-establishing the political underground and organizing ANC propaganda inside the country.   
  
Chair: John Motshabi   
Secretary: Mac Maharaj   
Other members:  Ray Simons, Reg September, Dan Tloome, John Gaetsewe, Ruth Mompati. 

**3.e. MK Central Operations HQ, 1976 - 1980**    
  
The role of Central Operations HQ was purely to develop armed struggle internally, and did not control all aspects of MK activities.   
  
Central Operations HQ Personnel:  Joe Modise, based in Lusaka, was responsible for the Western Front (operations via Botswana). He was assisted by Keith Mokoape and Snuki Zikalala.   
Joe Slovo, based in Maputo, was responsible for the Eastern Front (operations via Swaziland.) He was assisted by Sello Motau ("Paul Dikeledi") and "Lennox" Tshali and Jacob Zuma.   
  
Logistics and Ordnance (1976 - 1980): Jacob Masondo.   
Communications: Jackie Sedibe 

**3.f. Lesotho, 1976 - 1980**    
  
Commanded by Chris Hani and Lambert Moloi. Lesotho reported directly to the RC. It was in practice run as a separate area, with its own joint command consisting of political, military and intelligence components. 

**3.g. Angola (1976 - 1980)**    
  
Angola was a special case; it was considered a military zone because of the war in the country. Various structures, all directly reporting to the RC, were established in Angola during this period.   
  
The Regional Commander was Mzwai Piliso. Julius Shekeshe took over the post of Regional Commander in 1979. 

**Personnel and Training** (1976 - 1980): Headed by Mzwai Piliso. This post entailed responsibility for all MK camps and arranging MK training abroad. He was assisted by Andrew Masondo (National Commissar), Ronnie Kasrils (Regional Commissar) and Julius Shekeshe (Regional Commander.)   
  
**Commissariat:** Headed by Andrew Masondo as of 1976. Political instructors included Mark Shope, Ronnie Kasrils, Wellington Madolwana ("Francis Meli"), and Jack Simon. Ronnie Kasrils was Regional Political Commissar between 1977/78 -1980   
  
**Logistics and Ordnance** (Angola): Reid Ngake (1976 - 1980)   
  
**Security and Counter-Intelligence** (Angola, 1976 - 1980): Godfrey Pule and Sipho Dlamini were key figures in Angola intelligence structures. Mike Themba ("Mike Sandlana") was in charge of security in Angola from 1977 - around 1984.   
  
The Morris Seabelo Rehabilitation Centre (originally called Camp 32) was established in late 1979. 

**3.h. MK Operations: Regional Structures, 1976 - 1980**    
  
**3.h.1. Eastern Front**    
  
Four "machineries", or military structures, operated from the Eastern Front (Maputo via Swaziland):   
  
**Natal Urban:**    
Commanded by Mduduzi Guma, Lionel Hadebe, Krishna Rabilal, Cyril Raymonds ("Fear"), Zweli Nyanda, "Oscar", Sonny Singh (Bobby Pillay)   
  
**Natal Rural:**    
Commanded by "Pass Four" (Johannes Pungula), Henry Chiliza, Mandla Msibi, Edwin Dlamini ("Chris")   
  
**Transvaal Urban:**    
The Transvaal command consisted of Selaelo Ramusi, Siphiwe Nyanda, Ntsie Manye and Solly Shoke.   
  
**Eastern Transvaal Rural:**    
Commanded by Gilbert Ramano ("Robert Moema"), and then by Glory Sedibe ("September"), Julius Maliba ("Manchecker"), and Thabo Gwamanda ("Thabo Mosquito"), Zaba Nkondo was commissar. 

**3.h.2. Western Front**    
  
Two machineries operated from the Western Front (Lusaka via Botswana). The Botswana Command consisted of Snuki Zikalala and Keith Mokoape.   
  
**Transvaal Urban:**    
Commanded by Zakes Tolo and later Thabo Gwamanda ("Thabo Mosquito")   
  
**Western Transvaal Rural:**    
Commanded by Victor Modise 

**3.i. IPC’s at regional level, 1976 - 1980**    
  
**3.i.1. The Botswana IPC**(1976 - 1980) was led by Henry Makgothi and Dan Tloome. At various times, Jenny and Marius Schoon, Patrick Fitzgerald, Magirly Sexwale, Zakes Tolo and "Negro" also served on this structure. 

**3.i.2. The Swaziland IPC**(1976- 1980) was led by John Nkadimeng and Judson Khuzwayo.   
  
It had two sub-sectors:

**Natal:** led by Judson Khuzwayo, Ivan Pillay and T. Tryon   
**Transvaal:** led by John Nkadimeng, Graham Morodi, Chief Mampuru and Billy Whitehead ("Archie"), and "General".

**3.i.3. The Maputo IPC**(1976- 80) Indres Naidoo, Jacob Zuma, John Nkadimeng, Sue Rabkin, Sonny Singh, John Nkadimeng (Swaziland to Maputo) 

**3.i.4 The Lesotho IPC**(1976 - 1980) Led by Chris Hani and Lambert Moloi, Linda Mti. 

**3.j. NAT (1976 - 1980)**    
  
Director: Simon Makana took over from Moses Mabhida.   
Other members of the Directorate were Godfrey Pule, David Motsweni ("Willy Williams"), "Peter" Tshikari, and "Ulysses" Modise. 

**3.k. London RC structure (1976 - 1980)**    
  
This was led by. Yusuf Dadoo with Aziz Pahad as Secretary. Other members were Reg September, Solly Smith, Ronnie Kasrils, Jack Hodgson. 

**4. ANC STRUCTURES 1980 - 1983**  

In 1981, in line with the ANC's ongoing attempts to better co-ordinate political and military activities, Senior Organs consisting of military and political personnel were established in the Forward Areas.   
  
**4.a. The NEC, 1980 - 1983**    
  
President: OR Tambo   
Treasurer: Thomas Nkobi   
Secretary General: Alfred Nzo   
National administrative secretary of the NEC: Joe Nhlanhla   
  
Other members:  Mzwai Piliso, Moses Mabhida, Joe Modise, Joe Jele, John Motshabi, Andrew Masondo, Joe Nhlanhla, Robert Manci, Joe Gqabi, Jacob Zuma, Steve Dlamini, John Nkadimeng, Simon Makana, Florence Moposho, Gertrude Shope, Thabo Mbeki, Johnny Makathini, Chris Hani. 

**4.b. Office of the President 1980 - 1983**    
  
**Special Operations:**    
Commanded by Joe Slovo, Aboobaker Ismail, and "Chris" Nungu until his death in 1982 in an ambush. 

**4.c. The Revolutionary Council, 1980 - 1983**    
  
Chair: OR Tambo   
Secretary: Moses Mabhida   
Assistant Secretary: Job Tlhabane ("Cassius Make")   
  
Other members:  Joe Slovo, Yusuf Dadoo, Joe Modise, Jacob Masondo, John Motshabi, Joe Jele, Chris Hani, "Lennox" Tshali, "Peter" Dlamini, Joe Gqabi, Mac Maharaj, Godfrey Pule, Jacob Zuma, John Nkadimeng, "Peter" Tshikare, Sizakele Sigxashe, Andrew Masondo, Mzwai Piliso, Robert Manci, Steve Dlamini, Simon Makana, Florence Moposho, Gertrude Shope, Thabo Mbeki, Johnny Makathini, Bogart Soze. 

**4.d. MK Central Operations HQ, 1980 - 1983**    
  
Commander Joe Modise, based in Lusaka, was responsible for the Western Front (operations via Botswana). He was assisted by Keith Mokoape and Snuki Zikalala.   
  
Joe Slovo, based in Maputo, was responsible for the Eastern Front (operations via Swaziland.) He was assisted by Sello Motau ("Paul Dikeledi") and Tshali (""Lennox" Tshali").   
  
**Communications:** Jakie Sedibe   
**Logistics:**Jacob "Mawiele" Masondo 

**4.e. The Department of Intelligence and Security (NAT), 1980 - 1983**    
  
The following appointments were made in 1981:   
Director: Mzwai Piliso   
Deputy Director and head of Intelligence: Joe Gqabi   
Deputy head of Intelligence, and attached to the RC: "Peter" Tshikare   
Head of Processing and Information: Simon Makana   
Head of Security: Jan Mampane ("Reddy Mazimbu")   
Deputy Head of Security: "Ulysses" Modise   
  
After the assassination of Joe Gqabi in Zimbabwe "Peter" Tshikari took over as head of Intelligence. 

**4.f. Senior Organs 1980 - 1983**    
  
Each S.O consisted of a joint political/ military committee and the following substructures: a Political Command, a Military Command, and a NAT structure. 

**4.f.1. Maputo Senior Organ 1980 - 1983**    
  
Chair: John Nkadimeng   
Secretary: Jacob Zuma   
  
Other Members:  Joe Slovo, R. Manci, Bogart Soze, "Lennox" Tshali, "Peter" Tshikare , Ronnie Kasrils, Sello Motau ("PaulDikeledi"), Julius Maliba ("Manchecker") 

**4.f.1.1.Maputo SO: Political Committee**    
  
Chair: Jacob Zuma   
Secretary: Ronnie Kasrils - Also Mandla Msibi, John Nkadimeng, Indres Naidoo, Sue Rabkin.   
  
The following structures resorted under the Maputo Political Committee(1980 - 1983)   
  
**Transvaal Urban:**    
Led by Graham Morodi ("Tati Mashego"), Oupa Mashinini, and "Comrade Musa."   
  
**Transvaal Rural:**    
Led by John Nkadimeng, Chief Mampuru, and Billy Whitehead as secretary   
  
**Natal Urban:**    
Led by Judson Khuzwayo, with Ivan Pillay and Terence Tryon   
  
**Natal Rural:**    
Led by Shadrack Maphumulo and Jabulani Nxumalo ("Mzala") 

**4.f.1.2. Maputo SO: Military Command, 1980 - 1983**    
  
Chair : Joe Slovo   
Secretary: Sello Motau ("Paul Dikeledi")   
Members: Julius Maliba ("Manchecker"), Siphiwe Nyanda, Edwin Dlamini ("Chris")   
  
The following machineries / military structures resorted beneath the Maputo SO Military Command:   
  
**Transvaal Urban:**    
Commanded by Siphiwe Nyanda and Ntsie Manye   
  
**Eastern Transvaal Rural:**    
Commanded by Julius Maliba and Glory Sedibe ("September")   
  
**Natal Urban:**    
Commanded by Henry Chiliza and later Thami Zulu, Zweli Nyanda, Cyril Raymonds ("Fear").   
  
**Natal Rural:**    
Commanded by "Pass Four" Pungula, and Edwin Dlamini ("Chris") 

**4.f.2. Botswana Senior Organ, 1980 - 1983**    
  
Chair: Henry Makgothi, succeeded by Lambert Moloi   
Leading figures in this SO during this period were Billy Masetlha, Keith Mokoape, Dan Tloome, Marius and Jenny Schoon, Patrick Fitzgerald (the latter three were forced to leave Botswana during this period), Wally Serote, Thabang Makwetla, Hassan Ebrahim. 

**4.f.3. Lesotho 1980 - 1983**    
  
Until the coup, Chris Hani, Lambert Moloi, Linda Mti. 

**4.f.4. Angola, 1980 - 1983**    
  
For the first time a full formal Regional Command with established structures was created 1980. The Regional Command was composed as follows between 1980 - 1989.   
**Regional Commander:**    
Simon Shekeshe, followed by Graham Morodi in around 1982; then Godfrey Ngwenya who was injured in a UNITA ambush in around 1985, then Ali Makhosini.   
  
**Regional Chief-of-Staff:**    
Successively, Thami Zulu (Mzwakhe Ngwenya), Timothy Mokoena (Godfrey Ngwenya), Raymond Monageng (Robert Mandita), Thabi Mofokeng (Steven Kobe), David Ngwezane (Ben Senokoanyane) 

**Regional Commissar:**    
Successively, Mike Temba, Edwin Mabitse (Edward Mabitsela), Che O'Gara (January Masilela), Herbert Malinga, Rufus Mbilini.   
  
**Regional Chief of Security:**    
Successively, Alfred Wana (Mdala), Captain Lentsoe (Moeketsi), Morris Seabelo (Dantili), Zolile Zozi ("Dexter Mbona"), Caeser Kate (Mphakamisi Ncumani).   
  
**Regional Chief of Personnel:**    
Successively, the late Joseph Vooki (Arios Molefe), Peter Seeiso (Phillip Sebothoma), Tony Montori (Jeremiah M. Nyembe.)   
  
**Regional Chief of Logistics:**    
Successively, Theodore Mothobi, Reid Ngake, Albert Mabeleng.   
  
**Regional Chief of Transport:**    
Successively, Reid Ngake, Graham Morodi ("Dan Mashego"), Frans Dibakwane   
  
**Regional Medical Officer:**    
Successively, Dr Peter Mfelang, Dr Sipho, Dr. "Hagar McBerry" (Davidson Masuku.)   
  
**Regional Chief of Communications:**    
Solly Mokgatle 

**5. ANC Structures 1983 - 1985**    
  
The Senior Organs in the forward areas had not been particularly effective in improving co-ordination between the political and military aspects of struggle. In April 1983 a conference of all Front commanders and commissars was held in Luanda to address the continuing problem of a lack of effective coordination between the military and political aspects of struggle. It was felt there should be joint planning, command and control in all operations; and the ANC had to move towards building military structures inside the country, taking a longer-term view and preparing the ground for peoples' war in order to sustain military operations, rather than carrying out a string of one-off "pot boiling" actions.   
  
The NEC resolved to intensify its work both inside and outside the country. External work was to be co-ordinated by a newly-created External Coordinating Committee.   
  
The Revolutionary Council was replaced by the Politico-Military Council (PMC), which became the executive arm of the NEC in relation to all matters pertaining to the conduct of the political and military struggle inside South Africa. The PMC co-ordinated the activities of the Political HQ, Military HQ, and NAT, and was supported in its activities by a small Secretariat. By 1983 a new Military Headquarters (MHQ) had been established, bringing together and reorganizing the old general HQ along formal military lines.   
  
The PMC met once a month and was tasked with the overall strategic planning for internal ANC/MK work, and to assess the state of the nation. The executive committee of the PMC, the Secretariat, met between full PMC meetings on a weekly basis.   
  
The Senior Organs were replaced by Regional Politico-Military Committees (RPMCs), and were also given the authority and responsibility for making operational decisions. The RPMCs were charged with co-coordinating political and military activities in their areas of responsibility, and (where possible) setting up Area PMCs inside the country. Area PMCs would be responsible for providing local-level leadership on political and military matters, the gathering of intelligence, and the screening of recruits. 

**5.a. The NEC 1983 - 1985**    
  
President: OR Tambo   
Treasurer: Thomas Nkobi   
Secretary General: Alfred Nzo   
Administrative secretary of the NEC: Joe Nhlanhla.   
  
Other members:  Mzwai Piliso, Moses Mabhida, Joe Modise, Joe Jele, John Motshabi, Andrew Masondo, Robert Manci, Joe Gqabi, Jacob Zuma, Steve Dlamini, John Nkadimeng, Simon Makana, Gertrude Shope, Florence Moposho, Chris Hani, Thabo Mbeki, Johnny Makathini. 

**5.b. The External Co-coordinating Committee, 1983 - 1985**    
  
Chair: Alfred Nzo   
Secretary: Hermanus Loots   
Other members:  Thabo Mbeki, Johnny Makathini 

**5.c. The Politico-Military Council (PMC), 1983 - 1985**    
  
Chair: OR Tambo   
Treasurer: Reg September   
The Secretary of the PMC was Joe Nhlanhla, until 1987   
MHQ representatives on the PMC: Joe Modise, Joe Slovo, and Chris Hani.   
PHQ representatives on the PMC: Joe Jele, Mac Maharaj, Jacob Zuma, John Motshabi, Ruth Mompati   
NAT representative on the PMC: Mzwai Piliso   
Other members included:  Alfred Nzo, T.T. Nkobi, Job Tlhabane ("Cassius Make"), Sizakele Sigxashe, Andrew Masondo, Moses Mabhida, John Nkadimeng.   
  
The following structures fell under the PMC: 

**5.d. Political HQ (1983 - 1985)**    
  
John Motshabi, Joe Jele, Mac Maharaj, Jacob Zuma, Jabu Molekane, Joel Netshitenzhe, Vusi Mavimbela, Ellen Khuzwayo, Gertrude Shope, Ruth Mompati. 

