**Attachment 17: The African National Congress in Government**

In an article called ‘DO WE HAVE THE MOST CORRUPT GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD???” which was shared on Facebook, a South African made the following statement, which sums up the results of governance by the African National Congress in South Africa, as follows:

. 19 years of ANC rule unemployment has gone up by 60% !!
. we now have the highest unemployment rate in the world
. South Africa is now the rape capital of the world
. After 19 years of ANC rule we have achieved the dubious distinction of being 140th on a world list of 144 countries for our education department.
. We are officially the country where the most hijacks take place
. We are also on the top ten lists for the most murders
. In 19 years the rand/dollar has gone from R3.41 to R10.00
. During ANC rule the petrol price has gone from R1.73 to R12.83 per liter
. In 19 years our defense force has gone from being the iron fist of Africa to a laughing stock that can't defend Disneyland from an invasion of fluffy toys
. In 19 years we have ten times more people in squatter camps and 1000% more illegal immigrants
. In 19 years our roads, railways, military, police, municipal services, old age homes, hospitals and orphanages have literally fallen apart and are worth nothing anymore
. No other country on the planet has more convicted criminals in their parliament than us!!
. 25% of all South African school girls are HIV+
. Our school girls had 100 000 abortions last year

Besides the fact that no governance handed over by succession since the illegal formation of the Union of South Africa can be seen as legal because its power has been handed over to it by a preceding illegal government, we need to ask:

Is the African National Congress capable of running South Africa?

Does the history of the African National Congress warrant its position as governor of South Africa?

To address these pertinent questions, we need to discover if the African National Congress has proven itself to have the best interests of the country as a nation as its primary concern; and

How the African National Congress has utilized power and funds entrusted to its care historically.

In this attachment, we discuss:

Part 1: The attitude of the African National Congress towards South Africans as a nation before it became the government;

Part 2: The attitude of the African National Congress towards South Africans in its leadership position as being the government;

Part 3: How the African National Congress managed the power and funds entrusted to its care during the liberation struggle before it came into power as government of South Africa.

The Union of South Africa, which was completed in 1910 through which the British Crown annexed all of South African land and placed South Africans under British governance, was illegal as the majority of South Africans did not agree to the formulation of this Union. The control of South Africa by British governance was handed down in succession to British loyal officials up to and including the present leadership within the African National Congress, as discussed in Attachment 10 - South Africa is bound as a possession by the British Crown.

Before the African National Congress took control of South Africa as government officials, national and international outrage against the previous system of governance since 1910 was widely publicized. This is discussed in Attachment 9 - Objections to the formation of the Union of South Africa.

There has not been a legal government in South Africa since 1902. The African National Congress inherited an illegal system, which was corrupt, and has proven that they are not able to rectify the system to the benefit of the nation.

The African National Congress became a terrorist organization when they decided to take on an ‘armed struggle’ against the people of South Africa pre 1994, and made use of criminal entities to further their goals. They have been stuck with these criminal entities and predominantly aggressive terrorist mind-set ever since, which is not in accordance to the agreements they made at the time they took over control of the country with the nation as a whole, neither have they adhered to the stipulations of the Constitution of South Africa as it was given to them in 1994 to apply from thence forward. In his 2010 biography of Nelson Mandela, Peter Hain quoted the former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as stating in 1987: "The ANC is a typical terrorist organization... Anyone who thinks it is going to run the government in South Africa is living in cloud cuckoo land."

We will prove that the African National Congress leadership is corrupt; and that the African National Congress has repeatedly committed high treason against the South African nation as a whole.

**Part 1. The African National Congress before it became the South African government**

**1) The attitude of the African National Congress towards South Africans as a nation**

In 1973, the leaders of the anti-apartheid organizations met to discuss future strategy. Three major factors were discussed:

* How to convince the government to change their policies to include equal rights for the non-white communities;
* How to raise international awareness to the situation in South Africa to gain international pressure on the government; and
* How to uplift the poorest of the poor.

Three options were placed on the table:

* An armed struggle against the civilians of South Africa;
* Sanctions against the economy of South Africa;
* The creation of “civics” groups to establish the distribution of funding for the infrastructure of poor communities.

**a) The African National Congress changed its character and resorted to violence to make demands**

**(i) ANC leaders who did not approve of violence against the nation and sanctions against the economy of South Africa**

At the 1973 meeting between all the opposition to the anti-Apartheid government parties was held, Mangosuthu Buthelezi made it clear that he did not approve of an armed struggle, but suggested peaceful negotiations. He also did not approve of sanctions as he believed such actions would worsen the unemployment figures. He did, however, agree that community service centers should be established to provide housing for the poor, and provide some form of protection to ensure their survival.

**(ii) Political leaders who did approve of violence against the nation and sanctions against the economy of South Africa, changed the basis of the ANC from peaceful resistance to violent resistance**

Leaders of the ANC, SACP and PAC approved an armed struggle, sanctions, and ‘civics’. They formed a coalition and decided to have the ANC as the leading public figure.

The coalition formed an army, ‘uMkontwe Isiswe’, to perform guerrilla warfare on the state and terrorize civilians into submission to their cause. The uMkontwe Isiswe generated soldiers collectively known as the MK soldiers. The actions of uMkontwe Isiswe in their guerrilla warfare against South Africans is further discussed in Attachment 14 - MK soldiers

**(iii) Buthelezi kept the principle of peaceful resistance upon which the ANC had been based originally and incorporated it into the IFP**

Although Mr. Buthelezi agreed to support the ‘civics’ movement, he chose to create an alternative to the radical movement, and formed the Inkatha Freedom Party. It was, in fact, the peaceful negotiations by Mr. Buthelezi which concluded the transformation of South Africa from an Apartheid government to a non-racist government. It could be said that the guerrilla warfare by the African National Congress delayed rather than progressed government negotiations, the guerrilla warfare which, in fact, continued even after peaceful negotiations had been entered into in 1992.

It is significant that once it had been agreed upon by the National Government to hand over governance of South Africa to the African National Congress during secret negotiations as discussed in Attachment 101, the African National Congress continued its violent attacks upon the nation of South Africa, and in particular, on the lives of known Inkatha Freedom Party supporters.

**(iv) The African National Congress have maintained their aggressive stance**

At present, South Africa is reeling from the ‘shoot to kill’ armed presence the African National Congress government has taken towards the citizens of the country. On the 16th of August 2012, the shooting of mine workers at Marikana was shown during the evening news time slot on public television.

Various reports of police violence have been reported on social networks and have been compared to the violence experienced in the 1980’s. It has become evident that the African National Congress has maintained their aggressive stance since the fateful day an armed struggle was decided upon at the meeting in 1973.

**Part 2. The African National Congress in government.**

**Section A. The safety of the nation.**

Threats to the safety of a nation can come from within the country itself, or from across its borders. The government of a country has the mandate to ensure the safety of each person living within the country it serves. Where such a government is negligent in its duties to protect a nation, it is failing in its duties. Where such a government remains silent on the attacks on the lives of the people within the country it serves, it is, by its silence, condoning such attacks. Where a government is found to be directly involved with attacks carried out on the lives of the people inside the country it serves, this action is tantamount to treason against the nation.

Attacks on people living inside a country which puts their lives at risk can happen in more than one way:

I. Physical attacks on the lives of people;

2. Unsafe drinking water;

3. Insufficient food which could lead to famine;

4. Being denied entrance into the work force;

5. Extreme taxation which renders the value of their money worthless;

6. Endorsing the sale of questionable seeds and food to the nation, which could affect their health detrimentally e.g. Genetically engineered seeds and food

The safety of any country is of extreme importance for the survival of its people. Not only are people being murdered in South African public places and on the streets, but also inside their homes.

Besides the violent attacks on their lives, the nation is suffering from an oversupply of drugs on the streets brought into the country by mafias which were tied to the African National Congress before they were unbanned in 1992, and are now allowed to continue their malpractices. Child slavery for sexual enterprise has also become a bustling industry in South Africa and the lives of babies are ripped from them as a cure for AIDS and traditional medicine.

The food supply to the nation has decreased significantly in volume and in quality while the population is expected to double within the next twenty years, there is a continual unabated inflow of foreign nationals into the country who arrive here with no funding or gainful employment to sustain them. Most of these foreigners do not leave the country but turn to crime for survival.

The call for attacks on the lives of white farmers as well as land grabs has seen the decrease of white commercial farmers from about 85 000 in 1992, to less than 11 000 presently. For the first time in the history of South Africa, the nation has imported basic foodstuffs since 2007.

Regulations have been put in place forcing the farmers to buy seeds which have been genetically engineered. These seeds are sterile which forces farmers to purchase more seeds every planting season. Foodstuffs made from these seeds are the direct cause of deformities in unborn babies and are a threat on the lives of all who consume them. This is discussed further in Attachment 27 - Humanitarian atrocities committed by the Crown against southern Africans, Section 2. Agriculture is interfered with in South Africa by the Crown which is hazardous to the health of South Africans.

The water supply of South Africans is also under attack of becoming unusable. At present, the South African fresh water is rated as the third best water in the world. Most of this water is collected from underground channels. The African National Congress has given permission for fracking in nine different places in South Africa within the very near future which will poison the underground water and leave the nation without sufficient water to drink.

Policing and security of the country has been used for a self enrichment vehicle of the African National Congress government. Whistle blowers on the criminal activities of the African National Congress government are victimized. Criminals are regularly set free from prison in hoards by Presidential pardon. The police force is used to protect the personal enterprises of government officials, and is often involved in attacks against the nation.

Armaments to protect the country have been used in private business deals to enrich government officials and are inefficient and insufficient to protect the country in case of an attack on the nation. The military budget is astronomical considering that the military staff is minimal and ill supplied. Furthermore, the African National Congress is forming its own personal army with the funds of the nation. As a political party who are landlord of the state treasury, this is not only an abuse of the system, but an abuse which could lead to an armed attack against the very nation who has entrusted it with their state machinery in tote.

Not only has the security infrastructures of South Africa been compromised by the African National Congress in government, but all infrastructure that is in place to secure the future of the South African nation has been compromised through their denial of the importance of infrastructure in the country; the neglect to maintain and develop infrastructure; as well as the tendency to sell off any infrastructure which is in place and which has been serving the nation to the highest bidder.

Corruption in governance is rife, and the guises used to cover up its inefficiencies keeps the nation ignorant to its needs of any potential threat against which it may have to protect itself.

To point, we highlight some of the action performed by the African National Congress government which are life threatening to the South African nation.

**(i) The African National Congress polarizes the nation into white and black**

After having two decades of all the power which governance gives them, the African National Congress has failed to uplift and protect the lives of the nation, and in particular, the poor communities. The government hides its inaptitude by blaming the Whites, creating hatred between the races which could flare into civil war. More than ever before in the history of South Africa, has the nation been destabilized as it has been recently. Yet, the outside world does not criticize the government they supported to take over the rule of South Africa.

Polarization in a country could lead to mass genocide such as the Hutsis and the Tutsis; the Protestant and Catholic Irish; and the Russian revolution wherein the Bolshevik Zionist revolutionaries murdered more than twenty million Christians.

**a) Racism defined**

To define the understanding of the African National Congress’s understanding of a non-racial society, we differentiate between the two variants of negative and positive racism.

Racism, tribalism, ethnicity and discrimination in particular through regulations enforced on society, such as Affirmative Action, which excludes certain communities of the nation based on the color of their skin, and equal rights in general are social and legal related terms.

Negative racism is related to the classical legal (both liberal and communist) notions of discrimination and equal rights.

Positive racism allows anyone the freedom to express in public debate without fear of sanction the desire to maintain race, ethnic group, tribe, culture etc. This positive racism is the individual form of the internationally recognized right for any collective of self determination.

Negative Racism has many variants.
1. The superficial physical distinction of skin color;
2. The political version to ban the legitimate proposition of positive racism; and
3. Legitimating of pro-active anti-white racism.

**b) The United Nations has supported negative racism**

The translation of racism by the United Nations is of pertinent importance to the world it controls. The United Nations has the ability to support or destroy a country.

The system of Apartheid is recognized by the United Nations under the name of segregation. Segregation was the principal upon which the government of South Africa operated to develop different nations within South Africa separately.

Today, the exclusion of Whites from the work force in South Africa by the African National Congress is based on skin color, and has nothing to do with the abilities of the workers. It is impossible for all the employment positions in South Africa, in a country which is at 1,219,912 km2 (471,011 sq mi), the 25th largest country in the world, to be filled by the White minority, which carries less than 4.5 million people and of which only 1.5 million are at an employable age, amongst a population which is estimated to be in excess of 50 million people. It is the only country in the world where regulations such as Affirmative Action, which excludes whites from the workforce, is applied, which effectively protects the majority of South Africans from the minority of South Africans. Yet the United Nations allows the African National Congress to enforce an inverted form of Apartheid, which discriminates against all South African communities who are not classified as ‘black’ based on the color of their skin, wherein this negative racism in South Africa threatens the ability of minority groups to survive.

Negative racism (both liberal and communist), as displayed through the United nations ultra leftwing ‘tiersmondialism’ etc. is part of the idealistic movement of economic re-distribution, and opposes intellectual, scientific, industrial and technological innovation.

The superficial physical difference in skin color is closely related to vulgar mockery found in slogans like black sun, black Jesus. This semantic, provocative, street version carries abject hatred and incites violence.

The United Nations are the driving, ideological and legitimizing force behind the creeping genocide of white people in South Africa. It has allowed for the construe of racism based on the color of a person’s skin by making colonialism of the English and French to become understood as synonymous with the Holocaust in Germany instead of ages of Roman Catholic Church hatred against the Jewry in Germany, and United Nations members indoctrinate with these lies the black youth in South Africa today to accept the notion of denial of genocide committed on whites.

**c) The African National Congress promotes negative racism in South Africa**

The attitude of the African National Congress towards minority groups in South Africa is that of a bully. It ignores the desires of communities who call on their right for self determination, and makes a mockery of their cultures with derogatory slogans. The African National Congress also blames everyone else except themselves for their ineffective governance, corruption and inefficiency. It indulges in myth making such as "reconciliation" and "non-racialism".

There was a policy of "reconciliation" designed to smooth the entry of the African National Congress into power post-1994, and Nelson Mandela was tasked with delivering assurances to the white minority that their rights would be respected. However, this was not long lasting. The African National Congress ditched this policy as soon as it realized its grip on state power was secure in 1996, as was always the intention. The historic ideology of the liberation movement is properly described as one of revolutionary African nationalism.

From 1996 onwards the African National Congress of Thabo Mbeki pursued aggressive Africanization policies within the state.

White racial nationalism was replaced by Black nationalization in South Africa. This has caused a ‘brain drain’ as Whites fled the country, mass immigration by Blacks from neighboring African states, high unemployment, and a corrupt and dysfunctional state run by inefficient leadership cadres, decaying infrastructure, appalling education for the poor, the strangling of investment in the mining industry, and so on. One of the great tensions in South African politics today is between those, such as the former African National Congress youth leader Julius Malema, who seek to finally give effect to the African National Congress's historic mission through a festive orgy of looting and destruction; and those who recognize the damage it has done thus far and see the need to pull back from it and find a different path.

In seeking a solution to the problems of South Africa, the sympathies of many Western observers are with Mr. Malema, even as his archaic demands for nationalization are condemned. The Guardian's David Smith commented on Twitter in September 2011 that "Anyone with a leftwing bone in their body may have to admit Malema tells some painful truths." In an editorial on the African National Congress Youth leader's suspension the Financial Times offloaded responsibility for the ruling party's failures onto the white minority stating: "the legacy of centuries of oppression cannot be erased in two decades."

Underlying such claims is a nasty and enduring strain of Western racialism. But what gives them intellectual purchase is the myth-making of the past two decades. If all that's been reported on for the past fifteen years are imaginary African National Congress attributes of "forgiveness", "reconciliation" and "non-racialism" it makes sense to argue that the country is currently suffering not from a surfeit of racial nationalism, but from too little. Thus, in a view ascribed to Malema but which seem to reflect his own, David Smith writes "Mandela's miracle of forgiveness and reconciliation is all very well, and it saved white people from ‘being driven into the sea', but it also let them off the hook."1

**Anti-White Slogans**

The African National Congress has slogans which promote white genocide, viz. "One settler, one bullet!", and "Kill a farmer, kill a Boer!" These are still often chanted at rallies. They also have songs that take solemn oaths to kill the Boers such as "Bulala AmaBhulu;" and President Jacob Zuma's theme song, “Awulethe Umshini Wami” (Give me my machine gun), amongst others.

**African National Congress racism contributes to the genocide of the White South Africans**

As government, the African National Congress is responsible for the safety of every person in South Africa. Their inefficiency at protecting the lives of the nation, combined with their outright denial of the full extent of the attacks on the lives of South Africans, is tantamount to treason. The nation cannot defend itself if it does not realize that there is an unproclaimed war. Not only is there a media blanket on the extreme violence which accompany attacks on the lives of White South Africans, but the amount of attacks are also not made public. There is no program on the computer records of the South African Police on which to record genocidal attacks, and there are no statistics available to monitor the situation.

To date, there have been more than 3,000 brutal torture-murders of farmers and their families -­ almost as many as American soldiers in the full-blown war situation of Iraq, and an estimated total of 50,000 murders of the White population as a whole since 1992. Urban murders resemble the torture- murders on the farms, with little or nothing being stolen. During the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) with the British doing their utmost through their Scorched Earth Policy and Concentration Camps for the Boer women and children, they succeeded in killing only 3,000 women, 24,000 children and about 3,000 men in battle at a time when the White population in South Africa was far less than now. This peace-time onslaught by the ANC-SACP's army of brain-washed criminals has taken a far greater toll, and the Whites have not even been able to fire a shot in their defense. Meanwhile, the international media and the United Nations look on mutely and dispassionately. The attacks on the lives of the White South African community are discussed further in Attachment 15 - The silent genocide of the Boer Nation in South Africa**.**

**LAND OWNERSHIP**

One of the greatest reasons given for the attacks on the lives of white farmers has been for the possession on land. The African National Congress has been educating school children for more than a decade that the land of South Africa belongs to them, and that white farmers had stolen this land from their forefathers.

**(i) Regulations have been put in place for land redistribution**

Regulations have been put in place and the South African Constitution has been changed to cater for any person/s that have claims to land, to be handled and for such land to be redistributed back to the land claimants. Unfortunately the African National Congress government has been delaying the process of land redistribution, causing further distrust and polarization between White and Black - the Blacks believing that the Whites are not prepared to negotiate and give land back, causing the Blacks to call for economic freedom in their life time, and for land to be taken without restitution.

**(ii) Proof exists of land entitlements**

Over and above the land title deeds of the Boer Republics which are still held by their leaders, proof does exist of various land entitlements through concessions made by African leaders for gifts and services received from the Whites as well as purchases made by the Whites of land from African leaders, the British government, and various other institutions since their arrival in southern Africa, of which the African National Congress government are fully aware.

**(iii) False propaganda about land ownership**

The African National Congress spread propaganda that the “Whites, representing 11% of the population, own 87 % of all the land in South Africa." This is a blatant lie. Statistics determined by the government's own commissioned report, carried out by the South African Institute for Race Relations in 1991/92, revealed the following facts:
Up to and including 1990, about 66,000 "white" (i.e. mostly Afrikaans speaking) farmers were occupying 77-million hectares of total land surface. And some 10% of this land was not owned by the farmers: it was being leased from the State.
They completely omit to mention that the State is a major landowner, and that people of other races also own/permanently occupy farmland in South Africa:

515,000ha farmland was owned by Asians/Coloureds in 1991.

Also in the SA Institute for Race Relations' 1991/92 report, about 22,000 Asians and people of color owned and farmed on 515,000ha of land. "People of color", especially the Griqua-Afrikaans speaking groups in the northern Cape, farmed on commons which were owned by their local church groups157,000-ha farmland owned by black farmers in 1991 outside autonomic homelands.
In addition, black small-farmers owned 157,000-hectares of farmland outside the former homelands in 1991/2, with the vast majority of these black farmers being communal farmers occupying state land.

15,7-million hectares owned by black homeland farmers and  25 million hectares owned was by State, of  which 16 million hectares was lying fallow.
It is important to note that in 1991/92, a full 25 million hectares of South Africa's total land surface of 1,219,912 square kilometers was actually owned by the State.
South Africa's total irrigated land surface was 13,500 sq km in 1998 out of the country's total surface area of 1,219,912 sq km.2

In 1994, the State inherited another 1,085,084 state-owned urban sites:  which are mostly municipalities and their parcels designated for township developments, as well as inheriting large military-holdings, forests and wildlife reserves.

By March 2011 the State owned 64,976 farms, 5448 'agricultural holdings'; and 41% of SA’s entire land surface in the former tribal homelands – which are not as yet registered in the Land Registry office and thus are also not listed as ‘State-owned’ in their official land-registries.3

Furthermore, most land surface in South Africa is not used for farming.

In 2001, 87.13% of the total SA land surface was used for purposes "other than farming”.

According to the CIA satellite surveillance photographs in 2003, only about 7% of South Africa's total land surface was actually being used for crop-growing, both dryland and irrigated.
Sources: CIA World Factbook, December 2003; FAO; United Nations World Statistics Pocketbook and Statistical Yearbook; Health the World Foundation.4

In 2008 only 0.79% of the country’s land surface was under permanent crops: only 14,980 square km was under irrigation.

The CIA observations from space have also registered the fact that by the end of 2008, although South Africa previously had  access to 12.1% ‘arable land’ of its total land surface, only 0.79% of the land was under permanent crops – of which 14,980 sq km were irrigated in 2008.5

In 2009, the Mail & Guardian reported that the national and provincial government owned about 24,5-million hectares, but the extent of municipal ownership was not clear. The department could not confirm the 25% ownership claimed by Popsa, because audits on municipal land were still to be conducted. However, the department’s database showed that 1,2-millon properties were owned by the various municipalities.

The Mail & Guardian also reported that the 2008 audit of state land was being used to identify state-owned land for use in the government’s land reform program. It added that the department said only 5% to 7% -- or two million hectares -- of state-owned land was potentially available for agricultural redistribution or disposal. The government was tracking black land ownership only where the government had handed land over to black communities.

Mohoebi from the state department was quoted as saying:
“However, we are requesting the banks who provide financing for land acquisition to share information in this regard. To date they have not given us the information.”

**(iv) The evaluation of land for redistribution**

The African National Congress is calling for land redistribution, but has no idea how to go about it. After 18 years in government, it still has not been able to finalize the process. It has been stalling for time, as is clear in the statement made by the opposition political party, as follows:

“Until government has completed an audit of what land it owns and in what condition it is in, land reform will be seriously compromised.” See full statement by the opposition party with regard to land redistribution in Footnote 1 – Land redistribution study by the shadow minister of Rural Development and Land Reform

Bottom of Form

The ongoing inability of the African National Congress government to have a clear cut plan and regulations as to how land will be redistributed, and how much land is to be used for redistribution, has caused many White farmers to give up farming in South Africa. We refer to a report in 2004, at which time there were 25 000 White farmers as opposed to less than 12 000 White farmers presently in South Africa, which reads as follows:
*“October 5, 2004 - Marleen Smith of the Landbouweekblad reports this week that great confusion exists among South Africa's (rapidly shrinking) commercial agricultural community about the government's black economic empowerment programme regarding the redistribution of farm land, it's so-called Agri-BEE policy document tabled last month.
The key questions among the country's (then) 35,000 (editor's insert, now 25,000), remaining commercial (Afrikaans speakers) farmers are - exactly how much land is available and suitable for farmland-redistribution; What is this land's real agri-potential and future viability; Who actually owns this land; and exactly how much land still needs to be handed out to black communities and for what purpose?
At a recent farming congress in Bloemfontein, there were many more questions than answers to the fuzzy Agri-BEE document introduced by the minister of land and agricultural affairs.
One fact was made abundantly clear in the Agri-BEE document, namely that white farmers were not opposed in principle to the concept of land redistribution, according to Agri-South Africa, the South African farmers' lobby which is cooperating with the government. What bothers the farmers however is that there are no clear guidelines on exactly which and how much land must be redistributed.*

*The government bandies about merely with percentages without being specific, saying that it wants "30% of ALL agricultural land redistributed by 2014.*

*The Agri-BEE framework also wants an extra 20% of all high-potential agricultural land "leased to black farmers by 2014". This means that a full 50% of the present commercial farm land would be lost. However commercial farmers don't know which land sites the government is talking about and exactly how much agricultural land is actually still viable enough to do this with anyway.
That fact is a very far cry from the ANC's claim in 2004 that 'whites still own 87% of South Africa's land'. 
It's important to note that only 0.79% was being cropped permanently in 2004 and that the total capacity for arable land is only 12.13% for all of South Africa - and that includes large areas of marginal land such as the semi-arid Karoo and Northern Cape.  And of South Africa's very arid total land surface, only 3 % has "permanent high-agricultural potential" where farmers could always produce excess food productively.
All these above-mentioned facts are a very far cry from the ANC's grossly inaccurate but persistent claims that '87% of the land is owned by white farmers"...*

Besides the controversy on who had lived on which land before White farmers started farming on the land, the land evaluation has also been complicated as the land has been improved by the White farmers, as summed up in the following statement:

*‎"This is obviously a very difficult and complex problem and starting from the premise that culturally black South Africans were not farmers but herders, makes it even harder to deal with. Evaluation is equally difficult because it has to account for the centuries of investment both of life and finance into the creation of land into a viable resource. That the Government gives no attention to the land it owns in a custodial capacity and is not developed appropriately is very strange. If White farmers tore down their fences, homes and farm buildings and left the land as they found it, would it still have the same attraction? "*

**(v) The African National Congress is hoarding most of the land taken for land redistribution for itself and uses it for speculation.**

Land speculation by the government took place before 1994, and has continued unabated. To point we refer to a media article of 2004 as follows:
*It is important to note that in 1991/92, a full 25-million hectares of South Africa's total land surface of 1,219,912 square kilometers (about twice the size of Texas) was actually owned by the central State - and that much of this land is being speculated with by government officials. This State-owned land is in addition to the 15,7-million hectares of the former homelands and trust lands which were also taken over by the central State in 1994. This fact was determined in government-funded research for the national agriculture department in 2001.
Prof. Frans Swanepoel was in charge of this research programme as director of research development at the University of the Free State. The rest of the team members were Agnes Nyamande-Pitso, Prof. Edward Nesamvuni, Almero de Lange and Aldo Stroebel. Of this 25-million hectares of state-land, (i.e. excluding the homelands) only about 9-million is being used for non-agricultural purposes such as the military and national parks. (\*The rest seems to be for the most part, disused and fallow land sites in urban areas, such as former railway properties -- and much of it is being widely speculated with by government officials who run the state-company PROPNET. Recent objections about this were raised by the ANC-affiliated evangelical activists' group Jubilee-2000 in East London, chaired by Berend Schuitema.)
State-land farming is mostly communal, undertaken primarily in the former independent homelands it was found -- a total of 15,5 million hectares, plus the  1,2-m hectares which had been held in trust for homeland consolidation prior to 1994.
The agricultural department's own researchers urge that especially the trust-land owned by the State be urgently redistributed to create a new generation of commercial black farming entrepreneurs. The Eastern Cape, pressed by Jubilee-2000's activism, has started such a programme recently.*

*The big question in the commercial farming community is whether the former black homelands -- now owned by the central government -- were actually included in the government's 30% "redistribution target" or not. According to the Agri-BEE framework 30% of all agricultural land must be occupied by black farmers by 2014. If the former homelands, already occupied by black families who are mainly eking out a subsistence living, are kept out of this equation, this would mean that a full 23-million hectares of commercial farm land would be lost to commercial agriculture under the land-redistribution programme (remember: 77-million hectares was owned by 66,000 'white' farmers in 1991/92). If the former homelands are included in the Agri-BEE target, the acreage to be transferred from commercial white farmers would however be 11 million hectares.
The agricultural department's researchers painted a rosy Arcadian picture of what they wanted to achieve: "so that about every third farm in any farming region one drove through, would be owned by blacks."*

This report also pointed out that in South Africa's communal areas, black farmers owned 38% of the country's total cattle-stock and that a full one-third of South Africa's tea production came from the former homeland-region in the Lusikisiki-area. (The latter is no longer applicable: the Sapekoe tea company which produces 90% of all of the country's 10-million tons of tea and buys up large quantities from black small-farmers, announced on the 3rd of October 2004, that it was closing down because of the government's land-reform policies.  A full 10,000 Sapekoe workers were immediately put on unpaid leave).6

Presently, the situation on land redistribution still does not favour the economy of the country, nor does it offer justice to the past. The Department of Rural Development and Land Reform's 2010/11 annual report has revealed that 85.6% of land purchased from land-owners for the purposes of land reform has been transferred to land claimants under leasehold, while only 14.4% of claimants have been awarded full ownership rights.

According to the annual report, a total of 322 844.9931 hectares of land was transferred to beneficiaries in the 2010/11 financial year. The majority of the land- 276 396.6839 hectares - was registered in the name of the state. Just 46 448.3038 was returned to land claimants with full ownership.

This discrepancy highlights the government's skewed approach to land reform. Instead of land claimants being granted full ownership of their land, which would allow them to borrow against their assets in order to implement changes to their businesses in the case of commercial operations, or simply to upgrade their property if it is residential, the vast majority of claimants are merely tenants on state-owned land.

Not only does this prevent the land from being used as loan collateral, but it acts as a disincentive for claimants to invest in the land's productive capacity. Without the freedom and stability to invest in their properties, claimants are consigned to the status of tenants, and have no incentive to make improvements to the land they have acquired since they bear neither the risk nor the reward associated with running a successful business. See information as drawn from Footnote 2 - Statement issued by Lindiwe Mazibuko MP, DA Shadow Minister of Land Reform and Rural Development, 29 September 2011.

**(vi) Land redistribution grants are fraudulently obtained by government officials.**

Land redistribution grants worth many millions are fraudulently obtained by government officials. To point we refer to Court papers filed with regard to four farms worth more than R52m being forfeited and several officials held for alleged fraud and corruption in Footnote 3 – Land Reform Funds Stolen by the ANC government

**(vii) The government calls for land to be handed to Blacks who are not able to farm**

**a) There is no encouragement to develop undeveloped land**

Although less than 1% of South Africa’s arable land is under irrigation, there is no encouragement by the African national Congress for this land to be developed. In fact, the Landbank which has been established with state money set aside to help farmers, has been stolen by government officials.

**b) Farm land is not utilized properly**

Large portions of SA's communal farming areas also are very under-utilized: they have always had great agricultural potential but are not being exploited, the report has found.
In most of the communal farming areas (in the former homelands) ...Farmers often plow and replow the same soil without the proper implements, creating an impenetrable layer of land which makes dryland-maize production impossible. "Large portions of (former homelands) which used to be very fertile for crop-production are now not farmed at all. "The reasons for this are a shortage of labour because family members migrate to work far from home; or the high expense of production or lack of access to mechanization."

Provincial agricultural departments especially in the Eastern Cape, Limpopo, KZN and North West spend large portions of their budgets and manpower on promoting agricultural production in communal areas.
However new approaches about land-use in the communal sector certainly are needed, the report has urged. It points to several cooperative projects in Limpopo province between commercial and communal farming communities to try and solve the problem of underproduction in the former homelands and trust areas.
Many agricultural officials doubt such a concept would work, however - claiming that that there "aren't too many non-farmers who are farming 'opportunistically' on communal land.
Other officials felt that communal models for Black Economic Empowerment did not work in agriculture because of the opposing interests of both parties. "There should be focus on individual empowerment instead of communal to assure the establishment of a black farming class," these officials had recommended.

* South Africa's agricultural potential must also be taken into strong consideration when black economic empowerment is brought into agriculture. The Agri-BEE framework also wants a full 20% of all high-potential agricultural land "leased to black farmers by 2014".
This is a requirement in ADDITION to the 30% which has to be handed over to black farmers.

However according to the internationally-accepted classification system of land surfaces, (Klingbiel & Montgomery) land is divided into eight classes of usage ability. This takes important factors into consideration such as land erosion, climate, and the physical landscape restrictions. According to this system, a total of 95% of South Africa's total land surface suffers from severe agricultural restrictions as far as precipitation, terrain and soil type are concerned. While some 21% (about one-fifth) of the country's surface is viewed as officially "reasonably suitable for agriculture", a full 13% is only marginal land just barely suitable for only limited agricultural activities such as in the Karoo and the Northern Cape.7

**c) African land beneficiaries of land claims sell the land off**

Black farmers have resold nearly 30 per cent of the white farmland bought for them by the government, very often back to White farmers. When viewing ownership of farmland, it appears that Whites are not prepared to part with the land, which is not true. We place a media article relating to this in Footnote 4 - Cashing in on once White-owned farmland.

**d) Redistributed farms fail.**

Studies of the South African model have shown that as many as 90 per cent of the new black-run farms fail because the new owners do not have the experience of running a large enterprise. To point, we discuss the Magwa tea Farm, which was the largest in South Africa that has failed since it was taken for land distribution in Footnote 5 – Tea Farm destroyed through land redistribution.

**Political Scandals of the African National Congress Government**

Scandals and the cover-up of scandals created by the African National Congress government would never be accepted in democratic societies internationally. Such scandals have been revealed regularly since the inauguration of the African National Congress as government for South Africa, and have been an embarrassment to their members who voted them into power.

On the 16th of June 2001, Thabo Mbeki in his position of the South African President declared on national television that the behaviour of Winnie Mandela would not be accepted in any democratic society. However, his words should pertain to most of the African National Congress cabinet ministers, including the presidents.

**The African National Congress has placed criminals in leadership positions.**

Criminals in leadership positions have taken the lives of innocent people living inside South Africa.

As the Weekly Mail pointed out, several high-ranking torturers and killers continued to work in the African National Congress security department which operated out of the party headquarters in Shell House, Johannesburg. These included Nelson Mandela's personal bodyguard, MB Mavuso (Umkhonto traveling name 'Jomo'), a former guard at Quatro who is 'widely alleged to have been directly involved in torture'.

Another torturer who worked in the African National Congress headquarters, had the travelling name Sizwe Mkhonto - a former student at the Moscow Party Institution, who had been trained in intelligence in East Germany and the USSR, and was camp commander at Quatro for several years, starting while still in his teens. This brutalized youth called the principal leader of the mutiny, Ephraim Nkondo, from his cell in Quatro on Saturday 26 May 1984. This was shortly after the crushing of the mutiny in Pango camp. Nkondo was seen the same day being pulled through the camp with a rope around his neck.8 The next day he was found dead in his cell, with a rope around his neck. Without strict accounting for the torture and murder of individuals such as Nkondo, the ANC continues to condone the vicious murders of South Africans by its silence, if not by open instigation through antagonistic songs such as ‘Shoot the Boer’.

**a) Drugs related leadership**

Since 1992, the National Intelligence Agency in South Africa has made several investigations with regard to the illegal drug industry in South Africa. They have discovered that prominent leaders within the African National Congress government have been guilty of the misuse of banned substances and the smuggling thereof. This included prominent members such as Thabo Mbeki, Cyril Ramaphosa, Mathews Phosa, Tokyo Sexwale, Joe Modise and Irvan Khoza. Many of these members were exposed during Operation Jericho, in which Vicky Kwaswame was one of the main suspects.

The inability of the African National Congress to eradicate the illegal drug industry in South Africa has led to communities forming gangs which carry out street justice. Street justice itself turns into crime and inhumane behaviour as street bombs and shootings become the order of the day, wherein innocent bystanders and children get killed. The government should be held accountable for not bringing safety and peace in these gangster controlled areas. Point to prove we refer to a recent news article written about PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs) in Footnote 6 – Pagad boss held by cops.

**ARMS DEALS**

The protection of a country should not be treated as an excuse for its leaders to enrich themselves at the cost of the tax payers.