**5.e. Military HQ, 1983 - 1985**    
  
Commander -in -Chief: OR Tambo   
Army Commander: Joe Modise   
Chief of Staff: Joe Slovo (1983 - 1985);   
Deputy Army Commander and Commissar: Chris Hani (1983 - 1985)   
Chief of Operations: Lambert Moloi (1983 - 1992)   
Chief of Communications: Jackie Molefe (1983 - 1992)   
Chief of Military Intelligence: Ronnie Kasrils (1983 - 1987)   
Chief of Ordnance / Logistics: Job Tlhabane (1983 - 1987);   
  
**Special Operations** no longer reported directly to the President. Aboobaker Ismail was appointed overall commander of Special Operations, and reported to Joe Slovo at MHQ.   
**5.f. NAT National Directorate (1983- 1985)**    
  
Director: Mzwai Piliso   
Deputy Director and head of   
Counter-Intelligence: "Peter" Tshikari   
Head of Intelligence: "Ulysses" Modise   
Head of the Central Intelligence   
Evaluation Sector (CIES): Sizakele Sigxashe 

**5.g. Regional Politico-Military Councils 1983 - 1985**    
  
**5.g.1. Maputo RPMC/ Coordinating Mechanism in Swaziland, 1983 - 1985**(included Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe before 1985)   
  
Joe Slovo, Jacob Zuma, "Lennox" Tshali, Bogart Soze, Sello Motau ("Paul Dikeledi"), Siphiwe Nyanda and John Nkadimeng.   
  
After the signing of the Nkomati Accord in 1984, the Maputo RPMC was replaced by a **co-coordinating mechanism in Swaziland.**    
  
This was chaired by Ronnie Kasrils (1984), then Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim (1985 - 86) Other members included Thami Zulu, Siphiwe Nyanda, and a NAT representative.   
  
Two regional PMCs reported to the co-coordinating mechanism in Swaziland: the **Natal Regional PMC**, led by Shadrack Maphumulo, Ivan Pillay, Thami Zulu, Cyril Raymonds ("Fear"), Terence Tryon, and Doris Skosana. the   
  
**Transvaal Regional PMC**, led by Siphiwe Nyanda, Sello Motau ("Paul Dikeledi"), "September", Ntsie Manye and "Archie" (Billy Whitehead)   
  
Each of these RPMCs had Military, Political and NAT structures.   
  
Politico- Military machineries resorting under this RPMC were as follows:   
  
**Natal Urban:**    
Led by Ivan Pillay, Thami Zulu, and Terence Tryon   
  
**Natal Rural:**    
Led by Shadrack Maphumulo and Doris Skosana   
  
**Transvaal Urban:**    
Led by Siphiwe Nyanda, Sello Motau, and Solly Shoke   
  
**Transvaal Rural**:   
Led by "Archie" and Glory Sidebe ("September")   
**5.g.2. Botswana RPMC, 1983 - 1985**    
  
Botswana structures went through a number of rapid changes in the 1980s because of a number of cross-border attacks and severe infiltration by the enemy.   
  
In 1983, Lambert Moloi headed the Botswana RPMC. In 1984, a Co-coordinating Committee was established, consisting of representatives from military and political structures.   
  
Chair: Thabang Makwetla, followed by Thenjiwe Mthintso   
Political representative: Wally Serote   
Military representative: Lambert Moloi - Also Rogers Nkadimeng (killed in a car bomb in Gaborone, 1985)   
  
The political machinery resorting under the Botswana RPMC at this time was led by Wally Serote and Thabang Makwetla.   
  
The military machinery was led by Thenjiwe Mthintso, Patrick Mavundla ("Naledi"), and "Dan". 

**5.g.3. Lesotho RPMC, 1983 - 1985**    
  
This RPMC was headed by Judson Khuzwayo, with "Wana", Linda Mti, Skenjana Roji and Thenjiwe Mthintso (between 1982 - 1983.) 

**5.g.4. London RPMC, 1983 - 1985**    
  
Chair: Aziz Pahad 

**5.g.5. Angola, 1983 - 1985**   
  
Angola was a military zone under a Regional Command.   
**Angola Regional Command:**   
  
Commander: Timothy Mokoena (Godfrey Ngwenya) (1984 - 1987)   
Commissar: January Masilela (1985 - 1986)   
NAT: "Morris Seabelo" Dantili 

**6. ANC Structures, 1985 - 1990**    
  
The Kabwe Conference was held in May 1985. In response to the sharp increase in mass struggle inside the country, Political HQ was replaced with a strengthened Internal Political Committee (IPC) in 1987.   
Operation Vula was launched in 1986, with Joe Slovo assisting the President. Mac Maharaj and Ronnie Kasrils were among the leading figures in this project. By 1988, Mac Maharaj and Siphiwe Nyanda had been infiltrated into the country.   
  
MHQ was also extended, with the appointment of a number of deputies at HQ level.   
  
A Code of Conduct was adopted. In terms of the general (civilian) Code Of Discipline, three offices were established specifically to better regulate disciplinary procedures, and halt abuses that had been occurring. These were the Review Board, the Officer of Justice, and the National Peoples' Tribunal.   
  
A Provisional Directorate of Intelligence and Security was created to run NAT, and action was taken to clarify the command structures over NAT personnel deployed in Angola. A President's Council (also referred to as the National Security Committee) was established in the latter half of 1987, and was chaired by OR Tambo; this committee had the brief of overseeing the functioning of NAT and dealing with security issues in general. 

**6.a. The NEC, 1985 - 1990**    
  
For the first time the ANC had a fully -elected NEC, consisting of 28 members.   
President: OR Tambo   
Secretary-General: Alfred Nzo   
Treasurer: Thomas Nkobi   
  
Other members:  Johnny Makathini, Simon Makana, Joe Slovo, Thabo Mbeki, Chris Hani, Moses Mabhida (until his death in 1986), Tony Mongalo, Dan Tloome, John Motshabi, John Nkadimeng, Mac Maharaj, Cassius Make (until his assassination in Swaziland in 1987), Florence Moposho, Joe Nhlanhla, Joe Modise, Ruth Mompati, Henry Makgothi, Pallo Jordan, Jacob Zuma, Joe Jele, Sizakele Sigxashe, Robert Manci, Gertrude Shope, Francis Meli, Reg September, Jackie Selibi, Hermanus Loots ("James Stuart"), Steve Tshwete, Zola Skweyiya.   
  
Other NEC members were co-opted in 1987:  Ronnie Kasrils, Jackie Sedibe, Aziz Pahad, and "Bra T" (Godfrey Ngwenya), and Sindiso Mfenyane. 

**6.b. The Office of the President, 1985 - 1990**    
  
**The President's Committee**    
  
This committee was established in late 1987. 

Chair: OR Tambo   
Other members:  The Secretary-General, Alfred Nzo; the Treasurer General, Thomas Nkobi; the head of NAT, Joe Nhlanhla; Joe Modise.   
  
**The Office of Justice**    
  
This Office also reported to the President.   
Chair: Zola Skweyiya (appointed by the NEC in 1985.) 

**The National Review Committee (the Review Board)**    
  
The Review Board reported to the President and the NSC.   
Chair: Dan Tloome 

**The National Peoples' Tribunal (the Tribunal)**    
  
The Tribunal was appointed for a period of three years by the NEC. The President appointed the Chair from among the members of the Tribunal. The Tribunal would recommend sentences to the President, who would usually refer such cases to the Review Board. After the Board had dealt with a case, sentence would be confirmed by the President and carried out.   
Chair: Hermanus Loots ("James Stuart"): appointed in late 1985   
Other members:  Shadrack Pekane; Z.N. Jobodwana. 

**6.c. External Co-coordinating Committee 1985- 1990**   
  
Chair: Alfred Nzo; also Thabo Mbeki, Johnny Makathini, and Hermanus Loots as Secretary. 

**6.d. The PMC, 1985 - 1990**   
  
Chair: OR Tambo   
  
The Secretary of the PMC Secretariat was Joe Nhlanhla (1983/84-87), followed by Joe Jele (1987-90)   
  
MHQ representatives on the PMC: Joe Modise, Joe Slovo, Chris Hani, Steve Tshwete, Ronnie Kasrils, Job Tlhabane (until 1987)   
  
PHQ was replaced by the Internal Political Committee in 1987. PHQ/IPC representatives on the PMC during the period from 1985 - 1990 were: Mac Maharaj, Joe Jele, Jacob Zuma, Ruth Mompati, Steve Tshwete, and Joel Netshitenzhe.   
  
NAT representatives on the PMC: Mzwai Piliso (until 1987); and then Joe Nhlanhla and Sizakele Sigxashe   
  
Other members 1984 - 1987 included Moses Mabhida and John Nkadimeng.   
  
The following structures resorted under the PMC: 

**6.d.1. Political HQ until 1987, when it was replaced by the Internal Political Committee in 1987:**   
  
PHQ was led by Joe Jele, with Mac Maharaj, Jacob Zuma, Ruth Mompati, Steve Tshwete and Joel Netshitenzhe. 

**6.d.2. Military HQ, 1985 - 1990**    
  
Army Commander: Joe Modise   
Chief-of-Staff: Joe Slovo (1985 - 1987) Chris Hani (1985 - 1992)   
Commissar: Chris Hani (1985 - 1987) Steve Tshwete (1987) Godfrey Ngwenya (1987 - 1992)   
Chief of Operations: Lambert Moloi (1983 - 1992)   
Deputy: Julius Maliba (1987 - 1994)   
Chief of Communications: Jackie Molefe (1983 - 1992   
Deputy: Castro Bela (1987 - 1994))   
Chief of Military Intelligence: Ronnie Kasrils (1983 - 1989), Keith Mokoape (1989 - 1992) Mojo Motau (acting head as of 1992)   
Deputy: Keith Mokoape (1987 - 1989)   
Chief of Ordnance and Logistics: Job Tlhabane (1983 - 1987)   
  
In 1987 Ordnance and Logistics were separated into two separate sections:   
  
Logistics: Bogart Soze   
Ordnance: Aboobaker Ismail (1987 - 1994)   
Special Operations: Aboobaker Ismail until August 1987; then "Tommy Masinga" 

**6.d.3. The NAT Directorate, 1985 - 1990**    
  
After the Kabwe Conference, the NEC appointed a Provisional Directorate of Intelligence and Security to run this Department.   
  
Director: Joe Nhlanhla (confirmed in 1987)   
Deputy Director and Head of Intelligence: Jacob Zuma (1988)   
Administrative Secretary: M. Timol   
Head of CIES/ Processing and Analysis: Sizakele Sigxashe   
Head of Counter-Intelligence and Security: "Peter" Tshikari" (until 1986); then Jan Mampane 

**6.e. Regional Politico-Military Committees (RPMC's), 1985 - 1990**  

**6.e.1. Swaziland RPMC, 1985 - 1990:**    
  
Chair: Ronnie Kasrils (chair, 1984); Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, until 1986 when he was abducted; Siphiwe Nyanda (1986 - 87/88); Silumko Sokupa (1988 - 1989)   
  
Other members:  Sello Motau ("Paul Dikeledi") (1985 -1987); Thami Zulu (1985 -1988); Vusi Mavimbela (1985 - ); Welile Nhlapo (1985 - ) Shadrack Maphumulo (1985 -1987, when he was killed ).   
  
These committees resorted under the Swaziland RPMC:   
  
Political Committee:   
"Ivan" chaired the Natal structure   
Billy Whitehead ("Archie") chaired the Transvaal structure   
  
Military Committee:   
Siphiwe Nyanda headed Transvaal structures   
Thami Zulu headed Natal structures 

**6.e.2 Lesotho RPMC, 1985 - 1990**    
  
The RPMC which had previously been working in Lesotho was structured as follows during this period:   
  
Chair: Charles Nqakula   
Chair of the Political Committee: Mzukisi Gaba   
Chair of the Military Committee: Skenjana Roji   
Chair of the Labour Committee: Tony Yengeni.   
  
In 1987 - 1988 this RPMC was restructured as follows:   
  
Chair: Charles Nqakula   
Chair of the Military Committee: James Ngculu   
Head of Special Operations: Edwin Mabitsela   
  
Security and Intelligence structures remained in place. Additional members taken on in this period were Lindinto Hlekani, Steve Tshwete, and Chris Pepani. 

**6.e.3. Botswana RPMC, 1985 - 1990**    
  
Botswana RPMC, mid-1985   
After the Kabwe Conference, an RPMC was established to replace the Co-coordinating Committee.   
  
Chair: Thenjiwe Mthintso, until 1987; then Thabang Makwetla   
Military representative: "Naledi" (Patrick Mavundla)   
Political representative: Wally Serote   
  
Structures resorting under the 1985 RPMC in Botswana included the following:   
Political Committee: chaired by Thabang Makwetla   
Military Committee: chaired by Thenjiwe Mthintso 

**Botswana RPMC, 1986:**    
  
In 1986, the RPMC had to change; Wally Serote was withdrawn to Lusaka. .   
  
Chair: Barry Gilder (temporarily), then Thenjiwe Mthintso   
Secretary: Thabang Makwetla   
Military representative: Dan Hatto and Patrick Mavundla ( "Naledi")   
  
Structures resorting under the 1986 Botswana RPMC were as follows:   
  
**Political machinery:** Thabang Makwetla, Thabo Kubu, James Raditsela, Mapule Raditsela, Hassan Ebrahim, Kgomotso Jolobe.   
  
**Military machinery:** Patrick Mvundla ("Naldei Sehume", who was killed in the SADF raid of 28/03/88); Boy Molokoane (who was killed in an ambush outside Francistown in January 1988); "Itumeleng" Tsimane, and Dan Hatto. 

**Botswana RPMC 1987**    
  
After 1986, structures had to change again and the RPMC was composed of the following cadres:   
  
Chair: Thabang Makwetla   
Other members:  January Masilela, Zakes Tolo, James Ngculu, Barry Gilder.   
  
During this period a specialized structure concentrating on the Western Cape was set up and was composed of the following cadres: James Ngculu, Dick Ngomane, "Blah" Riekets, and later Miranda Ngculu. 

**6.e.4. Zimbabwe RPMC, 1985 - 1990**    
  
This RPMC was only set up in 1985.   
  
Chair: Julius Maliba ("Manchecker")   
Secretary: Garth Strachan   
Other members:  Ngoako Ramatlhodi, Linda Mti, Jabulani Nkabinde, and "Oliver"   
  
The Zimbabwe RPMC had three committees: 

**Political Committee:**   
  
Chair: Ngoako Ramatlhodi (1986 - 1987)   
Secretary: Garth Strachan   
Other members:  Derek and Trish Hanekom; Jimmy Corrigall; Pete Roussos 

**Military Committee:**    
  
Chair: Julius Maliba (1985 - 1986) Jabulani Nkabinde (1986 - 1992)   
Other members: "Ali", "Oliver", Benjamin Mongalo   
There were also NAT representatives. 

**Ordnance:**the head of the regional Ordnance structure was Benjamin Mongalo, who reported directly to Lusaka. An additional structure was set up under J. Modimo, tasked with infiltrating arms into the country, which also reported directly to Lusaka. 

**6.e.5. London RPMC, 1985 - 1990**    
  
Chaired by Aziz Pahad; also Wally Serote.

**6.e.6. Angola, 1985 - 1989**    
  
**Regional Command:**    
  
Regional Commander: Timothy Mokoena (until 1987)   
  
"Ali" Makhosini (1987 - 1989)   
Deputy Commander: Mike Sandlana (until 1989)   
Regional Commissar: January Masilela (until 1987/8)   
NAT representative: Dexter Mbona (1986 - 1989)   
  
**Regional NAT structure:**    
  
Head: Dexter Mbona (1985 - 1989)   
Deputy head: Gabriel Mthembu ("Sizwe Mkhonto"), 1984- 1986 

**6.e.7. Uganda (1989 - 1991)**    
  
Commander: Thabi Mofokeng   
Head of Regional NAT Directorate: Quesh Dlamini 

**7. ANC Structures 1990 - 1994**    
  
With the unbanning of the ANC, the release of the ANC leadership from prison and the return of exiles, many changes took place. A range of new structures had to be set up to meet the challenge of negotiations and the return of exiles. Tokyo Sexwale was tasked with attempting to take care of the need of MK cadres until MK HQ personnel arrived in the country. Key structures set up during this period included the Negotiations Commission. In response to the state-sponsored violence which took off in July/August 1990, a Peace Desk was established.   
  