**a) The Weapon Transaction Scandal**

Transactions made by the African National Congress as government of South Africa concerning the purchase of armaments have created huge scandals. What is lesser known, is that much of these transactions were masterminded by African National Congress leadership members who were Apartheid spies. The connection between one of the Weapon Transaction masterminds, Joe Modise, and former NP prime minister PW de Klerk, is discussed in Footnote 7 – Joe Modise, ANC leader and NP spy.

**Thabo Mbeki**

In 1999, while the country was at peace with the rest of the world, Thabo Mbeki committed high treason against South Africa when he saddled the country with a debt of more than R60 billion through irregular arms transactions, and his cabinet protected him. The irregularities which took place while his cabinet protected him, makes them guilty as co-workers to the illegal weapons transaction of Mbeki.

**Minister Lekota**

Prominent government officials received money to influence their decisions in handling this matter. Minister Lekota forced Dr. Richard Young to discard classified documentation regarding this scandal, by withholding his permission for Young to make public the proof he had regarding corruption in this weapons business deal headed by Mbeki. The excuse Lekota gave for withholding his permission was that the documentation held by Young could leak out confidential state information to other countries. However, other countries had already been aware of the irregularities during the weapons transaction of Mbeki. A German Intelligence group reported that the German government supported this weapons transaction and its irregularities, and covered up information leaks to the South African public.

**The Vuvani Company, General Lambert Moloi and Joe Modise**

To note that long before the suspicions of irregularities were aroused, a German agent mentioned that the Vuvani Company should be investigated, and that Vuvani was used to channel money to government officials in South Africa. General Lambert Moloi, son-in-law of Joe Modise, was one of the Vuvani directors.

**The corruption trail from British Aerospace, Marwol Investments, Charles van Staden, South African Reserve Bank, Ukhozi Aerospace, Vuvani, Joe Modise to Thabo Mbeki.**

Money from British Aerospace (which is involved with MI6) was paid into the bank account of Marwol Investments in the Netherlands. From there, Charles van Staden handled transfer of these funds through the South African Reserve Bank to Ukhozi Aerospace, from where it was channeled to Vuvani. From Vuvani, money was paid over to Joe Modise, before it reached Thabo Mbeki. Hereby, Thabo Mbeki was receiving money from British Intelligence Services.

**Jean-Ives Ollivier**

The relationship between Thabo Mbeki and Jean-Ives Ollivier is significant when considering the connection between Ollivier and the French Intelligence Services, as well as Thompson CSF, which is well documented.

Ollivier assisted Mbeki during his presidency in South Africa with his image in French speaking countries. Thompson CSF (which is found in France and South Africa) was reputedly used by the French Intelligence services for their operations.

Ollivier also had a close relationship with Alfred Servan, who was the managing director of Elf. The president of Elf was Loik le Floch at the time Dumas, who was the French minister of the Exterior, and Alfred Servan were involved in an arms deal scandal with Taiwan.

Servan and Ollivier were closely involved with providing arms deals to South Africa.

Other friends of Ollivier included the son of Francois Mitterrand, who spent Xmas of 2000 in jail because he had smuggled weapons to Angola. A long lasting relationship between Oliver and Shabier Shaik had also started in Lebone.

Sipiwe Nyanda, who took Jean-Ives to Thabo Mbeki, admitted receiving a Mercedes Benz for his trouble. Tony Yengeni, who was chief whip of the African National Congress, had also received cars. Yengeni received two Mercedes Benz of which he gave one to Wivine Ndlandu Kavidi, a Congolese-Brazzaville woman with Jean-Piere Oba, also from the Congolese-Brazzaville. Oba organized Congolese-Brazzaville passports for Jean-Ives Ollivier and his partner, Dominique Nasplezez.

**Media gag on Arms transactions for the African National Congress in government**

The importance of the secrecy involved with the Arms deals of the African National Congress in government, becomes pertinent when we consider the main role players in these Arms deals.

* **Mac Maharaj**

Mac Sathyandranath Ragunanan Maharaj, known as Mac Maharaj, Presidential Spokesperson, played a key role in the negotiation process to South Africa's first democratic elections, and was joint secretary in 1994 of the Transitional Executive Council.

 A political activist since the early 1950’s, he was a member of the African National Congress' armed wing Umkhonto weSizwe. Maharaj was elected to the African National Congress national executive committee at the 1985 Kabwe Conference. He served on the African National Congress National Executive Committee and was a member of the South African Communist Party (SACP)’s political bureau and central committee.

**Mac Maharaj, with reference to Operation Vula**

Not only has Mac Maharaj kept Operation Vula operational, even after the reason for its establishment ended in 1994, when governance of South Africa was handed over to the ANC/SACP alliance, but he has been stocking it with arms, even though South Africa is not at war.

**Gagging of news media on secret Arms deals**

The Mail & Guardian had been following the Arms transactions closely since 1999. However, they have been gagged by government to expose evidence which they believe would prove that Mac Maharaj was involved with corruption. In Footnote 8 we offer an article explaining the situation written by Mail & Guardian entitled “Why we were censored, and what we plan to do.”

We quote the response of the international editor from the website called Censorbugbear on the gagging of Mail & Guardian with regard to the Arms Deal as a flagrant disregard of the South African Constitution by the African national Congress, in which the article refers to the role played by Mac Maharaj, in his position of spokesman for the president of South Africa, as follows:

*“Today the Mail and Guardian found out what the ANC thinks of the constitution of South Africa…Nothing.
They wipe their backsides with the constitution. They feel nothing for freedom of speech or the public's interest. As long as they can steal taxpayer’s money and nobody complains all is OK.
Ultra scumbag and Marxist terrorist Mac Maharaj censored them.
Big Mac was the commander and master brain of the dreadful “Operation Vula” during the 1980’s when the ANC shifted the focus of their terrorist bombing from 20% to 80% civilian targets.
He is directly responsible for the coldblooded murder of thousands of innocent men, women and children of all races. He thought nothing of it to plant bombs in shopping centers, fast food restaurants, bars, golf clubs and even hospitals. And what for? All so he and his scumbag terrorist jailbird buddies in the ANC could steal the taxpayers blind in among many others, the now infamous arms deal of 1999.
Maharaj (former minister of transport) was one of the main brains involved in this arms deal along with Joe Modise (former minister of defense), President Jacob Zuma, his financial planner and convicted fraudster, Shabir Shaik, and some others.
After the arms deal corruption inquiry died down around 2003, Mac Maharaj kept a low profile and became the president’s spokesperson.
The Mail and Guardian found out that Maharaj lied under oath to the Scorpions (SA version of the FBI, now known as the Hawks) and to prove this they had to quote certain transcripts.
Maharaj claimed that they obtained the info illegally, got a court order and threatened the M&G editor with 15 years in prison.
The questions thus far are:
1) If he did nothing illegal and the bribe money he received was innocent, why did he lie under oath?
2) If he did nothing illegal, what is he trying to hide by gagging the newspaper*

*The ANC is currently attempting to push the “protection of information bill” through parliament that will see the likes of Nic Dawes (M&G editor) jailed for 25 years if they reveal any of the corruption scandals of the thieving ANC bastards.
Outside of Dawes’ office hangs a picture of one of their newspapers from 1986 at the height of the ANC terrorist onslaught against the people of South Africa, their “People’s War” and Operation Vula, when the Apartheid Government declared a state of emergency and censored the M&G.”*

**OPERATION VULA**

`Operation Vul'indlela', more widely known as `Operation Vula', compiled the attack on the Union of South Africa from various aspects at the same time, which pushed the economy of the country to near destruction, was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people both inside and outside the South African borders, and threatened total collapse for the infrastructure of the country.

To realize the enormity of the role Operation Vula played can explain all the avenues it encompassed, and is still encompassing today in South Africa. We find that the same leadership in Operation Vula was carried over to govern South Africa.

Operation Vula can be divided into three sections, namely the setting up of communications from the top leadership to the men on the ground, the attack on the people who lived along the borders of South Africa, and the attack on the lives of the people who lived inside South Africa. These attacks were both physically and economically in an attempt to collapse the infrastructure of South Africa, and bring about the Communist system of governance.

At the time the National party handed over governance to the ANC/SACP, it was on the condition that these attacks should end. A detour was therefore taken to introduce a stepping stone of Socialism into governance to serve as a bridge between Democracy and Communism. The blatant attacks on the Union were softened to undercurrent and underground attacks on both the economy and lives of South Africans. The movement is still carried forward as the National Democratic Revolution as the African National Congress is conducting governance in South Africa, based on the same principles it used during its ‘Liberation struggle’ from the Union of South Africa through Operation Vula. Immense funds are gathered and misused for the personal pleasures of the leaders, and control on the nation is enforced through military action.

**Description of Operation Vula by Connie Braam**

Connie Braam was directly involved with founding Operation Vula. From her report we ascertain that Operation Vula was the following:

* An operation to smuggle freedom fighters into South Africa
* It provided direct communication channels between the freedom fighter leaders
* It was funded by rich Jews
* Vula ensured unity between the ANC members before they returned from exile.

**The present upkeep of Operation Vula by Mac Maharaj from the African National Congress**

The website of Operation Vula is presently open and updated by Mac Sathyandranath Ragunanan Maharaj, known as Mac Maharaj, Presidential Spokesperson.

**The Secret World of Operation Vula**

In a book called ‘Shades of Difference; Mac Maharaj and the Struggle for South Africa’, Padraig O'Malley wrote extensively about Operation Vula (Opening the Way), on which the Sunday Independent wrote an article which is provided in Footnote 9 – Secret world of Operation Vula. It is clear that Operation Vula became an underground within the African National Congress itself.

Vula was controversial because it was secret even inside the African National Congress: the wider African National Congress leadership - including Thabo Mbeki - knew nothing about it. The Vula Boys would later claim their scheme had been sanctioned by party president Oliver Thambo, who by then was too ill to confirm or deny this. That gap between the groups appears to have persisted.

**The Vula Boys versus the Mbeki Boys**

The ‘Vula Boys’ are the collection of Communists and (mostly Natal) African National Congress intelligence operatives who set up Operation Vula, the secret pre-1990 programme to develop the leadership and financial networks inside South Africa needed to launch a violent revolution.

Vula was led by Mac Maharaj (later made Minister of Transport by Mandela - but fired by Mbeki). It included Siphiwe Nyanda (later Defense Force Chief), Ronnie Kasrils (moved by Mbeki from Defense to Water Affairs), Mo Shaik (demoted from national intelligence coordinator to ambassador in Morocco), and Shaik’s brother Shabir. President Jacob Zuma (then still ANC intelligence chief) was apparently also within the Vula network and is widely perceived to be the closest the group has to a protector in government. (Shabir Shaik is said still to handle his personal affairs.)

It is of importance to notice how prominent Vula Boys who were removed from prominent power positions under the rule of President Mbeki returned to positions of power under the Zuma administration. Two to mention, is Mac Maharaj and Ronnie Kasrils. Mac Maharaj has been a prominent role player in keeping Operation Vula adrift. Both President Zuma and Ronnie Kasrils served within the intelligence structures of Operation Vula.

**Operation Vula militated peace initiatives after the unbanning of the against African National Congress in 1990**

Operation Vula militated against another initiative within the African National Congress, namely the Mbeki-led efforts at dialogue with the apartheid state.

Vula continued its secret operations following the African National Congress's unbanning in 1990, leading to increasing conflict between Vula operatives and the African National Congress leadership about strategy and the direction of negotiations. "The views of the Vula comrades were largely ignored”, the group's former communications man Tim Jenkin wrote in a 1995.

The level of conflict was such that in February 1990, Maharaj quit the African National Congress.

Mandela - just released from prison - persuaded him to retract his resignation, but in June 1990, Vula's cover was blown following the arrest in Natal of two of its operatives, Charles Ndaba and Mbuso Shabalala - both later murdered by security police, purportedly to prevent the exposure of Ndaba as a police agent.

In the midst of negotiations, Mbeki was confronted by the Nationalist negotiators with evidence of a secret African National Congress unit of which he had been unaware. FW de Klerk charged the African National Congress with secretly plotting insurrection while negotiating a settlement.

**The Vula Boys and corrupt Arms Deals**

We refer to an article by Noseweek with regard to the position Thabo Mbeki found himself in as leader of the African National Congress at the time the Arms Deal scandal broke out while he was also President of South Africa as follows:

“What are we to make of the arrest of 'Tony Yengeni, Parliament's former defense committee chairman, and the police raids on the home and offices of Shabir Shaik, MD of armaments company ADS and brother of South Africa's arms procurement chief, Chippy Shaik? What are the prospects that the official investigations of alleged irregularities in the government's (now R6O billion-plus) arms procurement programme will "go all the way"?

The current situation regarding South Africa’s arms purchases is eerily echoed in a 1998 report by Washington Post correspondent David Ignatius about a similar arms scandal that raged in France and continues to haunt French politics.

A large bomb is ticking away in the midst of French political life - a scandal that could explode with tremendous force or, as is often the case in France, be quietly defused and buried..."

In 1998, a corruption investigation of judge Eva Joly turned really nasty when she found evidence that French defense giant Thomson-CSF had acquired former foreign minister Dumas' mistress's services as a lobbyist - just when the company needed government approval for a $2.5b deal to supply frigates to Taiwan. Dumas had been a key opponent of the deal, but within a year it was approved - without any explanation.

"Chirac must decide soon," wrote Ignatius, "whether to encourage an escalation of the judicial probe (to include the frigate deal) - and, figuratively speaking, bring down the pillars of the temple - or instead try to contain the investigation."

Will President Thabo Mbeki allow the investigation to go the whole way, risking bringing down the pillars of the temple, or will he seek to limit the enquiry to small-time corruption involving secondary contracts only? As we ask it, we know it's a foolish question. But let's have a closer look anyway at the situation, both current and historical, and see if our suspicions are correct.

Arms-deals investigators will quickly have discovered that those within the ANC most interested in the deals can be divided roughly into two competing groups: the Vula Boys and Thabo's Boys.

While both are equally anxious to maintain their grip on power and their cut of the arms deal profits, the difference between them could just influence who will be sacrificed and who will be saved in the arms-deal investigations.

Some sources believe Mbeki was so angry that, in effect, he allowed the Vula network to be hung out to dry. Maharaj and others were arrested and released on bail only after the Pretoria agreement with De Klerk had already been signed. Mbeki allowed these key hawks within the ANC to be side-lined.

In mid- December 1990 Maharaj again "retired" from the ANC. Again Mandela brought him back - into the Cabinet.

**The Vula Boys in Government**

The Vula Boys were positioned strategically throughout state structures.

The Shaik brothers' mentor, stalwart Communist academic Pravin Gordhan was placed to head the South African Revenue Service, where he was been joined by his old comrades Vuso Shabalala (Customs), Ivan Pillay (Special Investigations) and Sirish Soni.

Solly Shoke became mission director for the SANDF.

Raymond Lalla was placed as a senior official in police intelligence.

Mpho Scott was made an MP who appeared to be somewhere at the centre of just about every major empowerment deal - including the arms deal.

a) **Murder Plots**

The repeated surfacing of Vula members in alleged plots is no coincidence. To point, the report which Georg Meiring (then SANDF head) presented to President Mandela in which it was alleged that Meiring's 2IC (Siphiwe Nyanda) was plotting with African National Congress radicals against the government. Although later claimed to be a hoax, it does not seem feasible that a man as serious as Meiring would find any benefit from creating hoaxes. Maharaj's name has also been floated by African National Congress sources in connection with bizarre Mbeki plot allegations. Clearly ideological issues were involved in the conflict.

Maharaj, Gordhan and company were associated with the African National Congress’s left wing, which included much of the white left, and was seen as sympathetic to ex-trade unionist Cyril Ramaphosa. At least two of the Shaik brothers privately expressed concern at the "crude Africanism" espoused by some of Mbeki's acolytes.

**b) Arms deal inquiries**

It is said that, in the course of their arms-deal inquiry, tile Scorpions have taken an interest in the relationship between Maharaj, Gordhan, Zuma and the Shaiks.

* **Ronnie Kasrils**

Ronnie Kasrils sued several newspapers for suggesting that the Scorpions were at one stage investigating him.

**The link between Ronnie Kasrils and President Zuma in Operation Vula**

The link between Kasrils and the present South African President Zuma goes back to the establishment of Operation Vula, where both had been key role players as head of Intelligence.

**Ronnie Kasrils planned greater destabilization of South Africa by using the work force of the country, based on the Bolshevik Revolution strategy**

Although the MK attacks against South Africans increased substantially between 1981 and 1986, their effectiveness decreased as the South African Defense Force and Security became more effective.

The land mine campaign to destabilize the border areas had achieved little more than increased security force deployments and vigilance in these areas and cause neighboring state's acute embarrassment. The ANC's tactical influence over street committees and other rudimentary forms of alternative government which emerged to replace displaced official local government structures was largely rhetorical. And the state was able to concentrate its forces and isolate, contain and re-establish control over areas of unrest with the use of only a fraction of its total capability.

As the high rate of MK infiltration continued in 1986, the number of guerilla attacks underwent a further increase, to a total of 231. A third of these attacks were against police personnel and stations, SA Defense Force personnel and state witnesses in political trials. But, while the total number of attacks for 1986 represented a 70% increase on the total for 1985, the rate of security force neutralizations of guerillas rose even more steeply - to 186, or a 500% increase on the previous year, as security forces improved their position. MK's success rate thus dropped from only 3 guerilla neutralizations for every 13 attacks in 1985 back to four guerilla neutralizations for every five attacks.

In 1986, police reported 76 instances in which hand grenades were detonated; they captured or recovered nearly seven times that many (530). The rate of capture of other ordinance was also high during 1986.

These casualties and losses indicate that, whereas the ANC and its MK cadres had been able to exploit a breakdown in security force control between late 1985 and early 1986, they were unable in that period to develop inside South Africa mechanisms of organization to protect their own personnel and military capacity. There had been no qualitative improvement in the ANC's capacity to locate an armed presence inside the country.

The emergency measures also appear to have helped reduce the number of incidents of popular political violence, or `unrest', according to police statistics. Whereas in 1985, there had been 16,396 incidents of `unrest in which murder or other illegal acts of violence were perpetrated', the figure dropped to 13,663 (down by 17%) in 1986. By 1987, the street insurrection was, effectively, at an end: the total number of incidents of unrest for the year dropped to 4,140 (down by 75% on 1985, or by 70% on 1986).

Kasrils blamed the ineffectiveness of Operation Vula on the inexperience of the MK cadres, which almost entirely consisted of former students or unemployed youth. Since early 1986, Kasrils talked of forming workers’ militias, based on the fact that there would be greater maturity of their members, and that workers' militias would project MK activity into the strategically important industrial zones. Kasrils, head of ANC military intelligence at the time, recalls how his thinking on this was influenced by the Bolsheviks' experience:

“Lenin and the Bolsheviks...learned...that what was required for discipline and greater efficacy was to organize factory-based combat forces. Those that emerged from the streets tended...to be led by anarchistic elements... It's out of the factories, then, that the combat forces of the Bolsheviks grew, of course side by side with the major Bolshevik armed forces which were those within the Czarist army. So, for us, a lesson of 1983-1986 [was] clearly to develop our underground and our combat forces within the factories, within the industrial zones, and not simply [to] confine it to the townships... “

**Operation Vula projects.**

The lives of people living inside South Africa depend on the extent to which Operation Vula continues. To understand the danger which Operation Vula presents, we need to look at how it operated before 1994, to be able to recognize its influence in South Africa today.

Operation Vula can be divided into three sections, namely the setting up of communications from the top leadership to the men on the ground, the attack on the people who lived along the borders of South Africa, and the attack on the lives of the people who lived inside South Africa. These attacks were both physically and economically in an attempt to collapse the infrastructure of South Africa, and bring about the Communist system of governance

In this section, we discus three pertinent operations masterminded by the Vula Boys, namely:

a) Operation Zikomo

b) Operation Butterfly

c) Operation Uhuru

**a) Operation Zikomo was used to destabilize township areas**

Operation Zikomo was a large-scale project in 1985 to infiltrate South Africa with MK soldiers. Ronnie Kasrils, then head of the MK intelligence, says its purpose was to inject `several hundred' combatants as `shock forces' in the township uprisings. They were to form a kind of officer class for township militants, providing them with leadership and training. Ivan Pillay, of operational political structures in Swaziland, says an average combatant put across the border into South Africa, sent home to integrate themselves with the communities in defense committees, street committees, and such like, had between R1000 and R2000, an AK machine gun and 12 hand grenades, notably the hand grenades were favored by Umkhonto we Sizwe chief of staff Joe Slovo.

Operation Zikomo had important short-term effects. As state security forces lost control over some townships in 1985, and for as long as the state's sources of intelligence in those areas dried up, the newly-infiltrated guerillas survived. Insurgent armed activity leapt to new levels in the period from June 1985. Whereas there had been 30 attacks in the five months to May, there were 31 in June alone and 75 more between July and December - a total of 136 attacks for the year, more than double the number in any previous year. Over the year, the state killed or captured a mere 31 African National Congress guerillas, which meant a ratio of three guerillas captured or killed for each 13 attacks - MK's best year and most favorable casualty rate ever.

**Death of the `Grenade Squads'**

The ANC considered Zikomo a success, regardless of the fate meted out to its MK `grenade squads'.

Rumors of the availability of `pineapples' [grenades] in a township would attract scores of young militants from surrounding areas. The ANC had little command and control over either these young militant grenade squads.

Young activists died in the process of attempting to prime or throw grenades, and others were seriously injured, some of them losing limbs. Suddenly, within the external mission, reports Saloojee, the grenade squad project - which senior ANC operational officials had once fought to control - became an embarrassment: `Everybody was taking cover - nobody wanted to accept responsibility to what was happening.'

**The South African civilians were victims of Operation Zikomo violence**

The ANC condemned a campaign at the time for a national convention led by Inkatha and the PFP.

In the seven-and-a-half months to 20 July 1985, 334 people died in political violence, at least 55% of them as a result of security force action. Of the dead, only seven were members of the security forces killed by township residents; none were killed by guerillas. In three months to July, 207 people died in political violence, the largest single number on the east Rand, which remained the centre of revolt.

The unrest-related death toll between 21 July 1985 and 31 December 1985 totaled 545 people, of whom at least 256 were township residents killed by security forces; and of 20 security forces who died, only one was reported killed by guerillas.

**The economic upheaval which resulted from Operation Zikomo**

In late July and August 1985, concern of instability in South Africa and pressures for disinvestment caused Chase Manhattan Bank to stop rolling over some US$500-million in loans to South Africa, choosing instead to recall credits as they became due, and to freeze all unused lines of credit. A number of Pretoria's other major commercial lenders, a cluster of whose loans were due for repayment, responded in similar vein. The Commission of the European Economic Community called for economic sanctions against South Africa; 10 EEC states withdrew their ambassadors from Pretoria; the French government unilaterally announced a ban on investment in South Africa; and the United States House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly in favour of sanctions against South Africa.

The Johannesburg Stock Exchange's response in the last week of July was described as a `bloodbath', as market capitalization dropped 9.5% and the rand's international value plunged 12%.

**b) `Operation Butterfly'**

Operation Butterfly consisted of two operational initiatives.

The first was a programme to develop an integrated political-military underground command structure in the greater Durban area; the other was a campaign to destabilize the border regions of South Africa through attacks on White farmers.

**Cross-border Line of Leadership Communication was set up from Durban**

A group of operational commanders based in Mozambique and Swaziland believed the area political committee (APC) plan drawn up in 1981 would create greater communication of instructions between operatives. They drew up a plan in early 1985, codenamed `Operation Butterfly' to build, in effect, an APC in Durban and called the leadership they envisaged for Durban a `regional committee or district committee'. The ANC underground in Durban still included the highly efficient network around Pravin Gordhan. There were other formal political units as well, though they were generally less well organized. One of the MK machineries in Durban falling under Swaziland was headed by Vijay Ramlakan.

The operation was to have a single line of command from exile to the district committee in Durban. This district committee would operate as a single unit jointly controlling all specialized operational activities in the Durban area. The specialist units falling under the district committee would include ones dealing with mass mobilization, propaganda, logistics, communications, security and intelligence.

**Destabilizing the Border Areas**

The strategy to destabilize South Africa's border regions was to use landmines to denude the border areas of white farmers. Attacks against white farmers were deemed justifiable because of their role in state border defense networks.

Joe Modise, head of military headquarters, commanded the operation from Zimbabwe, while Chris Hani, the MK political commissar, slipped into Botswana on a false passport just after Christmas 1985 to oversee operations from there. Between the 27th of November 1985 and the end of the year, seven landmine explosions were reported, mainly in the northern Transvaal, just across the borders of either Botswana or Zimbabwe, while police reported recovering another six landmines.

The landmine campaign continued through 1986, with the focus of attacks shifting towards the eastern Transvaal (where it was being fed by ANC operational machineries in Swaziland, then working under desperate pressure).

Most landmine attacks occurred in narrow belts of South African territory just over the borders of Botswana, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Evidently, the devices had been planted by units who spent no more than a few hours inside South Africa.

Security force deployments rose sharply after the first explosions; neighboring states were seriously embarrassed; moreover, poor intelligence available to MK units meant many casualties were not white farmers or security forces but, instead, blacks from the ANC's potential constituency.

**Destabilizing of South African borders cost the state treasury millions**

Between 1980 and 1990, the South African government had spent more than R200-million in border regions improving radio and telephone networks, tarring roads, enlarging commando forces, improving the security force presence and easing the debt burden on border farmers.

**c) Operation Uhuru**

To most people, the word Uhuru means ‘Freedom’. To many, this Freedom is believed would only be gained once all Whites living in South Africa are gone, if not voluntarily, then by death.

During the Truth and Reconciliation Tribunal, the African National Congress claimed that life threatening attacks on local farmers through Operation Vula had been disbanded shortly after negotiations with the National Party government began in 1990. This is more than 20 years ago.

Farmers live in rural areas, and attacks on their lives usually reach their local newspapers, but very seldom make national headlines. However, we need only to look at the headlines that do come through, to realize that the Vula Boys are still very much in operation in the farming areas, despite the denials of their masters. We need only look at social networks to see that the same modus operandi used during Operation Vula projects in attacks against White farmers by the MK soldiers while the African National Congress was banned, is still being used today.

To point, in any two week period on the IOL media internet site, attacks wherein the modus operandi are the same, can be found, of which we offer the following summaries from a single news media source, called IOL.

**TWO WEEK headline list from one source, *IOL***

* [96-year-old and gardener killed](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/96-year-old-and-gardener-killed-20121007)7 October 2012: A 96-year-old woman and her 55-year-old gardener were murdered in Witkoppies. Both victims were suffocated and strangled. The old woman was tied with shoe laces on her feet and arms before she was killed.
* [Man murdered in Charlize's old house](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Man-murdered-in-Charlizes-old-house-20121003) - News24

3 October 2012: Barry Newland, a 56 year old man, was tortured to death inside his home. A gang of 5 men gained access to the property by pretending to be interested in viewing a car he was selling. The domestic worker had let them in. The gardener and domestic worker were forced into another room and tied up. They tied Newland up when he got home. They put a plastic bag over his head and left him to suffocate. Police spokesperson Lieutenant Sekele said Newland was burnt with cigarettes and a clothes iron.

* [Bound son hears father shot in robbery](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Bound-son-hears-father-shot-in-robbery-20120925) - News24

25 September 2012: Fanie Ntjingila aged 22, and his cousin was standing outside their family home on a De Deur smallholding, when they were attacked by four armed men, who forced them inside and tied them up. His father aged 58 arrived on the scene and was shot, dragged into the house, and left to die.

* [Top athlete shot in farm attack](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Top-athlete-shot-in-farm-attack-20120925) - News24

25 September 2012: Corrie Harmse aged 46 was shot when she got out of her car at the farmhouse at about 20:00 on Friday night. The gang of about five made her and the rest of her family lie down in the house while they took some valuables. Harmse needed stitches to her head and the injured bone, muscles and tendons in her shoulder.

* [Lenasia imam brutally killed - report](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Lenasia-imam-brutally-killed-report-20120924) - News24

24 September 2012: The priest Molana Hassan was stabbed to death by a gang of four men who broke into his home and placed him, his wife and children in separate rooms.

* [Award-winning author attacked on farm](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Award-winning-author-attacked-on-farm-20120921) - News24

21 September 2012: Chris Barnard aged 73 was attacked by a gang of four men inside his home and tied to a left tied up to a chair and lying on the floor for almost 12 hours before he was freed by workers arriving for work the next morning.

**ONE YEAR headline list from one source, *IOL***

The list of attacks on the farmers’ lives carries on steadily since 1992. To point, IOL internet news media between February 2012 and February 2011, in the section ‘articles relating to farm attacks’ display the following headlines:

* [Farmer beaten, tied to tree then shot](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmer-beaten-tied-to-tree-then-shot-20120131)

2012-02-22

Farm murders should be declared a priority crime in view of a rise in the number of farm attacks this year, the Freedom Front Plus says.

* [Dog frees attacked farmer’s wife](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Dog-frees-attacked-farmers-wife-20120221)

2012-02-21

A boerboel helped untie a farmer's wife after she was tied up and her husband shot dead in a farm attack in Fochville in the North West.

* [DA: Govt failing farmers](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/DA-Govt-failing-farmers-20120221)

2012-02-21

Farmer deaths are a result of government ignoring its responsibility towards the safety of rural citizens, the Democratic Alliance says.

* [North West farmer shot dead](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/North-West-farmer-shot-dead-20120220)

2012-02-20

A Buffelshoek farmer has been shot dead and his wife assaulted by five men who overpowered them while they were milking their cows, North West police say.

* [Female farmer stabbed 10 times](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Female-farmer-stabbed-10-times-20120216)

2012-02-16

A female farmer, who was attacked in her farmhouse and stabbed repeatedly, has complained about the police's handling of the incident.

* [2 in court for murder of Brits pensioner](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/2-in-court-for-murder-of-Brits-pensioner-20120130)

2012-01-31

Two men, one of them aged 19, have appeared in court charged with murdering a pensioner and assaulting his wife on a plot outside Brits, police say.

* [Farmer beaten, tied to tree then shot](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmer-beaten-tied-to-tree-then-shot-20120131)

2012-01-31

A 77-year-old farmer who was murdered over the weekend was badly assaulted, tied to a tree and then shot dead, North West police say.

* [North West farmer shot in the head](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/North-West-farmer-shot-in-the-face-20120130)

2012-01-30

A 77-year-old farmer has been shot dead at his home in Stella, near Vryburg, North West police say.

* [Farmer shot dead while changing tyre](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmer-shot-dead-while-changing-tyre-20120113)
* [Man kills robber armed with BB gun](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Man-kills-robber-armed-with-BB-gun-20120127)

2012-01-27

A 70-year-old Mpumalanga pensioner, who heard voices outside his house, has shot dead a robber as he tried to gain entry into his house with what turned out to be a plastic air gun.

* [North West farmer killed, family assaulted](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/North-West-farmer-killed-family-assaulted-20120114)

2012-01-14

A North West farmer in his fifties has been killed and members of his family assaulted during a robbery at Ventersdorp, police say.

* [Namibian held over Vredendal farm attack](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Namibian-held-over-Vredendal-farm-attack-20111127)

2011-11-27

A Namibian man has been arrested in connection with a farm attack on an elderly couple in Vredendal in the Western Cape.

* [Elderly couple attacked with screwdrivers](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Elderly-couple-attacked-with-screwdrivers-20111125)
* [Grabouw attackers linked to more crime](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Grabouw-attackers-linked-to-more-crime-20111126)
* [Farmer assaulted with axe, steel pipe](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmer-assaulted-with-axe-steel-pipe-20111118)

2011-11-18

A farmer is in a serious condition after he and his fiancée were assaulted with an axe and steel pipe at their house in the Western Cape.

* [Farmer shot dead near Lesotho border](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmer-shot-dead-near-Lesotho-border-20111103)

2011-11-09

North West police are offering a reward for information about the Zimbabwean couple believed to have killed two parrot breeders on their Rustenburg smallholding last week.

* [Farmer shot dead near Lesotho border](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmer-shot-dead-near-Lesotho-border-20111103)

2011-11-03

A Free State farm manager has been killed and his brother seriously wounded by attackers who shot at them near the Lesotho border.

* [Farm murder: 10 suspects acquitted](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farm-murder-10-suspects-acquitted-20110928)

2011-09-28

A magistrate has slammed the police for a "can't care less" investigation which has seen 10 people accused of murder after a farm attack in the Free State being acquitted.

* [Cigarette stub sinks dairy farm killer](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Cigarette-stub-sinks-dairy-farm-killer-20110620)
* [Words can trigger genocide - Malema judge](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Words-can-trigger-genocide-Malema-judge-20110912)
* [TAU SA 'vindicated' by hate speech ruling](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/TAU-SA-vindicated-by-hate-speech-ruling-20110912)
* [Cops track down alleged farm attacker](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Cops-track-down-alleged-farm-attacker-20110808)

2011-08-08

A man wanted for terrorising farming communities in Limpopo has been arrested after four months on the run, police say.

* [Attackers jailed for 'heinous' killing](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Attackers-jailed-for-heinous-killing-20110704)
* [Boys appear for Reitz farm attack inquiry](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Boys-appear-for-Reitz-farm-attack-inquiry-20110803)

2011-08-03

Two boys who allegedly murdered a farmer and buried him in a shallow grave have appeared for a preliminary inquiry at the Reitz Magistrate's Court.

* [Farmers' union condemns attack](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmers-union-condemns-attack-20110801)

2011-08-01

The farmers' union TAU SA has reiterated its call for a special investigative unit to investigate farm murders, following the discovery of a Free State farmer's body.

* [Free State farmer buried in shallow grave](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Free-State-farmer-buried-in-shallow-grave-20110801)
* [F State farmers lose R80m to stock theft](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/F-State-farmers-lose-R80m-to-stock-theft-20110630)
* [Life sentences for Lindley murders](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Life-sentences-for-Lindley-murders-20110728)

2011-07-28

Two of the men found guilty of killing a Free State farmer, his wife and their 2-year-old daughter, have been sentenced to three life terms each.

[Lindley murder accused 'conspired to kill'](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Lindley-murder-accused-conspired-to-kill-20110613)

[DNA evidence links Lindley suspects](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/DNA-evidence-links-Lindley-suspects-20110601)

All six accused in the Lindley farm attack had conspired to kill farmer Attie Potgieter and rob his family, the Free State High Court has heard.

* [Heidelberg killers' case postponed](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Heidelberg-killers-case-postponed-20110708)

2011-07-08

The case of two men accused of brutally killing elderly Heidelberg farm couple, Charlotte and Martiens Bekker, has been postponed to August.

* [Attackers jailed for 'heinous' killing](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Attackers-jailed-for-heinous-killing-20110704)

2011-07-04

Two KwaZulu-Natal farm attackers have been jailed for killing a domestic worker and a 7-year-old boy to avoid being identified.

* [Heidelberg farm killings: 2 held](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Heidelberg-farm-killings-2-held-20110704)

2011-07-04

Two men have been arrested in connection with the murder of an elderly couple on their Heidelberg farm. The couple were stabbed multiple times with the wife tied up as well.

* [Appeal of Escort farmer’s killer dismissed](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Appeal-of-Escort-farmers-killer-dismissed-20110624)
* [Elderly couple murdered on Gauteng farm](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Elderly-couple-murdered-on-Gauteng-farm-20110702)
* [Hello boss, dad told - then shot dead](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Hello-boss-dad-told-then-shot-dead-20110627)

2011-06-27

Two men have been arrested after a man was shot dead in his bed and his wife wounded on a smallholding in Muldersdrift. The men reportedly helped the couple move into their new home.

* [Farm murder suspect given R700 for drinks](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farm-murder-supect-given-R700-for-drinks-20110607)

2011-06-07

Lindley farm murder accused Tshekolo Letlala had been given "drinking money" of R700 the night of the killing, the Free State High Court has heard.