Political structures at HQ were re-organized into an internal re-organization committee, which Ronnie Kasrils, Steve Tshwete and Sue Rabkin as key officials.   
  
Here we concentrate only on those structures which are of relevance to the mandate of the TRC. 

**7.a. The NEC, 1990 - July 1991**    
  
The NEC as constituted after the Kabwe Conference was reinforced by released leaders.   
  
**The NEC, 1991 - 1994**    
  
At the National Conference in July 1991, the following people were elected:   
  
President: Nelson Mandela   
National Chairperson: OR Tambo   
Deputy President: Walter Sisulu   
Secretary-General: Cyril Ramaphosa   
Deputy Secretary-General: Jacob Zuma   
Treasurer-General: Thomas Nkobi   
**The rest of the NEC:**    
  
Kader Asmal, Thozamile Botha, Cheryl Carolus, Jeremy Cronin, Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, Harry Gwala, Chris Hani, Pallo Jordan, Ronnie Kasrils, Ahmed Kathrada, Terror Lekota, Saki Macozoma, Mac Maharaj, Rocky Malebane-Metsing, Winnie Mandela, Trevor Manuel, Gill Marcus, Barbara Masekela, Thabo Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Wilton Mkwayi, Andrew Mlangeni, Joe Modise, Popo Molefe, Ruth Mompati, Mohammed Valli Moosa, Elias Motsoaledi, Mendi Msimang, Sydney Mufamadi, Billy Nair, Sister Bernard Ncube, Joe Nhlanhla, John Nkadimeng, Siphiwe Nyanda, Alfred Nzo, Dullah Oimar, Aziz Pahad, Albie Sachs, Reg September, Albertina Sisulu, Zola Skweyiya, Joe Slovo, Marion Sparg, Raymond Suttner, Steve Tshwete, Mcwayizeni Zulu. 

**7.b. Office of the President, 1991 - 1994**    
  
This was closed down after 1991. 

**7.c. Military HQ, 1990 - 1994**    
  
Commander-in-Chief: Nelson Mandela   
Army Commander: Joe Modise   
Chief of Staff: Chris Hani (1985 - late 1992) Siphiwe Nyanda (1993-1994)   
Deputy Chief-of-Staff: Siphiwe Nyanda (until late 1992)   
Chief of Personnel: Godfrey Ngwenya   
Deputy: Johannes Modimo   
Chief of Operations: Lambert Moloi (1983 - 1992)   
Chief of Communications: Jackie Molefe (1983 - 1992)   
Chief of Military Intelligence: Ronnie Kasrils (1983 - 1987) Keith Mokoape (1987- 1992)   
Logistics: Bogart Soze   
Ordnance: Aboobaker Ismail (1987 - 1994)   
  
(Note: most of these posts were no longer operational posts in accordance with the ANC's commitment to suspend armed actions in 1990.) 

**7.d. The NAT Directorate, 1990 - 1994**    
  
Director: Joe Nhlanhla   
Head of Intelligence: Jacob Zuma, until 1993; Terror Lekota, 1993; Alfred Nzo, 1993 - 1994   
Head of Counter-Intelligence: Daniel Oliphanti   
Deputy Head, CI: Lizo Njenje   
Head of Security: J. Mampane   
Head of Marshalls/   
Deputy Head, Security: Nceba Skumbuzo Radu, 1992 - 1994   
Administrative Secretary: Billy Masetlha (1991 - 1994)

**Footnote 4: March by Cadres from exile claiming tortures in ANC camps.**

The following articles referred to human atrocities suffered by MK cadres during training at African National Congress camps in exile:

**1. REC Will Form Armed Units To Attack ANC**

DURBAN Aug 8 Sapa

Returned exiles will form an armed unit to fight the African National Congress if demands for an independent commission of inquiry were ignored, Returned Exiles Committee chairman Pat Hlongwane warned on Saturday, SABC radio news reports.

He was speaking during a march on the ANC office in Durban by several hundred exiles demanding a full investigation into alleged atrocities committed at ANC camps.

The ANC called on the police to guard their office, but the march proceeded peacefully.

**2. Inkatha - REC Join Hands Against ANC**

JOHANNESBURG, Aug 9 Sapa-AFP

A threat by supposed former African National Congress (ANC) detainees to assassinate the ANC leaders they claim tortured them in detention has sparked a war of words in the ANC in the east coast city Durban.

Pat Hlongwane, chairman of the newly-formed Returned Exiles Committee (REC) told the black-oriented weekly City Press here Sunday that some 200 former exiles had undergone training in Israel and had infiltrated ANC ranks around Durban.

"We are not going to shoot ANC members at random," he told the paper. "Our targets will be ANC leaders and cadres who took part in our detention, torture and assault," he said.

They launched a campaign Saturday with a march by some 600 people, some of them apparently armed, on ANC offices in Durban. Many of the marchers were supporters of the ANC's bitter enemy the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) from Lindelani, an IFP stronghold near the city, City Press said. The REC has set up its offices in Lindelani, where the local IFP leader, Thomas Mandla Shabalala, was "sympathetic," according to City Press. Hlongwane said the next step would be the hearings of a commission of inquiry appointed by the

right wing Washington-based pressure group the International Freedom Foundation (IFF).

If that failed to bring ANC cadres "to justice", the REC's men would start their assassination campaign, Hlongwane threatened.

Harry Gwala, the ANC's fiery Natal Midlands regional leader, escaped an apparent assassination attempt when gunmen fired on his car in Edendale near the provincial capital Pietermaritzburg on Tuesday. His deputy Reggie Hadebe was injured in another gun attack on a funeral last Sunday, in which an ANC official was killed.

Hlongwane told state-run television here Sunday: "We've been calling for a commission of inquiry to investigate atrocities committed by the ANC leadership in exile. We must make the ANC ungovernable."

An ANC spokesman said Hlongwane was a South African Police agent who had played a key role in the previous assassinations of ANC members. ANC executive committee member Joel Neshitendze told City Press the organization would be interested to see how the police, who protected the ANC's Durban offices from the marchers Saturday, would respond to Hlongwane's evident death threats.-AFP

<http://www.e-tools.co.za/newsbrief/1992/news9208.10>

**Footnote 5: Searchlight on MK camp abuse investigations.**  
  
1993-04-00: Searchlight South Africa Vol. 3, No 2: 10 April 1993 (p.8-30)

*SEARCHLIGHT SOUTH AFRICA* has been vindicated by three recent reports and one major press investigation into the system of prison camps run by the African National Congress in exile.  
Still more, the participants in the mutiny in the ANC army Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in Angola in 1984 have been vindicated. There is clear recognition in all three reports that a major motive for the mutiny was the demand for democracy in an army tyrannized by the ANC Security Department. Not a shred of credibility remains for the slur that the mutiny was 'instigated by enemy agents'.  
At the same time, there has been no investigation worth the name into abuses in the camps run by the South West African People's Organization of Namibia (Swapo) in southern Angola, or in camps run by the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in Tanzania and elsewhere.  
  
The three reports into abuses in the ANC appeared between October 1992 and January 1993. The most reliable and significant of these reports, by Amnesty International (2 December 1992), drew more than half its material from information previously published in *Searchlight South Africa* in issues 5 to 9. This information was subsequently confirmed by Amnesty, conducting its own independent investigation through a full-time professional researcher, Richard Carver, with whom SSA was frequency in touch.  
  
The ANC was compelled at the highest level to acknowledge its imprisonment, torture and execution of members in exile as a means of suppressing critical opinion. It was compelled also to acknowledge the role of *Searchlight South Africa* in exposing these abuses. The *Weekly Mail*, the leading liberal newspaper in South Africa, also acknowledged reliance on material published in SSA more than two years previously, as a source for its own exposure of torture and executions by the ANC.  
The reality of the ANC's system of prison camps and the nature of its Security Department, Imbokodo ('the boulder that crushes'), has been established without question. The ANC is no longer portrayed almost universally by the left and the liberals as a sandy Robin Hood riding to the rescue of humanity on a dashing (Hollywood) charger. Where previously there was silence, or uncritical celebration of the perpetrators of abuses, there now is routine reference in the South African and international press to the issue of 'the camps'. It is a truth that can no longer be suppressed.   
This work was carried out in conditions of extreme difficulty. The Amnesty report was the culmination of two and a half years of exhausting campaigning, in all but total isolation, mainly by two people. Amnesty had to be threatened with exposure before it undertook to carry out this investigation.   
  
Even then there was no certainty that its inquiry — which was taken out of the hands its South Africa desk — would result in publication.  
  
Whole-hearted, generous and unstinting collaboration was provided to this magazine by a single British colleague, the former Westminster borough councilor, Bill McElroy — an outstanding human being worth an army in any campaign. Southern Africa owes this remarkable man a debt of gratitude. He is known and loved by many former ANC and Swapo detainees.

**Footnote 6 - Administration and Staffing at Camp 32**

The following information regarding the staff and administration of Camp 32 was taken from the report by representatives of the African National Congress to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission:  
  
The camp was under the command of the Commander; his deputy was the Camp Commissar. The rest of the administration consisted of the Chief-of-Staff, Chief of Logistics, Chief of Ordnance, and the Chief Recording Officer. Commanders of Camp 32 were, successively, Sizwe UMkhonto, Morris Seabelo, Afrika Nkwe (for a few months only), Mzwandile Damoyi, and William Masango. 

The Staff consisted of the Staff Commander and Staff Commissar, the Communication Officer, a medical orderly, drivers, and Recording Officers.   
The next layer of the administration was a platoon of guards led by a Platoon Commander and Platoon Commissar. The platoon was divided into Sections, each with its Section Commander and Section Commissar. 

Camp 32 was staffed by members of NAT. The reasons for this anomaly arose out of the non-existence of a defined structure -viz. military police or at best, qualified prison warders, to take on responsibility for this Centre.

**Notes:**

1. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Complaints by Former African National Congress Prisoners and Detainees, Johannesburg, August 1992. Amnesty International, South Africa: Torture, ill-treatment and executions in African National Congress camps, London, December 1992 (AI Index: AFR 53/27/92). The Report of the Douglas Commission, Durban, January 1993.
2. The Guardian in Britain carried a sharp rebuke on its letter page on 19 February 1993 from Mr. Bill McElroy, of Justice for Southern Africa. He pointed to factual errors and bias in a eulogistic article by Victoria Brittain on Chris Hani, the SACP secretary general, concerning his role in the mutiny in Umkhonto in Angola in 1984.

3. Ellis, Stephen, and Sechaba, Tsepo (1992), Comrades Against Apartheid The ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile, James Currey and Indiana University Press. Ellis and Sechaba note that their account of the mutiny 'relies heavily' on the article in SSA No 5 by Ketelo et al. (p 128, n 3) The reviews of this book were interesting. The ANC newspaper, New Nation, funded by the Catholic Church, waited until immediately after publication of the Skweyiya report before printing a very favorable review which took note of the 'Stalinist socialism' of the SACP and commended the book's "wealth of new information and insights.' (30 October 1992) By contrast, the review by Garth Strachan – formerly close to the ANC security department - in the SACP journal African Communist (second quarter, 1992) - is concerned mainly to question the motives of the authors, and avoids the central issue of suppression of democratic discussion by the security department through a bland reference to 'mistakes.' Strachan's review makes no reference at all to the mutiny.

4. Mkatashingo (letter to the editors), The ANC Conference: From Kabwe to Johannesburg,' Searchlight South Africa No 6 (January 1991).

5. For the mysterious death of Thami Zulu (real name Muzi Ngwenya), poisoned with a chemical Diazonin used by South African Military Intelligence while under ANC guard in Zambia in November 1989, see Paul Trewhela, 'A Can of Worms in Lusaka: The Imprisonment of Hubert Sipho Mbeje,' Searchlight South Africa No 9 (August 1992). A definite criminal network existed within the ANC in Angola, Zambia and the frontline states. (See note 10.)

6. The following appear to be the real names of some of the people executed at Pango: Mlamli Namba, Vusumzi Maxwell Tonisi, Loyiso Victor August, Lucky Samuel Twala, King George Matshika. These names are derived from named photographs of Umkhonto members published in an 8-page Fact Sheet titled 'ANC Hell Camps,' abstracted from the Aida Parker Newsletter No 141, Johannesburg. Names and photographs are almost certainly from the files of South African Military Intelligence.

7. Kasrils is described in the Douglas report as deputy commissar of Umkhonto in Angola, head of Umkhonto special operations and head of its military intelligence (1983-88). He played a prominent part in events leading to the massacre by Ciskei troops at Bisho in September 1992. (See this issue, Paul Trewhela, 'A Massacre of Innocence.')

8. Earl, a senior figure in Imbokodo in Angola and Tanzania, fled to Kenya in 1990 with his wife after they rejected efforts by a leading figure in Imbokodo to recruit them into an operation involving smuggling of drugs into South Africa. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees moved them to the United States, (personal communication) Earl was based at this time in Zambia, where a series of mysterious deaths took place around the same time, in some cases involving security personnel. One of those murdered was Jackie Mabuza, a member of the security directorate and nephew of the Imbokodo security chief Joe Nhlanhla. Mabuza was poisoned in Lusaka in 1989 while attempting to investigate corruption in the National Executive Committee. (See note 6) A major scandal involving the top ANC leadership in Lusaka has still to break.

**Further reading:**

‘Inside Quatro: Uncovering the Exile History of the ANC and Swapo’ by Paul Trewhela;

‎"WOMEN IN THE ANC AND SWAPO SEXUAL ABUSE OF YOUNG WOMEN IN THE ANC CAMPS” Olefile Samuel Mngqibisa, Searchlight South Africa Number 11 October 1993 (p.11-16) Editors: Olefile Samuel Mngqibisa, a former soldier in the ANC army Umkhonto we Sizwe, presented important new evidence to the Commission of inquiries;

“Mbokodo: Inside MK: Mwezi Twala - A Soldier's Story, by Ed Bernard and Mwezi Twala, distributed by Amazon;

“A MISCARRIAGE OF DEMOCRACY:THE ANC SECURITY DEPARTMENT IN THE 1984 MUTINY IN UMKHONTO WE SIZWE” by Bandile Ketelo, Amos Maxongo, Zamxolo Tshona, Ronnie Massango and Luvo Mbengo. Searchlight South AfricaVol.2 No.1 (No.5), July 1990: (p.35-68). Subtitle ‘Prelude to Mutiny’ with reference to 12 January 1984;

“AN OPEN LETTER TO NELSON MANDELA FROM EX-ANC DETAINEES” by Shauri Moyo P.O. Box 17073, Nairobi. Dated 14.04.90. Writer begins the letter as follows: Dear Cde Mandela Revolutionary Greetings! The news through the press about our horrific experiences at the hands of the ANC security organs must have left you in a state of bewilderment;

‘SKWEYIYA COMMISSION REPORT 1992 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO COMPLAINTS BY FORMER AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS PRISONERS AND DETAINEES [Note: Bold & Italic Emphasis As from Original at ANC website];

Jeremy Gordin's column, "The Justice Malala Question", Politicsweb, 27 October 2010;

‘SOUTH AFRICA: Torture, Ill-treatment and Executions in African National Congress Camps’, Amnesty International 2 December 1992 AI Index: AFR 53/027/92;

‘THE ANC CONFERENCE: FROM KABWE TO JOHANNESBURG’, Searchlight South Africa, Vol. 2, No 2: 02 January 1991; p.91-94;

‘A DEATH IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE KILLING OF SIPHO PHUNGULWA’ by Paul Trewhela1993-04-00: Searchlight South Africa, Vol. 3, No 2: 10 April 1993;

‘THE CASE OF SAMUEL MNGQIBISA (ELTY MHLEKAZI)’.: Searchlight South Africa,

Vol. 2, No 3: July 1991 (p.49-53) includes a resignation letter addressed to The Chief Representative, African National Congress of S.A., Dar es Salaam, 07/02/1991 from SAMUEL MNGQIBISA, alias Elty Mhlekazi;

###### ‎[Dec 1992: Amnesty International Report] Amnesty International: South Africa: Torture, Ill-treatment and Executions in African National Congress Camps (Dec 92);

Sun Times dated 6 Dec 2009 titled ‘Inside Quatro: Uncovering the Exile History of the ANC and SWAPO’ by Paul Trewhela;

[ANC Centenary Celebrations Conspiracy of Silence: ANC's Mbokodo Quatro Terror Torture Camps](http://networkedblogs.com/sxc6s)

**Section B Terrorist operations by the MK soldiers against the lives of South Africans**

The attack on South Africa was carefully planned by the SACP/ANC leadership into intensifying stages. To note, the National Executive Committee (NEC) has always been the African National Congress's highest policy-and decision-making body.