* [Grim details of Lindley murders emerge](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Grim-details-of-Lindley-murders-emerge-20110525)

One of six men accused of killing a Lindley farmer and his family has testified that they did not intend to kill the family, despite being armed.

The wife and daughter of a Lindley farmer, who is said to have been stabbed 151 times, had been cut and shot in the head and neck, court has heard.

* [Lindley farm murder was planned - report](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Lindley-farm-murder-was-planned-report-20110526)

2011-05-26

A man accused of murdering the Potgieter family in Lindley has admitted in the Free State High Court that it was planned, a report says.

* [Farmer stabbed 151 times - witness](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmer-stabbed-151-times-witness-20110525)

2011-05-25

Murdered Lindley farmer Adriaan Potgieter may have been tortured to death, the court has heard on the first day of the trial of six men.

* [Stop making radical statements: Agri SA](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Stop-making-radical-statements-Agri-SA-20110505)

2011-05-05

Political parties should refrain from making radical statements that could have a negative impact on certain communities, says Agri SA.

* [3 in court for farmer's murder](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/3-in-court-for-farmers-murder-20110503)

2011-05-03

Three men have appeared in the Ottosdal Magistrate's Court in connection with the murder of farmer André van der Merwe.

* [Murdered farmer named](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Murdered-farmer-named-20110501)
* [Farmer, family found shot dead](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmer-family-found-shot-dead-20110418)
* [Farmer killed, dragged behind bakkie](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmer-killed-dragged-behind-bakkie-20110501)
* [Group shocked at farm green lights ban](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Group-shocked-at-farm-green-lights-ban-20110428)

2011-04-28

Farmer’s organisation TAU-SA is in "shock and disbelief", after Limpopo police vowed to stop farm watch organisations from using "green lights" on their patrol vehicles.

* [FS farm unit catches trespassers](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/FS-farm-unit-catches-tresspassers-20101004)
* [AfriForum turns to UN over farm murders](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/AfriForum-turns-to-UN-over-farm-murders-20110404)

2011-04-04

AfriForum intends informing the UN Human Rights Council about the "alarming incidence" of farm murders in SA, as well as the hate speech lawsuit against ANC Youth League president Julius Malema.

* [Farmer stabbed during robbery](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmer-stabbed-during-robbery-20110309)
* [Court hears of brutal farm murder](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Court-hears-of-brutal-farm-murder-20110308)

2011-03-08

A Dutch immigrant couple was found in pools of blood after both were killed on their dairy farm two years ago, the North Gauteng High Court has heard.

* [Teen arrested for shooting farmer](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Teen-arrested-for-shooting-farmer-20111213)

2011-12-13

A 17-year-old youth has been arrested after he shot the farmer he worked for in the head after an argument, Western Cape police say.

* [Grabouw attackers linked to more crime](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Grabouw-attackers-linked-to-more-crime-20111126)
* [Elderly couple attacked with screwdrivers](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Elderly-couple-attacked-with-screwdrivers-20111125)

2011-11-25

An elderly couple has been attacked on their farm by men armed with knives and screwdrivers in Vredendal in the early hours of the morning.

* [Farmer assaulted with axe, steel pipe](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmer-assaulted-with-axe-steel-pipe-20111118)
* [Cop kills farm robber in North West](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Cop-kills-farm-robber-in-North-West-20111114)

2011-11-15

A suspected farm robber has been shot dead in a scuffle with a police officer near Moedville in North West.

* [Zim couple on the run after double murder](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Zimbabweans-on-the-run-after-couple-murdered-20111103)

2011-11-03

Police suspect the killers of an elderly couple who were murdered on their smallholding near Rustenburg, might be Zimbabweans.

* [Limpopo farmer shot in the head](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Limpopo-farmer-shot-in-the-head-20111013)

2011-10-13

A 50-year-old man has been murdered on his farm in Limpopo, police say.

* [Reitz farm attack accused denied bail](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Reitz-farm-attack-accused-denied-bail-20110810)

2011-08-10 20:13

Two teenagers accused of killing a farmer in Reitz, Free State, have been denied bail by the Bethlehem Magistrate's Court.

* [2 get life for stoning couple to death](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/2-get-life-for-stoning-couple-to-death-20110728)

2011-07-28

Two men have been sentenced to double life imprisonment for stoning a Limpopo couple to death on their farm in 2010, police say.

* [Boy survives night of terror](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Boy-survives-night-of-terror-20110720)

2011-07-20

A 9-year-old boy has told how two robbers threatened to shoot him if he left the house, after they had murdered his father and made off with money from the safe.

* [Man murdered on smallholding](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Hungarian-man-murdered-on-smallholding-20110719)
* [Elderly couple murdered on Gauteng farm](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Elderly-couple-murdered-on-Gauteng-farm-20110702)
* [6 killed on farm, suspects in 25 cases](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/6-killed-on-farm-suspects-in-25-cases-20110704)
* [Tip-off foils farm attack](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Tip-off-foils-farm-attack-20110704)

2011-07-04

A "shaken" farmer has told how he and his family were told to stay put in their houses as police and security guards lay in wait for a gang of robbers.

* [Farm shoot-out leaves 5 dead](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Six-killed-in-KZN-shoot-outs-20110704)

2011-07-04

Five men have been killed in a shoot-out with the police at a farm in Richmond, KwaZulu-Natal police say.

* [Woman killed, hair stuffed in mouth](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Woman-killed-hair-stuffed-in-mouth-20110703)
* [Escapees go on crime spree](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Escapees-go-on-crime-spree-20110612)
* [Woman axed to death in house](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Woman-axed-to-death-in-house-20110629)
* [Elderly couple murdered on Gauteng farm](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Elderly-couple-murdered-on-Gauteng-farm-20110702)

2011-07-02

An elderly couple has been murdered on their Heidelberg farm, say Gauteng police.

* [Arms display at hate speech trial 'dangerous'](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Arms-display-at-hate-speech-trial-dangerous-20110414)
* ['Boere is bad', says young Malema supporter](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Boere-is-bad-says-young-Malema-supporter-20110414)
* [Solidarity official's uncle dies in attack](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Solidarity-officials-uncle-dies-in-attack-20110209)
* [Farmers protest over family murder](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmers-protest-over-family-murder-20101206)
* [Appeal of Escort farmer’s killer dismissed](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Appeal-of-Escort-farmers-killer-dismissed-20110624)

2011-06-24 17:40

The killer of a well-known Estcourt farmer has failed to have his 24-year jail sentence reduced by a full bench of three judges in the KwaZulu-Natal High Court.

* [Couple murdered on smallholding](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Couple-murdered-on-smallholding-20110613)

2011-06-13

A man and his wife have been brutally killed on a Vereeniging smallholding, a week after he was turned away when trying to report the poisoning of his dogs and an apparent death threat.

* [Worker couldn't warn farmer, court hears](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Worker-couldnt-warn-farmer-court-hears-20110602)

2011-06-02

A Lindley farm worker was too far away from farmer Attie Potgieter to warn him about an imminent attack on his family, the Free State High Court has heard.

* [Widow, son tortured, robbed on farm](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Widow-son-tortured-robbed-on-farm-20110602)

2011-06-02

An elderly KZN farm owner and her son have been hospitalised after being beaten with knobkerries, asphyxiated and doused with boiling water.

* [Man, 84, beaten to death by robbers](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Man-84-beaten-to-death-by-robbers-20110526)
* [Shoot the boer ruling a 'blow to the ANC'](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Shoot-the-boer-ruling-a-blow-to-the-ANC-20110517)

2011-05-17

A ruling by a High Court judge that the lyrics "dubula ibhunu" (shoot the boer) is prima facie incitement to murder and has dealt a major blow to the ANC, organisations have said.

* ['Shoot the boer' incitement to murder - judge](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Shoot-the-boer-incitement-to-murder-judge-20110516)
* [Cosatu: Don't ban 'shoot the boer'](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Cosatu-Dont-ban-shoot-the-boer-20110415)
* [Hanekom: Let's talk about 'shoot the boer'](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Hanekom-Lets-talk-about-shoot-the-boer-20110415)
* [Gran, worker killed on smallholding](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Gran-worker-killed-on-smallholding-20110506)

2011-05-06

A Limpopo man has discovered the badly-beaten body of his mother in her bedroom, while the blood-covered body of an employee was found hidden near a river.

* [Agri SA: Rural farmers need protection](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Agri-SA-Rural-farmers-need-protection-20110504)

2011-05-04

A plan to protect rural farmers must be quickly implemented, an Agri SA branch has said following the brutal murder of a North West farmer.

* [Murdered farmer named](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Murdered-farmer-named-20110501)

2011-05-01

The Ottosdal farmer, who was shot and his body then dragged behind his bakkie for about 1.2km, has been named.

* [Malema witness 'too scared to testify'](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Malema-witness-too-scared-to-testify-20110415)

2011-04-15

A farm attack victim and witness in the hate speech case against ANC Youth League president Julius Malema, was "too afraid to testify", the Equality Court has heard.

* [Farmer stabbed during robbery](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmer-stabbed-during-robbery-20110309)

2011-03-10

A farmer has been stabbed at least eight times with a broken bottle during a struggle with two men who asked him to help them fix a puncture, North West police say.

* [Agri SA: Farm murders hurt economy](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Agri-SA-Farm-murders-hurt-economy-20110223)

2011-02-23

The wave of farm murders has triggered mounting concern within the community which is demanding immediate steps to stop it, farming body Agri SA has said.

* [Farmer shot dead for R700, cellphones](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmer-shot-dead-for-R700-cellphones-20110220)

2011-02-21

The robbers who allegedly shot and killed a Free State farmer and tied up his wife and domestic worker, made off with just R700 and some cellphones.

* [Farm murder blamed on government](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farm-murder-blamed-on-government-20110221)

2011-02-21

The widow of a murdered Stellenbosch farmer says she doesn't hold a grudge against his killers, but blames the government for not tackling poverty and unemployment.

* ['1 farm attack a day since Zuma address'](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/1-farm-attack-a-day-since-Zuma-address-20110219)

2011-02-19

There has been about one farm attack per day in SA since President Jacob Zuma's state of the nation address, says the Christian Democratic Party.

* [Farmer killed in shootout with ‘robbers](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmer-killed-in-shootout-with-robbers-20110218)’

2011-02-18

A Stellenbosch farmer has been shot dead after trying to defend his wife and two children in a shootout that left one intruder injured, Western Cape police say.

* [Grisly farm murder scene 'indescribable'](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Grisly-farm-murder-scene-indescribable-20110210)

2011-02-10

The son and sister of a man who was gruesomely stabbed to death along with his girlfriend in their North West smallholding have described how their bloody bodies were found.

* [Turn intention into action, Zuma told](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Turn-intention-into-action-Zuma-told-20110209)

2011-02-09

Solidarity general secretary Dirk Hermann has written an emotional letter to the president pleading with the government to turn their intentions on fighting crime into action.

* [Solidarity official's uncle dies in attack](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Solidarity-officials-uncle-dies-in-attack-20110209)

2011-02-09

The uncle of Solidarity's deputy general secretary, Dirk Hermann, has reportedly been killed in a farm attack in Limpopo - the 1 647th farmer to be killed since 1991, he says.

* [ANC condemns farm killing](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ANC-condemns-farm-killing-20110209)

2011-02-09

The ANC has condemned the murder of the 78-year-old uncle of Solidarity's deputy general secretary in a farm attack, calling for the police to "to leave no stone unturned"

* [Three held for Free State farm murder](http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Three-held-for-Free-State-farm-murder-20110220)

It is noticeable during murder trials that the majority of farm attacks are committed by gangs who are led by foreign nationals who have received military training, and are unknown to their victims, or had been employed by the victims for a very short period of time. Loyal farm workers of the victims are invariably also attacked, interrogated, and quite often, murdered.

By the extreme violence applied during these attacks on the non-suspecting victims, in comparison with the negligible amount of goods stolen – if any, it is clear that these attacks are perpetrated by a crazed mentality, the mentality common to a terrorist.

In their statements of the events during an attack, most victims say the following:

* The attacks took place when they least expected them;
* There were more than one attacker at the scene of the attack;
* Male victims were demobilized immediately, before any words were spoken;
* The victims were tied up before they were robbed;
* The attackers demanded money, guns, jewellery and the safe to be opened;
* The attackers followed a lead of command;
* The attackers had planned beforehand what they were going to do, ask for and look for;
* The eyes of the attackers were striking. Cold, lifeless, or full of hate.
* The attackers felt no pain;
* The victims were tortured after the attackers had taken what they wished for;
* Female victims were raped in front of their families;
* The vehicle of the victim was used to flee the scene, but found abandoned within a 10km radius;

It is clear that these attacks are well planned. The movements of the victims are observed over an extended time period before the attack takes place.

The habits of the victims are observed, as well as which people would be expected to be present at the scene of the attack. The more people expected, the larger the amount of members in the gang that participate in the attack.

From witnesses of these attacks, and crime reports given after court trials, it is clear that these attacks are performed by gangs, with a leader, and also a ‘look-out’ placed outside the immediate scene of the attack.

Well planned and rehearsed attacks such as these on civilians had never before been experienced in the history of South Africa. It has only been in the training camps of the MK where the following has been taught:

* targets carefully selected in accordance with the political policies of the movement;
* planning for operations was as careful as possible, which includes:
1. Whenever possible, a final reconnaissance was undertaken just before an attack to ensure that conditions had not changed
2. A further aspect of all planning was to ensure that the attackers had planned for their safe withdrawal after attacks, and had the necessary resources to do so. (This would include sufficient money for fuel and a means of establishing and keeping contact, such as a celphone).

**Operation Vula – UHURU, Night of the Long Knives**

The final operation by Vula is codenamed ‘Uhuru’ – Night of the Long Knives. Vula Boys believe that by the mass murdering of White people in South Africa, they will gain economic freedom. At present, this murdering is proceeding at a widely spread low intensity action. A hard hitting, mass action is planned for seven days after Nelson Mandela dies.

**Impatient Vula boys call for the death of Nelson Mandela to complete Operation Vula which includes the murder all White people in South Africa**

Of particular interest regarding the safety of people living inside South Africa at present, is the fact that Operation Vula has not yet ended. It has been an ongoing project aimed to reach completion upon the death of Nelson Mandela, famous Nobel Peace winner and face of the African National Congress. Some ‘cadres’ have become so impatient to murder all the white people in South Africa, that they are rebelling against the African National Congress, accusing the African National Congress of being too slow to implement the plans they have all been working on so hard for so long, and are calling for the death of Madiba – the common name used for the Freedom Struggle icon Nelson Mandela.

Facebook is the largest social network in the world. There are many group and private discussions, with huge support, such as the following in January 2012:

Speaker 1:
*What the Fuck!!!!
The freedom struggle started in 1912?
What the hell was the Bhambatha rebellion.
What was the Shaka fighting?
What was Hintsa fighting?
What was every man who took up a spear, a gun, a feather, and a rock fighting for if not freedom.
And now Sharpeville is an ANC thing?
So too is Soweto Uprising.
Even the bloody russian freedom charter now is theirs.
Armed struggle is ANC.
What the fuck!!
Suicide bombing in the middle east, may be needed here!!*
January 4 at 10:56am via mobile •
• 13 people like this.

Speaker 2:
*Snr Im with you, bloody ANC.*

January 4 at 10:59am

Speaker 3:

*I think the defferent here is that Shaka, bhambatha and so on were fighting for the land and ANC from 1912 were fighting for freedom.*

January 4 at 11:09am • 1

Speaker 4:

*And i get so pissed off when the ANC makes people believe they are responsible for our freedom . FUCK THAT !!!*

January 4 at 11:14am • 1

Speaker 1:

*The 1912 project was essentially against the 1913 Land Act. It was for land as well.
Anyway there is no way to separate the fight for land and freedom.
Because we did not fight to be oppressed in this land we owned. There can never be separation.
You can't fight for your house only to allow some else to dick-tate to you!*

January 4 at 11:15am • 3

Speaker 4:

*Thanks 4 responding bt suicide bombing aint what I'm ready 2 do, they can kill me bt I aint killing myself cos freedom I will taste it*

January 4 at 11:29am

Speaker 3:

*I here you bro, but there is a defferent between writing something down that says "we want our land back" and "fighting for the land".Shaka and so on fought for land, they never wrote something down and never acted. Last time when i checked ANC wrote that they would fight for land but they never fight for land instead they fought for freedom so that black people may look white.*January 4 at 11:36am

Speaker 5:

*But Freedom equals land.. You cant be free without land hence you get dic(k)tators.*

January 4 at 12:10pm • 1

Speaker 1:

*Exactly wats bn on ma mind for a few hrs..., a circle of the founders were part of the 3rd (darkie)legislature, hwich is y they knew about the lobbying of the land act which was then legislated by 1913. It was about LAND. Freedom means free dominion over land. Who is truly living? The one with the land. Racism is an attitude, someone not liking u..racist land and cpaital ownership is not on. Its a pity even the party founded on this has gone as far as sayin people were fighting for democracy. democracy is just the way we go about our freedom. Native, ntse ke makalletse the embellishment and inflation of HIStory....*

January 4 at 12:21pm • 3

Speaker 3:

*Zukisa Gaddafi Toure Mxesibe fuck anc we need to kill evry member of the anc.
and is on the page of the man that wrote : that mandela must die*

In the last conversation by Speaker 3, he refers to a poem called ‘The Mandela must die’, which had been written on a facebook page, which was open to the public for viewing, and comment. It read as follows:

*MANDELA MUST DIE
The Mandela Must Die!!
For the children of Azania whose dreams of freedom were executed!!

The Mandela must die!
His continued survival threatens the aspiration of the children.
His breath stuns the revolution.
His heart-beat pins them to the floor! His eye blink keeps them blinded!
His voice keeps them silent!
He must be destroyed!

Expose his lie.
Tell the stories that were left in the island!
Call to justice those from the firing-squad.
Call for the absolute truth in the TRC. Put to justice those who were wrong. Arrest Biko's killers!
Tell of Sobukwe story.
Expose the sell-out at the World trade centre.

Give the settler back his bible and take back the land, give it to the children!!

Win uhuru for the masses!
Kill the oppressors in the minds of the children!
Burn him, beat him and crush even his blood when it falls!!
Let there be no trace, no scent of him in them.
Kill the bourgeoisie for she threatens the revolution!
Drown the myths of the settlers that impinge on your children self-worth. Feed your neighbors.
Educate the children, tell those who teach them to learn from them!
Walk tall in the hills and fields of Azania.
Don't forget your forefathers, for they know the path.
Muzivi wenzira yephariyare ndiye mufambi wayo!! Utters Zimbabwe!! Kunjalo! cries Kwazulu.
Where are the women, lay before them grass mats, ask them to ululate.
Do it humbly for they gave birth to the nation.
Protect your girls. Make men of your boys, but not too soon!
Shenxa Nyeka for you have seen it in your lifetime!
Tell them Lephatsa for they can't tell you nothing!!
Lead us to the light Malaika wa Azania!

If all of this is to be true in our lifetime, there is but one path!
The Mandela must die!!
Yes, he must die.*

(Posted on Sunday, September 11, 2011 at 9:00am)

**Blog discussion on Uhuru**

The murder of all Whites in South Africa orchestrated by the ANC/SACP leadership operation Uhuru has been widely discussed. We extract from an internet Blog page article on the discussion of ‘Uhuru - The murder of all white Africans, topic started on 10-1-2006 @ 06:41 AM by Gemwolf as follows:

* There is a "disturbing" rumour doing its rounds in South Africa, that the day that ex-president Nelson Mandela dies, the black people of South Africa will unite and "clean" South Africa of white people by murdering them all.
* (...) Ok, so this brings me to the conspiracy theory. They call it Uhuru – A Xhosa word that roughly translates into “Night of the Long Knives” according to them. According to me it comes from the Swahili word for “Freedom”.
* *Uhuru (also known as Operation Vula/Operation White Clean-up/Operation Iron Eagle/Red October campaign) is something that touches every Afrikaner.*
* *In 1990 Nelson Mandela visited Russia. The Kremlin gave him a fully worked out plan, which would only be set into motion when he was no longer there.*
* *The Plan is known by different names in different provinces - OPERATION WHITE CLEAN-UP, OPERATION UHURU, NIGHT OF THE LONG KNIVES, OPERATION IRON EAGLE, and a couple of others. The Plan centred around foreign blacks from Africa*
* *This would enable them to orchestrate Operation White Clean-up countrywide, with hardly any resistance. They just had to wait for the sign. And what was the sign? By 1997 almost every black in the country knew that: the death of their beloved ‘Madiba’.
An honorary title adopted by elders of Mandela's clan. The title has come to be synonymous with Nelson Mandela would be the trigger.

Dozens of country villages are also already targeted, and the attack (with the codename Operation Iron Eagle) will be under the control of the Army. It seems that many extremist blacks are already getting impatient because Mandela won't lay his head down, because a while ago a faction in Johannesburg were on the brink of launching an attack against the whites, and had to be stopped in a rush. The only way to stop them was to call in the help of the taxi-drivers -- these then painted the following message on the backs of their taxi's WAIT! NOT YET UHURU! It is estimated that minibus taxis could transport 70,000 armed blacks from the townships to mid-town Johannesburg within an hour.*
* *Large amounts of AK-47's, ammunition, hand grenades, and even incendiary devices are carried secretly by night in trucks to arms dumps in KwaNonqba by Mosselbay, and other black townships countrywide.*
* *This is also happening in smaller towns in all the nine provinces. When a white policeman from the Boland a region in the Northern Cape recently confronted a black colleague about this, telling him he was aware of 'Operation White Cleanup, the black laughingly replied: "We don't care that you know. On the contrary, we don't care if all whites know about this, because you'll do nothing to stop it." The white policeman couldn't answer the black - knowing with dismay that it was the truth. Blacks are working with Americans and British*
* *A senior ANC consultant, Mzukizi Gaba, told a police officer who arrested him for driving on the wrong side of the N1 in the Cape: "The day Mandela dies, we will kill you whites like flies!"
This report appeared in the Cape Argus in 1996.*
* *Murders of whites, especially Afrikaners, have already begun. The official HNP newspaper of the Herstigte Nasionale Party mentioned in an article: "Farm murders taking their toll among Afrikaners." In the period between 1991 - 2002, a total of 1287 farmers have been murdered during attacks on farms. More whites have died violently than during the duration of the 'bush war. The "war of the flea" is being waged against whites, in other words, an undeclared war.*
* *At present there is also the so-called 'New Firearms Act that will be enforced on whites to disarm them to facilitate Operation White Cleanup, making it difficult for whites to defend themselves.*
* *We’ve got information from a hardware store in Northern Pretoria (name known to us) that in the past month I don’t know the precise date, it just says in the past month 38,000 machetes (long knifes) were sold to blacks. Some come in and buy 20 at a time. The same happened in the 60’s in Kenya and the Congo. The blacks are getting instructions from their ancestors to ready themselves. In our parts we often hear the African drums at night.*

Of interest: ATS Members have flagged this thread 26 times

**c) Toll road and driver’s license contracts**

While Mac Maharaj was in charge of the Department of Transport, this department got Shabir Shaik's company Nkobi Investments on its feet via a R4-billion toll road contract on the N3 highway. Nkobi has a small share of the consortium. This was followed by an R400m contract for the production of credit card-type driver's licenses - Nkobi's first joint venture with French arms company Thomson-CSF and with Denel.

**The N3 toll consortium**

Among the major shareholders of the N3 toll consortium was Rand Merchant Bank, part of the FirstRand Group, where Comrade Mac Maharaj since become a director. Two other group subsidiaries, Wesbank and FirstAuto, also each won R750m contracts while Mac Maharaj was minister of the Transport Department.

Also on the Rand Merchant Bank board was Ahmed Sadek Vahed (of tile AM Moola group), whose daughter was married to Shabir Shaik.

The Sunday newspaper Rapport revealed that Pravin Gordhan, Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service, solved a tax problem for the AM Moola group at the request of Shaik. This personal service, explained a spokesman for the South African Revenue Service, was part of Revenue's open door policy.

The *Rapport* newspapers also told us that Gordhan's brother-in-law worked for Shabir, and that Shabir handled Jacob Zuma's finances.

When the Scorpions raided the offices of Nkobi Holdings and the home of Schabir Shaik, judges in Paris and Mauritius - where raids took place on Thomson-CSF (now called Thales) offices - had to have been convinced that good grounds existed for those raids.

Investigators have been told not to bother former Defense Minister Joe Modise, as he was apparently dying of cancer.

Jayendra Naidoo, who negotiated the final deals, was also declared out of bounds to investigators.

Ian Pierce, an accountant who was reputed to have several present and former cabinet ministers as clients, and who set up many of the empowerment companies involved, continued simply to defy a subpoena to hand over documents.

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7 Landbouweekblad issue 24 September 2004

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**FOOTNOTES:**

**Footnote 1: Land redistribution study by the shadow minister of Rural Development and Land Reform**

Until government has completed a comprehensive audit of what land it owns and in what condition it is in, land reform will be seriously compromised, says Democratic Alliance (DA) shadow minister of Rural Development and Land Reform Lindiwe Mazibuko.

On Monday the official opposition presented its alternative to the green paper on land reform that was unveiled by Rural Development and Land Reform Minister Gugile Nkwinti in late August.

Referring to the green paper, Mazibuko said that somewhere between 19% and 30% of South Africa’s total land was owned by government or state-owned-entities.

“Until a proper audit is done and the state of the land is established, there can be no proper land reform process,” Mazibuko said.

Turning specifically to the green paper Mazibuko said: “As expected, it relies heavily on a discourse of apartheid and colonial dispossession while paying no attention to government inefficiencies after 17 years in power.”

Mazibuko continued to say that: “Most importantly, it offers no vision of how to substantially address the inequities bequeathed by apartheid in a coherent and sustainable way. If the green paper is implemented in its current form, the landless of South Africa will continue to feel the effects of the past.

She said there was no question that South Africa needed an effective and well-implemented land reform programme.

“It is a moral imperative that the injustices created by the 1913 Land Act—which forced millions of black South Africans off their land—are addressed,” Mazibuko said.

**Land management commission**
in its response, the DA said that its own vision for land reform was developing the rural economy in which the injustices of apartheid and colonialism were redressed through a combination of sustainable job-creating economic growth, and a well-managed and appropriately resourced land restitution and redistribution programme.

The party recommended an extension of the Western Cape’s programme of encouraging commercial farmers to sell shares in their farms to their workers, who had been educated on the principles of profit sharing.

However, Mazibuko acknowledged that the DA had to still formulate a full [policy](http://mg.co.za/index.php) on rural development and land reform.

She said the DA would develop a more comprehensive rural development and land reform policy as part of its overall economic policy to get the country’s GDP to grow by 8% per year. This policy, Mazibuko said, should be completed by year end.

The DA expressed its concern with the green paper over the proposed creation of a land management commission that would be given wide-ranging discretionary powers to subpoena, award amnesty and invalidate land ownership.

**Judicial powers**
“These are powers that should be in the hands of the courts, not in a quasi-autonomous body within the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform and accountable to the ministry,” Mazibuko said.

The DA also expressed concerns about the establishment of a land valour-general, who would be mandated to determine financial compensation in cases of land expropriation.

“Again, this is a task that should be left to the judiciary—as specifically provided for in the Constitution. Appointing a non-independent body to determine compensation will be open to abuse and undermine the constitutional principle of willing-buyer-willing-seller,” Mazibuko said.

DA deputy rural development and land reform shadow minister Annette Steyn said another major concern was with the government’s focus on the three-million South Africans who live and work on privately-owned farms, while failing adequately to deal with the issue of communal land tenure, which affects the 16-million landless South Africans who reside in the former apartheid homelands.—I-Net Bridge

<http://mg.co.za/article/2011-09-12-no-land-reform-before-audit-says-da>

**Footnote 2: Statement issued by Lindiwe Mazibuko MP, DA Shadow Minister of Land Reform and Rural Development, 29 September 2011**

Only 14.4% of land claimants’ receive ownership rights - Lindiwe Mazibuko

Lindiwe Mazibuko

29 September 2011

**DA MP says majority of beneficiaries are merely tenants on state-owned land**

Department's annual report shows full extent of skewed approach to land ownership

The Department of Rural Development and Land Reform's 2010/11 annual report has revealed that 85.6% of land purchased from land-owners for the purposes of land reform has been transferred to land claimants under leasehold, while only 14.4% of claimants have been awarded full ownership rights.

According to the annual report, a total of 322 844.9931 hectares of land was transferred to beneficiaries in the 2010/11 financial year. The majority of the land- 276 396.6839 hectares - was registered in the name of the state. Just 46 448.3038 was returned to land claimants with full ownership.

This discrepancy highlights the government's skewed approach to land reform. Instead of land claimants being granted full ownership of their land, which would allow them to borrow against their assets in order to implement changes to their businesses in the case of commercial operations, or simply to upgrade their property if it is residential, the vast majority of claimants are merely tenants on state-owned land.

Not only does this prevent the land from being used as loan collateral, but it acts as a disincentive for claimants to invest in the land's productive capacity. Without the freedom and stability to invest in their properties, claimants are consigned to the status of tenants, and have no incentive to make improvements to the land they have acquired since they bear neither the risk nor the reward associated with running a successful business.

Why would claimants devote time and resources to investing in land that is not theirs?

This effectively means that the true spirit of the purpose of land reform - the returning of land rights denied during Apartheid and the colonial era to claimants with full ownership rights - is not being adhered to.

The Democratic Alliance (DA) will soon be making its submission on the Land Reform Green Paper. The Department has today indicated that the deadline for submissions is 31 October. Central to this will be the proposal that the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS), which facilitates the transferring of land to claimants under leasehold, be scrapped. It is essential that all land is transferred with full ownership rights, together with the requisite skills training and financial support, to ensure that land reform is a success.

Statement issued by Lindiwe Mazibuko MP, DA Shadow Minister of Land Reform and Rural Development, September 29 2011

The Minister of Land affairs proudly proclaimed government as the biggest land owner and landlord earning in excess of R4 billion a month in rentals, but the speech is pulled so they can run with the stupid ideology of all whites are to blame for everything

It was said in 2008: With the settlement of land claims, the Commission for Restitution of Land Claims has settled more than 95 % of total claims lodged and is left with only 4 998 very complex, rural claims.

 Madam Speaker, the Department of Land Affairs has responded to the calls for a national state land audit. In March this year, we completed the audit of some 228 000 parcels of state land on our national database amounting to some 23 million hectares of land. More work will be done again this year to ensure that we have a comprehensive asset register of all state owned land in South Africa.

 Mr. Speaker, I wish to take this opportunity to clarify this issue of the government’s commitment to distribute 30 percent of the country’s agricultural land by 2014. In 1994 South Africa had approximately 82 million hectares of white owned agricultural land. That is when the government set itself the target to redistribute 30% of this land to the previously disadvantaged by 2014.

**Footnote 3: Land Reform Funds Stolen by the ANC government**

The KZN Land Reform Department has been bleeding millions of rand through fake land claims facilitated by its own corrupt officials.

Court papers filed in the Pietermaritzburg High Court allege that former department official Promise Makhanya has been involved in another dodgy land claim deal in Winterton.

Makhanya, deputy director of land affairs in Ladysmith, was suspended in 2010 amid claims that she was involved in a R36 million land claim scandal in Ladysmith.

Acting chief director of the Department of Land Reform and Rural Development, Bonginkosi Zulu, said that while Makhanya was dismissed earlier this year, charges against her still stood.

In a statement, the anti-corruption task team, which includes the Land Reform Department, Special Investigating Unit, police, the Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) and National Prosecuting Service, said the Winterton case was part of a huge continuing investigation which had already led to four farms worth more than R52m being forfeited and several officials held for alleged fraud and corruption.

In an affidavit filed in the Pietermaritzburg High Court in August, AFU head Knorx Molelle said investigations had revealed that a land redistribution grant of R22m for the Amaswazi community, near Winterton, had been fraudulently obtained.

The unit secured a high court order preserving three of the farms that had been bought with the land grant, pending a forfeiture application.

R11m of the grant was used to buy the farms in 2008.

In his affidavit, Molelle said Makhanya had “appointed” herself project officer in spite of another official, Nonhlanhla Shabalala, already performing this function. Makhanya then hired a farm manager, Mel Singh, and made payments from the remaining R9m without the trustees’ knowledge. - The Mercury

<http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/officials-fingered-in-r36m-land-deals-1.1393112#.UGliypjA_z4>

**Footnote 4 - Cashing in on once White-owned farmland.**

**Black farmers in South Africa cash in by selling land given to them by the government... back to whites who originally owned the farms**

By DAN NEWLINGUPDATED**:** 13:10 GMT, 1 September 2011

South Africa's black farmers are cashing on their once white-owned farmland - by selling it back to its original owners.

The South African government has spent a fortune trying to redistribute the country's land wealth from the white minority to the black majority.

It has bought thousands of hectares of white owned farm land and either given it or sold it on to poor blacks.

Black farmers: Many are being sold back to the original white owners

But yesterday the country's minister of land reform admitted that many of the new black farmers have simply resold the land back to the original owners.

Gugile Nkwinti said black farmers have resold nearly 30 per cent of the white farmland bought for them by the government.

He said: 'The government bought land and handed it over to aspirant farmers who then sold it again, in many instances back to the original owner.'

Land economists say that the redistribution policy is highly inefficient as the white-owned land is often bought at above its market value by the government.

After the land has been given, or sold at a discount, to the new black owner, he is able to simply then able to sell it on.

This means that both farmers - black and white - are able to turn a profit from the government's involvement.

After black majority rule was won in 1994, Nelson Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) government set a goal of redistributing 30 per cent of agricultural land to blacks by 2014.

However, so far it has managed to buy and successfully redistribute just two per cent of the country's land.

The problem is hugely emotional in South Africa, where the majority of black people still live in poverty, despite 17 years of black rule.

In neighboring Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe's government tried to solve the same problem by forcibly evicting around 5,000 white farmers from their farmland.

Even though Zimbabwe's policy has been an unmitigated economic disaster, some influential politicians in South Africa have advocated doing the same.

Addressing the problem yesterday, Mr. Nkwinti said: 'In our country we wanted to solve it yesterday.

'That's not possible. So we think it's going to take a bit of time and it will require patience.'

Studies of the South African model have shown that as many as 90 per cent of the new black-run farms fail because the new owners do not have the experience of running a large enterprise.

**Footnote 5: Tea Farm destroyed through land redistribution**

Magwa Tea's failure bitter to swallow

09 MAR 2012 09:35

Once renowned across the world, South Africa's last remaining tea estate is struggling to recover from disputes that have plagued it since 2009.

Thulami Mtembu has worked at the Magwa Tea Estate for 33 years. It is more than a job for him. “It’s the smell. Every day I come here I feel so refreshed,” he said. “I love the aroma of the tea bush. The conditions here make our tea special.”

The fragrant lime-green bushes stretch away to the horizon at the biggest tea plantation in the southern hemisphere. It is a deceptively tranquil scene. Magwa has been racked by strikes, violence and financial strife that have brought production to a standstill.

The crisis encapsulates South Africa’s struggle to realize the potential of its wealth of natural resources. It is a story of low or unpaid wages, powerful unions, political inertia and allegations of financial mismanagement. It is a stark example of self-destruction.

The 1 800-hectare Magwa farm outside Lusikisiki in the Eastern Cape is blessed with an ideal climate and soil type for tea. At its peak five years ago it came close to profitability, producing 2.7-million tons of tea in a season. The farm employed 1 200 permanent and 2 300 seasonal workers.

Market decline led to the problems
But when the market shrank and the tea price declined, the problems began. The provincial economic development corporation stepped in and, despite emergency subsidies from the state, tension over wages erupted. The farm claimed its workers were the best paid in the industry, earning five times more than their counterparts in Malawi. But even today some still earn R1 100 a month, below the national minimum wage of R1 376 for farm work, according to Nkosinathi Mbolo, who is arbitrating between the management and employees.

Sweating in the afternoon sun, Vukile Jikwayo (51), a mechanic, said he earned R1 250 a month: “The money is too little—I have to buy food and educate five children. All we want is a better income.”

From 2009 the workers rebelled against changes to their terms of employment. Laborers who pluck tea leaves and throw them over their shoulder into a backpack were told to increase their haul from 200kg to 253kg a day on the same pay, according to the Food and Allied Workers’ Union.

Preferential treatment of workers
Then Magwa’s management gave pay rises of 100% to some workers but not to others, the union claims. “This led to conflict among the workers. Management was selective in terms of compensation,” said Mbalisi Tonga, the union’s provincial secretary in the Eastern Cape. “The manager said he would reward, in his words, ‘deserving cases’.”

Tonga said there was further resentment when, to comply with the law, lunch breaks were extended from 30 minutes to an hour—but with a deduction of R6. “At that point, they unified the workers. The workers said we must fight and the strike started.”

There was a strike in 2010 and again last year. What happened during the latter is bitterly disputed. Tonga claims picketing workers were beaten and arrested by police. Management accused the workers of a violent rampage in which shots were fired, buildings gutted and a security guard killed.

Mtembu, the estate manager, said: “The place was ruined. They burned all the houses, destroyed protective clothing and removed everything—furniture, ceilings, floors, windows.

It was a looting spree. The management ran away and it was a free-for-all. A security guard was killed and supervisors were severely beaten. Any manager present that day would have been killed too. It was workers versus management. Some of the workers themselves were beaten because they got caught off guard.”

Magwa security manager Daan Schoeman was quoted by South African media last year as saying a manager called him with a desperate plea for help. “He said ‘Help Daan, they’re killing me’, but I couldn’t do anything. It was impossible to get in. They chopped him up with pangas but he made it out [alive]. One of the security guards, though, was shot dead. That day I started becoming an old man.”

The union denies the charges. “From the information we got, there was no violence. We trust our sources because there were court cases. Complainants ... have not been able to sustain their claims in court,” Tonga said. Asked about the death, he replied: “I have heard about it and some members were taken to court, but ... they were acquitted.” The management used the strikes as a convenient excuse to flee, Tonga said. “As the management, you are supposed to take the responsibility and face it. What happens at Magwa is that if there’s a strike, it’s a holiday for management.”

The general manager, Ian Crawford, left the estate in September last year. Attempts by the Guardian to contact him failed. Last month, speaking to the Financial Mail, he described Magwa as “a murky, messy scenario with politicians and other people ducking and diving” and said he was taking it to court for money he was owed. “Until the politics around Magwa is resolved and discipline is restored in the workplace, it will never recover,” he said. “It’s game over for a project that had huge potential to uplift poor people.”

Crawford has been criticized by workers and the government alike. Ayabulela Ngoqo, spokesperson of the provincial department of rural development, said: “Mr. Crawford was running Magwa like his own house. He was a man who could stop on the side of the road and sign a cheque. There was a revolt from the workers.”

Other managers who had left the farm in February last year returned in November, too late to save the year’s harvest. In some months workers went unpaid. “A whole season was lost, maybe about R30-million. Everything we are doing now is getting ready for next season. We talk to the workers but we don’t talk about the past,” Mtembu said.

An uneasy truce has been reached, with managers and workers in dialogue, though some managers remain off site. But a shortage of funds to invest in tractors, trailers, coal and diesel means that employees have been reduced to “piece work” of six hours instead of the standard nine. The fields are being maintained in readiness, but there is no guarantee of a harvest in September.

Machinery is lying idle. Inside giant sheds, rows of conveyor belts are standing still and tea-cutting equipment gathers dust. “This would normally be operating at full steam,” said Mbolo. “But there is a shortage of coal and parts.”

So the paralysis continues. “As far as production is concerned, there is nothing happening. We don’t have funds to buy coal or diesel. We have made requests to the government. It did promise R20-million to assist with the planting, but sometimes politicians make promises and don’t cover all the costs,” Mtembu said.

“There is no pay rise. We cannot predict another strike. If the workers want to do those things, they’ll simply do them. If they want to resort to violence, they’ll resort to violence. It depends on the quality of the union leadership.”

But Mtembu is optimistic that South Africa’s last tea plantation can be saved. “I would not have come back if I did not feel the company has potential. There’s no point sitting at home with so much knowledge; let me assist. The company was once a star and can be a star again.”

Ngoqo said the government was still working on a rescue package. “The department is trying to source funding so the farm can be running smoothly and undertaking harvesting. We don’t want the people to lose their jobs.”

Until then Magwa is left clinging to past glories. Tonga reflected: “Twenty years ago they got a trophy from France for the best tea in the world. That trophy is not there now. I don’t know if it got lost or burned down with the office.”—

<http://mg.co.za/article/2012-03-09-magwa-teas-failure-bitter-to-swallow>

**Footnote 6: Pagad boss held by cops.**

August 24 2012 at 07:44am
by Lynnette Johns

Cape Town - Three Pagad members – including the organization’s leader, Abdus Salaam Ebrahim have been taken in for questioning by police in connection with a shooting in the early hours of on Thursday.

The three men are aged 54, 52 and 37.

Police spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Andre Traut said a 21-year-old man had been shot and wounded in Rietbok Street in Lotus River after midnight on Thursday.

The three were taken in soon after the incident. A spent cartridge was found at the scene.

Pagad national spokesman Osman Sahib has confirmed that Ebrahim was one of three of their members held at the Grassy Park police station for most of on Thursday.

The three men were later detained separately at three police stations across the city – Nyanga, Langa and Harare, Khayelitsha.

Sahib said the police had told him that a spent cartridge was found in the car.

The Cape Flats is in the midst of a drug and gang war and a number of innocent people have been caught in the crossfire.

Cassiem Parker, also speaking on behalf of Pagad, said late on Thursday that they were trying to meet the three and would only then be in a position to release a press statement.

He said the organization had been meeting regularly and carrying on with its anti-drug and gang activities. Pagad came to prominence in 1996 when drug turf battles escalated.

The organization marched on the houses of drug lords and suspected drug lords.

Although acquitted in 2002 of the public lynching of Hard Livings gang boss Rashaad Staggie, who was shot numerous times and set alight during a protest march on his Salt River home in August 1996, Ebrahim, pictured, was convicted of public violence.

After serving nine years in prison and four more under house arrest, Ebrahim said in 2010 that he was ready to throw himself back into the fight against gangsterism and drugs.

An executive member of the Mitchells Plain community policing forum said on Thursday that Pagad had been meeting regularly at mosques in the area and had held marches in the community.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, he said Pagad was “raising the temperature”.

On Wednesday, a pipe bomb was hurled at the house of a suspected drug dealer in New Woodlands – the third pipe bomb in the past two weeks.

Traut said the circumstances of the matter were being investigated.

“Finer aspects can only be released once our investigation has reached a more advanced stage,” Traut said.

Hanif Loonat, chairman of the Western Cape Community Policing Board, said on Thursday that he was sure the police would get to the bottom of the matter.

No fingers could be pointed at anyone, he said, until there were enough facts.

[**Pagad boss held by cops - Crime & Courts | IOL News | IOL.co.za**](http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/pagad-boss-held-by-cops-1.1368865#.UDc_JEd0VvU.facebook)

[www.iol.co.za](http://www.iol.co.za)

**Footnote 7: Joe Modise, ANC leader and NP spy.**

Joe Modise, now deceased, a founding member of MK and a former chief of staff was made Minister of Defense for the African National Congress government in 1994.

Modise had been a double agent Apartheid spy, and was the mastermind behind the Arms Deal during Mbeki presidency.

To get his position as Minister of Defense, Modise first had to wipe his competition off the map, namely Chris Hani, the leader of the SA Communist Party and at the time chief of staff of uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) the armed terrorist wing of the ANC.
Hani was about to be made Minister of Defense and score all the kickbacks on weapons deals. “Bra Joe” (Joe Modise), along with his friends which included Neil Barnard in the SA Secret Service (NIS) or National Intelligence Services, they had Hani assassinated, framing Conservative MP Clive Derby-Lewis and using another double agent Janusz Wallus as the killer.

When Modise became the Minister of Defense, he made his wife Jackie Sidebe the first female general in the New SA Defense Force, and got his daughter, Thereza Magazi, on the board of Conlog (later renamed Logtek), one of the companies for counter trade agreements, and the company responsible for securing the prepaid electricity meters for Eskom...these meters are in almost every house in SA today. He also appointed his brother in law, Lambert Moloi on the board of the parastatal arms manufacturer Denel (Armscor).

During the 1950’s Modise was a member of the township gang called the Spoilers in Alexandria near Pretoria, who were fighting another gang called the Msomis.

He was physically very strong. A boxer and a football player who could look after himself. He later became a truck driver.
The Spoilers were a cut above the rest of the Township gangs. They dressed smartly, befriended musicians and celebrities and were out to make money like the mafia.

Despite receiving terrorist training in Czechoslovakia and the USSR he never became a communist, and was distrusted by Joe Slovo and Chris Hani as an ”informer for the Boers”.

All his enemies ended up being whisked away by the Apartheid Security Police.

As an exile in Lusaka Zambia, Modise was living a rich man’s life in the affluent suburb of Avondale, whilst running a stolen car racket and a bank robbery racket in South Africa.
At one stage Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda called him in and asked him not to flaunt his wealth, because the cars he was driving could not even be afforded by the Zambian ministers in parliament.

In 1981, Joe Modise was arrested in Botswana smuggling weapons and diamonds. In 1985 he was selling an ANC/SWAPO weapons cache near Saurimo, in Angola, to UNITA . At the time UNITA was an ally of the Apartheid government and a sworn enemy of the ANC.

At one stage in Lusaka he shared a house with a cocaine, ecstasy and other drugs dealer known as Mr. Stevens.

It is quite common knowledge amongst people in the know and journalists worthy of the name in South Africa that Joe Modise and his henchman Tom Nkobi were Apartheid informers and double agents and at the same time being mafia like criminals.

After F.W. de Klerk opened the floodgates and these criminals were allowed back in SA, along with Nigerian drug lords, we saw gang wars in 1996 with hand grenades chucked over garden walls, etc. But it was when Modise befriended Solomon Majura, the ZANU-PF terrorist who became one of the biggest landowners of Zimbabwe after stealing white owned farmland that Modise saw drug dealing, car hi-jacking and bank robberies as small fry...the real money was to be made in government contracts.
Involving his friend at Denel, Fana Hlongwane, his political contacts such as Thabo Mbeki that he supported to succeed Nelson Mandela, and that old Apartheid sanction buster Tony Georgiades, former husband of Elita (now the wife of former president and traitor F.W. De Klerk) he secured the deals with British Aerospace and Thomson CSF of France to buy new trainer jets for the SA air Force. Tony Georgiades was the middle man.
Everyone from the top down, De Klerk, Mbeki, Modise, etc were all sharing the spoils of South Africa.

German Daimler Aerospace admitted that they delivered 30 luxury Mercedes Benz vehicles to top ANC members one of which was chief whip Tony Yengeni, who at one stage chaired the Parliamentary Defense Committee, and who would later be convicted of fraud and sent to prison, carried on the shoulders of his ANC mates such as Ibrahim Rasool into Polsmoor prison.

Things almost fell apart for Modise in 1997 when five former Security branch policemen applied for amnesty with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for their involvement in more than 40 murders of Anti Apartheid terrorists. They wanted to reveal the names of former Apartheid informants and double agents now in top government positions. Mbeki shut them up calling it gossip mongering and the TRC refused to make the names known. None of this is a state secret. It is common knowledge nowadays. It was all reported in the mainstream media and condensed in journalist R.W. Johnson’s book, “South Africa, a brave new world”. 2009.

**Footnote 8: Why we were censored, and what we plan to do**

**Mail & Guardian article: Why we were censored, and what we plan to do.**

By NIC DAWES - Nov 18 2011 16:23

Today we published our regular Friday edition with the majority of the lead article, and sections of an editorial blacked out.

We did this very reluctantly on the advice of our lawyers, having been threatened with criminal prosecution and civil court action by Mac Maharaj, President Jacob Zuma’s spokesperson and the subject of the story.

We talk to M&G editor-in-chief Nic Dawes about Mac Maharaj’s accusations that the paper is ‘invoking fears of censorship’, and the plan in going forward with the story.

The facts are simple: our story would have shown that Mr. Maharaj lied when questioned under oath by the Scorpions in the course of investigations flowing from the arms deal.

In seeking to prevent publication, either by a court interdict or the threat of criminal investigation, Mr. Maharaj has one objective: to avoid answering to the South African public for either the suspicious payments, or his lies about them.

He is now claiming in press statements and interviews that the Mail & Guardian obtained its information illegally, and comparing our conduct to that of journalists at the defunct British tabloid News of the World, who hacked into the phones of celebrities, and the murdered schoolgirl Milly Downer. He is doing nothing, however, to address the substance of the question he must answer: if the hoard of offshore cash was legitimately acquired, why did he lie about it when subpoenaed to testify by the National Prosecuting Authority?

Let us cut through some of the confusion that Mr. Maharaj’s allegations are intended to create.

Our investigative team, lead by Sam Sole and Stefaans Brummer, has been exploring the web of corruption and influence peddling surrounding the 1999 arms deal for more than a decade, patiently assembling evidence, and helping to ensure that the issue does not sink out of the public consciousness.

President Jacob Zuma’s announcement of a judicial commission of inquiry into the deal, which was affirmed by an order of the Constitutional Court this week, means that work is as relevant as it has ever been.

It is against that backdrop that we planned this week to publish new information about Mr. Maharaj’s role in the saga.

**Arms deal investigation**

His name figured prominently in the arms deal investigation from very early on, principally in relation to a contract for new driver’s license cards awarded by the department of transportation during his time as minister of transport.

The Scorpions suspected that the payments from Schabir Shaik might have related to the tender award, which went to Shaik and his partners, the French arms company Thomson-CSF. Of course it was payments Shaik made to Zuma on behalf of Thomson, to secure influence in the arms deal that was central to his conviction for fraud and corruption.

It was in order to pursue those allegations that the Scorpions used the powers granted to them by section 28 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act to subpoena Maharaj to answer questions under oath.

The Mail & Guardian is in possession of documents which outline the answers he gave them. We tested those answers against other documents in our possession, and facts in the public domain in order to establish his truthfulness.

This matters or at least two reasons.

Firstly, he is the spokesperson for the president, and occupies a position of immense public trust.

Second, if the payments were innocent, as Maharaj has always insisted, then surely he would have felt at ease telling investigators the truth. If, on the other hand, he lied, his entire account is called into question.

Our assessment of the evidence makes it clear he lied. In order to demonstrate this to our readers we needed to quote from the record of the section 28 interview.

To do so, Maharaj warned us, would be a crime. And indeed, section 41 of the NPA Act contains little-known and sweeping provisions forbidding disclosure of any material emanating from a section 28 process, and punishing such disclosure with up to 15 years in jail or a fine. Public interest is no defense in terms of the act.

This mirrors closely the blanket prohibition on disclosure contemplated by the Protection of State Information Bill, and it’s represented a serious dilemma for us.

Deciding not publish information that the public clearly ought to know in the face of a threatened criminal sanction offends against our most basic principles, and, we believe, those of the Constitution.

On the other hand we live in a democracy governed by the rule of law, we are extremely reluctant to commit a criminal offence, and we were advised strongly against doing so by our lawyers, who understand free speech issues very well.

For now we are going to fight this bad law, within the law.

It is clear to us that the Act is vulnerable to constitutional challenge.

It is a commitment that is going to be seriously tested if people like Maharaj continue to hide from public scrutiny behind the NPA Act.

**Footnote 9: Secret world of Operation Vula**

As well as establishing lines of communication between Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela, the 'opening of the way' imported huge quantities of arms into KwaZulu-Natal.

In a book about Mac Maharaj, Padraig O'Malley writes extensively about Operation Vula, 'Opening the way', the underground operation which was initiated in the late 1980’s to facilitate the return of exiled leadership into the country. Commanded by Oliver Tambo, the ANC president in exile, and Joe Slovo, the chairperson of the South African Communist party, Vula was one of the ANC's most effective operations. O'Malley writes that Vula was a sophisticated, secret arms-importation business as well as a propaganda and crisis-management operation in the mass democratic movement. Vula opened lines of communication between Tambo in Lusaka and Nelson Mandela, then in Victor Verster prison, and affected the course of the struggle. Maharaj, as the commander of the operation within South Africa, faced untold intrigue.

The story of Vula is complex: its narratives overlap, intertwine and run off in different directions. They are rich in tension, spiced with comrades' often not-too-kind comments about each other, ringing with the voices of strong personalities, a human drama as much as a political drama. And all under the nose of the Security Branch (SB), which boasted that no ANC operation was beyond its reach, while blithely unaware that it had been penetrated at the highest level. Information from its security files was going directly to ANC intelligence in South Africa, which fed it to Vula before dispatch to Lusaka.

In December 1988, four months after Maharaj and [Siphiwe] Nyanda had crossed the Swazi border into South Africa, Tambo wrote to Mac:

"We need a sustained, ever growing and expanding military offensive. But we are unable to take off in any significant manner. We hit one disaster after another, continuously, year in and year out, precisely because we sought to run before we could walk, and kept on walking.

"Vula must not follow the beaten path - it's a minefield. Vula must strike out on a new road - to lay the indispensable foundations for a viable armed struggle by first creating, building and consolidating a strong, resilient, extensive political network that is self-protective, absorb shocks.

"This is precisely the task Vula has started tackling with startling vigor and effectiveness. In the result much has been achieved but much, much more has yet to be done, especially in consolidating the ground already covered…"

Yet more than a year beforehand, Tambo had instructed Thabo Mbeki to meet with a group of Afrikaner "intellectuals" led by Willie Esterhuyse, a Stellenbosch University professor who had contact with PW Botha and other senior South African government officials.

The first meeting took place in October 1987. Over the following 18 months, the Afrikaners and ANC officials, the groups varying in size and composition, met on a dozen occasions at Mells House Park, outside Bath in Britain. On the ANC side, Mbeki and Jacob Zuma were the key players.

The Afrikaners would become proxies for the National Intelligence Service (NIS) in exploring opportunities for a negotiated settlement. The [ANC's] National Working Committee received briefings on the substance of these meetings, although it did not become privy to the NIS connection until October 1989.

Giving his benediction to both Thabo Mbeki and Maharaj in their endeavors reflected Tambo's holistic approach to the struggle. Like any good CEO, he understood that in a volatile political marketplace you diversify your political holdings. Prudence required him to plan for different outcomes.

Thus he had to plan for a seizure of power, as well as for a protracted armed struggle, ways of balancing the four pillars of struggle, strangling the regime through economic isolation, and a negotiated settlement. Each course of action had to be pursued. The various pursuits were interrelated: Maharaj's Vula and Mbeki's Mells House Park talks complemented each other.

Tambo orchestrated the efforts of both and he knew, too, as a result of the visits of Ismail Ayob and George Bizos to Lusaka, that Mandela was in contact with the South African government.

It has sometimes been insinuated that Mbeki opposed the armed struggle as early as the onset of the 1980s. If so, whatever misgivings he may have expressed about it in private were not consonant with his behaviour within party and ANC structures. As one of the six members of the SACP politburo, the party's highest organ, he had a role in formulating and approving "Path to Power", the party's blueprint for destroying the apartheid regime.

"Path to Power" was presented to the party at its conference in Havana in April 1989. Mbeki chaired discussion of the document and did so brilliantly, according to Joe Slovo.

"Path to Power" forcefully advocated seizure of power as a way forward, even as Soviet expansionism was visibly crumbling. It was adopted as the party's manifesto to great acclaim, much of it for the intellectual impresario who had conducted the proceedings with such panache.

At a pivotal meeting of the national executive committee (NEC) in February 1990, within a week of Mandela's release, when there was a wide-ranging discussion of how the ANC should proceed in such circumstances, Mbeki countenanced that "[we] need to correct [the] position that creation [of understanding] will make armed struggle unnecessary".

Nor did Mbeki at any time, either in the NEC or the politburo, or to Tambo or Slovo in private, convey reservations about Vula.

Moreover, after Mandela was released and had taken charge, he authorized that Vula continue its clandestine operations even though the ANC was then legal. Between August 1988 and May 1990 Vula embedded itself in Natal and to a lesser extent the Witwatersrand. Huge quantities of arms were imported and stored across South Africa, ready for the day of insurrection. Vula was probably the ANC's most successful operation. At one point, in response to a report from Maharaj on Vula's activities, Tambo enthused: "The report is remarkable for its scope and its detail. It gives a clear vision of the immense potential of the Vula concept but also its tremendous yield in terms of what has been achieved within a short period of time. To Adam [Mac] and Sylvester [Nyanda], Bravo!"

Vula established a direct line of communication between Mandela and Tambo at a delicate moment in the ANC's engagement with the white regime.

Within the mass democratic movement, a "core committee" was established, including Cyril Ramaphosa, Sydney Mufamadi, Reverend Frank Chikane and Father Smangaliso Mkhatshwa, who "set" the political agenda for Cosatu and the United Democratic Front in consultation with Lusaka via Maharaj. Maharaj smuggled a draft of the Harare Declaration to Mandela and whisked his comments and those of nine other internal leaders back to Lusaka within 10 days. Nyanda trained Umkhonto weSizwe cadres for a people's army - not for present deployment on the ground - and gave them a familiarity of the geopolitical landscape. Vula provided logistical and manpower support for the war in KwaZulu-Natal, and conveyed to Lusaka a copy of Mandela's memorandum to PW Botha before Mandela's meeting with him in July 1989.

In April 1989, Maharaj contained the frenzy that erupted when Mandela was perceived by some senior members of the mass democratic movement to be "selling out".

He provided feedback and analysis on the crisis around Winnie Mandela's involvement in the death of a child activist, a situation that would have caused immense trouble for Mandela on his release, pulling him between his wife and the mass democratic movement that had condemned her.

The accomplishments directly attributable to Vula were real and affected the course of the struggle.

After Maharaj informed Tambo that he could open a line of direct communication between Tambo and Mandela, Tambo withheld approval until Maharaj could satisfactorily assure him on two counts ("Firstly, exactly how would you ensure & be certain that the enemy was not picking up on the disclosure of your response to M [Mandela]? Secondly, how would you demonstrate to M the operation of the secret line and ensure in that in the process the enemy is kept permanently unaware?")

Within weeks Maharaj, who had first proposed opening a line of communication five months earlier, in November 1988, was able to convince the ever cautious Tambo to give him the nod.

Vula also compelled Lusaka to face harsh realities that challenged cherished shibboleths, but at the same time reinforced the need for operations like Vula itself. Vula had to try to disabuse Lusaka of some of its misconceptions about how spontaneous but chaotic youth uprisings could be used. The youth imposed their ideas of revolution, and infighting muddied the waters.

In the absence of a real MK presence, self-armed youth took it upon themselves to impose their rule in townships that by now really were "ungovernable".

The mass democratic movement was at the coal face. It got there not by following some battle plan handed down by the ANC in Lusaka, but by using the people - the grassroots and the instruments the masses used to organize themselves to disrupt, disorientate and engage the regime at street level and on the economic front. But it was vital that such efforts be co-ordinated with those of the ANC, and Vula played a significant role in that process.

The quality of the leadership in the mass organizations was always bothersome and, in one frank exchange, two pivotal UDF leaders bluntly told Tambo and Slovo that a broad-based leadership simply didn't exist.

Both Harry Gwala, a former Robben Island prisoner and veteran Stalinist leader of the SACP and the ANC in the Natal Midlands, and Govan Mbeki, who was released from Robben Island in November 1987, presented problems of a different kind. Gwala, once back in Natal after his release in November 1988 and disgusted with the derelict state of the political organizations, decided to remedy matters on his own terms. The Natal heartland was the scene of some of the fiercest fighting between the UDF/ANC and Inkatha, and Gwala declared a scorched earth policy on Inkatha.

Among all ANC leaders, Gwala came closest to being a warlord in his own right. He was not inclined to take orders from anyone. He ranted about a so-called Indian cabal, and ranted when he learned that Maharaj, an Indian, had been charged with setting up the ANC's underground.

Yet Gwala had to be brought into line. A working accommodation was reached between him and Maharaj, his "loose talk" halted. But, when he finally agreed to meet Maharaj, he did so in circumstances that maximized Maharaj's public exposure.

Govan Mbeki was the first of the Rivonia trialists to be released. He saw himself as the head of the ANC in the country. He immediately became involved with the UDF, its tactics and strategies. Lusaka gave him permission to set up structures in the Port Elizabeth region, but Mbeki, too, was his own man and began to extend his mandate to the whole country, without proper authorization from Lusaka.

He established a National Collective and recruited national figures in the mass democratic movement. This presented Lusaka with problems. Mbeki was an icon of the struggle, especially in the Port Elizabeth region, to which he was now restricted. He was not someone who could easily be told what to do.

Members of the mass democratic movement - unaware of the constraints on his theatre of operation Lusaka was attempting to impose - would follow Mbeki's directions, believing them to have the imprimatur of Lusaka.

Since the Security Branch had Mbeki under surveillance at all times, his more militant actions endangered not only himself but the leadership of the mass democratic movement. He, too, had to be brought into line, but with great subtlety and sufficient deference.

The narrative of Vula and the role it played in the struggle against apartheid is chronicled in the communications (comms) transmitted, via London or Amsterdam, between Vula operatives and Lusaka.

To read them is to see they are part spy novel, part cartoon. There are mix-ups and foul-ups; there are ANC spies spying on ANC spies.

They expose the bureaucratic nightmare of ANC inefficiency in Lusaka, but provide riveting details of the setting up of a direct and secure line between Tambo in Lusaka and Mandela in Victor Verster prison. To succeed, Vula had to become an underground within the ANC itself. But also running through the Vula comms is a tangible sense of excitement: of being behind enemy lines and relaying its movements to the outside.

The comms between Tambo, Slovo and Maharaj are exercises in exquisite minimalism. The voices become interchangeable, harmony of language achieved, the ANC in exile speaking as if it were on the ground in South Africa, the mass democratic movement relaying the same messages to the masses.

‘Shades of Difference; Mac Maharaj and the Struggle for South Africa’ by Padraig O'Malley (Penguin, R240) will be available in stores on May 10

With acknowledgements to Sunday Independent.

<http://www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za/articles10/vula.html>

**Part 2 B. The infrastructure of the nation**

The future survival of the people in a country depends on its infrastructure.

At the time the African National Congress took over governance in South Africa, there was a well laid out infrastructure along with plans on how to maintain and expand it.

Since 1994, little has been done to expand the infrastructure of South Africa, and even less has been done to maintain it.

The railways system which extended throughout the country was partially collapsed, mostly through crime. Schools and other post school educational centers have closed down, hospitals have become a death trap, medical care has become a medium used to promote corruption, and where the roads are maintained, tolls are erected. The system whereby clean water was provided to the nation is in disrepair and has reached a critical stage of uncontrollable sewerage spills, and is discussed in Part 2 D – The Ecosystem of South Africa

Although money is allocated by government for the upkeep of the infrastructure in South Africa, such funds are not used for this purpose through negligence and corruption by the government municipalities and leadership.

In an article1 dated 30 October 2012 titled ‘DA raises concerns over funding for infrastructure’, it was mentioned that:

* With government debt approaching 40 percent of gross domestic product, there was little fiscal space for the National Treasury to finance the country’s R4 trillion infrastructure programme over the next 15 years, but to rely on state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which themselves were not capable of raising private funds
* The 2012 Budget review of public sector infrastructure expenditure for the last financial year indicated that 39 percent of the nearly R12bn budget for public private partnerships (PPPs) had remained unspent; 39 percent of the R143bn budget allocated to non-financial public enterprises, including Transnet and Eskom, was not used; and a mere R7.3bn or 4 percent of total public sector infrastructure expenditure was spent through PPP partnerships.
* Recent credit rating downgrades by Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s Investors Service of both Eskom and Transnet reflected their diminished capacity to raise funds, Ross added. S&P cited Transnet’s “extremely high” likelihood of extraordinary support from the state as the primary driver for the downgrade and the negative outlook. “According to the National Treasury, the cost of servicing debt will rise by 20 basis points or 0.2 percent as a result of the downgrades. When applied to a multibillion-rand corporate bond, this increase can become quite substantial,” Ross said.

While driving along South African roads, we find numerous large potholes, missing man hole covers, leaking water and neglected public amenities.

The DA made a full report of their findings of roads and potholes, and included pictures, to the media, as shown in Footnote 1 – DA report on Roads.

Vehicles as large as military trucks are falling into potholes in Johannesburg, of which photos were placed in the media in November 2011. 2

**2B1. ROADS**

South Africa has a vast land surface and usable roads are a necessity for every person in South Africa to survive.

**The government non-payment of its bills to maintain the roads has caused road maintenance companies to go into liquidation and is embarking on another business drive worth R3‚2-trillion**

Business Day reported an article3 titled ‘Samyati CEO lifts lid on the chaos that sank his firm’ dated 18 July 2012, the reason why roads are not maintained in South Africa was through systemic corruption and incompetence in provincial and municipal government, particularly in the Free State‚ KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo, where non-payment of government departments have forced the civil engineering and construction company, Sanyati Holdings, to be liquidated.

Sanyati Holdings was a listed company‚ employing about 2500 permanent and temporary staff. At that time it was still unclear whether the Free State government had acted legally in awarding contracts to Sanyati and other companies‚ because it knew it could not pay for the work.

Malcolm Lobban‚ who has now stepped down as Sanyati CEO‚ said an "unprecedented debacle" involving 23 road rehabilitation contracts awarded by the Free State department of police‚ roads and transport in 2010 was just the tip of the iceberg. He said rapid staff turnover at the Free State roads department had caused chaos. The three directors-general employed by the department had accused contractors of shoddy work and corruption‚ and had refused to pay. "Allegations that our work was shoddy are completely unfounded. It is corruption and incompetence‚ and if I had to choose one over the other‚ I would say corruption‚" Lobban said. He said SA’s ability to deliver infrastructure was being "compromised" by this state of affairs.

His remarks echo wide concern in business as the government prepares to embark on a big infrastructure drive‚ potentially worth R3‚2-trillion. Recognizing the threat‚ the Treasury has had the Free State roads department‚ most departments in Limpopo and some in Eastern Cape under national administration all of this year. But‚ Lobban said‚ this has led to little more than payments to service providers being suspended. "Any bank will tell you their client base is littered with this kind of problem — because the government has not paid timorously." He said contractors had been reduced to fighting "tooth and nail" to get paid‚ including by "appealing to morality". "But you are confronted with deceit‚ heavy-handedness and stringing along." He said a large number of contractors‚ big‚ medium and small‚ have been affected by "apparent" violations of the Public Finance Management Act by the Free State‚ and that "irregular and corrupt" behaviour was widespread. "The fact is they have been shuffling guys all over. All of Free State roads — from head of department down — were fired‚ all on allegations of corruption." Lobban said that by the end of last May‚ Sanyati had an 18-month outstanding claim of R43m from the Free State roads department‚ after having received R14m in part payment late last year. In desperation‚ he had personally asked the Treasury for payment‚ to no avail. He also said Sanyati executives had been "questioned" some months ago — "hearsay" indicated this had involved former police commissioner George Fivaz — and Sanyati had been given a clean bill of health. Listed engineering and construction contractors including Sanyati‚ Basil Read‚ Raubex and Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon (WBHO) have all been affected by protracted nonpayment issues‚ with the Limpopo government only paying contractors R280m after a direct appeal to President Jacob Zuma ‚ Mr. Lobban said. When Sanyati’s cash flow began to dry up in 2012‚ First National Bank froze its R80m overdraft. "Effectively we have been playing banker (to local government)"‚ Lobban said. Free State police‚ roads and transport MEC Butana Komphela had acted "positively"‚ but was "thrown a hospital pass".

Nonpayment to the Sanyati group included R14m by Limpopo‚ and three claims in KwaZulu-Natal amounting to R30m. Money had been "stolen" by an agent appointed by a south coast municipality in KwaZulu-Natal‚ despite "work legitimately performed‚ measured‚ certified and invoiced"‚ Lobban said. There were also carrying costs for the more than R850m second phase of the Western Aqueduct bulk water project supplying Durban‚ during a legal battle over the granting of the tender to an Esorfranki-Cycad Pipelines joint venture opposed by the Sanyathi Phambili joint venture.

Kobie Botha‚ group MD for the roads division of WBHO‚ said the Free State roads department had originally tendered 23 contracts‚ of which only 12 were carried out. These were spread between WBHO‚ in a joint venture with Edwin Construction‚ and Raubex‚ Basil Read and Sanyati‚ which won a single contract.

"Remember‚ you had to finance these things — it’s uncommon and that’s the cause of the problems‚" Botha said. He said the roads department had said it did not have money‚ and had asked contractors to design‚ finance and constructs the projects with "milestone" payments over four years. "They asked for a solution‚ so we gave them a solution. It was an opportunity‚ so we took it‚ with (the Free State) government as a client‚ but it turned out to be not so great‚" Botha said. When the roads department ran out of money and stopped paying‚ contractors "stopped working"‚ but retained a presence on each site to maintain safety. "We are continually trying to find a solution with the (Free State)‚ and are positive we are close to one. Once agreement is reached we will go back and complete the contracts." Free State roads department communications director Zolile Walaza said yesterday the department had entered into a four-year payment schedule ending in 2013-14 with 12 companies because there was not enough money and "the roads were dilapidated and in need of urgent work".

Walaza would not comment whether the payment schedule agreement complied with the Public Finance Management Act. However‚ a Treasury source close to the matter said last week that all the contracts contravened the act. Walaza said there was a difference between the amount that Sanyati claimed was completed and the amount contained in a report of technical experts‚ which included forensic agents from the Treasury‚ the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the national Department of Transport. He said the Sanyati project had not been completed‚ but the department was meeting the firm tomorrow to "try and convince (them) to accept the settlement".

**The African National Congress in government lent Zimbabwe $148 million USD for “road upgrades” during February 2013 but does not maintain its own roads and is forcing South Africans to pay Open Road Toll fees for the maintenance on roads which were built with tax payer’s money**

South Africans are reeling from the shock demand by government for them to purchase E-tags to facilitate them with payment of toll fees on existing open roads which were built with tax payer’s money. Yet the Development Bank (which is wholly owned by the South African government), lent Zimbabwe $148 million USD (R1.4 billion) for "road upgrades“ during February 2013.4

Top of Form

They have also approved providing an additional loan facility for idealization of the Norton to Kadoma road in Zimbabwe. The contractor working on the Plumtree-Harare-Mutare road was expected to finish work, which included installation of nine solar powered state-of-the-art toll plazas, by April 2014. Other toll gates that had been constructed countrywide were being modified to enable electronic tolling. Modification of the structures was expected to be complete by April 2013, with the hope to capitalize on the computerization and increase toll gate revenue from 84 million US dollars realized in 2012 to 90 million US dollars in 2013.

**(2B1I) POTHOLES**

**The government’s arrogance on the repair of potholes is costing the nation their lives and wastes the tax payers money**

South African roads are riddled with potholes, including major metropolitan areas. The increasing number of dangerous potholes are not only putting lives at risk through accidents and causing damage to vehicles, as well as risking the lives of travelers who are stranded along the roadside after having an accident due to the potholes; but are also resulting in a number of civil claims against the state following injuries, thus placing a further burden on the public purse.

This is a direct result of the ANC-led government's lax attitude towards effecting repairs to South Africa's road maintenance backlog which currently stands at R38.3-billion.