**Stage 1. The Sabotage Campaign**  
The first MK actions in 1960 were sabotage operations. Targets included government installations, police stations, electric pylons, governmental administration offices, and other symbols of apartheid rule; in rural areas, there were arson attacks on sugar cane fields and wattle estates.   
  
By the time of the Rivonia Treason Trial arrests in 1963, MK leaders were discussing the possibility of embarking on guerilla warfare to take the struggle forward. 

**Operation Mayibuye**  
The draft document Operation Mayibuye indicated aspects of the thinking of the leadership at this time, and identified targets as follows:

Strategic road, railways and other communications, which included power stations, police stations, camps and military forces as well as what the leadership considered to be irredeemable Government stooges.

A decision was made to shift the African National Congress’s approach from sending armed groups of cadres into the country to spark off guerrilla warfare, to developing the political arena inside South Africa to support their armed action. It was emphasized that a period of political reconstruction inside the country was necessary since the successful development of armed struggle depended on political mobilization and strong underground structures, an important precursor to theories of peoples war developed in the early 1980’s.

**Morogoro conference.**

At the Morogoro conference of 1969, it was decided to enter stage 2 in the war against the people of South Africa, wherein the targets were no longer confined to government structures, but to include civilians.

Initially the targets were limited to oil refineries, fuel depots, the Koeberg nuclear plant and military targets such as Voortrekkerhoogte before it was decided by Special Operations Command to attack military personnel. This resulted in operations such as the car bomb at South African Air Force HQ in Pretoria.   
The case studies presented indicate that such operations were not carried out on the spur of the moment or on the whim of a particular individual, but were based on months of careful preparations.

The MK leadership policy towards soft targets and taking the struggle to white areas included Civics, community organizations, and trade unions. MK operations increased sharply, most of them carried out by formal units based inside the country, many of which were supported and housed by underground political cells. 

**Stage 2. 1969 - 1979: from Sabotage to Terrorism**

By their own admission, representatives in the leadership of the African National Congress described Stage 2 of their assault on South Africa as acts of Terrorism in their report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which wording included the following:   
“Classic terrorist warfare roots itself among the rural population and moves from there into urban areas; A multi-faceted approach was adopted, with terrorist operations carried out throughout the country in both rural and urban areas.”

During stage 2, attack targets included the following:

* Economic infrastructure: this entailed attacks on fuel supplies, considered to be the lifeblood of the economy; the power network without which no modern developed country can function and the strategic road, railways and communications network essential for trade.
* Military operations which provided security for the country: the South African Defence Force and paramilitary police forces
* Political-state infrastructure: which included all government installations and personnel involved in the administration of the country.

**Military training camps, school kids “education can wait”**

Thousands of new recruits were herded into MK, taken from the youth of South Africa. Many children were taken out of school through the call from MK leadership of “liberation first, education later”. Some children were also kidnapped and forced into MK service. This allowed for new vistas to intensify the struggle and to hit defenseless people. Many of these youths, after initial training in MK camps and in Eastern Europe, were briefed and infiltrated back into the country to begin operations. 

**The call for an increase of violent attacks between 1976 and 1979**

Between 1976 and 1979 there was a marked escalation of armed actions, which included about 37 armed actions between June 1976 and the end of 1978. Railway lines were sabotaged, police stations attacked, and Bantu Administration offices were bombed.

**G5 Operation**

 In 1978, the MK implemented the ‘G5 Operation’ in which units were sent into the country to attack police stations which included Moroka, Orlando and Booysens.

**Special Operations**

In 1979, the African National Congress President, OR Tambo, asked his National Executive Committee for a mandate to form a special unit to attack key strategic targets - spectacular operations that would hit the South African economy hard, and inspire other revolutionaries into action, which would build the base for mass political upheaval within the country.1 The unit would report directly to him; he would authorize such attacks and take political responsibility for them. This was agreed to, and the first Special Operations Command consisted of Joe Slovo, Montso Mokgabudi (Obadi), and Aboobaker Ismail (Rashid.) Thereafter Special Operations was set up to undertake high-profile acts of sabotage on key economic installations. This structure reported directly to OR Tambo. 

**Operations carried out by MK units from neighboring countries**

Parallel to operations carried out by Special Operations, there was a steady increase in the number of operations carried out by other MK units from Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and, in later years, Zimbabwe. One study estimated that 150 cases of armed action took place by these MK units between 1976 and 1982, overwhelmingly concentrated on economic targets, the administrative machinery of the South African government, the South African Police and South African Defence Force installations and personnel.

**Stage 3: The call for attacks on white civilians and soft targets increased.**

In mid-1983 the MK Head Quarters produced a discussion document called ‘Planning for Peoples War’ which posed the question as to whether the time was ripe to move away from the 1979 approach towards including civilians as targets in their war against South Africa. Among the conclusions were that the African National Congress should continue carrying out and even escalating those actions which had played an important role in stimulating political activity, mass resistance and mass organization, and that there should be more concentration on destroying ‘enemy personnel’ (The term enemy personnel referred primarily to members of the South African Police and South African Defence Force). The concept of potential future guerrilla zones inside the country was raised.

**The MK Modus Operandi then were same as we find in Farm Attack Murders inside South Africa presently.**  
In the same manner in which MK units operated from neighboring countries, targets inside South Africa were carefully selected and planning for the operational attack prepared in detail. Whenever possible, a final reconnaissance was undertaken just before an attack to ensure that conditions had not changed. A further aspect of all planning was to ensure that cadres had planned for their safe withdrawal after attacks, and had the necessary resources to do so. 

**The 1983 Attack on the South African Air force Head Quarters.**  
The National Executive Committee gave OR Tambo the mandate to allow Special Operations to proceed with an attack on the military personnel who waited for buses outside the South African Air force Head Quarters at approximately 16h30 each day.   
On the afternoon of 20 May 1983, the Special Operations MK unit drove into Pretoria and parked the car packed with explosives in Church Street, at the entrance of the Air Force Head Quarters. In the explosion that followed, 19 people were killed which included two MK cadres that took part in this mission, and 11 Air Force officers. According to initial media reports, more than 200 military personnel and civilians were injured. The MK leadership said afterwards that the bomb exploded a few minutes earlier than planned.

**The 1983 attack at the New Brighton community council office**

In another attack during 1983, an attack at a community council office in New Brighton resulted in one death and five injuries.

**The 1984 attack on the Sebokeng Community Council**

On the 3rd of September 1984, the civil unrest which commenced with a protest march against the rent increases imposed by the community council at Sebokeng, resulted in the murders of several people, including two community councilors that day. Hereafter, unrest spread from the PWV-Free State area to the Eastern Cape and the Western Cape.

**1984 politically related death toll**

In 1984, of the 175 people killed in "unrest related incidents" during the year, four were councilors. 149 of these 175 deaths in 1984 took place after the 3rd of September - the day which signaled the beginning of serious civil unrest.

**Petrol bomb killings of Councilors September 1994 - April 1985**

According to the Department of Constitutional Development, twelve councilors had died between the beginning of September 1984 and April 1985.

The SAIRR annual survey for 1985 lists several petrol-bomb attacks on councilor’s homes across the country, and a few incidents in which grenades were used. The SAIRR survey also recorded four cases of attacks on the homes of Members of Parliament, but no injuries or deaths are mentioned. All of these attacks were said to be petrol bomb attacks, with hand grenades used as well in two cases.

**The 1985 Kabwe Conference**

The Kabwe conference was held in June 1985 to assess developments since the Morogoro conference of 1969.   
At the conference, it was reaffirmed that African National Congress policy regarded the following targets legitimate: South African Defence Force and South Africa Police personnel and installations, as well as selected economic installations and administrative infrastructure. It was also reaffirmed that the risk of civilians being caught in the crossfire when such operations took place were not allowed to prevent the all-round intensification of the armed struggle. Furthermore, the focus of armed operations had to shift towards striking directly at enemy personnel, and the struggle had to move out of the townships to the white areas.

**The MK call to disregard the rights of unarmed civilians**

OR Tambo noted at a press conference in 1985 that the distinction between hard and soft targets was going to disappear in an intensified confrontation, in an escalating conflict.

By the end of 1985 an official pamphlet titled "Take the Struggle to the White Areas!" was distributed inside the country.   
Targets were identified as follows: the racist army, police, death squads, any people considered or suspected to be agents and stooges in the African National Congress midst, and the call to take the war to the white areas is defined as follows:

* Strengthening ANC workers organisations and engaging in united action in the factories, mines, farms and suburbs.
* Spreading the consumer boycott to all areas of the country.
* Organised and well-planned demonstrations in the white suburbs and central business districts.
* Forming underground units and combat groups in ANC places of work and taking such actions as sabotage in the factories, mines, farms and suburbs, and disruption of the country’s oil, energy, transport, communications and other vital systems.
* Systematic attacks against the army and police and the so-called area defence units in the white areas.
* Well-planned raids on the armouries and dumps of the army, police, farmers and so on to secure arms for the MK units.

The MK leadership had called on all members and supporters of the African National Congress to intensify the struggle at all costs, and to move towards creating a situation of ‘ungovernability’ and people’s war. 

**As MK attacks increased, the South African Protection Services and Defense Force neutralized most MK attackers.**

In the period 1985 / 1986, the number of guerrilla attacks underwent a 70% increase, to a total of 231. A third of these attacks were against police personnel and stations, South African Defence Force personnel and state witnesses in political trials.

MK guerrilla ‘neutralizations’ in 1985 were 3 for every 13 attacks, but in 1986, MK guerrilla ‘neutralizations’ were 4 for every 5 attacks.

In 1986, police reported 76 instances in which hand grenades were detonated; they captured or recovered nearly seven times that many (530). The rate of capture of other ordinance was also high during 1986.

**1986 police fatalities**

In 1986,18 members of the South African Police were killed and 192 injured in "rioting" during the year.

**1986 civilian fatalities**

There were "spates" of attacks on councilors and others perceived as collaborators in February in Alexandra, in May in Thokoza, and in September in Soweto.

Besides these incidents, seven attacks on councilors in which one councilor was hacked to death and the child of a councilor was similarly killed "by a group of five men". Nearly all the attacks listed are described as being carried out by "mobs" or as petrol bomb attacks. In a few cases hand grenades were used and in one case a limpet mine exploded at a block of flats in Fordsburg, which was used to house Soweto councilors. There was also a petrol bomb attack on the home of a Labour Party MP.

At least 1,298 deaths in "political violence" took place during the year, with activists, trade unionists and religious leaders the targets of petrol bomb, hand grenade and hit squad attacks.

**MK laid Landmine explosions 1985 – 1987**

During the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, MK leadership said that they did not have reliable statistics on how many people were killed in landmine explosions for which the African national Congress was responsible. Their rough estimate was based on available press reports, which reported approximately thirty explosions took place between November 1985 and July 1987 resulting in about 23 deaths in total, including two cadres who were killed whilst laying a mine.

**Stage 4: Transformation of armed actions into a generalized peoples’ war**

In August 1988, the National Executive Committee issued a statement specifically on the conduct of armed struggle in the country:

"The NEC further re-affirmed the centrality of the armed struggle in the national democratic revolution and the need to further escalate armed actions and transform our offensive into a generalized people’s war. (...,) However, the NEC also expressed concern at the recent spate of attacks on civilian targets. Some of these attacks have been carried out by cadres of the people’s army, Umkhonto we Sizwe, inspired by anger at the regimes campaign of terror against the oppressed and democratic forces, both within and outside South Africa. In certain instances operational circumstances resulted in unintended casualties." 

**MK units were allowed to follow their own initiatives**

According to the statements given by MK leadership to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, many of the established MK units had been allowed initiative in executing their operations. The MK leadership reckoned that their operations would be different to that of a conventional military force, in which planning takes place at HQ level by experienced officers, as the MK was engaging in what they considered as guerrilla warfare. They believed that in guerrilla warfare, most of the detailed planning takes place at the lowest level: each cadre was to be trusted to make principled and educated decisions with regard to choice of target.

**References:**

1 To quote from the "Green Book":

10a)... It is therefore vital to have under continuous survey the changing tactical relationships between these two inter-dependent factors in our struggle...The concrete political realities must determine whether, at any given stage and in any given region, the main emphasis should be on political or on military action."

**Footnote 1: List of MK Operations**

Information in this list was drawn from report handed in by the leadership of the African National Congress to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for the Tribunal in which all matters considered as acts of inhumanity towards the South African nation during their ‘armed struggle’ against the Union of South Africa was to be considered for justice.

The report states that the information gathered was from the press and the Annual Surveys of the SAIRR, and may have omissions and errors, due to censorship during the apartheid era and other difficulties in collecting information of this nature.

Although the report states that the accounts offered are not MK records, the report does classify actions taken into categories. Some of this sorting does not coincide with the rest of the information the report offers, neither with the rationale on which the term humanity is based.

Farmers, Farm Laborers, members from alternative political parties, people who refused to take part in strike action, and Community Councilors are incorrectly classified as South African Police or South African Defence Force members, or as personnel actively assisting the South African Police or South African Defence Force. This is incorrect as Farmers, Farm Laborers, members from alternative political parties, people who refused to take part in strike action, and Community Councilors were not actively working for the Security Forces, but for themselves, their communities, and other employment providers. Furthermore, these people were surrounded by civilians, and attacks aimed at them invariably injured innocent women and children.

Shops and entertainment facilities frequented by South African Defence Force and South African Police members cannot be seen as legitimate targets, as there was no restraint as to which shops and entertainment facilities could be used by the South African Defence Force and South African Police members, and therefore allows for every shop and entertainment facility in South Africa to be classified as a legal political target.

The report by the African National Congress to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission further proves that the MK leadership had their own legal system, which did not correspond to the legal system of South Africa, in which the African National Congress operated. However, the African National Congress legal system included a process to be followed by which people were judged to be a danger to the ‘freedom struggle’ movement. Such people included spies for and collaborators with the South African government. The attacks on the lives of suspected spies for and collaborators with the South African government cannot be upheld as justified, as the African National Congress had not followed the procedures they had set out for themselves along their own legal system, neither any other legal system in the world, whereby to judge if these suspects were indeed guilty. These suspects were also not given the chance to defend themselves legally or physically before they were meted the death and physically dilapidating sentences imposed on them by representatives of the African National Congress, who were not suitably qualified to act in the position of a representative of the law in any country.

In this attachment we have discussed Stage 4 of the onslaught carried out by the African National Congress against South Africa, in which it is clear that the African National Congress were aware of the damages caused to the lives of people in South Africa, which included massacres, physical and emotional damage, as well as huge economic losses. It is furthermore clear that the African National Congress encouraged people inside South Africa to make the country ungovernable, irrespective of the dangers it would bring to the lives of people, and that the African National Congress endorsed the violent actions of their supporters to be carried out as per their own reasoning, without having to find permission or report to any higher authority, calling this method of operation ‘guerrilla warfare’.

In Stage 4, we have discussed the transformation of armed actions into a generalized peoples’ war wherein MK units were allowed to follow their own initiatives; the fact that the African National Congress mother body defended the MK leadership calling for actions which could injure or kill civilians even though they were aware of the effects thereof; the African National Congress condoned the killing of Councilors; and that the African National Congress justified attacks on the lives of civilians.

Over and above cases mentioned earlier, we offer the following list as mentioned, of action by the African National Congress and its representatives during the ‘people’s war’ which they instigated against the people who were living inside the country we know as South Africa. Please note that certain abbreviations have been used, which include SAP for the South African Police members and SADF for the South African Defence Force members.   
  
**1960**’s: Details are not available, but it is estimated that the MK High Command co-ordinated over 190 acts of sabotage between October 1961 and July 1963.

There were no deaths or injuries reported.   
**1976:**   A study by Tom Lodge of the University of the Witwatersrand estimated that there were 150 MK attacks between 1976 –1982.   
30/11/76      Skirmish with SAP in the Eastern Transvaal led to two SAP killed as arrested cadres escape custody, throwing grenade into SAP vehicle.

**1977:**  
08/01/77 Economic: railway line near Soweto.

24/02/77 SAP buildings: Daveyton SAP station Bomb causes structural damage.