The typical cost of maintaining a road, when maintenance is done timorously, is R100 000 per kilometre. If the road is left for three years, the cost rises to R600 000, and if the road is left for a further five years, it will rise to R1.8 million per kilometre.  A bad road also costs motorists twice as much in time, safety and operational costs as a good one.

## **On the 28th of February 2010, in a media article3 called “**Pothole crisis: National audit of South African roads is crucial”, the Democratic Alliance (DA) called for a national audit of the South African road network to be carried out as a matter of urgency after state-of-the-province addresses had revealed haphazard and insufficient budgetary allocations for the solution of the pothole crisis faced by the country's metropolitan areas.

## It was estimated that between 1988 and 1999, the percentage of the road network in a good or very good condition fell from 75% to 33%. A more recent report emanating from the AA in November 2008 indicated that about 60% of national or provincial roads are in a poor or very poor condition compared to about 22% ten years earlier.

## The DA reported that the current policy employed by the ANC-government with regard to the maintenance of the road network was based on inaccurate figures, and was also inadequate, stating that, “government policy cannot be determined on estimations and outdated data, but must be based on concrete and factual data.”

The DA pointed out that no dedicated allocation of state funds to uphold the infrastructure in the country means money is spent elsewhere instead of on roads. This system diverted funds away from road maintenance and created the current neglect and deterioration.The article referred to a case in point which involved a former chef who's suing the government for R1.1-million after she lost her hand and part of her forearm in an accident when the taxi she was travelling in hit a pothole in 2005. Instead of repairing this pothole, which would have cost an estimated R500, R5.3-million was instead spent on tarring a road leading to the residence of the then Minister of Transport, Sbu Ndebele, Premier of Kwazulu-Natal.
In response to this lawsuit, the head of the Kwazulu-Natal Transport department, Chris Hlabisa, was quoted as saying that people should stop suing the Transport Department for injuries and damages caused by potholes and instead they should be grateful that they have roads to travel on. Hlabisa's statement was indicative of the disregard of the duty placed on the state to protect the rights of those using South Africa's public roads to dignity, life and security.
South Africa's current road maintenance backlog of R38.3-billion exists, as correctly pointed out by Hlabisa, because "…roads have now exceeded their lifespan of 25 years… we haven't had significant funding towards improving the road network."
Contrary to Hlabisa's assertions that people should stop suing the state for their neglect in carrying out repairs timorously, the fact is that they are indeed correct in doing so. The Constitution places a duty on the state to ensure that reasonable measures are in place to provide for the safety and security of all South Africans, including those using the country's roads. The fact that the ANC-government has neglected to ensure this safety by carrying out continuous repairs on roads constitutes a flouting of this Constitutional imperative and people affected by this must exercise their right to relief.

**(2B1II) Bridges are not maintained in South Africa**

The average life expectancy of a bridge is 20 years, yet in South Africa there are various bridges throughout the country which are much older than that, and which are not maintained. This poses a risk to the lives of people who use the bridge and who pass under the bridge, including vehicles and trains.

On 11 November 2011, IOL news media reported6 a pedestrian bridge between the M7 Edwin Swales Drive and the M1 Higginson Highway, south of Durban, had collapsed. About twenty vehicles collided after the fall of the bridge, and several people were seriously injured.

**2C. ELECTRICITY**

 During Apartheid, South Africa sold most of the extra generated electricity to other African countries as they had an over-supply of cheap, abundant electricity. Today the ANC can't even supply enough electricity to keep the country going, and electricity black-outs under the cloak of ‘load sharing’ are common across the country. The electricity supply of South Africa is discussed further in Attachment 27 - Humanitarian atrocities committed by the Crown against southern Africans, Section 3.1 Eskom.

**2D. HEALTH STRUCTURES**

**(2DI) PUBLIC HEALTH FUNDS STOLEN BY TOP HEALTH OFFICIALS**

In August 2012, the *Sowetan Live* reported in an article 5 called “SIU probes R1bn health dept fraud’, on investigations involving fraudulent cases in which more than R1 BLLION, earmarked to provide medical services to the public, had disappeared. Under investigation was a current chief director, a former head of department and a former chief financial officer of the South African Health Department. The three had made improper payments of R15.3-million, R1.2-million and R681, 916 to service providers. The investigation by SIU commenced only in 2010 after a private forensic firm had reported the fraud in 2008 already. The SIU conducted over 460 interviews and obtained 296 statements from witnesses who included department officials.

The unit identified 10 procurement deals worth over R1-billion pertaining to contracts entered into by the health department for the supply of various services. In one incident, a service provider was paid R11-million in duplicate payments. Barely R1 million has been recovered.

**(2DII) MEDICAL SMART CARD**

At any given day in South Africa, you will find people lining up for medical care. Shortly before the 2008 elections, the African National Congress in government announced the introduction of a smart card, which would contain the medical history of patients, and was intended to cut waiting periods at the state hospitals and clinics,

During the pilot phase, more than R200 million of tax payer’s money disappeared, and soon after the elections, in 2009, the smart card project was discontinued followed up as the subject of investigation by the Special Investigating Unit, which began in May 2010.

The tender for the project was not awarded to the lowest tender, but to KOPM Logistics, which is owned by Dr Peter Matseke, for a staggering R609-million. In fact, the KOPM Logistics' bid was R104-million higher than Lifesense Clinics' bid, which stood at R505-million, and R169-million higher than the Price Waterhouse Coopers Consortium's bid, which was R440-million.

The smart card was piloted at Diepkloof Clinic and the Lillian Ngoyi Community Health Centre in Soweto and at the Sebokeng Hospital.

In a February 2010 parliamentary written reply to the DA, Minister of Health Aaron Motsoaledi stated that, "Many contracts allowed for payments to consultants before services were actually delivered and in some cases, contracts were awarded and payments were made without any subsequent completion of projects. For example, more than R200-million was paid for a Health Information System (HIS) and a smart-card system that never materialised."6

Senior health officials sought an in-camera meeting with members of the Gauteng legislature's Scopa to explain how the money had been spent, but the meeting was not held.

**2E. ROADS**

**(2EI) E TOLL SYSTEM**

Another African National Congress in government scam is the e-Toll controversy, where the African National Congress has used State pension money to fund an R20billion road upgrade in Johannesburg. The African National Congress, eager to continue with their pillaging of the country, set up a front company called SANRAL. SANRAL funded the upgrade with R20 billion from the State pension funds, without their permission - an upgrade which was supposed to be part of the infrastructure plans of the 2010 Soccer World Cup. After this vast spendathon on already built roads, the government informed everyone that the 'new' roads would be toll roads with an e-Toll money collection system. Everyone is now naturally outraged as tax payers have already paid for these roads via the still existing road fund. Now they have to pay twice, the second time via toll monies, collected by SANRAl. Once SANRAL pays back the borrowed pension monies, they pocket the interest for the rest of their lives.

COSATU - the biggest labour union in South Africa, and also a government partner of the African National Congress - acted all outraged and shouted for strikes and mass action....only until it was revealed that they were part of the SANRAL consortium. They then postponed any strike action against the toll road for a month for the court case they had made against SANRAL to be resolved, claiming insufficient funds to continue action against E-tolling, and asking public donations of no less than R1 million to enable them continue their court action.

Furthermore, SANRAL have appointed a Swedish company to run the e-Toll system to the tune of over an R1billion PER YEAR in 'collection' costs.

**(2EII) FUEL LEVY FOR ROAD MAINTENANCE FUND**

Years ago, under the Apartheid government, the South African government set up a road fund which was funded by a fuel levy. As a result, South Africa had world-class roads throughout the country. When the African National Congress came into power they stole all the money from these types of funds which were set up to maintain the existing infrastructure.

**2F. SPORT FACILITES**

Taking part in sports was compulsory at schools pre 1994. Government schools were equipped with athletic fields, indoor sport facilities, and very often swimming pools and tennis courts. After 1994, sports has become neglected and most schools do not offer sports anymore, not only because of a lack of facilities, but also a lack of teachers who are capable and prepared to train children in various sporting activities.

**(2FI) SOCCER WORLD CUP STADIUMS**

The Soccer World Cup which was hosted by South Africa in 2010 left the nation with unnecessary expenditure and government officials, along with their FIFA partners, with great personal gain. Profits from hosting the world cup were earmarked to improve the soccer facilities in South Africa, but most of this funding has been misspent.

On the 3rd of July 1992, South Africa had its membership 7 of the Football International Federation Association (FIFA) reinstated. The reinstatement was motivated by the government of South Africa's release of all political prisoners and the open negotiation process of all political parties in South Africa.

South Africa won the bid to host the 2010 Soccer World Cup. This hosting became a source by which the African National Congress leadership in government stole from the nations’ tax payers, and rewarded FIFA substantially

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) published its findings four months before the event in *Player and Referee: Conflicting Interests and the FIFA World Cup, 8*written by award-winning investigative journalists from South Africa and the UK, in which it reported the following:

* FIFA “strong-armed” members forced Cape Town officials to build Green Point stadium. It cost R3 billion more than the two alternatives, there was no pre-existing need for the stadium and it will probably become a white elephant. The cost of erecting soccer stadiums for a once-off event exceeds the benefits for local communities, and the long-term financial viability of several stadiums remains questionable.
* Match Event Services, the official hotel and ticketing provider, was awarded its contract by FIFA without public bidding. It marked up room costs by 30% and is controlled by a British family, meaning a “large chunk” of the profits from hotel accommodation will not stay in South Africa.
* One of the shareholders of Match Hospitality, which has exclusive rights to offer hospitality packages to corporate clients, is the FIFA president’s nephew.
* There was very little in the form of competitive bidding for lucrative stadium construction contracts in South Africa.
* The steel industry is suspected of price-fixing, resulting in significant cost increases in the building of arenas and other infrastructure.
* An impact assessment of the World Cup on South Africa’s domestic economy stated “FIFA is the major beneficiary, while South Africa carries a disproportionate share of the cost burden”.
* The 2010 World Cup is estimated to generate an income of between $3.2 and $4 billion for FIFA. In addition, all revenues from television ($2 billion), marketing ($1 billion), hospitality ($120 million) and licensing ($80 million) go to FIFA and its local organising committee. The South African event is projected as the largest of all World Cups thus far, generating more revenue than any other before it. South Africa has paid out $5 billion getting the Rainbow Nation ready, while FIFA has spent $1.1 billion.

Journalist Andrew Jennings said of FIFA that, “If corruption is defined as the abuse of public office for private gain then, in my opinion, FIFA has created a model of institutionalized global corruption.”

A year later, FIFA president Sepp Blatter boasted of FIFA’s record £1.24 BILLION (R12billion) profit from the 2010 soccer tournament event held in South Africa. The mere the £50million (R550million) promised by FIFA to South Africa as a reward for hosting the tournament through the so-called 2010 Legacy Programme had not yet been forthcoming. This is nothing less than exploitation.

The bill to the South African taxpayer for the 2010 Soccer World Cup tournament far exceeded the proposed estimate of R2.3 billion. The taxpayer bill amounted to R17.4 billion for South Africans, who live in a country which still struggles to provide housing, electricity and running water in many parts. Irrespective of such dire needs, FIFA said the World Cup's legacy money would focus on developing the grassroots of football as well as education, health and social projects.

In June 2011, The Sun reported in an article 9 called ‘The Lost Legacy Fund: FIFA Still Owe South Africa R550m after Record World Cup’ that Fund spokesman Greg Fredericks confirmed, "None of the £50million has been spent—not one cent. The money is still in Zurich. The delay is simply down to the amount of time it takes to establish legally recognized bodies for handling this amount of money."

The Sun also quoted lawyer Richard Spoor—representing locals in Matsafeni, where the 41,000-seater Mbombela Stadium was built on land belonging to the local people—as saying, "Even now there's no adequate water supply and the living conditions are totally unsanitary. The roads are unpaved and there's no proper sewage system. The conditions are unhealthy and frankly quite deplorable."

After FIFA president Blatter confirmed that the funds were administered by accountants Ernst and Young, of which only £10m of the £60m fund had been used - to build the extravagant South Africa Football Association (SAFA) building next to the Soccer City – Britain’s best-selling tabloid The Sun quoted shadow Culture, Media and Sport Secretary Ivan Lewis as saying, "This is another example of poor leadership. South Africa faces many challenges and FIFA should release the money as a matter of urgency."

Labour MP Michael Dugher added, "FIFA is a shameful shambles. It made a vast sum from South Africa and has a duty to plough that money back as soon as possible." 10

The Sun further reported that the High Court has to rubber-stamp the setting up of a trust to decide how to distribute the remaining cash, and that best estimates predicted a further five-month wait for any payout from the Legacy fund—while the cash remains in FIFA’s Swiss bank accounts gaining interest.

In January 2013, *The Guardian* referred to the World Cup legacy fund in an article titled ‘Revealing the “true beneficiaries” in which it pointed out the following figures:
*£2bn: the cost to South African tax-payers of hosting the tournament; £394m: FIFA's tax-free profit.*

The article also quoted FIFA representative Danny Jordaan referring to the £32m FIFA World Cup legacy fund which has been spent thus far on "social welfare" projects, as stating that it is “a source of "pride and optimism … Our assault on poverty, unemployment and inequality is gaining momentum!" In response to the media questions about the 26 Mercedes-Benz cars which were purchased from the legacy fund for South African Football Association executives, Jordaan said the questions about the purchase were misguided, and asked, "How do you expect them to get around seeing their constituents when they don't have any transport?" 11

On the 28th of April 2013, *Sport24* reported in an article 12 titled ‘SA’s SWC legacy under threat’ that, “The now-dysfunctional South African Football Association (SAFA) is facing serious financial difficulties and may have "dipped into" FIFA's World Cup legacy money to keep it "afloat."

This follows the concerns raised in The Sunday Times report over the use of around $12m (R109m) of World Cup money, which was separate to the main legacy fund, and had moved to SAFA's accounts over the past two years.

The newspaper also reported that SAFA had just $318 000 (R2.9m) in the bank at the end of the financial year in 2012. The newspaper said it had seen figures from an audit of SAFA's accounts for the year up to June 2012, which showed the federation had made a loss of R54.5m rand and "burned cash" when it was struggling with diminished sponsorship.

It has also been reported that there has been a lot of commodities which came from the World Cup legacy has been wasted. In excess of 60 Hyundai busses the corporation had donated for development to SAFA have not been in use since 2010. Of the funds, money was made available to kill an official who wanted a clearer investigation into the Mbombela Stadium in Mpumalanga.

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**FOOTNOTES:**

**Footnote 1: DA report on Roads.**

DA report on potholes crisis: Johannesburg and Durban reaching tipping point

On Tuesday 2 February and Wednesday 3 February, the Democratic Alliance visited the Johannesburg and Durban metropolis respectively, with the purpose of investigating the condition of each city's roads and the infrastructure related to it. Today we present a photographic report on those visits and put forward a series of proposals to help solve the problem.

All the photos accompanying this report, as well as the presentation made to the media are available on the DA's Media Centre ([www.damediacentre.co.za](http://www.damediacentre.co.za/)). This report should be read in conjunction with those photos.

We undertook the visit for three reasons:

First, and perhaps most importantly, because the condition of the country's roads are of concern to every commuter and affect all South Africans, directly or indirectly. We rely on them for our safety and as a means to get from one place to another. Both of those factors mean roads are critical to the day-to-day lives of millions of citizens - the DA believes they should be the gateway to opportunity and thus, safe and well maintained.

Second, because this particular issue is now firmly established in the public mind as cause for serious concern. In the Johannesburg media, the debate around the conditions of that metro's roads in particular is reaching fever point and, in Durban, the situation has been put on the front pages by the recent court application, brought before the High Court, in which a commuter, permanently injured when the taxi she was travelling in hit a pothole and crashed, successfully held the provincial administration liable for the incident.

Third, because, as Helen Suzman famously stated, the best way to represent the interests of the public is to ‘go and see for yourself' and, in this particular case, the nature of the problem lends itself to on-site inspection.

What the DA found was deeply alarming. It is perfectly clear that, in both cities, years of neglect and poor planning have generated a problem that is as wide spread as it is acute. Outside of major arteries (although a number of these were also severely compromised) there are potholes everywhere and a general degradation of road infrastructure on an enormous scale. Only with urgent action and a carefully thought through plan, can the problem be countered. We are at a tipping point, where we have one of two options: take dramatic and urgent action to arrest the exponential decline, or continue on as normal and risk generating an infrastructure backlog that is impossible to reverse.

**What the DA Found**

For ease of reference, this report is divided in a number of sections, each one of which is designed to demonstrate a particular aspect of the general infrastructure decline and the extent to which it is now manifesting.

**General**

The DA photographed over a 100 potholes. We focused only on the worst of the worst. This is an important point because, while this report identifies some of the most dramatic examples, what it does not do is properly convey the general condition of the roads, which, in most cases, was in a state of advanced decline. If potholes themselves had not yet manifested, the tar was stripping away, there was wide spread scarring and significant wear and tear was evident around every corner.

**Johannesburg and Durban.**

The situation in Johannesburg was more acute than it was in Durban, but that is not to suggest that things were far better in KwaZulu-Natal. The difference is relative. That said, in the areas the DA inspected, the problem was widespread and dramatic and the decay was everywhere. Significantly, the various ‘potholes' fell into two distinct categories: those that had occurred naturally - through neglect and time - and those that were the consequence of some or other man made intervention - most commonly, a strip of tar had been removed for repair work and never replaced.

Very often the problem was most serious off the main arteries, those suburban roads that form the greatest proportion of any city's total road network.

Between Johannesburg and Durban, the DA visited the following areas: Parkview, Melville, Dunkeld, Houghton, Forrest Town, Parkhurst, Northcliff, Killarney, Rosebank, Blairgowrie, Greenside, Emmerentia, Peter Place, Westcliff, Durban North, Ntuzuma, Umgeni, Umgeni Heights, Yellow Wood Park, Woodhaven, Austerville, Morningside, KwaMashu and Inanda.

‘**Natural' Potholes.**

These were more numerous than those caused by human intervention and more serious. A natural pothole occurs after a substantial period of time and neglect and, unlike a man-made pothole - which needn't be a reflection of the general condition of the road in which it occurs - more often than not means that there is a serious and fundamental problem with that road's upkeep. Very often the base below the road has been allowed to wash away, because a pothole has not been repaired, which exponentially increases the cost of any rehabilitation, because a larger section of the road needs to be dug up and replaced. In extreme circumstances, the pothole becomes a sinkhole, with the entire road collapsing.

Here one pothole stands out in particular, in Bolton Road, in Rosebank. A major artery, not five minutes go by without, at least, 30 cars passing along it. The pothole is obscured by a bend in the road and every second car hits it. It is deep and severely dangerous, and typifies the problem.

**Man Made Potholes**

Unfortunately, these too were everywhere. There were those that appeared to be fairly recent, and those that had been left for such a long period of time, they had taken on a natural degradation of their own, no doubt at an exponentially faster pace, because they had been given an initial ‘boost', so to speak. One of the most common forms of this kind of pothole is what I have referred to as a ‘trench' - a strip of tar cut out right across a road, for a pipe to be laid or dug up - only to be left unsealed.

It is significant that, in every photo taken by the DA, not one shows any sign of municipal work -men or women on the job, acting to repair the problem. The problem has become so serious that a number of drive time radio shows have taken to setting up a grid on Google Maps, to identify potholes in Johannesburg. It currently shows over 500.

**Missing Manhole Covers**

In both Johannesburg and Durban, but particularly in Johannesburg, there were a great many manhole covers missing. These took all shapes and sizes and, often occurred in key interchanges and roads with a great deal of traffic. No doubt the consequence of theft; they constitute a real and serious threat to any vehicle that might hit them.

**Leaking Water**

On repeated occasions, we witnessed municipal water points simply spewing out what appeared to be a never-ending stream of water down a road or across an intersection; we counted at least ten such examples in a single day. The cost to the city in water wasted must be enormous. Further, endless running water acts to increase the degradation of a pothole or road, wearing away tar and the base. We will be asking parliamentary questions to each of the Water Boards, to try and establish how much water the main metros lose, and the cost, in this regard.

Here it is worth mentioning the pothole in Glenhove Road, just outside Houghton, on the bridge crossing over the M1. Not only is the pothole enormous (a combination of natural decay and then, on top of it, municipal intervention) but, not ten meters away from it, huge amounts of water are actually seeping through the tar itself (as opposed to from a particular water point). That bridge constitutes a very serious public hazard, not only to those cars travelling on it, but to those cars travelling below it on the M1.

Other Decay - Signs, Pavements, Lights Not Working, Traffic Lights Out

There were plenty of other signs of infrastructure degradation: traffic signs collapsing, lamp posts collapsed, street lights not working and pavements left ripped up, or with often with huge holes in them, manmade and natural. Of particular concern is the number of traffic lights out on any given day. And here, once again, Johannesburg seemed to experience the problem more dramatically than Durban. Any one of the key local news stations would report up to 15 sets of traffic lights out on any given day, some for days at a time. The DA saw at least seven sets out on the day it was visiting.

**Forrest Town**

One suburb visited by the DA deserves special mention: Forrest Town in Johannesburg's Northern Suburbs. Home to President Jacob Zuma, it is rife with potholes, leaking water, missing manhole covers and broken signage. Some of the biggest and certainly a great many of the most substantial potholes occurred in this area, a good illustration perhaps, of the fact that the problem is literally on the President's doorstep. We took some pictures of huge potholes within 100 meters of his private house. And that is not the only high profile building to have to deal with the problem. The road outside the American Embassy in Killarney (home to President Mbeki) has two huge potholes; so does the suburb of Houghton (home to Nelson Mandela and the Nelson Mandela Foundation).

**The Worst 15**

From those hundred or so potholes photographed by the DA, we have identified the 15 worst. To do this, we took into account both their location - that is, if they are on a major carriageway or a road with a great deal of traffic - and their size (often a signal of the amount of neglect that caused them in the first place).

The worst 15 are as follows:

1. Bolton Road (Rosebank, Johannesburg): Hidden from oncoming traffic, if you watch down Bolton Road you can see cars hitting it at speed on a regular basis.

2. Riviera Road (Killarney, Johannesburg): A mini sinkhole, across the road from the American Embassy, closer inspection suggests a large part of the road has worn away beneath it.

3. Kenville Road (Umgeni Heights, Durban): With an ANC election poster hanging over it, and on an incredibly steep hill, it has already been the cause of a number of serious accidents.

4. North East Road (KwaMashu Highway, Durban): Riddled with potholes from one end to the other, this entire stretch deserves a mention, on a double lane highway, the risk of serious accidents is acute. [[Picture](http://www.mailfire.co.za/link/QlJVTj0xNjUwMiZMSUQ9Njc1MDAmU0lEPTkzNDY5NQ%3D%3D.aspx)]

5. Glenhove Drive (Killarney, Johannesburg): The biggest one of them all; started out small and then grew and grew. A natural pothole that has become a crater after municipal intervention. We call it, ‘The Big Hole'. Most disturbingly, it is on a bridge over the M1.

6. 7th Street (Parkhurst, Johannesburg): Bigger than a car.

7. Hamilton Avenue (Parkhurst, Johannesburg) A cascade of (public) water flows almost non-stop down this road and, from the top to the bottom, there are a myriad of potholes, each one developing at an exponential rate.

8. Cowell Road (Forrest Town, Johannesburg): A block or two from the President's private residence, this monster takes up so much of the road one has to go into the oncoming traffic lane to get round it.

9. Kafue Road (Emmerentia, Johannesburg): A tree has started to grow out of it.

10. Dukuzu Road (KwaMashu, Durban): At the bottom of a dip, a road used almost exclusively by taxis, this huge trench is a very serious threat.

11. Thorn Road (Austerville, Durban): A huge, half man-made, half naturally developed scar that takes up a third of the road. The metal water point that sticks out of the middle of it is particularly dangerous.

12. River Street (Killarney, Johannesburg): Another huge pothole, just down the road from the American Embassy.

13. Greenside Road (Emmerentia, Johannesburg): Much like the River Street pothole, no doubt the creation of some long-forgotten municipal intervention, after the rain it resembles a small lake, easily as big as a small car.

14. Woolraad Road (Austerville, Durban): Not strictly a pothole. Just the small matter of a large section of the road itself gone missing.

15. The Valley Road (Westcliff, Johannesburg): A major linking road that runs from Jan Smuts down to Melville, this humdinger is currently protected by a single traffic beacon, and has been for about a month.

**How the Problem Occurred**

Prior to 1994, money allocated to the provinces for road maintenance and upkeep was effectively ring-fenced. That is, a certain amount of money was set aside specifically for this purpose and could not be used for anything else. It is true that this money was often grossly misallocated, but the principle of a dedicated allocation existed. This usually came from funds derived from the fuel levy and in the form of direct grants.

Post 1994 the system was changed and an equitable share was allocated to each province to be divided up and spent as that province saw fit. The same scenario applied to cities and large metropolitans (which collected their money from rates). No dedicated allocation meant money was spent elsewhere. As roads were not seen as an urgent requirement, money that was traditionally used for this purpose was diverted elsewhere and so a situation was created whereby this key element of our infrastructure was neglected and allowed to deteriorate.

The problem with this kind of neglect, is that the problem increases exponentially. If a road is not properly maintained and problems addressed as and when they occur, the cost of repairing the problem, as it grows, increases exponentially too. And so, the more it is neglected, the harder the problem is to overcome. The estimated total cost of our road infrastructure backlog (on national and provincial roads alone) currently stands at R126 billion. If that problem is to be reversed, we drastically and urgently need to rethink the way in which we allocate our fiscus. The situation in our metros and municipalities is equally problematic, with backlogs estimated in the region of R38 billion. In other words, across all three spheres of government, we face an estimated backlog of around R164 billion. And that underspending, cumulated over years, is now starting to manifest in very real and dangerous terms, for South African commuters.

**What the DA Proposes**

The DA proposes the following:

A dedicated road maintenance fund sourced primarily from the fuel levy

A percentage of toll road profits must go towards community development or to subsidize rural transport.

Mobile weighbridges to regulate and penalize overloading by heavy duty vehicles

A dedicated Fund for Road Maintenance will help to ensure a regular supply of funds to gradually eliminate backlog Nationally and Provincially. This fund will be the prime responsibility of a special Department of Roads and Safety within the Ministry to deal with the backlog and continued maintenance. R30bn has already been approved as a five year holding strategy to prevent further deterioration of the road system and address the most critical needs. This leaves a major maintenance and improvement backlog of R96 billion.

The DA will also support and accelerate the government's newly established plan, to dedicate a portion of the income derived from fuel used in each metro, to that metro, and extend this initiative on a phased basis to local municipalities.

The DA will invest an additional R15bn a year for six years, making use of:

The existing fuel levy, in addition to toll income and other traffic-related income sources, which together currently contribute R26bn to the fiscus each year.

State funding in the form of conditional grants

Public Private Partnerships

Concessions

State-guaranteed money market loans

Public works programs as part of poverty relief and job creation projects

Vehicle license fees and fines.

International loans

A thorough national pavement condition

To encourage increased use of railways, through a levy on heavy duty vehicles, based on load and route.

The fundamental problem facing the Treasury right now is how to ensure that money is properly spent on those key elements of our infrastructure that have been neglected for so long. A dedicated fund for road maintenance is a way of ensuring that money is spent in this regard and not simply allocated elsewhere.

We will continue to influence the DoT and the Treasury to increase revenue flows into these infrastructure asset maintenance programs, in accordance with our alternative budget.

Statement issued by Stuart Farrow, MP, Democratic Alliance shadow minister of transport, February 10 2010

<http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71654?oid=159937&sn=Detail>

**Part 2 C. The Economy of the Nation.**

In South Africa there is a very high percentage of people who live below the bread line, and have no basic needs such as running water, electricity, toilets, homes, schools, transport and skills training facilities. Yet, the African National Congress in government are squandering the wealth of the nation on their own personal enrichment, through negligence, inefficiency, and corruption.

**CORRUPTION**

In September 2012, the *Volksblad* reported in an article 1 called ‘Korrupsie van R675 mjd skok’ (Corruption of R675 billion shock) that the R675 billion estimated loss through corruption which South Africa has suffered since 1994, was only the tip of the iceberg. Paul Hoffman, director of the Institute of Responsibility in southern Africa, issued this warning at the Cape Town University in a speech delivered with regards to the impact of corruption on poverty. He was the speaker at the national conference for strategies against poverty and inequality,

The amount of R675 billion is based on the figures of the government itself in that the country looses R30 billion annually due to corrupt activities.

Hoffman said further that the amount of energy which is used to hide corruption in something such as the weapons transaction, also does permanent damage to the structures of the country. The efforts by the government to curb corruption are not enough, but trips up its ability to finance the welfare of the country through which poverty can be reduced. Hoffman reported that “Should tender fraud and corruption be eradicated, there would already be R30 million per year more to invest in such aims.”

Some people who attended the conference referred to a war which is waging in South Africa between the values as written into the Constitution and the values as set out in the national democratic revolution of the ANC. Hoffman said that a clean state service could be a buffer against corruption, should it be managed according to the values as set out in the Constitution, but these constitutional values have practically died, and explained that, “There is cadre employment which is not only illegal, but not sustainable. When cadres are employed, conflict of interest will arise automatically as such a cadre will protect his position at any cost,” and he added that, “In such a system people are chosen who consider themselves responsible to the political party base, rather than to the voters.”

Hoffman again was making preparations for the Van Zyl Slabbert report in which the proportional representation in the vote system was broached.

**CORRUPT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS**

The full extent of corruption in government is not known, neither are the names of all the corrupt officials. Most often, irregularities by government officials are kept under wraps, and/or charges brought against them are iced or dismissed. However, when we look at the leadership of the African National Congress, the information which is available to the public, gives a shocking picture.

The national executive committee (NEC) is the highest decision-making body between conferences of the African National Congress.

In December 2012, the ANC elected a new 80-member national executive committee (NEC) at its Mangaung conference. *City Press* opened the closets of the new NEC members and the governing party’s top six officials and found that 24 (28%) senior ANC members either had criminal records, had been disciplined or moved from their jobs, or had bad governance clouds hanging over their heads. In an article called “The ANC’s naughty executive committee” the following was revealed wherein \*Indicates ranking in the NEC vote:

CRIMINAL RECORDS

1. Bathabile Dlamini (12\*, fraud)

The social development minister pleaded guilty to fraud in October 2006 in the Travelgate case. She abused the parliamentary travel system as an MP and defrauded Parliament of R254 000. Dlamini was slapped with a five-year suspended sentence and fined R120 000, payable over two years

6. Tony Yengeni (65\*, fraud)

One of two people convicted of arms deal-related offences, Yengeni, the ANC’s former chief whip, pleaded guilty to defrauding Parliament in February 2003. He failed to declare a 47% discount he received on a Mercedes-Benz 4X4 from a weapons company. He served about five months of his four-year sentence

MOVED, RESIGNED OR CENSURED

11. Angie Motshekga (35\*, censured)

The basic education minister was reprimanded in 2004 after an investigation found she had a “close relationship” with a company that won a government tender to pay out government grants. Her husband, and former Gauteng premier, Mathole, was also a director of the company

UNDER A CLOUD

16. Jacob Zuma - President (corruption, arms deal and Nkandlagate)

Zuma faces fresh probes in 2013 relating to his corruption case, his role in the arms deal and the more than R200 million splurge on his Nkandla homestead. Charges of corruption, racketeering, money laundering and fraud were withdrawn against the president in April 2009 after the emergence of the so-called Zuma “spy tapes” But the DA has been fighting . to review the decision to stop Zuma’s prosecution. This year the party will go to court to force Zuma and the NPA to hand over the tapes. The president will also be mentioned in the arms deal commission that gets under way in March. Judge Hilary Squires found that Schabir Shaik negotiated a bribe for Zuma from French arms dealer Thales.

CLEARED

20. Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula (17\*, Travelgate)

The minister of defense and her husband, Charles, were also embroiled in the Travelgate scandal, but were never charged. They were allowed to pay back more than R300 000 to the liquidators of Bathong Travel

26. Nomvula Mokonyane (25\*, tender irregularity)

In 2011 Madonsela cleared Mokonyane of using her influence to award a tender, to beautify a Gauteng highway, to a private company. The company submitted a proposal to her office, but she referred it to the roads and transport department

2. Jackson Mthembu (15\*, drunk driving and contempt of court)

The ANC spokesperson pleaded guilty to a charge of contempt of court in 2002 after ignoring a R500 traffic fine. In 2010 he pleaded guilty to driving drunk at 7am in a bus lane in Cape Town. In his previous career, as an MEC in Mpumalanga, Mthembu spent government money on ANC trips, didn’t follow protocol for the purchase of 10 BMWs and crashed a state vehicle without having a driver’s license

7. Winnie Madikizela-Mandela (79\*, fraud and kidnapping)

The “mother of the nation” has escaped jail twice for fraud and kidnapping. In 1991 she was charged with the murder of teenager Stompie Seipei. She was acquitted of murder but was convicted of his kidnapping and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. She appealed the sentence and it was overturned to a R15 000 fine. It was revealed recently that the NPA would soon exhume the remains of Lolo Sono and Siboniso Tshabalala, two other teenagers whose deaths were also linked to her Mandela United Football Club. In 2001 Madikizela-Mandela was convicted on 43 counts of fraud after obtaining loans for non-existent ANC Women’s League employees. She was sentenced to five years in prison, but succeeded, on appeal, to have her sentence suspended for five years

21. Zoleka Capa-Langa (44\*, agriculture)

The Eastern Cape Agriculture MEC faces questions of a conflict of interest relating to her husband, Mncedisi Zungula, who is the CEO of the Ntinga Development Agency. It was revealed in September last year that Capa-Langa’s department gave R5 million to Ntinga for an agriculture project in the Alfred Nzo District Municipality. Ntinga is only supposed to provide services to the OR Tambo District Municipality

12. Tina Joemat-Pettersson (39\*, censured)

In November last year Public Protector Thuli Madonsela asked President Jacob Zuma to reprimand Joemat Pettersson for violating the executive ethics code. This related to business class flights worth R150 000 the minister, her two children and their au pair undertook from Sweden to SA, sponsored by the state. Joemat-Pettersson told Madonsela she had to cut her trip short after being recalled by Zuma to assist with his wedding

27. Maite Nkoana-Mashabane (30\*, fishy security)

Parliament’s ethics committee couldn’t find any wrongdoing by the international relations minister after it was revealed Premier Fishing had paid R100 000 to a security company to secure her house in Polokwane. The committee found the security deal was entered into between her brother and the security company

22. Joyce Mashamba (50\*, nepotism)

probe into Nkandlagate is expected to reveal what role the president played in approving the multimillion-rand upgrades to his private residence The former Limpopo sports, arts and culture MEC irregularly appointed her son to the human resources unit in her department. In 2006 the Public Service Commission declared his appointment null and void

28. Billy Masetlha (32\*, hoax emails)

The former spy boss was acquitted of fraud in January 2009 after being charged in the so called “hoax email” trial. Masetlha was accused of masterminding a scheme to manufacture fake emails that purported to prove a political conspiracy against Zuma

3. Enoch Godongwana (19\*, drunk driving)

The head of the ANC’s economic transformation committee was convicted of drunk driving in 2003 after he was twice over the legal limit while driving and refused to undergo a breathalyzer test. He received a suspended three-year sentence and was fined R8 000 or 200 days in jail. Godongwana and his wife are also suspects in a Hawks investigation into the disappearance of R100 million from the pension fund of the SA Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union. Last year a commission of inquiry found they were party to fraudulent or reckless trading

13. Bheki Cele (54\*, fired)

In June 2012 Zuma fired Cele as chief of police after a judicial commission of inquiry found he was unfit for office. Zuma appointed Judge Jakes Moloi to probe Cele’s actions after Public Protector Thuli Madonsela found he acted unlawfully when signing multimillion-rand leasing deals. Moloi found Cele knew the landlord, Roux Shabangu, and pushed for his buildings to be rented. Cele is fighting his axing

17. Baleka Mbete - Chair (dodgy driver’s license)

To avoid long queues, Mbete requested that former Mpumalanga safety MEC Steve Mabona organize a driver’s license for her in 1996. The Moldenhauer Commission of Inquiry was established to probe her license. It found that the license was false, but could not find evidence of guilt on her part

MOVED, RESIGNED OR CENSURED

8. Jessie Duarte - Deputy secretary-general (resigned)

In 1998, the ANC in Gauteng decided Duarte should resign as MEC for safety and security during hearings into mismanagement in her department. The Moerane Commission also found there was a “strong suspicion” Duarte had covered up a car accident she had while driving without a driver’s license

23. Pinky Mokoto (61\*, medical waste tender)

In 2010 the Mail & Guardian revealed the former mayor of the Ngaka Modiri Molema District Municipality in the North West was included in a tender for the removal and disposal of medical waste in that province. Mokoto’s company, Makgoloke Engineering and Projects, formed part of the joint venture led by Buhle Waste

29. Ngoako Ramatlhodi (33\*, corruption)

The NPA decided in November 2008 not to prosecute the deputy correctional services minister for corruption after receiving representations from his lawyers. The now disbanded Scorpions was investigating allegations that Ramatlhodi benefited from a multimillion-rand social grants payments tender

18. Zweli Mkhize - Treasurer General (Amigos case)

The KwaZulu-Natal premier was interviewed by the Hawks for his role in purchasing “dirty” water purification plants worth R44 million from corruption accused Gaston Savoi. City Press revealed that Mkhize’s signature appears on two crucial documents recommending the purchase of the plants, but he was never charged in the case. In July 2005, as MEC for finance, Mkhize argued for the transaction to go ahead. He also co-signed a document with Economic Development MEC Mike Mabuyakhulu for the plants to be built without going out on tender. Mabuyakhulu and KwaZulu-Natal Speaker Peggy Nkonyeni were charged with corruption, but the charges were dropped last year

4. Ruth Bhengu (29\*, fraud)

Bhengu is also a Travelgate fraudster who ripped off Parliament’s travel scheme to the tune of R43 000. She was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, suspended for three years, and had to pay a R45 000 fine. In August last year, Parliament’s ethics committee found that Bhengu was involved in a deal that had a potential conflict of interest. As chairperson of the transport portfolio committee, Bhengu entered into a deal with the SA National Taxi Council to supply oil to the taxi industry

14. Humprey Mmemezi (58, resigned)

The former Gauteng local government MEC quit his position in July last year after the provincial integrity commission found him guilty of contravening the legislature’s code of conduct. Mmemezi used his government credit card to buy a R10 000 painting and covered up an accident involving a government vehicle

24. Pule Mabe (64\*, Prasa newspaper)

Questions remain about how Mabe’s company, KGP Media, got the contract to publish a free biweekly newspaper that is distributed on the country’s passenger trains. Mabe was the former head of communications at Metrorail (before the agency was rebranded Prasa) when he launched Hambanathi for the company in 2007. After becoming the ANC Youth League’s treasurer, he left Metrorail and registered Hambanathi privately. After the potential conflict was revealed, he relaunched the newspaper as Kwela Xpress

9. Malusi Gigaba (2\*, censured)

In 2009, then public protector Lawrence Mushwana recommended that action be taken against the former deputy home affairs minister by the speaker of Parliament for failing to cooperate with his probe. Mushwana found Gigaba misappropriated state funds by buying flowers for his wife, but he had admitted the mistake and repaid the R1 020 spent

30. Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele (45\*, conflict of interest)

The former housing minister, who now chairs the Central Energy Fund, was embroiled in the Mpumalanga Motheo housing scandal in the late 1990s. A commission of inquiry cleared her of wrongdoing

15. Miriam Segabutla (72\*, censured)

The former Limpopo health MEC was another of Madonsela’s casualties. The Public Protector found that Segabutla exposed herself to a conflicting situation by awarding tenders to companies linked to her. Tenders for forensic investigation were awarded to companies linked to a relative of Segabutla’s and her attorney. After being removed as an MEC, she was appointed SA’s ambassador to Cuba

5. Beauty Dlulane (59\*, fraud)

Dlulane, too, pleaded guilty to defrauding Parliament of R289 000 in the Travelgate scam. She was sentenced to a R120 000 fine or five years’ imprisonment

10. Ayanda Dlodlo (22\*, blacklisted)

The deputy public service and administration minister was last year blacklisted by Treasury from doing business with government. A company of which she was a director misinformed the Ekurhuleni municipality about the status of their toilet-building tender, which led to payments being made for incomplete work. In 2007, charges of fraud and theft, relating to her work as a Scorpions director, were withdrawn

19. Nathi Mthethwa (10\*, police slush fund)

The police minister said he was vindicated last year by an Auditor-General (AG) investigation that found he did not know crime intelligence money was used to build a R200 000 security wall around his private property. After categorically denying police funds were used to upgrade security at his KwaZulu-Natal private residence, City Press revealed a R200 million “slush fund” indeed paid for Mthethwa’s wall. The AG accepted Mthethwa’s version that he didn’t know who had paid for the wall

31. Philemon Mapulane (68\*, corruption)

Charges of fraud and corruption against the deputy speaker of the North West legislature were dropped in May last year. Mapulane was fired as Madibeng city manager after being accused of defrauding the municipality of millions of rands through a dodgy IT tender. The case fell apart when one of his co-accused, who turned state witness, changed his tune and said he lied about Mapulane’s involvement

CLEARED

25. Lindiwe Sisulu (3\*, dodgy appointment)

In April last year Madonsela cleared Sisulu of appointing a fugitive from justice as her special adviser in the defense department. Madonsela blamed the department’s vetting process, but said this couldn’t have been Sisulu’s fault.

**Government officials accused of paying cash for Zuma votes at Manguang**

*IOL* news media reported in an article titled 2 “ANC cash for Zuma votes charges” on the 26th of November 2012, that the disgraced former Gauteng local government and Housing MEC Humphrey Mmemezi, and others, have been accused of offering huge sums to Tshwane ANC members to buy votes for President Jacob Zuma ahead of the secret vote for ANC leadership at Mangaung in 2012.

Independent Newspapers was reliably told that Tshwane ANC regional chairman and mayor Kgosientso Ramokgopa formally complained about Mmemezi, the provincial ANC deputy secretary and a committed Zuma supporter, at a tense provincial executive committee meeting (PEC) which Mmemezi did not attend.

Mmemezi had shortly before been forced to relinquish his position as MEC following an exposé by Independent Newspapers that he had misused his state-issued credit card and damaged a government-owned luxury vehicle.

ANC sources said Ramokgopa, who supports Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe’s bid to dislodge Zuma as ANC president, also implicated Gauteng Community Safety MEC Faith Mazibuko in the alleged vote-buying scandal ahead of the party’s national elective conference next month.

Independent Newspapers understands that Ramokgopa’s concerns came after some Tshwane ANC branches complained to the regional leadership that Mmemezi and Mazibuko had offered individual members cash in exchange for them ditching Motlanthe. Motlanthe has been endorsed by the Gauteng PEC, led by Arts Minister Paul Mashatile and by the provincial ANC Youth League.

Acting on a mandate from his concerned branches, Ramokgopa took up the issue with ANC provincial secretary David Makhura. Earlier, Makhura denied that vote rigging formed part of their PEC discussions, but later back-tracked when presented with evidence of what transpired at the meeting.

Allegations of vote-buying against Mmemezi and Mazibuko come weeks after Zuma and the ANC’s national working committee, the party’s highest operational organ, established three task teams to get to the bottom of written complaints that some branch nomination processes had been marred by irregularities and fraud.

**Government officials charged with corruption disrespect legal procedures**

Legal procedures followed by the Court are ignored by many government officials who are charged with corruption, who do not arrive at Court on the day of their hearings. This is not only a waste of the Court’s time paid for by the tax payers, but displays the attitude of being above the law.

To point, on the 28th of August 2012, the fraud and theft trial of former Mangaung mayor Itumeleng Mokoena, his wife and 12 others was adjourned in the Bloemfontein High Court after three of the accused failed to appear in court yesterday.

Judge Albert Kruger postponed the matter after former municipal manager Mojalefa Matlole, Keabecoe Lekone and his partner Givenchy Hoffman failed to appear.

Lekone's twin, Kegomodicoe, told the court his brother would be present in court today.

Matlole was reported to have been in hospital to remove stitches after he had had an operation earlier, while Lekone and Hoffman were also said to be in hospital to see their child who was involved in an accident.

The removal of stitches is not an emergency and could be done at any time during the day. Visiting hours at hospitals in South Africa are also staggered for day and night visits.

Despite the evidence brought against them, Mokoena, his wife Granny, Matlole, Mzwandile and Bridget Silwana, brothers Keabecoe and Kegomodicoe Lekone, cousins Givenchy and Letitia Hoffman, Evodia Kok, Motlalepule Thithi and Buyelwa Khethelo have pleaded not guilty to charges of fraud, racketeering, theft and money laundering between 2000 and 2005.

The court has heard how the municipality spent millions of rands on catering for various events and how claims of more than R120000 were processed without any tender process, despite regulations that any work over the amount should go for tender. 3

**The Director of Public Prosecutions withdraws corruption charges against many government officials**

Corruption charges against many government officials are withdrawn by the Director of Public Prosecutions and subsequently the court cases are dismissed. To point, we quote the *Sowetanlive* report dated 17 August 2012, titled “Corruption charges withdrawn against KZN ANC officials” as follows:

*CASE DISMISSED: KwaZulu-Natal legislature speaker Peggy Nkonyeni will not have to stand trial*

*“The acting Director of Public Prosecutions advocate Moipone Noko has withdrawn charges against six accused in the Intaka case,” provincial NPA spokeswoman Natasha Ramkisson said.*

*Charges were dropped against KwaZulu-Natal legislature speaker Peggy Nkonyeni, economic development MEC Mike Mabuyakhulu, Lindelihle Mkhwanazi, Nozibele Phindela, Jabulani Thusi and Ian Blose.*

*“Upon a thorough and interrogative assessment, available evidence including consultations with some key witnesses, the acting DPP in consultation with the prosecution team, felt there are no prospects of a successful prosecution, therefore these charges can not be sustained against them during trial,” Ramkisson said.*

*The six were linked to the sale of water purification plants to the KwaZulu-Natal health department, allegedly at inflated prices.*

*Initially, 25 people were implicated in the in the so-called “amigos” corruption case which will be heard on October 1 in the Durban High Court.*

*The “amigos case” is a corruption matter involving Uruguayan businessman Gaston Savoi.*

*Savoi’s company Intaka allegedly paid bribes to ensure that a contract to supply water purifiers and oxygen generators to hospitals, at hugely inflated prices, went its way.*

*He would go on trial with former provincial treasury boss Sipho Shabalala, who allegedly received a R1 million donation for the ANC.*

*Noko was appointed in July after KwaZulu-Natal’s acting head of prosecutions Simphiwe Mlotshwa was ousted, reportedly for refusing to withdraw the charges against the two politicians.*

**CORRUPTION IN ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES WHICH THREATENS FOOD AND WATER SUPPLY TO THE PEOPLE AND ANIMAL LIFE IN SOUTH AFRICA**

Lies told during environmental impact studies of mining in farming areas is creating a shortage of drinking water and quality food to the people and animals in South Africa.

In an article 4 called ‘Gierigheid is die grootste problem in Suid Afrika’ (Greediness is the biggest problem in South Africa) dated 26 March 2012 in the *KVB* news page, it was reported that at least 18 of the 53 mines which are situated in the arable agricultural area of Mpumalanga do not have valid water licenses, where agriculture in the Delmas, Ermelo, Carolina and Standerton areas has to stand aside for coal mines.

Two coal mines in Mpumalanga belong to the president of the Chamber of Mines.

Another mine, Umcebo, in the Nkomati-catchment area belongs to a retired director-general in Economics and Industry.

Mines which belong to the magnate Patrice Motsepe, are also implicated.

Other names which are mentioned are Exxaro, Vuna Mining, Modikwa, Anglo Coal, Foskor – all are mining houses which have political connections to the government.

Since 2005, farmers have been trying to draw the attention of the government to the water pollution in the area, but mining licenses are still being issued without the required control on water issues. To get information on the water licenses of mines is very difficult as it is expensive to force the delivery of such information through courts.

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In 2012, the Minister of Water Works and Environmental Studies admitted that there were 53 mines without water licenses, and that the agricultural sector was struggling.

Underground water is polluted because there is interference with the environmental impact studies. Farmers say that even if mining houses rehabilitate the land from which coal was taken, the harvest is only about 25% of what it was before the mining operations took place.

The European Union warned that the irrigation water of the farms in the Mpumalanga region was of inferior quality and that it would affect their export.

**CORRUPT GOVERNMENT DEALS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET WHICH COULD THREATEN SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY**

The African National Congress government makes deals with the international market to purchase products at huge expense which South Africa does not need, and cannot afford to utilize. At present, the South African Defense Force is sadly lacking in products it could need should it need to protect the nation.

The government officials who do these deals receive deals of monetary worth from the international companies they do such deals with, which are not declared to the public.

As mentioned earlier in this document under the topic ARMS DEALS section a) The Weapon Transaction Scandal, weapons were bought by the African National Congress government led by Thabo Mbeki as president. Amongst the products bought, were 26 Gripens (17 single-seat Gripen Cs and nine two-seat Gripen Ds) as part of the Strategic Defense Procurement Package. (The Gripens replaced the Cheetah fleet, which was withdrawn four years early due to funding constraints.); four German MEKO class frigates and three German submarines.

**(I) Gripens air force planes**

According to defense minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, twelve of the South African Air Force’s 26 Gripen fighter jets are in long-term storage since the Air Force does not have the funding to fly them.
The lack of budget for the Gripens has also affected flying hours and pilot training.

In April 2011 then-chief of the Air Force Lieutenant General Carlo Gagiano said the Air Force was not going to fly the required number of hours due to a lack of funding and in its 2010/2011 report, the Department of Defense said that due to underfunding, the number of flight hours per Gripen aircrew member was reduced from 224 to 110 per year.

According to Maynier presently the SAAF can only muster six qualified Gripen pilots who only have 150 flying hours available across the whole Gripen squadron this year. When asked about Gripen flying hours earlier this year chief of the Air Force Lieutenant General Zakes Msimang said that the Air Force had never failed to deliver what was asked of it.
It is unlikely that the Gripen situation will improve anytime soon, as the defense budget for the 2013/14 financial year stands at R40.2 billion, just R1.8 billion more than the previous year’s.

**(II) German MEKO class frigates**

In Simonstown, four brand new state of the art German MEKO class frigates are almost all laid-up and rusting away, rotating a skeleton crew to every now and again take them out into False Bay for a spin or to scatter the ashes of a former Admiral.

When they are alongside and plugged into shore power only the air-conditioning system and the kitchen is switched on so the crew can feed on three meals a day under the African heat, courtesy of the taxpayer.

The SA Navy has lost almost 80% of their technical staff since the ANC took over and implemented their racist Affirmative Action policies.

These highly qualified technicians and engineers have simply moved on and emigrated to greener pastures where their skills are appreciated such as Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, etc.

**(III) German sub-marines**

Of the three highly sophisticated 209 class German submarines one is permanently laid up in a shed undergoing a three year repair to its electrical system. Considering that it takes only about six months to build such a machine from scratch and train its crew, it shows the immense stuff up that must have happened due to the ANC’s Affirmative Action policies.

The other two submarines are still kept alive by a handful of extremely brilliant submariners like Commander Gary Kretschmer ( a legend in South Africa) who “sank” the entire NATO fleet in a combined naval exercise in 2007, as was reported in the article 5 ‘Ace South African Submarine commander outwits entire NATO fleet’.

But nowadays they rent the submarines out for wedding ceremonies, as was reported in the IOL news article ‘Hardcore Sub becomes a love boat’.

**CORRUPT DEALS BETWEEN BANKS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS**

There are many reports of corrupt deals between banks and South African government officials, to the detriment of the South African nation. We offer a few for discussion.

**International banks involved in corrupt government deals**

In his book “Eye On The Money” published in 2007 on page 13, Terry Crawford-Browne records that ANC intelligence operatives in June 1999 informed him that "the arms deal was just the tip of the corruption iceberg that concerned oil deals, the taxi recapitalization process, toll roads, drivers' licenses, Cell C, the Coega development, diamond and drug smuggling, weapons trafficking and money laundering."

As a former international banker, Crawford-Browne informed both the British and South African governments as early as October 1999 that the Barclays Bank loan agreements for the British Aerospace (BAE) arms deal contracts would be fraudulent.

Amongst the documents Crawford-Browne submitted to the Constitutional Court for the subsequent Seriti Judicial Commission of Inquiry on the 13th of June 2012, were 160 pages of affidavits that detail how and why BAE paid bribes of £115 million (R1.5 billion) to secure its arms deal contracts, to whom the bribes were paid and to which bank accounts the bribes were credited. As yet, he is not permitted to disseminate the contents to the media.
The documents also reveal the complicity in money laundering of the British government as well as both international and South African banks. Crawford-Browne states that, “Corruption is so entrenched amongst British financial institutions that the City of London has famously been described as "the most corrupt square mile anywhere on the planet Earth”."

**Barclays Bank partnered the scandalous arms deal in January 2000**

The Barclays Bank/Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) loan agreements for the BAE arms deal contracts were signed in January 2000 by Trevor Manuel, as Minister of Finance for and on behalf of the Republic of South Africa.

The agreements were signed for and on behalf of Barclays Bank by Gabriel Buck, and for and on behalf of Her Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State by Chris Leeds of the ECGD.

2. Both Barclays Bank and the ECGD have long been notorious amongst international bankers for casting "blind eyes" to corruption, numerous banking irregularities including money laundering, and in being prime instruments towards impoverishment of so-called "third world countries." Barclays Bank was also by far the largest foreign bank creditor when apartheid-era South Africa defaulted on its foreign loans in 1985.

3. Crawford-Browne reports that it is evident from the documents his possession that method of calculating LIBOR interest rates (para 1.7A and 1.7B, page 11) to fund the BAE arms deal contracts conforms to the malpractices publicly reported in the current Barclays Bank LIBOR scandal.

4. Manuel's legal counsel, Advocate Michael Kuper SC in 2003 before the Cape High Court confirmed the authenticity of the 255 pages of agreements in Crawford-Browne’s possession. He also informed Judges Andre Blignaut and Dennis Davis that their covenant, representation and default clauses are "potentially catastrophic for South Africa." Those agreements, which he submitted, are ultra *vires*, and beyond the borrowing authorities of the Minister of Finance, set in both the erstwhile Exchequer Act and the current Public Finance Management Act (PFMA).

5. The submission of Crawford-Browne to the Seriti Commission has requested investigation of charges against both the Minister and Ms Maria Ramos (who is now Mrs. Trevor Manuel) of perjury in connection with the arms deal, and of money laundering against him. Ms Ramos was then Director General of the Treasury, and under oath, affirmed that the "agreements he signed are self-standing loan agreements with binding force and not dependent on any other agreement entered into by government." This lie was exposed by the Barclays Bank loan agreements.

6. When Judges Blignaut and Davis in February 2003 awarded Crawford-Browne discovery of the international offers negotiating team and financial working group papers for the arms deal, Manuel and Ramos refused to comply with the judgment. The court had previously rejected their arguments that it "was not in the national interest to reveal how the government conducts its international financial arrangements." Crawford-Browne states that, “This is pertinent given enthusiastic approval by the Minister in 2005 when Barclays Bank took over Absa with a 55.5 percent shareholding”.

**The international Barclays Bank is milking the South African Absa bank**

Absa bank, to the detriment of the South African public, has been milked by Barclays. Surveys repeatedly find Absa to be the most expensive of South African banks. The former governor of the SA Reserve Bank noted as early as 2007 that he failed to see any benefits of Barclays' management at Absa.

Although Absa's assets amount to only 4 percent of the total, Absa is reported to contribute 20% to total Barclays' group revenue.

It is also noteworthy that Minister Tokyo Sexwale, through Batho Bonke, is a major shareholder in Absa and is a former director. Clear conflicts of interest are evident. Ramos left the Treasury to become CEO of Transnet, and since 2009 has been CEO of Absa.
The current international scandal around interest rate manipulation by Barclays' and other irregularities, the fine of £290 million (R3.7 billion) on June 27, 2012, and the resignations of Bob Diamond and other senior executives, warrants a thorough investigation into "potentially catastrophic" implications of Barclays Bank's ownership of Absa.

An investigation should consider the implications of foreign control over South Africa's banking system (including what pressure was applied to the then Minister of Finance to approve the ill-considered takeover of Absa), the detrimental consequences of usurious interest rates and bank charges, currency volatility, stagnant economic growth, rising unemployment and impoverishment -- and appropriate remedial action.

**Absa bank concludes illegal deals with government officials**

Absa bank entered corrupt business deals with government officials. This came to light when one such deal went awry, and Absa was paid with state funds for the loan it had granted for personal use to a government official.

Absa granted *African Romance*, the private company of former ANC parliamentarian Valli Mohseen Moosa, a R50-million overdraft facility to finance a private diamond deal.

Government officials from the department of Economic Development guaranteed the loan from Absa by using state monies as guarantees.

According to a memorandum from the department the then chief director of legal advisory services noted that African Romance began trading in November 2007 after receiving funding from Absa, but in 2008 had the loan recalled when it defaulted.

The department had to fulfill the guarantee obligation. According to the memo "the loan was repaid by (the department) directly to Absa on August 15 2008 in exchange for 1020 cumulative redeemable preference shares ..."

The *Sowetanlive* reported on the 29th of August 2012, in an article titled “Department funded ex-ANC MP's business venture” that the Economic Development department acted as a guarantor for Moosa's company.

The company approached the department for financial assistance in January 2007 and the guarantee was "revised and provided on August 15 2007 at R50-million".

The report further shows that in addition to the R50-million loan settlement, the department agreed to pay an extra R5-million "to provide additional funding and support to the company in order to support its immediate needs until the restructuring is complete".

The standing committee on public accounts (Scopa), led by chairman Sipho Makama, recently reprimanded economic development department officials for agreeing to use public money to back Moosa's company to the tune of R55-million, stating that, "The government has no right to play the role of a guarantor to a private company. It is illegal to do that. They've contributed money (that is) unauthorized."

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**The systematic looting of the Public Investment Commission and money laundering**

The Public Investment Commission (PIC) is a R1 trillion entity which administers pension funds for public service employees, and is South Africa's largest financial institution. The Minister of Finance, ex officio, heads the organization.

There is a systematic looting of thePIC which also involves money laundering through some of the biggest banks and funding organizations in South Africa. Looted money is often used by officials in government to enter international business enterprises in their private capacity, and also in high risk shady deals by the African National Congress government, such as establishing the highly contentious E-toll system on existing public roads.

On the 14th of March 2012, the Political Bureau reported in an article titled “MP slams state pension fund stake in toll roads” that the government’s controversial e-tolling plans were the subject of heated exchanges in Parliament in which MPs and ministers accused each other of apartheid-style cover-ups and populist grandstanding on the subject.

In a members’ statement delivered in the National Assembly, IFP finance spokesman Narend Singh accused the government of hiding the fact that billions of rand in state pension money had been invested in the road tolling scheme through the purchase of SA National Roads Agency (Sanral) bonds.

Quoting a report in *The Sunday Independent*, Singh said:

* The Public Investment Corporation (PIC) – the government’s investment portfolio manager – had bought R17 billion in Sanral bonds in the past few years.
* Almost 90 percent of the PIC’s R495bn investment portfolio – accounting for about 9 percent of the market capitalisation of the JSE – comprises money from the Government Employees Pension Fund.

Singh said these facts revealed the “shocking real reasons” behind the government’s determination to see e-tolling succeed despite widespread public and trade union opposition. Singh added that the information should have been made available to Parliament’s standing committee on appropriations during its recent deliberations on the R5.7bn allocated in the Budget in additional funding for the Department of Transport to help lower tolls fees, stating that, “One wonders why this was never done. It is now very clear that there are huge economic issues at stake. If the tolling project fails, the government will not only have to bail out Sanral, but will also have to bail out the civil servants’ pension fund.”

International banker Terry Crawford-Browne dedicated his book, ‘Eye On The Diamonds’, published in May 2012, to Bheki Jacobs, who led that team of ANC whistleblowers but who died in 2008. His work also included investigation of systematic looting of the PIC, and money laundering.

**CORRUPT GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS**

ON THE 4TH OF March 2012, *News24* reportedin an article6 called ‘300m stolen from state coffers’ that civil servants stole more than R300million of public money in the past financial year, according to a report by the Public Service Commission (PSC) tabled in Parliament.

The PSC probed financial misconduct in 39 national departments and nine provincial governments.

A total of 1135 cases of financial misconduct were committed by civil servants during the 2009/2010 financial year.

Of these 998 were found guilty of taking R346mn from state coffers, the newspaper said.

This figure was the highest recorded in five years - representing a staggering 346% growth compared with R100m in 2008/2009.

The PSC slammed the government for not robustly pursuing criminal prosecution.

"Failure to institute criminal action... may encourage acts of financial misconduct to continue to be on the rise," said the report.

**Department of Communications.**

In an open memo dated 7 June 2013, Bantu Holomisa, Member of Parliament and leader of the United Democratic Movement (UDM), addressed President Jacob Zuma on the looting of State resources taking place at the Universal Service and Access Agency of South Africa (USAASA), a portfolio organization under the Department of Communications.

Holomisa referred to documents in his possession which indicate that the Department was wallowing in a sea of corruption and maladministration, and had also become rudderless, adding that the Minister of Communications, Ms Dina Pule, is implicated in this corruption.

Such conduct by the USAASA is not only costing the nation money, but is preventing students from getting the education which should be available to them.

The memo points out that:

Leadership positions within USAASA were filled by unqualified and unsuitable officials;

Overpayment on tenders to companies which did not fulfill their obligation ran into millions;

Contracts were entered into without due process taking place.

See Footnote 1 – Maladministration at the Department of Communications.

**(I) Health Department**

Details of corruption in the Department of Health are hidden from the public by administration officials.

On the 25th of October 2012, the Inkatha Freedom Party issued a report titled “IFP appalled by Adington Hospital’s R39 million tender deal” in which it was stated that: *The Inkatha Freedom Party in Kwa-Zulu Natal is appalled by Health Officials refusal to give details of an Ernst and Young forensic report that propped the awarding of a 93 million rand tender, where equipment was procured but not delivered.*
According to revelations discovered by the KZN Health Portfolio Committee, the company was commissioned to probe procurement processes, thereafter individuals were either dismissed or suspended. Further, the department officials were tight lipped and stated that the report was with the SAPS.
“During a portfolio committee meeting on Wednesday, 18 October 2012, we were given a report on the state of affairs at Addington Hospital, also in this report was a reference to Ernst and Young and the listing of five individuals who were either suspended or dismissed (as finding of this report) is said the following:
“Audit firm Ernest and Young were tasked to investigate these allegations. The outcome of the investigation led to the following:
· CEO – resigned
· Senior Finance Officer – resigned
· Finance Manager- Dismissed
· Foreman- resigned
· HR Manager- final written warning (later transferred to RK Khan)”

The Honorable Dr Roopnarain from the IFP said that this raises the question of how a department can thwart the work of the portfolio committee by withholding the report.

The IFP wants this report to be released in its entirety. In a Parliamentary motion, the IFP called on for the intervention of the Health MEC for the R93 million in taxpayers’ money for equipment that was never delivered. The IFP stated that, “It is totally improper and shocking that Officials from Department of Health are not forthcoming with information pertaining to corruption that involves taxpayers’ monies.”

**(I1) Negligence by government officials prevents the nation from using health care facilities**

In various areas of South Africa, government facilities are not open to public, or are partially available only for public use, due to negligence by government officials. Maladministration has caused a shortage of funds to operate hospitals and parts of hospitals.

To point, August 2012 marked nine months since the opening of a new R500-million hospital in Germiston on the East Rand, adjacent to the old Germiston state hospital, at which time the 300 beds and four operating theatres were still empty.7

The state-of-the-art Bertha Gxowa Hospital was opened in November 2011 as part of a revamp and extension of the old Germiston Hospital, but patients are still housed in the adjacent Germiston hospital building, which is in disrepair. The walls are cracking and the toilets filthy. The only public lift was not working.

Jacqueline McDonald, a patient for two weeks, said conditions were disgusting.

"We are about 20 in my ward and we fight over the two toilets. Some patients soil themselves in their beds because the toilets are always busy or not working at all," said McDonald. "We also bring our own linen because the laundry machine is faulty."

Bertha Gxowa had only been providing pharmacy services, an antenatal clinic, outpatients’ clinic and chronic illness clinic. The hospital also boasts a Home Affairs birth registration office, a lounge for new fathers and a mortuary, all of which have not been used. Only one of the four lifts of the public was working. Outpatients had to bring their own food as there was no canteen. Some public toilets were not flushing. Maternity emergencies were still being referred to the old Germiston Hospital.

Hospital CEO Christina Mndaweni did not want to speak about the cause for the delay.

On the 28th of August 2012, the *Sowetanlive* reported 8 that, “Patients relying on Gauteng's already strained state hospitals should brace themselves for a further deterioration of services,” as an estimated R234-million is likely to be missing from next years’ provincial health budget, which the legislature's standing committee on public accounts (Scopa) refused to approve and had classified as unauthorized expenditure. Before making its decision the committee was called on to consider condoning a massive R4.7-billion unauthorized expenditure bill, accumulated between the 2005-06 and 2010-11 financial years.

*IOL* news media reported 9 that patients, some critically ill, have to sleep on benches and sometimes on the floor for days at a time because of a shortage of beds at Helderberg Hospital in Somerset West.

Marius Gerber, aged 45, spent more than 48 hours on a plastic chair in the hospital’s trauma unit after he had suffered a heart attack on the Tuesday morning. At some point he had to sleep in his car after he was told there wasn’t a bed for him. Gerber said he decided to sleep in his car after attempting to sleep on the floor and finding it too cold and uncomfortable. When he went back to the hospital after a few hours, there was a note on his file saying he had “absconded”.

He was only given a bed on Thursday afternoon, and that was only after the Cape Argus queried the situation and the alleged bed shortage with the provincial health department. While Gerber commended doctors and nurses for their dedication, he said that, “the feeling we got from personnel was that they are also frustrated by the system… and that there’s not really much they can do to change the situation”.

Gerber is not the only one who couldn’t get a bed at the hospital. Other patients said they had also been waiting for beds since Monday. During the Cape Argus visit on Thursday, other patients were lying with duvets and pillows on the floor, while others lay on plastic chairs. A patient, who asked not to be named, said he had been sleeping on the floor since Monday.

Eric Soji, of Zola Township in the Strand, was admitted to the hospital’s trauma unit on Wednesday after a fall at work. While he has been told that he might need surgery, he still did not have his X-ray results to confirm whether he had broken his lower back on Thursday. “I don’t know if I will have the surgery at all or when can I have it. I’m in so much pain, but things are going very slow around here. I’ve been given pain medication to keep me going in the meantime, but staff really seem overwhelmed by the number of patients,” he said.

**(I2) About half of the nation’s Health Department employees are involved in doing business with the department in their personal capacity**

The former Eastern Cape Health superintendent-general Siva Pillay discovered that corruption was not limited to a handful of senior managers close to the money.

After being alerted by reports from the auditor-general to millions of rands worth of irregular spending in the department, Pillay tried to put numbers to how many employees were "doing business" with their employer, the Health Department.

The department's full workforce - about 50000 at any time and including doctors, nurses, paramedics and administrators - were asked to disclose their private business interests.

In 2010 more than 6000 employees revealed they were involved in businesses selling goods and services to the health department.

In 2012, Pillay repeated the survey. This time fewer than 30 people declared outside business interests. However, when he matched the names of employee's relatives to the directors of companies who did business with the health department, using lists of staff's dependants and spouses, he discovered that 23221 staff members were doing business with the health department.10

**(II) Social Grants**

Social grants from state funds are paid to members of the public who are unable to fend for themselves as pensions, which are the only income these people have to live from. The African National Congress government shows no regard for these defenseless people. Not only is the color of a person’s skin taken into consideration when legitimacy of grants are considered, but billions of grant funds are siphoned off annually by corrupt public servants. Furthermore, the government has used the state pension schemes to fund business deals, which includes the highly contested E-toll system which the public are refusing to pay.

The Pretoria High Court declared the actions of the Social Development Minister, Bathabile Dlamini, illegal when the matter of tenders was brought before it for judgment on the 28th of August 2012.The court ruled that a R10-billion tender awarded to a company to administer payments of social grants was declared illegal and invalid, but the court decided not to set aside the five-year tender recently awarded to US-listed company CashPayment Services (CPS) to distribute social grants worth nearly R500-billion, because doing so would result in disruptions to the payment of grants to about 14.8-million people. 11

The matter was brought to the court’s attention by AllPay Consolidated Investment, **an Absa subsidiary**, who’s tender to manage the social grants was snubbed by the unit in Dlamini's department which dispenses social grants, namely the SA Social Security Agency (Sassa). AllPay went to court to try to have the contract set aside, saying it was "fundamentally flawed". AllPay claimed procedural unfairness and irregularities of political interference. The judge supported AllPay’s argument.

No assessment of the capacity of CPS to perform the relevant undertaking before the tender was awarded. The judge said that, “This decision is unlawful, taken for an ulterior purpose."

Reports suggest that a former business associate of Human Settlements Minister Tokyo Sexwale is linked to CPS.

We refer to an article 12 from an Australian Blog dated 27 April 2012 titled “South Africa: Public servants siphon off R40 billion in social grants” which refers to the blatant theft from the state pension funds as follows:

*You can have a look at the narrative at the next article to see what I think of the corrupt, inept, dysfunctional ANC government of South Africa. It's not as if this corruption and fraud haven't been reported to the ANC before. No, this is nothing new for South Africa. Yet the ANC refuses to do anything about this blatant stealing of tax money - a whopping R40.8 BILLION over just two years. This amount of money could fund the new e-Toll roads in Johannesburg....twice over and they would still have change to show! If anyone wants to know why I left South Africa it was because of the crime and the looting of the country by a group of Marxist terrorists, portraying themselves to the world as competent, caring down-trodden Blacks, brutalized by White South Africans. Instead they have ousted themselves as the communist liberation freedom fighters they are - a collective of thieves, each trying to outdo the other to enrich themselves on the backs of people's hard work.*

*Public servants have illegally received more than R40.8 billion in fraudulent social grant claims between August 2009 and December 2011.
This was revealed in an answer to a parliamentary question from the Democratic Alliance (DA) by Social Development Minister Bathabile Dlamini on Thursday.*

*According to the answer, the money lost through social grant fraud by public servants could have paid 145,875 child support grants.
The Department of Social Development confirmed last week that the Special Investigating Unit had found 25,255 cases of social grant fraud by public officials since the inception of the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) in 2005.
"It is clear that this type of corruption has become endemic and that we need urgent intervention by the Department," Mike Walters, DA spokesperson for social development said.
Walters said that since the establishment of SASSA, his party had called for a comprehensive vetting process of officials involved in the social grant system.
A reply to a DA parliamentary question received from the Department of Social Development in March this year confirmed that 80% of staff members employed by SASSA have not been properly vetted.”*

**Human Settlement Department**

The Human Settlement Department controls the development of areas in which poor people live.

**(I) The Housing Development Agency of South Africa**

The Housing Development Agency of South Africa oversees investments in housing related infrastructure on behalf of the Human Settlements Department, and also manages inter-departmental projects. In Attachment 24 -War in Africa to rape her wealth by corrupt leaders, sub-section i) Nkandla we discuss how Zinhle Mbanjwa, as manager of the Housing Development Agency, is involved with using money which was earmarked to build low cost housing for the poor, has channeled these funds to build a highway to President Zuma’s home at Nkandla.