07/03/77 Civils: Pretoria restaurant destroyed by bomb - no details

15/06/1977 Skirmish with SAP: Two civilians killed in Goch Street warehouse when cadres realized they were being followed by SAP; two cadres captured.   
15/07/77 Economic: Umlazi, Durban. Damage to railway line.  
26/07/77 Skirmish with SAP: Vosloorus. One cadre killed.  
26/07/77 Skirmish with SAP: Dobsonville. One cadre killed, 2 SAP injured.  
09/09/77 SAP SB personnel: Leonard Nkosi; turned ANC cadre killed.   
27/10/77 SAP personnel: Bophuthatswana. Three cadres killed by SAP after throwing a grenade at a police patrol; 1 SAP injured.   
02/11/77 Skirmish with SAP: near Pongola One cadre killed, 1 SAP injured.   
??/11/77 Economic: railway at Dunswart & Apex Train driver slightly injured.

25/11/77 Civils: Bomb exploded at Carlton Centre, Johannesburg; 14 injured.

30/11/77 Civils: Bomb exploded on Pretoria-bound train

12/12/77 SAP building: Germiston police station. Bomb exploded, structural damage.

14/12/77 Civils: Bomb exploded in Benoni station

22/12/77 Civils: Unexploded bomb found in OK bazaars, Roodepoort

**1978**   
**??/01/78** Civil: Former ANC member Steve Mtshali who turned state witness in various trials was shot and wounded.

??/02/78 Civils: An unexploded bomb "capable of destroying a 22 storey building was found in Johannesburg office block and defused by SA bomb squad

02/02/78 SAP building: Daveyton police station Structural damage  
??/02/78 Skirmish with SAP: near Swaziland border Two SAP killed.

01/03/78 Skirmish with SAP: Witkleigat area. No details.   
10/03/78 Government buildings: Bantu Affairs Admin. Board, Port Elizabeth Bomb explodes outside offices; one civilian killed, three injured.   
??/04/78 SAP personnel: Swaziland border Cadres ambush SAP patrol; two SAP wounded.  
14/04/78 Civil: Abel Mthembu, former deputy president of the ANC in the Transvaal turned state witness at the Pretoria ANC trial was attacked.  
25/06/78      SAP Personnel: Det-Sgt Chapi Hlubi shot dead.   
21/08/78 BOSS personnel: B. Mayeza; shot dead in Umlazi.   
??/12/78 Government buildings: Soweto Community Council Bomb damages offices.

**1979** According to the SAIRR, there were at least 17 ANC guerilla attacks in urban areas between July 1979 and June 1980.   
1979 Economic: Sasol Oil Refineries Massive structural damage.  
1979 SAP building: Orlando police station attacked.  
14/01/79 Skirmish with SAP: farm near Zeerust; Seven cadres clash with SAP;

I captured, others escape over Botswana border.  
23/01/79 Economic: near New Canada station, explosion damages railway.   
24/01/79 Economic: railway between Fort Beaufort and King Williamstown, large quantity of explosives on line found and defused.  
Feb 1979 SAP SB personnel: Sgt Benjamin Letlako shot dead in Katlehong.   
April 1979 Economic: railway near Soweto Explosives discovered and defused.   
05/05/79 SAP personnel/building: Cadres opened fire in the Moroka Police Station charge office; 1 SAP killed, 3 injured; 3 civilians injured; extensive damage caused by grenades in offices.   
June 1979 Economic: railway in Eastern Transvaal Explosives found, defused.   
Nov 1979 SAP building/personnel: Cadres opened fire and hurled grenades into Orlando SAP Station charge office; 2 SAP killed, 2 SAP wounded.  
Nov 1979 SAP SB personnel: grenades thrown into home of Lt Magezi Ngobeni; 5 children wounded.  
Dec 1979 Economic: railway near Alice, explosion damages line. 

**1980** SAP building: Booysens police station, damage to building.   
14/01/80 SAP building: Soekmekaar SAP Station, one police officer injured.   
1980 Skirmish with SAP: Meadowlands No details.   
??/03/80 Skirmish with SAP: Bophuthatswana. Two cadres killed, one escaped.   
04/04/80 SAP buildings & personnel: Booysens SAP Station was attacked with grenades, rocket launchers, AK 47’s. Structural damage caused.    
June 1980 Civil: Tennyson Makiwane, expelled ANC official was shot dead.  
01/06/80 Economic: Sasol 1,2 and Natref. Eight fuel tanks destroyed in series of blasts; no injuries; R58 million damage.   
Aug 1980 SAP SB Personnel: Det-Sgt TG Zondi was shot at in Sobantu Village.

15/10/80 Economic: Railway line in Dube blown up.

29/10/80 Government buildings: West Rand Administration Board. Two grenades cause extensive damage, injured security guard and friend.   
30/10/80 Government residence: Port Elizabeth House of Transkei consul was damaged with bomb.   
21/11/80 Skirmish with SAP: Chiawelo; cadre killed.

**1981** According to the SAIRR, there were at least 26 sabotage attacks by the ANC between December 1981 and November 1982; and 13 suspected ANC cadres were killed in shoot-outs with the SAP.    
1981 Skirmish with SAP: house in Chiawelo; One cadre killed; possible SAP casualties.  
1981 SAP building: Wonderboom SAP station No details.   
1981 Economic: Capital Park sub-station was damaged by limpet mine.   
1981 SAP building: Mabopane SAP station, two dead (no details).   
1981 Economic: Rosslyn sub-station was damaged by limpet mines; two injuries.

??/02/81 Civils: Bomb blast in Durban shopping centre; two injuries

14/04/81 Economic: Richards Bay/Vryheid line 20km railway destroyed, coal trucks derailed   
21/04/81 Economic: power station in Durban, two transformers were destroyed by limpet mines.   
May 1981 Personnel actively assisting SAP: Hoedspruit Railways policeman killed with grenade.   
06/05/81 Economic: railway in Hoedspruit area, line damaged.

21/05/81  Government buildings bombed: Port Natal Administration Board, Pinetown; Offices of Dept. Colored Affairs, Durban.   
21/05/81 Economic: Port Elizabeth rail link to Johannesburg and Cape Town Line damaged by explosion.   
25/05/81 Propaganda: Pamphlet bomb in Durban and SAP building in Fort Jackson SAP station;   
 Economic: railway line near Soweto;

Economic: railway line on Natal South Coast;

Economic: power lines cut in Verde, OFS.   
27/05/81 SADF buildings: recruiting office in Durban destroyed in explosion.   
01/06/81 Civil: Firebombs at three PFP offices, Johannesburg.   
04/06/81 SAP building: SAP station, Johannesburg, Meyerton.  
11/06/81 Economic: railway line Natal North coast.   
16/6/81  Economic: railway line near East London.

26/06/81 Civils: Durban Cenotaph: 2 bombs exploded  
28/06/81  Economic: railway near Empangeni.  
03/07/81  Economic: fuel storage dept, Alberton Limpet mine defused.  
21/07/81 Economic: power supply; Pretoria, Middelburg, Ermelo At least six explosions at three installations.

26/07/81 Civils: Two bombs extensively damaged motor vehicle firms in central Durban, 05h50 and 06h10; three injuries

06/08/81 Civils: Bomb exploded in East London shopping complex minutes before rush hour; no details

08/08/81 Civils: Bomb exploded in Port Elizabeth shopping centre in similar manner to East London bomb

11/08/81 SADF personnel & buildings: the Voortrekkerhoogte Military Base was damaged by rocket attack.   
19/08/81  Economic: railway line near East London.   
02/09/81 SAP buildings & personnel: Mabopane SAP station. Two SAP and two civilians (one a child) killed.   
12/09/81 Economic: main railway line, Delville Wood, Durban Explosion damaged line.   
10/10/81 Economic: Durban railway station Government buildings: Durban offices, Dept. Co-operation and Development Four injuries; no details.   
21/10/81  Economic: Transformer in Evander destroyed Economic: Sasol III water pipeline, Secunda.   
26/10/81 SAP buildings & personnel: Sibasa SAP station Two SAP killed, station destroyed.   
01/11/81 SADF buildings & personnel: Jeppes Reef House near Swaziland border occupied by SADF Destroyed in rocket/grenade attack.   
09/11/81 Government buildings: Orlando Magistrates Court Explosion; no details.   
12/11/81 Economic: Rosslyn power substation in Pretoria was damaged by 4 limpet mines.   
09/12/81 Government buildings: office of Chief Commissioner, Department of Co-operation and Development, Cape Town.   
14/12/81 Economic: Pretoria power sub-station bombed.   
23/12/81 Government buildings: E. Cape Admin. Board, Duncan Village. No details.   
26/12/81 SAP buildings: Wonderboompoort SAP station. No details. 

**1982**  According to the SAP, there were 39 acts of insurgency in 1982.   
07/01/82 Government buildings: West Rand Administration Board, Soweto. Bomb damages office.  
12/05/82 Government buildings: West Rand Administration Board, Soweto. Bomb damages offices again.   
20/03/82 Government buildings: Langa Commissioners Court was damaged in explosion.   
28/05/82 Economic: Fuel depot and power transformer at Hectorspruit, damaged by limpet mine.   
03/06/82 Economic: railway near Dube was damaged in explosion.   
04/06/82 Government buildings: Bomb explodes in lift shaft of building housing offices of Presidents Council, Cape Town, one killed.   
28/06/82 Economic: railway depot at Vryheid was damaged in explosion.   
28/06/82 Economic: Two bombs caused extensive damage to Scheepersnek railway depot, pump station, stores, vehicles; Durban- Witwatersrand oil pipeline shattered; SAP & Government buildings in Port Elizabeth, Station Commanders office and New Law Courts damaged.   
July 1982 Government buildings: PE court building damaged.   
28/08/82 SADF buildings: Umvoti Mounted Rifles Army Camp at Red Hill in Durban received extensive damage to building and three SADF vehicles.   
Sep 1982 Skirmish with SAP: Boksburg, two cadres killed.   
24/09/82 Economic: Explosives placed at railway bridge near Upington; no details.   
Oct 1982 Skirmishes with SAP: KwaZulu. One SAP SB member killed; one cadre killed.  
26/10/82 Government buildings: Drakensberg Administration Board in Pietermaritzburg, three bombs exploded.   
Nov 1982 SAP personnel: W/O P. Selepe, Mamelodi was killed after he had given evidence in trials against cadres.   
08/11/82 Economic: Mobil fuel storage depot, Mkuze. Blast causes severe damage.  
Dec 1982 Civil: B. Hlapane was assassinated.   
13-14/11/82 Skirmishes with SAP: Piet Retief. Two SAP seriously wounded.   
18-19/12/82 Economic: Koeberg nuclear power station. Massive damage in four explosions.  
20-21/11/82 SADF/SAP installation & personnel: SAP rural station & temporary SADF garrison at Tonga. Rocket attack seriously injures two SADF personnel.  
??/12/82 Government buildings: Southern Free State Administration Board, Bloemfontein; blast left one dead, 70 injured

31/12/82 Government building / SAP building: Johannesburg Magistrates court (200m from John Vorster Square) Explosion; no details.

   
**1983** Economic: damaged railway line near Phomolong station.   
1983 SADF building: offices in Marshall Street received structural damage.   
1983 Economic: pylon in Denneboom received structural damage.  
1983 SAP personnel: Soweto. Grenade attack on patrol.   
26/01/83 Government buildings: the building of New Brighton Community Council offices was extensively damaged; one dead, five injured.   
30/01/83 Government buildings: Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court Explosion; no details.

08/02/83 Skirmishes with SADF: Paulpietersburg. No details.   
10/02/83 Economic: Richards Bay area, 500 hectares burned in arson attack.   
11/02/83 Government Buildings: Explosion at the Drakensberg Admin. Board Offices, no details.  
12/02/83 Government buildings: Free State Administration Board offices; bomb injured 76 people

20/02/83 Economic: Pelindaba Nuclear Research Station was set on fire; no details.

12/03/83 Civils: Bomb on railway coach on Johannesburg bound passenger train

21/03/83 Government buildings: Supreme Court, Pietermaritzburg. Explosion, no details.  
21/04/83 Government buildings: Supreme Court, Pietermaritzburg. Second explosion; no details.   
May 1983 Skirmish with SADF: Botswana border. Four cadres, one SADF killed.   
May 1983 Government buildings: Roodepoort; Offices of Dept. Internal Affairs was damaged in two explosions. Received damages of R250 000.

13/05/83 Civils: Explosive device (37kg of explosives in gas cylinder) found by SAP under bridge on Southern Freeway, Durban; defused

20/05/83 SADF personnel and building: Nineteen killed (2 MK, 11 SAAF officers) in car bomb at entrance to SAAF HQ, opposite building housing military intelligence personnel; 217 injured (number of military/ civilian injuries unclear.   
17/06/83  Economic: pylon at New Canada station, SAP defused bomb.   
28/06/83 Government buildings: Dept. Internal Affairs, Roodepoort. Explosion, no details.

July 1983 Economic: Sasol plant, Secunda.   
07/07/83 Government buildings: Durban Supreme Court Two bombs defused   
07/07/83  Government buildings: Dept. Internal Affairs, Roodepoort; SAP building: Roodepoort Bombs detonate at 00h40 causing structural damage   
06/08/83 Propaganda: Bomb explodes at Temple Israel, Hillbrow, before Marais Steyn due to speak there; no reports of injuries   
20/08/83 Economic: substation near Mamelodi Explosion caused damage of R100 000

26/08/83   Government buildings: Ciskei consular generals offices, Carlton Centre Limpet mines explode at 18h50; one injured   
08/09/83  Economic: electrical sub-stations, Johannesburg area Two (Randburg and Sandton) bombed   
11/09/83  Economic: substations at Bryanston North and Fairland Limpet mines cause structural damage   
12/09/83  Government buildings: Ciskei offices in Pretoria Limpet mine planted after hours causes structural damage   
13/09/83 Economic: Rowntree factory, Umbilo Bomb blast at 19h45; structural damage   
29/09/83 Economic: pylon in Vereeniging Police defuse explosives   
11/10/83 Economic/SADF personnel: Warmbaths. Mines explode at 02h20; extensive damage incurred by large fuel storage tanks, three rail tankers, one road tanker; two devices set to explode 1 hour later were found on door of Civil Defence office.   
14/10/83  Economic: two electricity pylons, Pietermaritzburg Mines explode at 02h00, 03h00   
01/11/83  Economic: Durban buses at municipal bus depot damaged by bomb at midnight;

  Economic: Germiston Railway line bombed;

  Economic: Springs SAP defuses bomb on railway line;

SAP building/personnel: Durban SAP workshop Bombed; no details   
02/11/83  SAP vehicles: Wentworth; Explosion at 02h55 damaged vehicles in SAP mobile store and the adjacent student residence (Alan Taylor Residence)   
03/11/83  Economic: Bosmont railway station was damaged by bomb; Economic: bus depot near Durban;

SAP buildings: SAP store near Durban.

22/11/83 Economic: Durban Pylons damaged by two explosions   
03/11/83 Economic: railway line, Bosmont/Newclare railway line damaged in explosion railway line near Germiston damaged by explosion railway line near Springs; explosives defused   
3 or 7/12/83 Government building: office of Dept of Community Development, Bree Street, Johannesburg Explosion; no injuries reported.  
08/12/83  Economic: railway 1km from Bloemfontein Locomotive and two trucks derailed   
12/12/83  Government buildings: offices of Dept Community Development and Commissioners Court, Johannesburg - Severe damage in limpet mine explosion; seven injured   
15/12/83  Government buildings: offices of Dept Foreign Affairs, Johannesburg - seven injured in explosion;

SADF buildings: Natal Command HQ - Three bombs explode on beach front nearby; no damage reported.  
19/12/83 Government Buildings: KwaMashu township offices, explosion caused R60 000 (sixty thousand) damage 

**1984** According to the Institute for Strategic Studies, Pretoria, there were 44 MK attacks during this year.   
1984 Skirmish with SAP: Mapetla One cadre killed; no SAP injuries   
1984  Skirmish with SAP: SAP ambush, Jabulani. One cadre killed, one injured.  
04/01/84 Skirmish with SAP: Mamelodi. One cadre killed.   
03/02/84 Government buildings: Ciskei consulate, Durban. Offices destroyed in explosion.   
23/02/84  Economic: Escom installation, Georgetown. Slight damaged caused by explosion.   
29/02/84  Economic: Mandini Power Station Bomb explodes; no information; SAP building: Mandini SAP station Bombed; no details.   
11/03/84 Economic: Mobil fuel depot, Ermelo; Four explosions, extensive damage, five storage tanks destroyed; no injuries reported.  
12/03/84  Skirmishes with SAP: area unknown. Two SAP seriously injured

April 1984  Skirmish with SAP: De Deur. One cadre killed

03/04/84 Civils: Car bomb at Victoria Embankment, Durban, killed three civilians, injured 20 civilians. To note: According to the SAIRR, two of those killed were Daya Rengasami and his wife Navi. He had been a member of the SA Students Organization and the BPC. The ANC in Lusaka denied an SABC report that it had claimed responsibility; other reports claimed that the ANC had prepared a statement on the blast which was held back once it emerged that the Rengasamis were casualties of the bomb. Rajbangsi said he believed his offices nearby had been the intended target of the bomb. The investigating officer was Capt. Andrew Taylor of the SB who is one of the accused in the Mxenge trial; he may be able to supply more details.