**(II) The Estate Agency Affairs Board**

The Human Settlements Department took over the Estate Agency Board (EAAB) in May 2012 and placed it under administration two months later, calling for an investigation into its affairs. This regulatory body for the real estate industry previously fell under the authority of the department of trade and industry.

Human Settlements Minister Tokyo Sexwale said that he called for the Special Investigating Unit to probe wrongdoing in the affairs of the EAAB and to lay criminal charges if necessary, and at the same time, his department would conduct due diligence into the EAAB “to understand what we are inheriting”.13

Speaking to media after his address, Sexwale said he had been aware of problems at the EAAB including alleged corruption, abuse of funds, maladministration and embezzlement.

In 2011, EAAB chairman Thami Bolani was suspended by Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies after allegations that a company of which Bolani was chairman pocketed R200, 000 from the EAAB.

On dissolving the board, Sexwale said it was dysfunctional, stating that, “To date when a board is supposed to be having 15 members, they are left with three.”

Sexwale said he was particularly interested in hearing from the EAAB’s suspended company secretary Nkululeko Ndebele. He also raised concerns about Wendy Machanik, Auction Alliance and the board’s fidelity fund.

Machanik, the close corporation Wendy Machanik Property Holdings, and its chief financial officer Bruce Bernstein have been charged with conspiracy to commit fraud, among other things.

Businesswoman Wendy Appelbaum alleged that Auction Alliance had used a ghost bidder when she bought Cape wine lands estate, Quoin Rock, for R55 million in December 2011.

(III) **The Department of Public Works**

The Department of Public Works signed a lease on behalf of the Department of Human Settlements for the same building in Pretoria occupied by the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID). The building, 114 Vermeulen Street, appears to have been leased to two government departments at the same time. The IPID has occupied the building – while Human Settlements never moved in – but Public Works has paid a total of R37.5 million on behalf of Human Settlements to lease the building over the past three years.

Public Works signed a 9 year lease in 2008 with Majestic Silver Trading 275, a company owned by Shabangu, the sole director at the time when it was granted the tender. 14

(IV) **The Gauteng housing department**

The Gauteng local government and housing department began destroying about 200 houses in November 2012 because the land they were built on was intended for government housing, and had been sold illegally. About 50 houses had been destroyed and another 113 were in line to be demolished before the South African Human Rights Commission went to court to try and stop this. Even an urgent court application by the Human Rights Commission to temporarily halt the controversial demolitions did nothing to stop bulldozers from demolishing further homes on Monday, shocking ordinary South Africans in a country still struggling with a desperate housing shortage.

The properties were sold in conjunction with government officials who worked at the Gauteng municipality, where water and electricity connections were made, and banking institutions who gave householder bonds.

The plots of land were apparently sold fraudulently for amounts ranging from R2, 500 to R95, 000. The buyers were given forged deeds of sale with the department’s logo.

On 29 September 2011, the South Gauteng High Court ordered the relevant residents of Lenasia to vacate their homes and to demolish the homes or structures erected on the property. In the event of failure to remove or demolish within the time period given, the City was granted the right to demolish the homes.

The Order did not require the City to provide those evicted with alternative accommodation. The Court order was irregular and is discussed in Footnote 2 – The constitutional irregularities of the Lenasia homes eviction court order

*Special Assignment* investigated South Africa's massive housing crisis and how it affects a section of society that doesn't qualify for RDP homes but also doesn't earn enough to qualify for bonds to formally enter the property market in its project dubbed "Cash-for-land Scam", and plans to expose how these scams even stretch into the rental market and how in one instance, a "landlord" has built 10 properties on government land and is renting it out to tenants with alleged assistance from City Power, the Johannesburg Council and even the courts.15

**CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS CREATES IDENTITY FRAUD OF CITIZENS**

Corruption and fraud by home affairs officials in government departments contribute to the number of 121 000 South Africans who have more than one identity document or are sharing an identity number with someone else.
"Currently there are 83 000 South Africans having two IDs at the same time, with a further 38 000 others sharing the same ID numbers," home affairs director general Mkuseli Apleni told16 reporters in Pretoria in February 2012. He said the prevalent cause of the duplicated IDs was the manner in which the department issued new green ID books after 1994.
"With the advent of democracy and the amalgamation of the various home affairs departments which served different nationalities, some information was not captured on the national population register, leading the department to issue new IDs."
He said there was a trend where home affairs officials were found stealing a child's registration number and using it in an adult's new identity document. When the child reached the age where an identity document could be issued, they would end up using the same ID number as the adult who had stolen it, adding that, "Minister Nkosozana Dlamini-Zuma is fully cognisant that these duplicate IDs create a situation in which lives of ordinary people [come] to a standstill, in that they are unable to transact with business, banks and government agencies."

**CORRUPT MUNICIPALITIES**

In his State of the Nation address at the National Assembly in February 2012, IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi warned President Jacob Zuma that corruption was on the verge of making South Africa dysfunctional, and that he was shying away from tackling it.17 “Corruption is the bane of our country,” Buthelezi said, describing corruption as a fundamental threat to South Africa's constitutional democracy.
“How can we embrace hope when our leadership refuses to acknowledge the many problems confronting our country, or the causes that lie at their root?” Buthelezi said, before adding that it was an “unspoken fact” that corruption had resulted in the axing of two ministers - Sicelo Shiceka and Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde, and the national police commissioner, Mr. Bheki Cele, was still suspended pending an investigation into corruption; the Speaker of the KwaZulu-Natal legislature, Ms Peggy Nkonyeni, and MEC Mr. Mike Mabuyakhulu were also facing corruption charges in court.
Two of the nine provinces had “all but collapsed” and the administration of the state was “in shambles”.
\* Limpopo has been rendered bankrupt through corrupt activities and five of its departments have been taken over by national government.

\* In the Eastern Cape, the education system has completely collapsed due to maladministration and corruption, forcing national government to intervene.
\* In Gauteng, the provincial government had sought help from the National Treasury for its health department, which was on the verge of collapse.
\* The Free State had sought help after discovering financial mismanagement and non-compliance in supply chain processes in its police roads and transport department.

Buthelezi asked “How, Mr. President, do we explain the contamination of public service and commercial interests? It is fatal and yet pursued relentlessly from the lowest to the highest levels of government. Too many, and I dare say the overwhelming majority, are trying to make money on account of holding public office, being in politics or exercising public power.”

Last year, Special Investigating Unit head Willie Hofmeyr told MPs that 20 percent of South Africa's procurement budget was lost to corruption each year. According to Transparency International's 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index, South Africa is perceived to be becoming more corrupt with each passing year. This perception was rooted in reality. On a scale of 0 (being highly corrupt) to 10 (being very clean), South Africa has fallen from a ranking of 5.1 in 2007, to 4.1 in 2011.

“The unspoken fact is that we are on the verge of joining the ranks of dysfunctional states, as the effects of corruption debilitate all spheres of life,” Buthelezi said.
Buthelezi also suggested that the ruling party was too close to the country's four major banks, stating that, “Another major policy mistake is maintaining the four retail bank policy and tolerating the collusion and other restraints of trade openly practiced by our banks.” A lack of “real competition” meant they were not forced to take risks they did not want to take, forcing all the “risky business” onto the Industrial Development Corporation and the Development Bank of Southern Africa. Buthelezi added that, “It would seem as if your government, Mr. President, has a greater commitment to serving the banks than the people we represent.”

On the economy, Buthelezi said Zuma had not explained how two sectors that should be booming as a result of high international demand - agriculture and mining - were “in reverse due to government's many policy failures”.
Another unspoken fact was that the latest Global Competitiveness Rankings of the World Economic Forum highlighted how corruption, wasteful expenditure and government red-tape was increasingly hindering business development, SMMEs and investment in South Africa. Buthelezi said there was a “disconnect” between the government and the reality of everyday life in South Africa.

Buthelezi told Zuma his address to the nation lacked accountability on the crisis in health, the crisis of education and the crisis of corruption, stating that, “What you have said looks good on paper, but what you have not said can prevent the fulfillment of the best-laid plans.”

**Waste of public funds by municipalities**

There is no consideration by many government officials of the living conditions of the poor people in South Africa, and these officials spend the tax payers’ money on unnecessary luxuries. To point, various government officials drive luxury vehicles at the expense of their municipalities.

To point, we discuss the transport given to the majors of Durban. Durban is in the eThekwini district of KwaZulu Natal, home of millions of impoverished people.

The government has purchased two Toyota Prado VX's, worth R1.5 million, for the eThekwini Metro's mayor and deputy mayor.

The two vehicles come fitted with 4 cameras, a fridge, sunroof and a full satellite navigation system.

eThekwini mayor James Nxumalo has a BMW 7 series while deputy mayor Nomvuzo Shabalala has the use of a BMW 3 series, all paid for by Durban's ratepayers.

Dean Macpherson, the DA's chief whip for the eThekwini region said 18 that the "purchase is a slap in the face of the poorest of the poor in eThekwini who have been denied housing and basic services due to fraud, corruption and limited budgets. While the DA appreciates that the Mayor and Deputy Mayor should have adequate means of travel and transportation, such luxury and opulence is simply not justifiable in the midst of service delivery protests and rates increases that the city has faced over recent times."

He said the DA would ask the Public Protector Advocate Thuli Madonsela to investigate the purchase in term of the Municipal Finance Management Act to determine whether there was a case for wasteful expenditure against the city.

Comment could not be immediately obtained from the eThekwini Metro.

**CORRUPTION THROUGH GOVERNMENT POLICIES**

Government policies have been put in place to uplift the poor communities in South Africa. However, these policies are misused by politicians to gain support from the nation, and by corrupt government officials to enrich themselves at the expense of the poor.

**(I) BLACK EMPOWERMENT (BEE)**

BLACK Empowerment policies (BEE) was invented by South Africa’s economic oligarchs, that handful of white businessmen and their families who control the commanding heights of the country’s economy, that is, mining and its associated chemical and engineering industries and finance.

It was NOT the ANC government who invented BEE; they inherited the system, much the same way as that the NP inherited Apartheid from the democratic system developed by the British Kindergarten.

"Under leadership of Professor N.E.Wiehahn, who had been a Broederbond member since 1970, the Wiehahn Report was handed in by the Broederbond to the government for consideration in 1979.
Cloaked as a liberalizing vehicle for Non-white workers, it became the foundation on which the total exclusion of the White workers from the work force was based.

The Riekert Report was followed by enforced Black Empowerment Policies (BEE) wherein work positions could only be filled by Black staff, financial institutions could only assist Black owned companies, and universities were to favour black student applicants; and Black trade unions which held industry and thereby the economy, at ransom as they made demands such as the calling for the nationalization of the Reserve Bank, the nationalization of all South African banks, the nationalization of the mines, the redistribution of land without compensation, and the outlawing of labour brokers.

As for BEE, instead of serving the purpose it was intended to, serves as patronage to the politically connected and high-ranking officials within the ruling party.

The flagship BEE Company, New Africa Investments Limited (NAIL), started operating in 1992, two years before the ANC came to power. It was created by the second-largest South African insurance company, SANLAM, with the support of the National Party government-controlled Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), a state-owned industrial investment bank created in 1940.

The formation of NAIL was soon followed by the creation of Real African Investment Limited (Rail), sponsored by mining giant Anglo American Corporation through its financial services subsidiary Southern Life.

The object of BEE was to co-opt leaders of the black resistance movement by literally buying them off with what looked like a transfer to them of massive assets at no cost.
To the oligarchs, these assets were small change. SANLAM created NAIL by transferring control of one of its small subsidiaries, Metropolitan Life, 85 percent of whose policy-holders were black, to several ANC and PAC affiliated leaders. The device used was to split shares of MetLife into a small package, dubbed high-voting shares which gave the politicians (funded by a loan from the IDC) control of the company. Overnight the politicians were transformed into multi-millionaires without having had to lift a finger because all the financial wizardry was performed by Sanlam's senior executives. All the politicians had to do was show up at the party to launch NAIL and thank their benefactor. Even the debt the politicians incurred was largely fictitious because it was MetLife that had to pay it back to the IDC.

This financial razzmatazz was designed to achieve a number of objectives. It was intended to: wean the ANC from radical economic ambitions, such as nationalizing the major elements of the South African economy, by putting cash in the politicians’ private pockets, packaged to look like atonement for the sins of apartheid, that is, reparations to black people in general; provide the oligarchs with prominent and influential seats at the high table of the ANC government’s economic policy formulation system; allow those oligarchs who wanted to shift their company’s primary listings and headquarters from Johannesburg to London to do so;
give the oligarchs and their companies the first bite at government contracts that interested them; and protect the oligarchs from foreign competition while opening up the rest of the economy, especially the consumer goods and manufacturing sector, to the chill winds of international competition.
All these machinations were eventually incorporated into South Africa’s democratic Constitution by the creation of a category of citizens, apparently 91 per cent of the population, to be known as Previously Disadvantaged Individuals (PDIs).

The ingenious legal notion of previously disadvantaged individuals created the impression that all black South Africans could or would benefit from BEE. This legitimized the co-option payment to the black political elite by dangling before the black masses the possibility that one day they, too, would receive reparations for the wrongs done to them during the apartheid era.

BEE and its subsidiaries – affirmative action and affirmative procurement – which started off as defensive instruments created by the economic oligarchs to protect their assets have metamorphosed. They have become both the core ideology of the black political elite and, simultaneously, the driving material and enrichment agenda which is to be achieved by maximizing the proceeds of reparations that accrue to the political elite. As we shall see below, this has proved to be disastrous for the country.

**Reparations**
The black elite, which describes itself as made up of PDIs, sees its primary mission as extracting reparations from those who put it in a disadvantaged position. To achieve this requires the transfer of resources from the wrongdoer – perceived to be white-owned businesses and the South African state – to the victim, the PDIs.

By this logic the South African state owes the PDIs high-paying jobs. This transfer of wealth from the strong to the weak is what has come to be known as BEE.
Enormous consequences follow from this apparently simple formulation:

1. In order for the wrongdoer to be able to pay reparations, the wrongdoer has to maintain a privileged position. This is the principle of fattening the goose that lays the golden egg. What this means is that the corporations that were allegedly responsible for victimizing the PDIs must not be transformed beyond putting a few black individuals in their upper echelons. The protection of these corporations has gone so far as to allow them to move their head offices and primary listings from Johannesburg to London in order to shield them from possible economic and political upheaval in South Africa. At a broader level, the battery of Washington Consensus policies – which include trade liberalization, balanced budgets, privatization, inflation targeting, as well as the small state – all serve to protect the interests of South Africa’s big business, one of the two main payers of reparations.
2. For the victim to continue to draw reparations it is critical that he or she remains perceived as a victim and as weak. This means that the former freedom fighter must be transformed from a hero who liberated South Africa into an underling. The payment of reparations to the black elite thus achieves the opposite of what it is claimed it was designed to do, that is, make its members leading players in the economy. In reality, it makes members of the black elite perpetual junior support players to white-controlled corporations.
3. One of the most destructive consequences of the reparations ideology is the black elite’s relationship with, and attitude to, the South African state. As the state is said to have been party to the disadvantaging of the PDIs it is therefore also perceived to owe them something. By way of reparations the state must therefore provide PDIs with high-paying jobs. By extension, the assets of the state are seen as fair game. The approach of the black elite to the state is, therefore, not that of using the state to serve the needs of the people but rather of using it, in the first instance, to advance the material interest of PDIs. Not surprisingly, corruption under the ANC government has grown by leaps and bounds, leading Transparency International – the worldwide watchdog on corruption – to downgrade South Africa in the world’s corruption tables. According to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index South Africa dropped from number 34 in 2000 to number 54 in 2008. In 2008 the least corrupt countries were Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden and the most corrupt country was Somalia, ranked at 180.1 Ironically, one of the most important restraining influences on the abuse of the state for the self-enrichment of the black elite is the white-controlled corporations – the abovementioned layers of golden eggs – because these corporations need the South African state to function efficiently in order to provide a stable business environment as well as functioning transport and communication infrastructure. The judiciary and the independent mass media also play an important role in this regard.
4. The ideology of reparations traps members of the black elite into seeing themselves as the beneficiaries of the production of other social groups and therefore primarily as consumers. To facilitate their role as consumers the black elite sees the state essentially as distributive rather than developmental. Most importantly, the black elite don’t see themselves as producers and therefore do not envisage themselves as entrepreneurs who can initiate and manage new enterprises. At best, they see themselves as joining existing enterprises, the process of which is to be facilitated by the distributive state through reparations-inspired legislation. This is the most striking difference between the black elite of South Africa and the elites of Asia, where the driving ideology is entrepreneurship".

**1) Corrupt government officials benefit financially from the AgriBEE fund**

Government officials who have access to the AgriBEE fund – money which was transferred into the Land Bank earmarked to aid blacks entering the agricultural and farming industry- have been using the AgriBEE funds to finance their personal lifestyles and business interests.

Much information on Agri-BEE corruption has been available to law enforcement agencies; some is contained in a forensic report by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and other details are in documents held by business partners of those involved, attorneys and auditors - which the *Sunday Times* has seen. But police and Land Bank and DoA investigators have yet to lay formal charges or seize any assets.

Xolile Ncame, who was the Land Bank's chief financial officer when the money was disbursed in 2007 and 2008, called the fund "a money-laundering scheme" in a memo sent to the board in June last year.
"Money was transferred from the Department of Agriculture in a lump sum and the Land Bank gets instructions on whom to pay," he wrote. "When this happens the CFO of the DoA never gets to see who the ultimate recipient is."
He also told the board he became suspicious when R50-million was transferred from the DoA in December 2007, and R39.5-million was disbursed to various accounts over the festive season, including R22-million on Christmas Eve.
"Normally during this period business is quiet as companies are closed and people are on leave," he said.
Ncame was fired soon after he blew the whistle.
A year later neither PWC nor police investigators had contacted him. It is unclear if he was ever questioned - like many other potential witnesses who are prepared to testify.

As an example of how funds were laundered from the Land Bank, we point out that a Hazyview doctor received a R6-million grant to buy a 70% stake in a dairy farm that was worth only R660000, near Springs in Gauteng, and an employee of a consultancy that did work for the Land Bank received R3.5-million for a stake in an agricultural enterprise.

The minister of agriculture, Tina Joemat-Pettersson, in a written response to a parliamentary question, conceded R19-million from the AgriBEE fund had been paid by the Land Bank into the trust account of Polokwane attorney Matuba Maponya; R3.5-million went out of the trust account to a company called Dipalo-Tema, R9-million to Tswelopele Farming and R6.5-million to Aquabela.

**Aquabela**

Aquabela is a mineral water factory on a farm near Bela-Bela in Limpopo, which belonged to Lilian Jacobs and her late husband, Frank. It also produces avocados, mangoes and koi fish. They sold it for R5.1-million to a shelf company called Circle Way Trading 167.

The Land Bank said it bought Aquabela for farm workers.

Cipro records show the directors of Aquabela initially included farm workers, but they were removed as directors soon after the deal went through.

Circle Way Trading 167 auditors Boshoff Drotsky told the Sunday Times that its sole shareholders are Mofokeng and a family trust belonging to former Limpopo land, housing and local government MEC John Dombo. Mofokeng is the sole director and owns 90% of Circle Way.
Boshoff Drotsky auditor Jan Boshoff said Mofokeng was also the sole member of a close corporation, Sotrimex, which trades as Aquabela.

Mofokeng is thus the majority shareholder in a working farm project in Limpopo that received R6.5-million from the AgriBEE fund.

**Tswelopele Farming**

R9-million was disbursed from the Land Bank to the trust account of Polokwane attorney Matuba Maponya. He transferred these funds to Tswelopele Farming which bought another farm near Bela-Bela, called Farmprops 122, for Mojanaga, the sister-in-law of former Land Bank boss Mohlahlane.

Although the farm and livestock were bought for R6.4-million, and less than R500000 was spent on operational costs, the project ran out of money in a year.
Mojanaga, who is listed as purchaser in the deed of sale, was supposedly given the farm on behalf of Gauteng-based HIV/Aids support group His Grace is Sufficient (HGIS).

Joemat-Pettersson's parliamentary reply says the Land Bank's records do not list HGIS as a beneficiary of the AgriBEE fund "either directly or through a third party". But this is contradicted by records the Sunday Times has seen, which show Mojanaga was to hold "Tswelopele/Farm Props" on behalf of several beneficiary groups, including "His Grace is Sufficient Support Group". A share certificate lists Mojanaga as the HGIS representative. But HGIS director Grace Silaule said her charity was simply a front to access the funds. "They just used us," she claimed.
Mojananga denied any wrongdoing. She said she "grabbed the chance" when Mohlahlane asked if she wanted to be part of an HIV/Aids support project on a farm, because she was sick - "I thought it would be healthy to be on a farm."
But she insisted she had no idea she was listed as a representative of HGIS, and received no financial benefits.
"My name was used fraudulently," she said.

Phil Mohlahlane, who was both head of the Agriculture Department section that approved AgriBEE project funding and acting CEO of the Land Bank when the disbursements were made, used money from the fund to pay cash for a R2.7-million home in Kyalami;
The fund also paid for another R6.4-million farm in Limpopo, which was transferred to Mohlahlane's sister-in-law, Jessica Mojanaga.

Mofokeng and Mohlahlane, who were once close friends, appear to have fallen out.
"They are driving around in fancy cars and fighting with each other over their stolen assets," said a former business partner, adding that, "They think they are off the hook."

**Dipalo-Tema**

Land Bank transferred R3.5-million to empower black workers to another company belonging to Mofokeng, Nzhelele Resources (Africa) - which had previously had a balance of just R127. Three days later Mofokeng signed a cheque for R710000 to buy the red AMG Mercedes from Grand Central Motors.
Less than two months later, Nzhelele received R2-million from Maponya's trust account - which also had a previous account balance of just R4 461 before receiving several deposits from the Land Bank's AgriBEE fund, totaling R19-million. A week later, Nzhelele paid the outstanding balance, of just over R1-million, for the R2-million home in Six Fountains

**2) CORRUPTION THROUGH TENDERS**

Tenders for work to be done for the government is given to BEE compliant companies. Many government officials who work in the municipalities of South Africa hand out such tenders to their families and friends, or companies in which they hold shares.

**a) Tenders for leasing government offices**

Financial losses due to fraud and corruption regarding leases could run into billions of rand, Public Works Minister Thulas Nxesi said at a media briefing at Parliament in 2012. 19

Nxesi reported that 3000 leases were being scrutinised, 500 of which had been audited so far, and that the government was paying dearly for advocates to help with legal proceedings against officials accused of graft. Thus far, nine officials had been charged, while another six were soon to face the music.

Cases under investigation included the controversial R1.7 billion police lease scandal with businessman Roux Shabangu.

Another matter involved the probe into former public works director general Siviwe Dongwana. After consultation with the minister of public service and administration, Dongwana's employment contract had been re-determined to be terminated on August 15, 2012 with a settlement payment, instead of July 2015.

In 2011, it was reported Dongwana was the highest paid director general in government, earning around R1.5 million a year.

Among others, the disciplinary hearing of one of two officials from the department's Johannesburg region, charged with misconduct, had been completed. The officials (Thabo Moagi and Desmond Simamane) received payments for motor vehicles as corrupt payments from the landlord.

“In the case of Mr Moagi R285 000 for a Golf 5 GTI; in the case of Mr Simamane a Nissan double cab to the value of R566 250 and various payments to the value of R635 000,” said Nxesi.

The two were acting as both portfolio managers and members of bid specification and evaluation committees. “Many of these bids were not advertised. They negotiated with the said landlord owning 10 companies and awarded 28 leases of which four (properties) were never occupied despite payments being made for three years in respect of these leases,” Nxesi said.

The outcome of Moagi's disciplinary hearing was expected soon. Simamane resigned before his hearing started. Police were also carrying out criminal investigations into fraud and corruption against Moagi, Simamane, and the landlord.

**b) Government Housing Programs**

Funds allocated for housing programs for the poor has been stolen by government officials.

In March 2013, News24 reported in an article 20 called ‘2 000 officials prosecuted for fraud, that more than 2 000 provincial and municipal officials in Gauteng were prosecuted for fraudulently benefiting from government housing programs in the 2010/11 and 2011/12 financial years..

None of the officials were suspended or sacked for their fraudulent activity. Instead they were entering into acknowledgement of debt (AOD) agreements with the Gauteng local government and housing department to repay the R11.7m lost.

It emerged that 1 630 officials in provincial government departments and 382 municipal officials were involved.

**c) The Johannesburg Sinking Fund**

The Johannesburg Sinking Fund was primarily used to offset future debts.

In 2006,Regiments Capital – a company with links to the ANC via Johannesburg mayor Parks Tau, took over the sinking fund and gave the tender to manage the fund to a company called Coral Lagoon Consortium, which had been set up in part by Regiments Capital before the tender was issued.

In October 2012, the Mail & Guardian reported in an article 21 called ‘DA R1bn looted from ANC linked Jo’burg sinking fund’ that R1-billion had been siphoned off from the fund since 2006.

Individuals connected to the African National Congress benefited handsomely from Coral Lagoon, a consortium that acquired shares in Capitec Bank in 2006 with the help of R285-million loan from the Industrial Development Corporation.

One such beneficiary is the mayor's wife, Pilisiwe Twala-Tau.
Besides Regiments having charged exorbitant fees for managing the fund, city officials were complicit in ensuring fraudulent transactions were made from the fund.
The Democratic Alliance (DA) stated that, "This is the public's money and officials must be held to account of how it is managed and administered."

**d) The Madibeng municipality**

On 25 January 2013, an article 22 titled “Deals for pals choke the North West Province” reported that the Madibeng municipality in Brits spent R4.9-million on tenders awarded to companies owned by its own employees. One municipal employee received the lion's share and R3.6-million went to his three companies.

At least 600 officials across the province's municipalities have business interests and the majority of them do business with their employers. The article stated that: *Corruption and theft are robbing North West Province residents of services they should be getting from their municipalities.*

*A Special Investigating Unit (SIU) report presented to the provincial government in November 2012 shows that politicians dipped into taxpayers' money to enrich themselves and those close to them at the expense of their community's needs.*

*Provincial politicians, however, are refusing to discuss the allegations.*

*Several service providers to the Madibeng municipality also claimed R5.8-million in value added tax, but the SIU found that those companies are not registered with the South African Revenue Services for tax.*

*There is also a trend of paying service providers for incomplete jobs or for no work. For example, the Madibeng municipality paid 18 companies R243 000 for cleaning streets, but the SIU found that most were "fictitious companies" and payments were made in cash, which made it impossible to trace individuals. Supply-chain management policies were flouted in almost all cases and it appears that "deals for pals", as a source called them, were the order of the day.*

*The Madibeng local municipality claimed to have spent R24 900 on funerals, but the SIU said "in some instances payments were authorised to companies that do not provide funeral services". A list of companies purportedly paid for funerals include sportswear chain store Totalsports; M-Bee's Glassworks, Bricks and Construction; and the Mr Cash & Carry store. In the Moses Kotane local municipality a supply chain manager ran a scam in which companies owned by her family members were awarded contracts.*

*"The SIU discovered that requisitions were only submitted to and quotations received from only three companies on a number of occasions. These quotations were submitted by her husband's company, a company belonging to her cousin and another company owned by a relative," said the SIU report.*

*Though municipalities have their own legal departments and, in most cases, a dedicated lawyer, an external legal firm was paid R20 000 for "perusal of a memorandum" and R50 000 for drafting a responding memorandum. In the same municipality, a director for community safety used a municipal truck and its driver to transport building materials from Rustenburg to his home in Venda. The municipality footed the bill, which also included repairs after the truck broke down on its way from Venda, according to the report.*

*In the Greater Taung local municipality, a manager who had been in the municipality's employ for only three months had his salary increased from R133 000 to R250 000 a year without a council resolution. The SIU recommended that the former acting municipal manager repay the difference.*

***Factional politics*** *Despite the SIU working hard to dig up evidence of corruption, some officials who were suspended or dismissed were reinstated as a result of factional politics within municipalities. Commenting on the SIU report, North West MEC for co-operative governance and traditional affairs China Dodovu wrote a short analysis that claimed ANC politics were behind the waste of money in the province.*

The Mail & Guardian has learned from two ANC sources that the party's provincial executive committee (PEC) denied Dodovu an opportunity to present the SIU report at its meeting.

"China's own report on municipalities and the SIU report were rejected at the PEC. They said they're factional and politically motivated," said a PEC member.

**In-house ANC Murder for tenders**

Assassinations within the African National Congress for leadership positions has been an ongoing procedure since before this organization came into power, and it persists, more notably before in-house elections and before the issuing of tenders.

In June 2013, the liberal Canadian Vancouver Sun reported on the African National Congress member in-house assassinations for positions with the government which could bring them wealth, as follows:

“The ANC has become a deeply corrupt party of cronyism and patronage. Indeed, holding ANC positions in governments at all levels has become such a sure route to wealth that aspirants will murder to get them. Last week, Reuters news agency reported that an internal ANC report states that in KwaZulu Natal — the largest of South Africa’s nine provinces and the home base of President Jacob Zuma — 38 party members have been murdered since February last year in fights for lucrative positions”.

**(I) Assassinations before in-house elections**

Shortly before the Manguang election in December 2012, two ANC branch leaders at the Kwa-Zulu Natal south coast were shot to death while they were driving in the Oshabeni district. 23

Sifiso Khumalo (31) pleaded guilty to the murder of Bheki Chiliza (39) and Dumisani Malunga (42) when he appeared in the Ramsgate regional court. Samuel Cele (34), his co-accused, pleaded not guilty to the charges, and will appear in court again on the 19th of September 2013.

“Khumalo is the regional chairman of the ANC Youth League branch in Port Shepstone,” Mzwandile Mkhwanazi, the regional secretary, said.

The metalworkers union Numsa welcomed the admission of guilt by Khumalo.

“What happened in the court shows that the suspicions of Numsa were correct. The murder was politically motivated,” Mbuso Ngubane, spokesperson for Numsa, said.

**(II) Assassinations pinned on ANC members to purge the organization from whistle blowers**

Shortly before the in-house elections of the African National Congress at Manguang in December 2012, the ANC regional secretary Aubuti Chika was assassinated inside his home. The Hawks arrested 8 suspects in connection with this murder, the most prominent being the North West Local Government and Traditional Affairs MEC China Dodovu two days before the election.24

Dodovu, who is also the deputy chairman of the ANC in North West, was arrested at a meeting in Potchefstroom of the ANC’s provincial executive committee officials.

Dodovu’s arrest was shortly after that of the chairman of the ANC Youth league in the North West, Papiki Baboile, who is also suspected of having been involved in the murder.

Other suspects arrested in connection with the murder include a ward councilor of Jouberton, Itumeleng Molebatsi, 50, Jerry Letuka, 28, ward secretary Paul Molomonyane, 33, municipal employee William Molefo, 46, and taxi driver Kgotso Kali, 36.

The killing of Chika followed an alleged attempt to murder suspended ANC provincial secretary Kabelo Mataboge, and was found to be a politically motivated murder by the Hawks.

A day after his release on bail, North West senior government official China Dodovu came out breathing fire 25 and accused “some ANC leaders” of conniving with law enforcement authorities to get him dismissed.

Dodovu further alleged that those who did not support President Jacob Zuma at Mangaung in December were victims of purging, which he said was rife in the province.

Dodovu said charges in connection with the murder of the secretary of the ANC Kenneth Kaunda Region, David Chika, in December were trumped up, and were part of a political scheme hatched to discourage him from rooting out corruption in North West municipalities. Dodovu was probing financial irregularities in the Matlosana Local Municipality, where he had discovered that the council had withdrawn more than R250 million from investments, but was arrested before he could meet North West Premier Thandi Modise to brief her on the irregularities and planned actions to address the issue.

Addressing the media in Jo’burg on Wednesday, just less than 24 hours after he was released on R20 000 bail, he said a plan to have him arrested was also intended to “besmirch my reputation in a desperate attempt at forcing a cabinet reshuffle in our province as vigorously agitated by some ANC leaders in the North West”.

Dodovu further claimed “the police know who has committed this hideous crime”, and that, “They must go and arrest people behind the killing of this comrade.”

Dodovu’s legal representative maintained his client’s innocence during the bail hearing, asserting that he was in Mafikeng on the day of the murder.

Dodovu added that, “It is against this backdrop that I insist that the State’s case against me is weak, if not non-existent. My arrest can only point to an unholy alliance between some ANC leaders, the police and the prosecution, as the desperation with which a campaign to get me dismissed from the North West (cabinet), by summarily suspending me from the ANC PEC (provincial executive committee), only serves to vindicate my conviction about an orchestrated dirty tricks campaign against me.”

After Dodovu’s arrest, premier Modise had appointed finance MEC Paul Sebegoe to act in his position. Dodovu said he had had a discussion with Modise after his arrest and requested a few days to attend to some things.

Dodovu said he learnt from the media that he had been suspended by the ANC along with Baboile, but they did not have any details as they had not received any formal notification from the party.

Also released on bail at the Klerksdorp Magistrate’s Court on Tuesday were the ANC Youth League chairman in the North West, Papiki Baboile, ward secretary Tumelo Molomonyane, ward councillor Itumeleng Molebatsi, former municipal employee William Molefo and taxi owner Khotso Kali.

Two other suspects, Jeffery Letuka and the man who allegedly shot Chika, Sihlangu Sikhakhane, were both denied bail.

**(III) Tender associated in-house assassinations**

Tenders by the government are granted daily. When such tenders are on the horizon, assassinations within the African National Congress membership increase.

To point, *IOL* news reported on 19 June 2013 in an article titled 26 “Killers ‘were hired by politicians” that the High Court heard that the killers of an Ehlanzeni district ANC leader were hired by politicians “too powerful to be brought to book”. His killer had been tempted with money and the promise of a government tender for their carpentry business. The article gave the following details to this assassination:

*Before sentencing ANC Chief Whip Johan Ndlovu's killers, defense lawyers Malanguti Malanguta and Katlego Matsego argued that the accused were used by powerful politicians.*

*“The accused were used by some powerful politicians... politicians would do anything to survive. They are so powerful that they will not be brought to book,” said Malanguta, for one of the accused, Bongani Mkasi.*

*“These boys are just players in a bigger political game and even if we sentence these mere accused, we cannot stop the game. As long as there are politicians who hire poor and vulnerable people to do crime, we will not win this.”*

*Mkasi, 30, and Mundi Khoza, 26, were found guilty of murder, armed robbery with aggravating circumstances and possession of an illegal firearm.*

*Their accomplice Life Khoza, 24, is already serving a sentence for Ndlovu’s murder after pleading guilty.*

*The three shot Ndlovu repeatedly near his home in Edinburgh village in the Hluvukani area on January 5, 2011. They then put him in the boot of his car and dumped him on the side of a road.*

*Malanguta said Mkasi and Khoza were tempted with money and the promise of a government tender for their carpentry business.*

*The lawyers argued that the reasons why the killers preferred to reveal the names of the politicians only to the police, and not have them mentioned in court, showed the politicians were feared.*

*Earlier, the State in its opening argument, said the two stood to make large sums of money by killing Ndlovu. Prosecutor Charles Mnisi said Mkasi already had a jail sentence for illegal possession of a firearm, while Khoza was previously found guilty of theft.*

*Mnisi argued it did not take long for the murder to be committed after the hit was ordered.*

*“Mkasi was just approached once and it was enough. He should have thought about this... five days after he was approached the killing took place. If he didn't want to, he should have maybe told someone.”*

*He said Mkasi was driven by greed for money.*

**GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS**

**Communications**

### Communications minister Dina Pule's boyfriend was paid R6-million in management fees for the ICT Indaba for four days work after her department apparently forced the conference organiser to hire him. See Footnote 3 – MTN shields corrupt government officials.