05/04/84 Government buildings: Transkei consulate in Botshabelo. Explosion destroys offices.

08/04/84 Civils: Arson attack at Hermansberg German Mission, Natal; extensive damage to vehicles and farming equipment

12/05/84 Government buildings: Durban, Trust Bank; Explosion causes extensive damage to offices of Dept. Internal Affairs and Durban HQ of SA. Railways Police injured.  
13/05/84 Economic: Mobil Oil Refinery, Durban; Cadres set fire to refinery in RPG.7 attack; running skirmish lasted several hours which ended when a car in which cadres were travelling was followed to a construction site by police; all were killed along with three laborers who burned to death when a paint store set alight in the battle. 4 SAP also injured.   
16/05/84 SAP personnel: Jabulani; Explosion destroys two private vehicles belonging to SAP members outside Jabulani SAP station   
18/05/84  Economic: railway near Lenasia was damaged by explosion.   
06/06/84  Economic: petrol rail tankers, Merewent, Durban. Four mines were damaged railway / defused (unclear).   
08/06/84  Skirmish with SAP: Ndwedwe. Two cadres killed in running gunfight with SAP.  
21/06/84  Economic: substation, Berea (Durban). Explosion damages substation, disrupts supply.   
12/07/84  SAP personnel: Jabulani SAP vehicle attacked; one SAP killed, one injured.  
28/07/84 Government buildings: SA Railways Police charge office, KwaMashu was attacked with hand grenades.  
03/08/84 Skirmish with SAP: Ellisras area; one cadre killed. Details unclear.   
7/08/84  Civil: Extensive damage to Tshabalala Dry Cleaners; Soweto Economic: Glenmore, Durban Escom sub-station destroyed.   
12/08/84 Government buildings: Department of Internal Affairs, Johannesburg –

explosion caused damage.  
16/08/84  SAP buildings/personnel: SAP HQ Soweto East, Roodepoort City Centre Building - two mines destroyed the second and third floors of building, injured District Commander, four SAP, two civilians; R260 000 damage.  
17/08/84  Skirmish with SAP: Mapetla - cadre resisting arrest killed.  
23/08/84  Government departments: DET, Booysens - Explosions destroyed 4th floor at 18h30   
24/08/84  Government buildings: SA Railways Police Regional offices, Dept Internal Affairs offices in Anchor Life Building Bomb exploded at 17h30; two civilians and four Railways Police injured.  
03/09/84  Government buildings: Dept. Internal Affairs, Johannesburg Explosion at 16h07; four injured.  
05/09/84  Economic: Eskom sub-station, Rustenburg; Explosion destroyed installations, disrupted power to Rustenburg and large area of Bophuthatswana.   
13/09/84  Economic: Escom sub-station, Durban. Limpet mines caused damage.   
14/09/84 Government Buildings: Department of Community Development, Krugersdorp. Bomb at 17h00 caused damage   
11/12/84  Economic: railway near Durban. Explosion damaged line, goods train damaged   
14/12/84  Skirmish with SAP: Ingwavuma One cadre killed, one SAP injured   
25/12/84 Skirmish with SAP: Ingwavuma Cadre killed 

**1985**  According to the Institute for Strategic Studies, Pretoria, there were 136 MK attacks during this year, a 209% increase compared with figures for 1984.   
??/01/85  Skirmish with SAP: Nongoma Three cadres, 1 SAP killed   
??/03/85  SAP personnel: Mamelodi Limpet mine destroyed SAP vehicle; no injuries  reported.  
??/03/85  Skirmish with SAP: Eastern Transvaal. Two cadres killed, one captured.   
??/03/85  SAP SB personnel: Tembisa Grenade attack on unnamed SB members home; no details   
22/03/85  Skirmish with SAP unit: Bushbuckridge. Two cadres killed.   
??/04/85  Economic: Escom sub-station, Durban. Parking attendant killed.

02/05/85  Economic: explosion at Anglo American and Anglovaal, Johannesburg - R170 000 (one hundred and seventy thousand) structural damage caused.

09/05/85  SAP personnel: two grenade attacks in Pretoria townships. No details.   
15/05/85  SAP building & personnel: Brakpan SAP barracks. Three explosions; no details.   
15/05/85  Government buildings: Brakpan Commissioners court and offices of Messenger of the court was attacked.

30/05/85  SADF building: Military Medical Centre, Johannesburg. Limpet mine causes structural damage   
31/05/85  Civil: Southern Cross Fund offices. Fourteen injured   
??/05/85  SAP personnel: GaRankuwa.SAP member killed

??/06/85  Government buildings: Lamontville. Three limpet mines explode at Natalia Development Board

??/06/85  SAP buildings: Umlazi SAP station. Three limpet mines explode; no details

??/06/85  Economic: Durban Escom sub-station damaged by explosion

??/06/85  Economic: AECI offices, Johannesburg. Bomb damaged offices.

??/06/85  SAP personnel Mmabatho: policeman shot.

//?06/85  Economic: Umtata Explosion destroyed Transkei Development Corporation bulk fuel depot; disrupted water and power supplies

??/06/85  Civil: Attack on home of Rajbangsi with petrol bombs and hand grenades; no injuries reported;

Councilors: Attack on home of former Gugulethu town councilor; no details.

??/07/85  Economic: Durban Limpet mines destroy sub-station

??/07/85  Skirmish with SAP: roadblock near East London Two cadres, one SAP killed in shootout

??/07/85  SAP personnel: Soweto Group dubbed the Suicide Squad attacks home of two Soweto policemen

??/07/85  Civil: Umlazi. Hand grenade damages bakery in Umlazi

??/07/85  Civil: Hand grenade attack on former community councilor in Gugulethu

??/08/85 Civils: three limpet mines explode in department stores in Durban, causing damage and no injuries reported.

??/08/85 Civils: Bomb exploded in night club at an Umlazi hotel; 30 children injured

??/08/85 Civil: Home of MP Barend Andrews attacked with hand grenade

02/08/85  Skirmish with SAP: roadblock near Mount Ruth Two cadres, one SAP killed

10/08/85  Economic: petrol bowser, East London fuel depot SAP defuse limpet mine

27/09/85 Civils: Limpet mines damaged basement of OK Bazaars at17h00 and early hours of 28/09, Smith Street; Game Stores (17h30), Checkers (17h30), all in central Durban Limpet mine defused in Spar, 18h30, central Durban

??/10/85 Civils: Home of Umlazi headmaster attacked with hand grenade; Limpet mines found at school in Durban (no details on area)

??/10/85  SAP personnel: Cape Town; Shots fired at police patrol; two incidents of attacks on police with hand grenades; no further details

??/10/85  SAP personnel: Mamelodi Home of SAP member attacked with hand grenade

??/11/85 Economic: Building housing Institute of Bankers in central Johannesburg damaged in blast;

Civils: Hand grenade exploded at Barclays National Bank branch, Woodstock.

??/11/85  SAP personnel: Cape Town. Four people including SAP officer and wife, railways policeman, killed in various hand grenade attacks; total of 20 such attacks recorded by this time say SAP.

??/11/85  SADF personnel: Cape Town. Three SADF injured in grenade attacks

??/11/85  Economic: Central Johannesburg Building housing Institute of Bankers was damaged in blast

??/11/85  SAP personnel: Cape Town Two grenade attacks on homes of SAP personnel SAP buildings: Manenberg SAP Station Vehicles damaged in grenade attack

??/11/85  Economic: Sasol 2 and 3 Rocket attack; three cadres killed by SAP

??/11/85  SADF Personnel: Soutpansberg area. Anti-tank mine explodes; four SADF, four others injured

??/11/85  Skirmish with Bophuthatswana Police: Four cadres killed, two cadres injured

??/12/85  Economic: Bus depot Umlazi. No details

6/12/85  SAP personnel: police patrol in Soweto. One SAP injured by grenade

08/12/85 SAP personnel: Chesterville. Home of SAP member bombed; no details

13/12/85  SADF personnel: troop carrier in Messina. One soldier injured in anti- tank mine explosion

??/12/85  Government buildings: Chatsworth Magistrates Court; Limpet mine explodes at 18h00; structural damage

??/12/85 Civils: Grenade attack on tourist kombi in central Durban; no details

??/12/85 Skirmish with SADF: near Botswana border. One SADF killed

14/12/85  Skirmish with SAP: Chiawelo. One cadre killed

17/12/85  Economic: Limpet mine explodes at 03h00; damages eight buses, PUTCO Fleet line depot, Umlazi

19/12/85  Farmers: Wiepe area. One farmer or civilian injured in anti-tank mine explosion

20/12/85  Farmers: Messina. Six killed in anti-tank mine explosion in game farm

21/12/85 Civils: Limpet mine attached to minibus injured 8 or 13 civilians

23/12/85  Civils: Amanzimtoti shopping centre blast by cadres: Five civilians killed, 40 injured.

29/12/85  Propaganda: pamphlet bomb, Durban Defused by SAP

**1986:**  According to the Institute of Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria, there were 230 incidents of insurgency during the year, a 69,1% increase over the 136 incidents in 1985.   
??/??/86  SAP personnel: home attacked in Springs. One person injured in grenade and AK attack

??/??/86  Economic: Springs railway station. Limpet mine damages building

??/??/86  SAP personnel: Vosloorus. No details

??/01/86  Farmers: Ellisras area near Botswana border. Two killed in anti-tank mine explosion; no details

Jan 1986  SAP personnel: Soweto Cadre throws grenade at 3 SAP members; cadre killed; no details

04/01/86  Farmers: Stockport (Botswana border) Two killed and two injured in anti-tank mine explosion

05/01/86  Skirmishes with SAP: roadblock on East London /King Williamstown road. One SAP killed, one cadre killed

07/01/86  Personnel actively assisting SAP: Soweto. Grenade thrown at Railways policeman

06/01/86  Skirmish with SAP: near East London. One cadre killed

08/01/86  Economic: Pretoria. Sub-station damaged by explosion

08/01/86  SAP personnel: AECI plant. Policeman shot at; skirmish followed in which two SAP and one civilian injured

09//01/86  Economic/ SAP personnel: Durban. Limpet damages substation in Jacobs, 21h15; second limpet explodes kills one SAP, injures three - five SAP (or one SAP, two engineers)

18/01/86  Economic: substation in Westville, Durban. Two limpets damage substation

20/01/86  Economic/SAP personnel: Four limpets damage pylon near Durban 20h45; fifth probably aimed at SAP explodes later; no injuries reported

24/01/86  SAP personnel: Mamelodi. Sgt Makhulu killed in grenade attack on his home

??/02/86  SADF personnel: Gugulethu. Buffel attacked with grenade; four SADF injured

??/02/86 Government personnel: Hand grenade exploded in Transkei minister's official car; no details

01/02/86  SAP personnel: Lamontville. Grenade thrown at patrol; one SAP injured

04/02/86  SADF personnel: Gugulethu. Four SADF injured when grenade thrown into their military vehicle

09/02/86  SAP personnel: Umlazi. Limpet mine destroys two SAP vehicles at Umlazi SAP station when parked after returning from riot patrol; no injuries reported

10/02/86 Civils: Large bomb defused by SAP in Amanzimtoti 200m from where the December 1985 blast (for which Andrew Zondo was hanged) took place

19/02/86  SAP personnel: Cambridge East SAP station - explosion in toilet block near Radio Control room; no injuries reported

Feb 1986  Skirmish with SAP: near Port Elizabeth; Two cadres killed, two SAP injured

Feb 1986  Economic: Durban Explosion at Durban sub-station; no details

12/02/86  SADF/ personnel actively assisting SADF: near Messina Bakkie detonates anti-tank mine; no injuries reported

2/02/86  Skirmishes with SADF: near Alldays. One SADF, one cadre killed

16/02/86  SADF personnel: Mamelodi Casspir severely damaged by anti-tank landmine

17/02/86  Skirmishes with SAP: Zwide. Two SAP killed, two cadres killed, one arrested;

  SAP personnel: area unknown. One SAP injured when vehicle hit by 10 bullets

??/02/86  Skirmishes with SAP: Zola, Soweto. Cadre blows up two SAP, kills self with grenade

??/02/86  Economic: De Deur. Limpet causes structural damage to substation

??/03/86 SAP Personnel: Dobsonville. SAP come under fire at funeral; no details

01/03/86  Skirmishes with SAP: Port Elizabeth or Grahamstown. One SAP seriously injured, cadre killed

03/03/896  Skirmishes with SAP: Gugulethu. Seven cadres killed

04/03/86  SAP building/personnel: John Vorster Square. Two SAP members, two civilians injured in explosion on 3rd floor

07/03/86  SAP building/personnel: Hillbrow SAP Station. Limpet found and detonated by SAP

15/03/86  Government buildings: Limpet mine explodes in front of Springs railway station, outside Indian Administration Offices; one civilian seriously injured

17/03/86 Civils: Mini-limpet discovered at Afrikaans high school at Elsburg, Germiston; police detonate limpet

17/03/86  SAP personnel: Mamelodi SAP member shot; died in hospital

18/03/86  SAP personnel: Mamelodi Constable Sinki Vuma shot dead at home

19/03/86  SAP personnel: limpet mine attack on SB member (no area); car destroyed member

19/03/86 Civils: Bomb blast inside wall of Springs New Apostolic Church

21/03/86  Economic: Durban. Four mines explode at Escom sub-station

26/03/86  Skirmish with SAP: Volsloorus. One cadre killed when he allegedly threw grenade at SAP members

08/04/86 Civil: Attack on home of former LP secretary in Natal, Kevin Leaf. No injuries reported

10/04/86 Civils: Limpet mine at Braamfontein station; 1 person killed, 4 injured

18/04/86 Civils: Bomb explodes in casino of Wild Coast Holiday Inn; 2 civilians killed, 1 injured.

21/04/86  Farmers: Breyten/Chrissiesmeer district. Two anti-tank landmines detonated, injuring two civilians in taxi and one tractor driver

21/04/86  Skirmishes with SAP: Alexandra. Cadre attacked SAP, one seriously injured; cadre retreated unharmed

23/04/86 Government buildings: Cala. Blast at Cala post office; no injuries

24/04/86  Government building: Meyerspark post office. Explosion causes structural damage

27/04/86  Skirmishes with SAP: Edendale hospital.l Gordon Webster rescued; one civilian killed, two SAP injured

??/05/86 Civils: SAP defused a 15kg bomb found under a car in downtown Durban.

01/05/86 Civils: Two grenades thrown at the home of Mr. Klein, principal of Wentworth Primary School. Klein said he was not politically involved. He was a police reservist some time ago. Klein and wife both injured.

07/05/86 Civils: Benmore Gardens Shopping Centre, Sandton. Bomb caused extensive damage, no injuries

25/05/86  Farmers: Farm of Colonel Koos Durr, near Davel. Anti-tank mine kills two, injures eight

26/05/86 As above: same road landmine detonated by tractor. No injuries reported

??/06/86 Civils: Bomb exploded at Jabulani Amphitheatre, Soweto; no injuries reported.

??/06/86 Civils: Ten people killed in explosion in minibus in Bophuthatswana

??/06/86 Civils: Limpet mine exploded in Queenstown shopping centre; one child injured

??/06/86 Civils: Limpet mine exploded in Johannesburg restaurant, injuring 17 people

10/06/86  Farmers: The farm Boshoek, 5km from Volksrust. Anti-tank mine injures one person

10/06/86  Farmers: The farm Blomhof, near Volksrust. Anti-tank mine injured two farm workers

14/06/86  Civil: Magoos/ Why Not bars. Car bomb kills three, injures 69, the majority civilians; McBride sentenced to death

16/06/86  SADF/ personnel actively assisting SADF: Winterveldt: Probable anti- tank mine explosion kills three BDF troops in troop carrier

22/06/86 Civils: Limpet mine exploded at 01h45 outside Copper Shop, West St, Durban

22/06/86  Economic: fuel storage tanks, Jacobs. Limpet damages tanks; Economic: liquid fuel pipeline between Sapref and Jacobs - limpet damages pipeline of Mobil Refinery near Durban

24/06/86 Civils: Explosion at 14h00 injured 16 civilians at a Wimpy Bar, Rissik Street outside President Hotel, Johannesburg; explosion at 14h26, five civilians seriously injured.

26/06/86  SAP personnel: Soshanguve Grenade attack on SAP members home; no details

27/06/86  Skirmishes with SAP: roadblock near Botswana border. Four cadres killed, one SAP injured

28/06/86 Civils: Queenstown shopping centre; explosion just before 12h00 injures two civilians.

29/06/86  Government buildings: Alice post office. Explosion; no injuries reported

30/06/86  Civil and SAP personnel: Westville, Natal. Mine exploded 03h15 on pedestrian bridge; second limpet aimed at responding SAP members exploded 15 minutes later

July 1986  Skirmish with SAP: Mdantsane. After a two-hour gun battle SAP killed one cadre

01/07/86 Civils: Explosion outside Carlton Hotel injures 8 civilians

04/07/86 Civils: Limpet mine exploded outside Checkers supermarket in Silverton; 20 civilians injured

05/07/86  SAP buildings: Mowbray SAP station, CT. Explosion injures two SAP

05/07/86  Farmers: Volksrust. One person injured by anti-tank landmine; no details

05/07/86  Government personnel: Vosloorus and Katlehong; Five Development Board officials killed in two attacks on their vehicles; two cadres killed

06/07/86  Skirmishes with SAP: Empangeni. Three cadres killed, one arrested

10/07/86  SAP building: Silverton. Explosion injures seven people

22/07/86  SAP personnel: Katlehong. One SAP killed

26/07/86  SAP personnel: Katlehong. Cadres attacked municipal police twice; both cadres killed, five police killed, 12 police injured

30/07/86  SAP personnel: Umtata SAP station. Three SAP, four civilians killed, seven SAP injured in grenade and AK attack

28/07/86  Skirmish with SAP: Nelspruit. Two cadres killed

30/07/86  Farmers: near Nelspruit. Anti-tank landmine exploded: no injuries reported.

03/08/86  Government buildings: Lakeside post office Explosion; no injuries reported

09/08/86  SAP Personnel: Durban. Lt Victor Raju killed in grenade attack on his home

16/08/86  Skirmish with SAP: Eastern Tvl, near Swaziland. Four cadres killed, one injured

16/08/86  Farmers: E. Tvl border area. Anti-tank landmine kills five, injures two civilians

17/08/86  Farmers: the farm Stellen Rust near Nelspruit. Anti-tank mine injures two civilians

22/08/86  Civil: Personnel actively assisting SAP: Natal. Grenade attack on Inkathas’ Winnington Sabelo; AK 47 fired at car of his wife as she entered the driveway, killing her and injuring 3 children

24/08/86  Councilor: Imbali. Grenade attack on home of town councilor Austin Kwejama; one child killed, one child injured

??/09/86 Civils: Mini-limpet exploded in bar of Devonshire Hotel injuring three civilians (this was a popular venue for Wits students)

??/09/86 Civils: Grenade thrown into crowded night club in Edenpark (Alberton)

01/09/86 Civils: Pick and Pay supermarket Montclair, Durban; bomb injured 1 civilian

07/09/86 Civils: The Durban holiday home for underprivileged children escaped

unscathed after a car bomb blast nearby

24/09/86  Government personnel: Home of Soweto Housing Director, Del Kevin, extensively damaged by limpet mine; no injuries reported

30/09/86  Skirmishes with SAP: Northern Natal. One SAP injured

Oct. 1986  SAP building: SAP station Newcastle was attacked, no details

06/10/86  SADF/ personnel actively assisting SADF: Mbuzini, near Mozambique border. Anti-tank landmine injured six SADF members in military vehicle

20/10/86  SAP buildings: Lamontville SAP station. Limpet mine explosion outside; no injuries reported

22/10/86  Civil: two anti-tank landmine explosions. Damage to property of Mr. Van Zyl

31/10/86 SAP personnel: Umlazi Det. W/O Seleka killed in grenade attack on home

Nov. 1986  Economic: Two offices of PUTCO bombed in Soweto 02or04/11/86  Civil: near Nelspruit. Anti-tank landmine explosion killed one woman, one child injured

04/11/86  SADF personnel: landmine, E Transvaal. One soldier on horseback killed

10/11/86  Government buildings: Newcastle Magistrates Court. Two bombs exploded - 24 injuries including Magistrate and Public Prosecutor

14/11/86  Farmers: Alldays district. Landmine injures farmer and son

23/11/86 Councilors: Fordsburg flats. Limpet mines exploded at new housing for Soweto town councilors; no injuries reported

??/11/86  SAP Personnel: KTC Camp. Grenade injured two SAP members

15/12/86  SADF / personnel actively assisting SADF: Barberton area. Anti-tank landmine injured two SAP in SAP vehicle

19/12/86  SADF / personnel actively assisting SADF: Komatipoort area. Anti-tank landmine injured SADF member;

Councilor: Soweto Grenade attack on home of Soweto councilor; two SAP injured

27/12/86  Skirmishes with SAP: near Messina. Two SAP, three cadres killed; two cadres escaped 

**1987**  Note: According to the Institute of Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria, there were 234 incidents of insurgency during 1987; there had been 230 in 1986.   
1987  SAP personnel: home of Hlongwane, Mamelodi. Damage to property

1987  Government buildings: Johannesburg Magistrates Court. Four killed, several injured

1987  SAP buildings: Kwandebele. SAP station. No details

01/01/87  SADF personnel: Alexandra National servicemen attacked; at least one injured

03/01/87 Civils: Corner Jeppe/Delvers St, Johannesburg; limpet mine injured three civilians

09/01/87  Economic: OK Bazaars Eloff Street. Bomb exploded, no injuries reported.

12/01/87  Economic: OK Bazaars HQ: Bomb caused extensive damage, no injuries reported.

09/01/87  SAP personnel: near KTC. Riot Squad member killed, two injured by grenade thrown into their vehicle

23/01/87  Skirmishes with SAP: Soweto. Two cadres killed

24/01/87  Skirmishes with SAP: Mendu, Willowvale. One TDF or Transkei police member injured

30/01/87  SAP/SADF personnel: Alexandra. Three SADF, one SAP killed in attack

31/01/87  Councilors: Diepmeadow. Home of town councilor Senokoane attacked; six injured including two SAP officers

??/02/87 Civils: Limpet mine caused damage to a shop in Matatiele (Transkei)

02/02/87  SAP personnel: Single Quarters, Bokomo SAP Station. Two attacks with grenades; one SAP injured

05/02/87 Civils: Explosion at bus shelter outside Groote Schuur estate; 1 civilian injured

18/02/87  SADF personnel: Tladi Secondary School. Grenade attack kills four SADF personnel

19/02/87  Civil: Grenade injures Chief Lushaba and Samuel Jamile of Inkatha

03/03/87  SAP personnel: Gugulethu. Cadre shot dead by police after he fired on their patrol with an AK 47

09/03/87  SAP personnel: Gugulethu. One SAP, two municipal SAP killed; one cadre possibly killed

11/03/87  Skirmishes with SAP: Zone 13 Mdantsane. Ciskei police confirm skirmish, no details

11/03/87  Skirmish with SAP: New Crossroads. Cadre shot dead in house

13/03/87  Skirmishes with SAP: Atteridgeville. Four municipal police killed, one injured

16/03/87  SAP personnel: Kagiso. Grenade attack on home of SAP member; no injuries

17/03/87  Skirmishes with SAP: Inanda SAP raid

17/03/87  Economic: railway line between Newcastle and Johannesburg. Three explosions damage line

28/03/87  Farmers: Josefsdal/Swaziland border area. Anti-tank landmine kills four, injures one civilian

??/04/87 Civils: Bomb exploded in a shop in centre of Newcastle; no injuries reported

??/04/87  Skirmish with SAP: Umlazi. Three cadres killed, four SAP injured, one critically, in shootout

01/04/87  SAP/SADF personnel: Mabopane or Mamelodi. Grenade thrown into Hippo, three SADF killed, two injured

01/04/87  Councilors: Dobsonville. Grenade thrown at home of Councilor Radebe; no injuries reported

02/04/87  SAP personnel: Nyanga. Grenade injured three SAP

03/04/87 Civils: Car park of Came Arcade shopping centre: limpet mine injured three civilians

08/04/87  Skirmishes with SAP: Ventersdorp. Two cadres, 1 SAP killed in shootout

09/04/87  SAP personnel: Meadowlands Zone 10. Three SAP attacked; casualties unknown

14/04/87  SAP personnel: Chesterfield, Durban. Grenade attack on home of SAP member; no injuries reported

15/04/87  SAP personnel: Umbumbulu. SB officer killed by sniper, another SB injured

16/04/87 Civils: Parking area of Newcastle supermarket. Explosion injured two civilians

20/04/87  SADF personnel: Dube station. Grenade thrown at group of soldiers; casualties not reported

23/04/87  SAP personnel: Bonteheuwel Grenade attack on home of SAP member. No details;   
 Personnel actively assisting SAP: Mitchells Plain. Grenade attack on home of security guard, no details;   
 SAP personnel: Ravensmead. Grenade attack on home of SAP member, no details.

24/04/87  Skirmishes with SAP: Umlazi. Riot SAP raid; cadres resisted; three Riot SAP injured, two cadres killed

30/04/87  SAP personnel: Osizweni, Newcastle SAP barracks. Grenade attack, four SAP injured

??/04/87 SAP personnel: KTC. Seven SAP injured in grenade attack on their patrol

04/05/87  Civils: area west of Messina. Driver killed and 10 passengers injured when truck detonated landmine

05/05/87 Civils: Johannesburg Civic Centre: two mini-limpets exploded, no injuries reported.

09/05/87  Skirmishes with SAP: Mamelodi One SAP, three SADF, one cadre killed

16/05/87  Economic & SAP personnel: Newcastle. Explosion at Newcastle station waiting room; second explosion at 01h34 while SAP investigating first blast; one SAP injured

19/05/87 Civils: Carlton Centre explosion; no details

20/05/87  Government buildings & SAP personnel: Johannesburg Magistrates Court. Car bomb kills three SAP, injures four SAP, six civilians injured

11/06/87  Skirmishes with SAP: Emdeni, Soweto SAP raid/ ambush of raiders: one cadre, one SAP killed

12/06/87  SAP personnel: Witbank. Two SAP found dead; Government buildings: Athlone Magistrates Court. Limpet mine explodes; no details

15/06/87  Councilors: Gugulethu; Grenade attack on home of councilor; four injured, two of them special constables

16/06/87  Councilors: Guglethu. Grenade attack on councilors home; two injured

21/06/87  SAP personnel: KTC camp. Grenade attack on SAP patrol injured seven SAPs

22/06/87  SAP personnel: KTC. Two SAP, five municipal police injured in grenade attack

12/07/87  Skirmishes with SAP: Athlone SAP raid; one cadre killed, four arrested

06/07/87  Skirmishes with SAP: Mdantsane. SAP ambush: cadre kills two, injures three Riot Unit SAP; cadre shot dead

08/07/87  Skirmish with SAP: Motherwell.

08/07/87 Civils: Bar of Village Main Hotel, Johannesburg: limpet mine explodes at 11h12; no details

18/07/87  SAP personnel: Mamelodi East. SAP member and wife injured in attack on their home

??/07/87  Skirmish with SAP: Mdantsane. Two SAP, one cadre killed in shootout

20/07/87  SADF personnel: SADF flats, District Six Car bomb explodes; no injuries reported

25/07/86  SAP/SADF personnel: Pimville. Grenade thrown at home; exploded outside house

26/07/87  Skirmishes with SAP: Katlehong Cadre escaped; no details

30/07/87  Farmers: The farm Bodena owned by Danie Hough. Anti-tank landmine injured three civilians

30/07/87  SADF personnel and buildings: Car bomb exploded outside Witwatersrand Command killing one SADF, injuring 68 military personnel and civilians

??/07/87  SAP personnel: Gugulethu Home of SAP officer attacked with grenade

05/08/87  Skirmishes with SAP: Ntsekisa Rd, New Brighton. Cadre killed in shootout

13/08/87  SAP personnel: Emdeni SAP Sgt. injured in grenade attack on SAP van

23/08/87  Civils: Emdeni Shop frequented by SADF members attacked with grenades; no details

24/08/87  SAP personnel: Emdeni. Grenade thrown at SAP vehicle; two SAP, eight civilians injured

27/08/87  Government personnel: Soweto; Home of former Mayor Kunene attacked; two council police killed

30/08/87  SADF personnel: Military barracks, Dobsonville. Grenade thrown at five soldiers outside barracks; estimated eight SADF members killed or injured

??/09/87  SAP Personnel: Marble Hall Commander of KwaNdebele National Guard Unit and his son (also SAP officer) found shot dead by AK 47 fire

??/09/87  Skirmishes with SAP: near Zimbabwe border SAP say six cadres killed in various incidents

02/09/87 Skirmish with SAP: cadre threw a grenade at a roadblock

24/09/87  SAP personnel: Soweto 10 people including two SAP injured in grenade attack on SAP patrol

28/09/87 Civils: Standard Bank arena: two bombs explode, no injuries reported.

01/10/87  Civils: Bomb placed outside door of Rajbangsi’s NPP office in Lenasia explodes hours after official opening; no injuries reported

17/10/87 Skirmishes with SAP: Heidedal, Bloemfontein. SAP raid on house comes under fire; no details

28/10/87 Skirmishes with SAP: Swaziland border. Cadre was wounded after he killed SADF member who approached him

06/11/87  SAP personnel: Khayelitsha. One Special constable, two civilians killed by sniper fire

12/11/87  Government buildings: Zola Municipal offices. Two limpet mines explode, third detonated by SAP while trying to diffuse it. No details on injuries.

14/11/87  SADF personnel: Cape Town. During the SADF commemoration march from CT to the Castle, a limpet mine exploded in a bin past which over 700 SAP and SADF filed past; 1 SADF injured

18/11/87 Government buildings: Johannesburg post office. Limpet mine found

23/11/87  Skirmishes with SAP: Umlazi. SAP raid on house: two cadres and alleged collaborator killed; two SAP injured by cadres who resisted

30/11/87  SAP buildings/personnel: Dube municipal training centre. Three explosions; no injuries reported.

10/12/87  Skirmishes with SAP: Port Elizabeth area. SAP raid on shack; heavy resistance from cadres; SAP drove Casspir over shack, killing four

12/12/87  SAP personnel: Soweto Group of SAP fired on by cadres in car; two SAP killed, four injured

??/12/87  SAP personnel: Nyanga Group of five Special Constables comes under fire; one killed 

**1988**    
1988  SAP personnel: ambush in Emdeni, Soweto No information

Jan 1988 SAP personnel: attack on police in Kliptown No information

25/01/88  Skirmishes with SAP: Ugie. Roadblock Cadres wound 1 SAP, retreat safely

25/01/88  Civils: Kokstad. Limpet exploded at Kokstad Men’s Club opposite Kokstad SAP station; building and two vehicles damaged

27/01/88  SAP personnel: Soweto Cadres open fire on SAP vehicle; three SAP, one civilian injured

??/02/88 Propaganda: 12 civilians injured in a blast at Wits Medical Command administration building in Braamfontein. The head of SAP public relations (Brig. Herman Stadler) claimed that the ANC was responsible and had carried out the attack for propaganda purposes; this was proved by the fact that newspapers had received an early tip-off, he said.

01/02/88  Skirmishes with SAP: Cadres resisted Transkei roadblock. Three killed, one injured by Transkei police

02/02/88  Skirmishes with SAP: Near Mount Fletcher. Cadre killed in skirmish: no details

06/02/88  SAP personnel: East London. One SAP killed in attack; no details

12/02/88  SAP personnel: Soweto. Municipal police guarding installation was attacked; two injured

12/02/88 Civils: Johannesburg. Cadre opened fire on car driven by ex- Rhodesian soldier; details on injuries unclear

01/03/88  SADF personnel: Benoni. Explosion caused extensive damage to bus transporting SAAF personnel; no details

07/03/88  Skirmishes with SAP: Queenstown SAP raid; cadre resisted, wounded six SAP; cadre and civilian killed

08/03/88  SAP personnel: Phiri Hall SAP mess. Prolonged attack killed one and wounded 10 SAP.

14/03/88  Government building: Johannesburg City Hall. Bomb exploded, no injuries reported.

17/03/88  Government building & SAP personnel: Krugersdorp magistrate’s court and adjacent SAP Station damaged by car bomb as well as two SADF and one civilian killed, and 20 civilians injured.

18/03/88  SAP personnel: Atteridgeville. Cadres attack tavern frequented by SAP; three SAP killed, no further details.

25/03/88  Skirmishes with SADF: Batavia, Far Northern Transvaal. Three cadres killed

27/03/88  Civils: Pietersburg. Antheas Club, building damaged by limpet placed in back garden; no injuries reported.

28/03/88  Skirmishes with SADF: island on Mutale river. Four cadres killed, one injured

??/03/88 Economic: Fort Jackson electrical sub-station. Three limpet mines caused damage, no injuries reported.

??/04/88  SAP building: attack on municipal police training centre. No details.

??/04/88 Civils: Bomb explodes at Johannesburg City Hall; no injuries reported.

09/04/88  Government buildings: Atteridgeville Development Board canteen. Limpet exploded nearby; no injuries reported.

12/04/88  Skirmishes with SAP: Mpumalanga township; SAP cornered cadre who killed self and two SAP with grenade; trapped second cadre who resisted: cadre killed one SAP and three civilians wounded in crossfire

15/04/88  Government buildings: Atteridgeville Municipal offices. Limpet mine explodes; no details

15/04/88 Civils: Explosion outside Pretoria Sterland cinema. One cadre killed, one civilian injured. According to an ANC official in Lusaka, the intended target was a nearby government building; the bomb exploded prematurely.

19/04/88 Civils: Explosion at private office block less than 100m from Parliament. Back entrance destroyed, branch of Santambank seriously damaged

22/04/88  SAP personnel: Soweto. Cadre ambushed municipal police vehicle, wounded four SAP, one civilian.

25/04/88  SAP personnel: Newcastle Sgt JM Mazibuku killed at bus stop

01/05/88  SAP personnel: Cape Town. Special Guard Unit vehicle attacked. No injuries reported.

04/05/88  SAP personnel / buildings: Kagiso SAP Single Quarters. Limpet mine exploded against wall; no details

10/05/88  SAP personnel: Mamelodi. Grenade attack on SAP members home; child killed.

14/05/88  Skirmishes with SAP: Newcastle. SAP raid home of cadre; cadre resisted but was killed

24/05/88  SAP personnel: Germiston station. Cadre who opened fire on SAP at station was killed when SAP returned fire; three civilians injured in crossfire.

25/05/88 Civils: Grenade attack on Sofasonke Party rally in Soweto; two killed, 38 injured

26/05/88 Civils: Outside African Eagle Building, Pretoria. Limpet mine injured four civilians outside Ruth Arndt Early Learning Centre;

Civils: Limpet mine detonated during lunch hour in Proes Street, Pretoria

28/05/88 Civils: Explosive device detonated at bottom of platform staircase in Johannesburg railway station, 1 civilian injured.

??/06/88 Civils: Bomb blast near Soweto's Inhlanzani station.

??/06/88 Civils: Mini-limpet mine exploded at Pretoria snack bar, injuring 18 people.

03/06/88  SADF buildings / personnel: SA Irish Regiment HQ, Anderson St, Johannesburg. Explosion; no details

03/06/88  Civils: Explosion outside Standard Bank, Roodepoort during lunch hour kills 4, injures 18 civilians.

05/06/88 Civils: Bomb detonated while train was standing at Saulsville railway station.

20/06/88  SAP personnel: Mdanstane W/O Swelindawo of Ciskei police injured in explosion at his home.

22/06/88 Civils: Amusement arcade in Winning Side Arcade, Johannesburg. Limpet mine killed ten civilians.

26/06/88 Civils: Papagallo Restaurant, East London: limpet mine discovered and defused.

29/06/88  Civils: cafe in Poynton building. Explosion injures two SADF, two prisons personnel, 13 civilians

??/07/88  Government personnel: Lenasia. Explosion outside home of member of Presidents Council, Dr Ismail Jajbhay; no injuries.

??/07/88 Civils: Two explosions at a meeting of Sofasonke party; no injuries reported.

05/07/88  Skirmishes with SAP: Gugulethu Police raid; cadre resisted for 3 hours; shot dead.

09/07/88 Civils: Limpet mine exploded outside Johannesburg Cambrians hockey club:. No further details

12/07/88 Civils: Kruger National Park. Landmine incident - no details

14/07/88  Skirmishes with SADF: Kruger National Park; follow-up operation after 12/07 landmine. Four cadres killed.

16/07/88  SAP personnel: Nyanga Cadre fires on SAP vehicle; one civilian killed, one injured SAP return fire; cadre wounded

17/07/88  SAP personnel: Soweto highway. Cadre opens fire on SAP vehicle from back of bakkie; two SAP injured.

22/07/88  Councilors: Soweto. Grenade attack on home of Soweto Council personnel manager, BE Qakisa; no details

23/07/88  SAP personnel: Pinetown. Cadre wounded SAP member; no details

26/07/88  Government personnel: Soweto. Three grenade attacks on homes of

Administration Board employees (P. Legare, Mr. Naledi, Mr. Gumede); no details.

29/07/88 Civils: Bus stop cnr. Victoria/Odendaal Streets, Germiston. Limpet mine injured one civilian

30/07/88 Civils: Wimpy Bar, Benoni Plaza. Limpet mine exploded at lunch hour; 1 civilian killed, 57 injured

??/08/88 Civils: Powerful explosion at a bus terminus used by black people; no injuries

??/08/88  Government buildings: Westville Post Office. Mini-limpet exploded; no injuries reported

03/08/88  SADF building and personnel: Wits Command. Car bomb explodes; no injuries reported;

Skirmishes with SAP: Bridgewater area. Five cadres killed in two incidents.

04/08/88  Skirmishes with SAP: Wild Coast hotel SAP raid; one cadre killed, one escaped.

05/08/88 Civils: Marula Sun Casino. Limpet mine discovered and suppressed; minor damage

08/08/88  Skirmishes with SAP: near Palala river. No details

13/08/88 Civils: Hyde Park Shopping Centre. Explosion injured three civilians

19/08/88  Economics: The Castle (heritage site), Cape Town. Mini-limpet mine exploded within Castle grounds; no details

20/08/88  Government personnel: Duncan Village. Grenade attack on home of mayor Eddie Makeba; extensive damage; no injuries reported

23/08/88 Civils: Wimpy Bar in Oxford St, East London. Explosion at lunch hour injured 23 civilians

24/08/88 Civils: Outside Wimpy Bar, Standerton. Limpet mine discovered, dragged into street and detonated; no details.

??/09/88 Civils: Bomb exploded at discotheque in Hillbrow injuring 19 people

??/09/88 Civils: Limpet mine explosion at Vinderbijl Square bus terminus in ohannesburg injured 19 people

??/09/88 Civils: Hand grenade thrown at home of Allan Hendrickse, leader of the Labour Party, from a moving car

??/09/88 Civils: Bomb under a car in parking lot of East London hotel exploded after area cleared; no injuries

??/09/88  Civils: Bomb goes off at Laudium home of Pretoria municipal election candidate; no injuries reported

??/09/88 Civils: Three limpet mines in Lenasia exploded at the offices of the Lenasia bus service, at the home of the Lenasia Management Committee, and the offices of the House of Delegates; no injuries reported

??/09/88  Government buildings: King Williamstown Magistrates Court. Bomb exploded, no injuries reported

??/09/88  SAP buildings & personnel: Woodstock Police Station. Mini-limpet exploded, no injuries

??/09/88  SAP Personnel: Soweto. Home of municipal policeman attacked, child injured

02/09/88 Civils: Outside a shop on the corner of Smith and Fenton Streets, Durban. Limpet mine exploded at 17h30, two civilians injured

02/09/88  Government buildings: Standerton post office. Limpets discovered

03/09/88  Skirmishes with SAP: Molweni, Durban. Cadre fired on SAP from house; cadre killed, four injured

07/09/88 Civils: Basement of North Park Plaza Shopping Centre. Explosion killed one civilian

08/09/88 Civils: Grenade thrown into the home of couple who did not join a strike (Mr. and Mrs. Modiko); child injured

10/09/88  SAP building/personnel: Moroka SAP Station barracks. No details on results of explosion.

10/09/88  Civils: Mini-limpet placed under basin next to back door of Lenasia HOD candidate, Mrs. Ebrahim; no details

19/09/88  Civils: Benoni. Car bomb explodes in flats 100m from SAP station; two civilians injured

21/09/88 Civils: Vanderbijlpark bus terminal: explosion after 17h00 injures 14 civilians

22/09/88  Civils: Explosion at the home of municipal election candidate SD Goolam injured four SAP, two guards, one civilian

??/10/88 Civils: Limpet mine exploded at central Johannesburg bus terminus, injuring four people

??/10/88 Civils: Car bomb explosion outside a Witbank shopping centre; two killed, 42 injured

??/10/88  Economic: Sandton Eskom substation. Limpet mine exploded.

??/10/88  Government buildings: Diepmeadow. Mini-limpet damages offices, no injuries reported  
??/10/88  Government buildings: Redhill Post Office. Bomb exploded; no injuries reported

??/10/88  Councilors: Bomb damages campaign HQ of a Wentworth municipal candidate in Durban

??/10/88 Councilors: Municipal councilor and assistant escape injury when hand grenades thrown at them in Thokoza

??/10/88 Civils: Explosion at KwaThema civic centre used as polling point in municipal elections; baby killed, four people injured

??/10/88  Government buildings: Explosions at Magistrates Courts at Wynberg (Johannesburg), Bishop Lavis, and Stellenbosch. No injuries reported

??/10/88  SAP Buildings: Woodstock Police Station Bomb caused damage, no injuries reported

??/10/88  SAP Personnel: Tembisa police barracks. Limpet mine explosion injured four SAP

??/10/88  Civils: Limpet mine causes extensive damage near Alexandra Municipal Police Offices. No injuries reported

??/10/88  Civils: Wattville and Thokoza. Homes of municipal candidates attacked with hand grenades; no injuries reported;

Councilors; Tumahole. Limpet mine exploded at homes of two councilors; no injuries reported;

Councilors: Gompo Town. Hand grenade attack on home of deputy mayor; no injuries reported.

??/10/88 SAP buildings & personnel: Katlehong. Mini-limpet exploded at Municipal Police barracks, no details

??/10/88  SAP personnel: Potchefstroom building housing Security Branch. Bomb exploded, at least one SAP injury

??/11/88 Civils: Explosion at Lenasia civic centre; no injuries reported

??/11/88 Economy: Explosion damaged section of railway line on outskirts of Durban; no injuries reported

??/11/88  Government buildings: Port Elizabeth Post Office. Limpet mine exploded, no injuries reported

??/12/88  Government buildings: Boksburg Receiver of Revenue offices. Limpet mine exploded; no injuries reported

??/12/88  Government offices: Brakpan Dept. Home Affairs. Limpet mine caused damage, no injuries reported

??/12/88  Government buildings: Cape Two municipal buildings, Magistrates Court in Paarl. Bombs exploded; no injuries reported

??/12/88 Civils: Two explosions in Bisho resulted in damage to garage and shop; one injury

??/12/88 SAP Personnel: Five people, one an SAP member, killed in Soweto; police said an AK 47 was used indicating that the ANC was responsible

**1989**    
??/??89  SAP personnel: Jabulani, Soweto. Mine detonates on vehicle; no details

??/??89  SAP personnel: attack in Diepkloof. Unnamed SAP member killed by AK fire

??/01/89  Economic: Post Office, King Williamstown. No details; Economic: Railways, Wilsonia, (E Cape). No details;

Economic : Mount Ruth railway station, Mdantsane. No details;

Economic: Glenwood, Durban. Escom sub-station damaged by explosion, SAP defuse second bomb nearby;

Economic: Sandhurst Explosion at Eskom sub-station;

Government personnel: Benoni. Limpet mine exploded at the home of the chair of the Ministers Council in the House of Delegates. Extensive damage, no injuries reported;

Economic: Ciskei. Explosion at aircraft factory; no injuries reported; no further details;

SAP building/personnel: Katlehong Municipal Police Station. Two municipal police killed in grenade attack

??/02/89  SAP building/personnel: municipal police barracks, Soweto. Structural damage; 4 SAP injured

??/02/89  SAP personnel: parade in Katlehong. One municipal constable killed, nine injured

??/02/89  SAP personnel: Katlehong. Limpet exploded at the home of Col. D. Dlamini, commander of Katlehong SAP Station. No details.

??/03/89  SADF buildings: Natal Command HQ Explosion; no injuries

??/04/89  SAP buildings/personnel: SAP HQ Durban. Explosion at single quarters; no details;

SAP buildings: Yeoville SAP Station. Bomb explodes; no injuries reported;

SAP buildings: SAP station, Durban. No injuries reported;

SAP Outpost: Katlehong. Five special constables injured;

Councilors: Thokoza. Two municipal police injured when grenades thrown at councilors home;

Councilors: Thokoza. Grenade thrown at home of Councilor Abram Mzizi; no details;

SAP personnel: Single quarters. No details;

Economic: Nigel post office. Explosion, no injuries reported.

??/05/89  Government installation: Klippan Radar Station. Attack by large group of guerillas using mortars; no injuries reported.

??/06/89  SAP personnel: Duduza. Limpet explodes under SAP vehicle; four civilians injured;

SAP personnel: Tsakane. Limpet explodes under vehicle outside SAP members home;

SAP personnel: Tsakane. Grenade thrown at SAP patrols, no details;

Civils: Soweto. Limpet explodes in rubbish bin outside home of SAP member;

SAP personnel: KwaThema SAP station. Bomb shatters window of dining hall;

SAP personnel: Ratanda SAP Single Quarters. Limpet mine explodes; no injuries reported;

Civils: Limpet mine at home of Boetie Abramjee LP MP, no details.

??/07/89 Civics: Bomb at JG Strijdom hospital; no details

??/08/89 Civils: Grenade explodes at Labour Party polling station, Bishop Lavis;

SAP building/personnel: Brixton Flying Squad HQ. Attacked with hand grenades and AK47’s. No injuries reported;

SAP personnel: Lt-Col. Frank Zwane, former liaison officer for SAP, Soweto, and his two sons were injured in grenade attack;

SAP building: Athlone SAP Station. Explosion; no details.

??/09/89 SAP equipment/personnel: Duduza Limpet mine on SAP vehicle: no details;

Government buildings: municipal offices, Alexandra. No information;

SAP personnel: patrol ambushed, Katlehong. No information;

SAP building: Mamelodi SAP station. Mini-limpet explodes outside, SAP vehicle damaged.

??/10/89 Civics: Bomb exploded outside BP centre, Cape Town and at a Woodstock garage a few minutes later

??/11/89 Civics: Bombs at First National Bank ATM at Berlin railway station, King Williams Town

ATTACHMENTS AVAILABLE IN BOOK FORM:

BUNDLE 1: Attachments 1 - 3 <https://www.createspace.com/4392573>

BUNDLE 2: Attachments 4 - 8 <https://www.createspace.com/4398589>

BUNDLE 3: Attachments 9 - 10 <https://www.createspace.com/4416061>

BUNDLE 4: Attachments 11 - 14 <https://www.createspace.com/4400727>

BUNDLE 5: Attachments 15 <https://www.createspace.com/4415962>

BUNDLE 6: Attachments 15a <https://www.createspace.com/4497969>

BUNDLE 7: Attachments 16 - 18 <https://www.createspace.com/4415984>

BUNDLE 8: Attachments 19 - 26 <https://www.createspace.com/4416010>

BUNDLE 9: Attachments 27 - 30 <https://www.createspace.com/4416021>

BUNDLE 10: Brief <https://www.createspace.com/4437109>

BUNDLE 11: Brief Concordance <https://www.createspace.com/4497991>

BUNDLE 12: Attachment 15b, update of

genocide records, 2013 will be available

during April 2014 on <https://www.createspace.com/4498007>