**TELKOM LTD**

Telkom, the national landline telephone service in which the government has 40% shares, has shown a loss of profits to shareholders since the African National Congress came into power. The March financial year end statements for 2011 showed a net loss attributable to shareholders of R216 million, and for the year end 2012, the net loss to shareholders was R11.6-billion,

**EXTRAVAGANT GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE**

During his first year in governance, between August 2009 and April 2010, the Zuma administration is known to have wasted over R1 billion of taxpayers' money on luxury vehicles, expensive hotels, banquets, advertising and other "wasteful expenditure". The Democratic Alliance (DA) kept a tally of the expenditure called "The Wasteful Expenditure Monitor". According to the DA, this waste could have:

Built 18,574 new RDP houses

Funded 7775 teachers for a year

Wastage included:

* R65 million in upgrades to facilities servicing President Zuma’s private home at Nkandla. These included a police station, helicopter pad, military clinic, and visitors’ centre, parking lot with parking for at least 40 vehicles and at least three smaller houses that will serve as staff quarters. The EDU-SOLUTIONS owner flew to Nkandla to meet up with Zuma and started pumping money into Zuma's trust fund, after that EDU-SOLUTIONS won the delivery of books tender with the Basic Education Department;
* R34 million in refurbishments to houses in Cape Town and Pretoria occupied by national Ministers and Deputy Ministers after the 2009 general elections;
* R515 000 on prolonged stays at luxury five-star ideas, including the Mount Nelson Hotel and Twelve Apostles Hotel and Spa in Cape Town for the Minister of Communications;
* R320 000 on furniture for the Minister of Communication’s official residence, but which was kept in storage while the Minister lived in luxury hotels;
* R3.7 million on a new ‘official residence’ for National police commissioner Bheki Cele, though several less costly official residences were available in Silverton;
* R1.2 million on furnishing for the National Commissioner's 'official residence';
* R235 000 was spent for 66 days at the 5-Star Table Bay Hotel by Minister Nathi Mthethwa and eight department officials – the Minister also stayed in the Presidential Suite for one night and four body guards in luxury rooms for four nights;
* R32.4 million, part of over R70 million spent on the President’s 5 official residences over the last 5 years. Jacob Zuma has presided over a large portion of this expenditure since 2009, which totals a minimum of R32.4 million. This number excludes staff salaries for the 5 residences which would add millions more per year;
* R2.4 million was spent on 2 x BMW 750is at a cost of R1.1 million each plus R50 000 on extras, including items like ‘rear seat entertainment’ and a ‘sports leather steering wheel’;
* R1.7 million was spent on a BMW 730d and Range Rover Sport TDV8;
* R11 million was spent when the Free State Provincial Cabinet purchased a new Mercedes-Benzes for each member (11 in total) – 10 Mercedes-Benz S500s, and 1 Mercedes-Benz S600 for Premier Ace Magashule;
* R1.5 million was spent on 2 x BMW 550is (X2) for Thokozile Xasa, Deputy Minister of Tourism;
* R1.6 million was spent on a Mercedes Benz GL320 CDI – for Pretoria office, and Audi Q7 4.2 TDI – for Cape Town office Deputy Minister of Communications, Dina Pule;
* R10.6 million was spent on an Inauguration party for Premier of KwaZulu-Natal;
* R7 million was spent on the opening of the Free State legislature;
* R40 million was spent on National Police Day, involving the summoning of one out of every three police officers in the country to Bloemfontein. The Minister has refused in parliamentary questions to confirm exact amount spent. R40m is a conservative estimate based both on figures made available to the DA by senior police officials;
* R2.7 million was spent on trips by Armscor executives to international arms exhibitions with their wives – staying at 5-star hotels and flying first class, while the SOE is in financial straits;
* R2.6 million was spent by several National Departments which held unnecessary “budget vote parties”: Arts and Culture – R 223 281, Basic Education – R267 000, Correctional Services – R101 594, Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs – R67 768, Energy: R412 077, Health (two parties) – RR65 639, Home Affairs – R52 365, Human Settlements –

R114 184, International Relations – R160 440, Police – R56 695, Justice and Constitutional Development – R24 323, Public Service and Administration – R104 407, Public Works – R84 240, Science and Technology – R33 000, Social Development – R180 026, Sports & Recreation – R105 000, State Security – R41 558, Trade and Industry / Economic Development – R43 000, Transport – R461 228 = R2 597 825 by various departments on the 2nd of June;

* R5.7 million was spent on a ‘Golden handshake’ to music producer Lebo Morake to ‘walk away’ from World Cup opening and closing ceremony project;
* R1.2 million was spent on a luncheon commemorating the re-opening of the Camden Coal Power Station, feeding 300 delegates (including President Zuma);
* R83 million was spent on the National Youth Development Agency’s “anti-imperialism conference,” sponsored by The Presidency (R29 million) and National Lotteries Board (R40 million) along with smaller amounts from the DTI and Arts and Culture;
* R2.5 million party thrown by SASSA for Jacob Zuma using RDP funds;
* R 2.6 million spent by DPSA on conferences within the first few months of the Zuma administration.

In 2011, the government spent R4.67 billion on catering, entertainment and travel allowances in 2011. This was double the amount spent during the previous financial year, ending March 2011.

In the financial year ending on 31 March 2012, the 34 state departments incurred the following costs:

- R194m for catering
- R31.7m for entertainment
- R4.4bn for travel and accommodation expenses.

The three departments responsible for the most spending on entertainment, food and travel expenses were defense (R780m), the police (R685m) and justice (R454m).
The department of defense’s travel and accommodation expenses amounted to R733m.

Dion George, DA MP, said 27 thatexpenditure of this kind while the country bled economically was a disgrace, and that it was totally unacceptable to spend such a large sum of money on frivolities, and that, "Wasting money in this manner amounts to negligence, during times in which poor South Africans are struggling to put food on the table."

**GOVERNMENT WASTAGE ON CONSULTANTS**

During the past 3 years, national and provincial government departments wasted R102 billion on ineffective and expensive consultants. Of the R102bn, about a third (R33.5bn) was spent by national departments and two-thirds (R68.5bn) by provincial departments.

A performance audit28 of government consultants released by the Auditor-General is littered with examples of badly managed consultant contracts, which include:

* The fixing of 200 SAPS armoured vehicles for the 2010 World Cup was calculated to be R80 million, but costs hit R177m and 44 Nyalas were delivered late.
* An SAPS IT contract for a firearm-control system was signed for R93m, but the contract was extended four times to finally cost R413m and, five years later, wasn’t finished.
* The Department of Defence had the expertise to maintain the Limpopo border fence, but paid a consultant R18m to do it.
* The Correctional Services Department hired consultants to manage other consultants, and paid an IT consultant R12m in 2009, but three years later, the project still wasn’t finished.
* Water Affairs signed 46 variation orders on 14 projects, adding up to R509m.
* Environmental Affairs had hired a consultant since 1999 in critical positions such as chief financial officer. The same department spent R9m on a consultant to advise it on procurement for its new building, more than R5m higher than the next bidder, and the hired consultant didn’t have all the skills needed.

The report looked at 2008/9, 2009/10 and 2010/11 and focused in particular on payments by national departments.

**GOVERNMENT WASTAGE ON PERSONAL FRIENDS**

**Guptas**

The Guptas are a wealthy, influential family based in South Africa since the 1990’s and are personal friends of the African National Congress leadership in government.

At the end of April 2013, the Gupta family, with close ties to President Zuma, flew to South Africa on a chartered plane, an Airbus A330-200, carrying 200 wedding guests and landed at a high security Waterkloof Air Force base, intended for the exclusive use of defending the country of South Africa, where it also refueled. In the process, the passengers bypassed customs procedures on their way to an entertainment complex. According to various media articles, including Zeenews.India, 29 this disregard to state security has angered many South Africans who see the episode as a case of cronyism linking big business and the highest levels of government in a country where corruption is a growing problem.
According to reports, Zuma’s two children are posted at high positions in the companies owned by the Guptas, namely Sahara Computers and Shiva Uranium.

Atul Gupta is chairman of the family-owned TNA media group, which includes the New Era newspaper. The family is also involved in technology and other interests.
A government report has accused Protocol chief Bruce Koloane of using deception to get landing permission for an Airbus carrying the wedding guests.
Bruce Koloane, who has been now suspended from the post of Chief of State Protocol, hinted at President’s role when he said that he was only following orders under “pressure from number 1”.
The response of Atul Gupta to the outrage o the nation was that South Africans should be thankful for the investment the Gupta family is bringing to the country. 29A

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However, the Guptas do not mention the astronomical amount of money they are making from the South African economy, which includes profit from the labour broking business, whereby half the wages of workers goes into the pockets of the labour brokers.

On 26 August 2012, the IOL media reported in an article30 called “Zuma family link to labour broking” that amid one of South Africa’s worst labour disputes (after the shooting of striking workers at the Marikana mine the Workers Unions called for a national ban on labour brokers), President Jacob Zuma’s son Duduzane, along with RK (Rajesh) Gupta are listed as non-executive directors at JIC Mining Services.

JIC Mining Services is majority-owned by Oakbay Investments, the family investment vehicle of the Guptas.
According to the company website, JIC provides contract workers to major industry players, including Impala Platinum where, earlier this year, four miners were killed.
Several trade journals also describe JIC as one of the biggest suppliers of contract labour. Independent labour analyst Terry Bell said 30 to 40 percent of mining sector workers were hired through labour brokers.
The article stated that, “Duduzane Zuma, who is linked to the Guptas through directorships in various companies, confirmed he was a non-executive director at JIC, but said he would not comment.”

Despite the Gupta family being one of the wealthiest families in the world, one of the main sponsors of the Guptas' media business is the Free State municipality. Free State Premier Ace Magashule was present at the Gupta household in Saxonwold, Johannesburg when a member of the Gupta family offered Vuyisile Kona, who had been newly appointed chief executive officer and chairman of the South African Airways, R500 000. (The airways soon ran into financial difficulty thereafter, and Kona was suspended.). Also present at this event was President Jacob Zuma's son, Duduzane.

Numerous reports have emerged over the past four years of high-ranking government individuals being invited to the Gupta home to be offered goodies and paraded before others to demonstrate the Guptas' influence.

DA leader Helen Zille visited the family compound and left with a cheque for R400 000, which she refuses to return to the Guptas despite the questions that hang over them.

It seems that appointments to boards and executive positions in the government parastatal - even cabinet positions - are made with the Guptas' full participation.

Both the chairman and the chief executive of Transnet, a major funder of the Guptas' infamous New Age breakfasts, have visited the Gupta house and admit to their links to the family.

In 2011, the then deputy minister of police, Fikile Mbalula, broke down in an ANC national executive committee meeting and recounted that he first heard of his promotion to sports minister from the Gupta family.

Reports31 abound of cabinet ministers being summoned to speak at the Gupta New Age breakfasts. Ministers are contacted, in the presence of sponsors and the lackeys of sponsors, and told that they must attend a breakfast. The media reported that one minister discharged himself from a hospital, in a sweaty and feverish state, to avoid letting the Guptas down. This man is an ANC veteran.

The family's influence on Zuma has been so huge that former ANC Youth League president Julius Malema warned that South Africa is "not a democracy of families; this is a democracy of the people of the country".

"When families are exploiting the resources of this country and are enriching themselves in the name of freedom," said Malema, "when those in political office abuse their power to benefit friends, the youth must rise in defense of the ANC."

We quote the statement31 of a South African columnist in the *Timeslive* media titled “Has the ANC been stolen?”On the state of the African National Congress in government as follows:

What the electorate will be asked to do is endorse the influence-peddling that has become the norm in this administration and in this party.

The cancer is not simply the Gupta family. The cancer is an ANC that allows blatant influence-peddling and corruption to continue in its name. The cancer is party leaders who are happy to sit and watch as the name of a noble organization becomes synonymous with blatant looting.

ANC leaders of yore like to ask the question: Where is the ANC? Has it been stolen?

The answer is depressing, heartbreaking: corruption, looting, influence peddling and in-fighting - this is the ANC now.

**INFLATED FUEL PRICES**

While the people of South Africa are experiencing ever increasing fuel prices, the majority of the monies paid for fuel go to the state coffers. A note on Facebook titled ‘ANC Corruption Crude Oil in SA’ asks the question “Where's the money gone to, Jacob?” whilst referring to the president, Jacob Zuma. The following expletive is provided:

We consume 579,000 barrels of crude oil per day in SA (Department of Statistics)
1 barrel makes 71.92282 liters of fuel
71.92282 x 579,000 = 41,643,000 liters per day
41,643,000 x 365 days = 15,200,000,000 liters per year
15,200,000,000 x R2.50 road levy per liter = R38,000,000,000 per year
R38 billion that is…
R38, 000,000,000 x 21 years that no road maintenance has taken place = R798, 000,000,000
that is close to 800 billion Rand which has disappeared from the public treasury.

**TAXES PAID BY THE WORKING CLASS**

Although legislation is put into place to prevent the public from knowing how the money which is taxed from them is being spent, the South African public is one of the highest taxed nations in the world. To give an indication of the taxes they spend, we quote an article called ‘We must stop this ANC orchestrated thievery!!’ written by a member of the public on the 21st of March 2012, as follows:

*Has anyone thought just how much tax we are already paying?

a. 35% on your salary
b.14% on everything you buy (bar fresh produce) and services rendered.
c. Carbon tax if you buy a new car (besides the 14% VAT you have to pay)
d. Tax on the fuel you put in your car to run it.
e. Toll on our roads - and for some it is going to come to a whopper of 10% of your salary (If you earn R10 000.00 a R1 000 would go toward tolling if you migrate between PTA and JHB every day.) - Bully to try and pacify me with the idea that I can claim it back from my income tax!!! I have to fork out the money first. Going on holiday to DBN? Remember to save up your R1000.00 for tolling.

To say the least - For every R10.00 you earn, the government is already taking approx R6.00 and still they want more. Are you happy with the R4.00 you are getting?*

*Where is all the money going to? It is definitely not being spent on what it should be - our hospitals are in a state of disrepair, our schools in shambles, our roads full of potholes, our water contaminated, sewers not working, left in the dark because Eskom failed to do their upgrades, the poor are poorer still, municipalities on the brink of collapse, and so the list goes on.

Heard about the youth day celebration that cost R100 million? Mmmm... did you pay for it?
Oh yes sir/madam you did! R100 million that could have paid for a couple of things our country needed more.
And to put the numbers in perspective:

The  next time you hear an SA politician use the word 'billion' in a casual manner, think about whether you wanted the 'politicians'  spending YOUR tax money.
A billion is a difficult number to comprehend, but one advertising agency did a good job of putting that figure into some perspective in one of its press releases:
A.   A billion seconds ago it was 1959.
B.   A billion minutes ago Jesus was alive.
C.   A billion hours ago our ancestors were living in the Stone Age.
D.  A billion days ago no-one walked on the earth on two feet.
E.    A billion Rand ago was only 27 hours and 12 minutes at the rate our SA government is spending it. (a billion rand a day??!!)

Building Permit Tax
Cigarette Tax
Corporation Tax
Income Tax
Value Added Tax
Fishing License Tax
Food License Tax
Fuel License Tax
Petrol/Diesel Tax
Hunting License Tax
Luxury Tax
Property Tax
Service charge taxes
Capital gains Tax
Social Security Tax
Securities Transfer Tax
Road Usage Tax
Local Tax
Vehicle License Registration Tax
Vehicle Sales Tax
Worker's Compensation Tax

Hardly any of these taxes existed 20 years ago...
Our nation was one of the most prosperous in Africa.
We had comparatively very little national debt...
We had the largest middle class in Africa and Mum stayed home to raise the kids.
What happened?
ANSWER:
Look at the Government.....and who is 'running' the country....
INTO THE GROUND - on YOUR and MY 'billions'!!!*

**DISINVESTMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN MONEY THROUGH CORRUPTION**

*GhostShell* hackers have released a huge amount of data of over 700 000 account details on dumped data, records and databases of top most financial giants from South African and  to some extent other countries from the continent, such as Algeria, Nigeria, Kenya and Angola. which ranges from government, mining, banking, petroleum, construction, management, networking, transport services, education/academics and other high profile financial institutions?

and a press release that is now available on Pastebin.

According to their press release 32, they had investigated data dating back to 2007, stating that:

*After two months of investigations, Team GhostShell has finally managed to fingerprint the entire top business infrastructure of South Africa, tracing some of its activities to other countries across the continent.*

*As always, we will provide you with a glimpse of that world, so that everyone else can do their own research and draw their own conclusions from it. Although this time around, the goal was not to release a large portion of data, we will still provide you with enough non-disclosure accounts and records from a variety of businesses; corporations and governments.*

There are total 40 Dumps that contains data compromised from various organizations which channel monies out of South Africa paying little or no tax, including Woolworths Holdings, Angola’s Oil field industries, The African Reinsurance Corporation, South African Diamond Corporation, PostNet Internet Services, African Mining, BEE Network, Moolmans Africa Mining Corporation, South African Express Petroleum. See details on interrelated companies in Footnote 4 – Organizations who disinvest from South Africa.

GhostShell further reported that in the year Jacob Zuma took over presidency in 2009, South Africa faced up to over 1 million new job cuts because of the economic meltdown from the previous year. At least half the South African population live on less than R322 (44 $USD) per month, while all time status between the rich and poor is increasing, the middle class almost being wiped out, leaving room for the rich to keep getting richer and the poor to keep getting poorer.

The report adds that while protests keep rising, the health and education branches of the country end up suffering the most, which places people to resort to petty crimes and violence. Without a proper health system, the average life expectancy in South Africa went from 62 years in a study back in 1992 to 48 years in 2010. The absence of education leads a lot of Africans to secure their financial status through illegal means, but that's only just the beginning. Because of that very same loss in education, there exists an even greater rise in rape cases throughout the country. On average it is said that at least half the female population have already been raped at least once, with statistics showing that every 7 seconds a woman is being violated.

GhostShell says that the point of their revelation is for people to find and see for themselves the connections these entities have with one another, how they conduct themselves on the financial playing field, and also economically speaking, how they actually do business world-wide.

**SECRECY BILL**

Whistle blowers on corruption in South Africa risk being jailed for revealing corruption in government as the African National Congress in power has passed the Secrecy Bill which gags the release of ‘sensitive’ information to the public.

Commenting on the Secrecy Bill, *The Mercury* newspaper reported the following on the 17th of February 2012 in an article 33 titled “Things you would never have known”:

*Over the past two or three years leading up to the release of the Manase findings, The Mercury has consistently published stories about how ratepayers’ money has been spent in the municipality. Most of these stories, which unveiled wrongdoings, would, not have seen the light of day if whistle-blowers and insiders had not bitten the bullet and put their jobs – and sometimes their lives – at risk to assist reporters with information. Some of the issues which were dealt with in the Manase report and which were covered by The Mercury include:

\*\* The excessive and unqualified use of Section 36, a provision in the supply-chain management policy that allows for the awarding of contracts in exceptional circumstances without following the normal tender procedures.

Some of the stories relating to Section 36 and which would not make it into the public domain if the bill becomes law include revelations that the former ANC chairman in the region, John Mchunu, was a multimillion-rand beneficiary of Section 36 contracts, and that the daughter of former eThekwini mayor Obed Mlaba had a multimillion-rand toilet container contract with the municipality.

The Manase report found that Mlaba had interfered in the awarding of a R3-billion waste-volume reduction tender. Before that, The Mercury uncovered that Mlaba’s two daughters were shareholders in the company that was awarded the contract.
Once it made headlines, the contract didn’t get off the ground.

\*\* The Manase report found irregular expenditure in the housing department totaling R428 million, and senior officials and politicians were implicated.
Two years before, The Mercury found that certain building contractors, like Zikhulise, were being granted contracts by the municipality despite shoddy workmanship and the fact that in some instances, the houses were uninhabitable and potentially life threatening.
If the Secrecy Bill becomes law, the whistle-blowers and journalists who had the documents proving payments and contracts in this regard, could be jailed.

\*\* The Manase report called for an investigation into overtime claims in the metro police department. Although the municipality has yet to reveal its overtime bill, whistle-blowers helped The Mercury reveal that officers had doubled, and in some cases even trebled, their salaries over December by claiming overtime.
\*\* Both the Manase report and Auditor-General Terence Nombembe’s 2009/10 report detailed how councilors in eThekwini were doing business with the municipality, in direct contravention of the Municipal Finance Management Act.
The Mercury had previously reported on the issue and released the names of the councilors, with the help of whistle-blowers, which could be prohibited if the Secrecy Bill in its present form becomes law.
While there are many examples of the negative impact of the Secrecy Bill, international organizations have also warned that it is not just about a clampdown on democracy, but also the erosion of SA’s hard-won democracy.

Human Rights Watch, an international organization, last year condemned the SA government for pushing the bill through the National Assembly, saying that despite the amendments which had taken place over 18 months, the bill was still a “serious blow” to democratic accountability.*

**INVESTIGATIONS INTO GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION ARE OFTEN BLOCKED**

**Police operations are plugged**

On the 19th of June 2012, Eblockwatch reported in an article titled “What happens when good cops are too good” that 40 highly experienced, hand-picked police officers were put into a team to investigate the ‘blue light’ syndicate which consists of criminals and corrupt police officers who rob the public.

One of these officers said that, "There is a lot of rot in our ranks. Some of our own members are involved [in the blue light syndicates]. We know them but we cannot do anything because we need to catch them in the act.'' He said the raids scheduled for later in the week were designed to do just that. But days before the scheduled raids, the officers were told by their commanders to stop all investigations into the syndicates immediately, and to hand in all the information that they had gathered during their three-week investigation - after hearing on Monday last week that their operation had been extended for two months.

The police officer stated that, "We have been given no reasons why we were shut down. All we were told was to stop everything, including gathering information on planned attacks, and locations of safe houses and weapons."

Gauteng police's General Pumza Gela, who ordered the establishment of the team, last month, advised motorists not to stop for unmarked vehicles fitted with blue lights, saying the gangs, which included police officers, were dangerous and well armed.

Motorists have been targeted by blue-light robbers, mainly on the N17, N14, N1 and M1 highways, and through Johannesburg, Benoni and Germiston, on the East Rand, and Pretoria.

During the month before the special team was formed, Blue-light robbers hijacked a Pretoria West sheriff of the court and a business owner from Kyalami, northern Johannesburg, in separate incidents;

Ryan Pickford, of Bryanston, northern Johannesburg, was hijacked in Main Road, Bryanston, during which he was held for two hours at gunpoint after being "arrested" by men claiming to be police officers. There were reportedly four similar incidents in and around Johannesburg on the same day.

The team has scored a string of successes in the three weeks during which they had operated. Its members killed two hijackers, arrested 38 and recovering 34 hijacked vehicles.

The team also raided a house in Pretoria, arresting three men and recovering blue lights and sirens, police radios, uniforms, pistols, ammunition and vehicles believed to have been stolen. The raid occurred after police received information that three men who were appearing in the Bronkhorstspruit Regional Court on the same day were part of a blue-light gang terrorizing Pretoria's eastern suburbs. The men, who were appearing on charges of armed robbery, led police to the house. The suspects are wanted in connection with a murder, eight attempted murders, and hijackings in Bronkhorstspruit, Cullinan and Welbekend.

Members of the team have unmasked several police officers involved in aiding the syndicates by providing tip-offs on imminent raids, and supplying weapons, uniforms, bulletproof vests, radios and blue lights.

Members of specialized units, such as the flying squad, are also allegedly helping the gangs. The modus operandi involves either stopping motorists after driving behind them or setting up bogus roadblocks.

*The Times* learned that the team was allegedly ordered to shoot to kill syndicate members - even if they were known to be police officers. A Pretoria policeman said they were told to "take out" police officers working with the gangs, stating that, "We were given these orders and then 48 hours later we were shut down. We were told to take two days off and then report back to our units." He said there was something "sinister" about the new orders. "It is clear we were doing our job just a little too well. We were about to carry out several raids, which were going to net the kingpins, including police officers.

"We had good successes. In three weeks, we arrested 38 suspects, recovered 34 hijacked cars, five firearms, R200000 in cash, R200000 worth of drugs and killed two suspects," he said. "It is clear someone is looking out for the wrong people's interests.

"We were hurting these thugs. The only way they could stop us was to shut us down. Our success has been our downfall."

**Specialized commercial crime unit investigations are blocked**

National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) advocate Glynnis Breytenbach, was the head of the NPA in Gauteng's specialized commercial crime unit when she was given orders to investigate corruption which included mining tenders in 2010. In May 2011, after she had uncovered names related to President Zuma, retired president Nelson Mandela, business associates of Julius Malema, and police crime intelligence boss Richard Mdluli, she was ordered to stop her investigations immediately and hand over all her documents and information to the NPA.

Breytenbach refused to stop the corruption probe; the NPA suspended Breytenbach and laid 16 charges against her, which included gross insubordination and improper conduct for allegedly not handing over her work laptop to the NPA, and for having information on it deleted. Other charges relate to Breytenbach bringing the NPA into disrepute by speaking to the media, either directly or via her attorney, without authorization.

In April 2012, Advocate Glynnis Breytenbach had her car shot at while driving, and someone tried to push her off the road.

On the 18th of July 2012, the Johannesburg Labour Court dismissed Breytenbach's challenge against her suspension. She had contended that acting national director of public prosecutions Nomgcobo Jiba suspended her in an attempt to stop her from prosecuting former police crime intelligence boss Richard Mdluli. 34

In June 2013, the NPA withdrew its charges against Engelbrecht, after many days in drawnout court proceedings.

**ANC REFUSES TO GIVE ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE OPPOSITION PARTY, DA**

In an article35 titled “The crises in South Africa is deepening Zuma unwilling to cooperate with democrats” in 2012, it is reported that President of South Africa Jacob Zuma has turned down a request by Democratic Alliance leader Helen Zille to publicly debate with her on the state of the economy: “The presidency sees no need to engage in any exercise that diverts attention from getting stakeholders to work together,” presidential spokesman Mac Maharaj explained.

“All South Africans are presently deeply concerned about the state of our country, and particularly our economy,” said Zille, adding that Zuma had not proved himself worthy of leading the country in the wake of escalating labour protests and the downgrading of the country's credit rating.

**ANC REFUSES TO GIVE ACCOUNTABILITY TO THEIR OWN SUPPORTERS**

Various areas in South Africa which are classed as ANC wards receive no or inadequate service from them. People living in these areas claim that the voting for these areas is rigged, and whistle blowers on corruption are harassed. To point, we refer to the densely populated Zandspruit informal settlement where more than 50 000 people live.

Zandspruit started 19 years ago on private land and now has more than 15 000 shacks. There is only one clinic, two primary schools, and no high school or recreational facilities. There is no electricity and inadequate toilets and taps. The roads are terrible and there are lots of raw sewerage streams, which are worsened when it rains. Rubbish frequently piles up before it is collected

Divisions in the ANC are holding back the development of Zanspruit which needs to be proclaimed as a township so that proper upgrading can take place, but Johannesburg council has inexplicably delayed in buying up the private land on which the shacks are built. This is despite a council resolution in 2004 authorizing the purchase of the land.

On the 22st of November 2012, DA members Jack Bloom and Kate Lorimer visited Zandspruit and found 36 that the clinic had been without water for two days, and children at the Masakhane Primary School had been sent home because of the lack of water. Although local ANC councilor Maureen Schneeman is accountable for this area, Lorimer made a few phone calls, and within less than an hour, a water tank was delivered, which shows how ineffectual Clr. Schneeman is. Zandspruit is a very volatile place, with lots of service delivery protests that spill over and sometimes block the busy Beyers Naude Drive.

Bloom and Lorimer walked into a boisterous protest by community members who were angry that four people were arrested that morning by the police in connection with a vigilante necklace murder in the area a month ago, and report the following:

*They were pleased to see us and we addressed them. They complained that the police did nothing to curb crime in the area and had arrested the four people for political reasons because they opposed corruption in the local ANC branch.*

*Another accusation was that the ANC branch had irregularly elected pro-Zuma delegates to the Mangaung Congress*

**The African National Congress corrupt people’s minds to keep them in power**

Not only does the African National Congress leadership use rhetoric statements to blame other organizations, groups of people and leaders to hide their own incompetence, but President Jacob Zuma uses superstition to gain ANC support.

“If you quarrel with the ANC, you have a problem because the ancestors turn their back on you,” Zuma said to applause from the ANC crowd.

Zuma also uses veiled threats to instill fear through statements such as the following:

“You will die a political natural death ... And that’s why no matter how you feel, don’t fight the ANC. No matter how long it takes, your death will come. And you know how it is with natural death, some will go in middle age, some a little later in life, and others die very young.” 37

**The African National Congress release prisoners to get more votes**

Since the African National Congress has come into power, their presidents have regularly released prisoners to boost their support. Most of these prisoners fall back into crime immediately after their release and South Africa is spiraling into a criminal cesspool.

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**Footnotes:**

**Footnote 1: Maladministration at the Department of Communications.**

Top leadership positions at the Universal Service and Access Agency of South Africa (USAASA), a portfolio organization under the Department of Communications, are filled by corrupt officials.

The Chairperson of USAASA, Ms Pumla Radebe, engaged in the appointment process of Mr. Zami Nkosi as CEO of USAASA. Ms Redebe did not recuse herself from this appointment process even though she and Nkosi had worked together previously for Pikitup and they both left the company under a dark cloud; she as Chairperson, and Mr. Nkosi and Managing Director,

Mr. Nkosi used Ms Radebe as a reference on his CV when he applied for the USAASA position.

USAASA overlooked all the minimum job requirements for academic qualifications and work experience when it employed Nkosi. The minimum requirements for the USAASA CEO position stipulate that a candidate for the position should have a postgraduate degree in Economic and Management Science, Communications Science, i.e. MSc, or at least ten years relevant experience in Executive and Strategic Management, of which three years at the executive management level within the ICT sector. Mr. Nkosi does not meet any of these requirements.

In his open memo to the President dated the 7th of June 2013, Bantu Holomisa points out irregularities in the tender USAASA had awarded Mthinthe Communications (Pty) Ltd to roll out broadband infrastructure to schools.

The first tender was for the amount of R7 million to roll out broadband to 33 ICT Access Centers. Within three months, Mthinthe was given another contract to connect an additional 90 centers, and the value of this tender was R31 million.

This R31 million increased to R33 million for no apparent reason. This amount was originally intended for the rollout of infrastructure broadband to 49 schools and 41 Access Centers around the country. However, close scrutiny of the first phase of the project revealed that 23 out of these 33 sites are in KwaZulu-Natal, while only eight are in Mpumalanga and two in the North West Province. Holomisa asks “What criteria did Government use to rollout this infrastructure?”

Furthermore, the company Mthinthe was grossly overpaid. In June 2012, Mthinthe was given an 80% subsidy to deploy ICT Centers in South Africa, as per their proposal, authorized by Themba Phiri, USAASA Executive Caretaker CEO.

On the 8th of August 2012, Mr. Phiri signed a second subsidy agreement with Mthinthe, without a motivation from Mthinthe, giving Mthinthe a 100% subsidy.

According to USAASA’s 2012/2013 Exception Report, the total Rand value amount of the 80% subsidy for Mthinthe should have been R 24 115 643.26 but the final Rand value subsidy amount given to Mthinthe was R33.1 million. This means that Mthinthe was overpaid by a whopping R8 984 356. 74. Mthinthe was further paid R2 390 751.00 with an expenditure description for branding.

However, according to USAASA’s 2012/2013 Exception Report, during the visit to

Mpumalanga none of the visited sites deployed by the service provider was branded.

According to USAASA’s Universal Service Fund, this brought the total amount paid to Mthinthe, as at 25th April 2013, to R35 402 015.50.

Furthermore, the deadline for the connection of these centers was set for the 31st of March 2013. However, the Exception Report states that, as at the 7th of May 2013, only 9 out of 120 Mthinthe centers were operational. Holomisa states that, “It is clear that some officials in the Department and at USAASA are using Mthinthe as a vehicle to loot State resources, because the company continues to receive payments, even though its work is incomplete”.

Holomisa pointed out that Mthinthe was not the only incompetent company tasked with connecting these ICT Access Centers, as Hawkstone Marketing was also tasked, and performs just as poorly. He stated that, “In both instances, USAASA management demonstrates no willingness to recover the amount overpaid to Mthinthe and to appropriately sanction these companies for their dismal performance. I am particularly concerned about the fact that USAASA’s 2012/2013 Exception Report shows that these two companies lack the requisite skills, expertise and capacity to do this job.”

Holomisa pointed to the request from Cell C to Minister Pule for half a billion rand to pay for a project which neither the government nor USAASA had identified, and that there had been no competitive bidding for this project. He states that it is strange that Cell C submitted its request for funding directly to the Minister, when no one else knew about this project. Holomisa stated that, after tracing the paper trail of this application, it was found that Minister Pule’s response dated the 7th of February 2013, stated: “NORMAN PLEASE DEAL WITH THIS.”

This culminated in the directive given by USAASA Chief Executive Officer, Zami Nkosi’s to Mr. Mmatlou Morudu, USAASA Executive: Business Development Service, for the CELL C proposal to be implemented. Mr. Nkosi’s directive is as follows: “This serves to officially hand this project to you and your team for implementation. It recommends that you enlist Mr. Thabo Makenete as the project lead as he is the author of the approved model.”

Holomisa states that the speed with which this project was approved and implemented is questionable. All the regulations of the Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2005 were flouted. Had it not been for Mr. Mmatlou Morudu’s refusal to implement the project, half a billion Rand would have been released for it.

In his refusal, Mr. Morudu argued as follows: “In response to your request for and advice, kindly note that the application by the eMalahleni Local Municipality in partnership with the Electronic Communications Network Services license providers Cell C, done in terms of Section 88 (1) (b); The Act clearly articulates that such application must be adjudicated via a competitive tender for Universal Service and Access Projects and such fails to pass to Section 90 Regulations.” He further argued that: “Whilst it is imperative that we proceed with subsidizing the rollout of broadband infrastructure in underserviced, we must duly comply with section 90 and, as such, we will start with the process of competitive bidding without delays.”

He concluded by saying that: “I have a duty of professional care and competence that I seek to abide by, in all my dealings.”

The strange part is that Government rolled out broadband infrastructure for R13 million at Msinga Municipality in KwaZulu-Natal, a municipality twice the size of eMalahleni Local Municipality.

**Footnote 2: The constitutional irregularities of the Lenasia homes eviction court order**

The following information is taken from an article by Pierre de Vos titled ‘Lenasia: The haunting abandonment of humanity’ dated 21 November 2012.

The Gauteng government has, for inexplicable reasons, decided that residents who have already been defrauded should be punished further by losing homes that they purchased honestly. But it is cruel and inhumane, and certainly not a solution.

I am haunted by this picture of a woman unsuccessfully trying to stop a bulldozer from demolishing her home in Lenasia. No one seemed to have thought of asking the woman her name. The newspapers said she was “unidentified”: like so many other black women in South Africa, she is literally treated as being without an identity, without a history, without a personality. Why did the Gauteng government want to demolish this woman’s home and why did a court grant an order allowing the demolition?

The bulldozing of people’s homes is an emotionally laden issue in South Africa. Anyone with a passing knowledge of the Apartheid past must recall the horrible images of bulldozers wrecking people’s homes in Fietas, Sophiatown, District Six and many other parts of the country. It therefore came as a shock to hear that our government sought, and a South African court ordered, the demolition of houses in Lenasia.

Given the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on forced evictions and the provisions of the Prevention of Illegal Evictions from and Unlawful Occupation of Land (PIE) Act, it is difficult to agree with the court for granting this order – which in any case the Gauteng government should never have asked for.

In terms of section 26(3) of the Constitution, when considering whether to order the forced eviction of unlawful occupiers from their homes, a court must take into account all relevant factors.

As the Constitutional Court stated in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers, our Constitution “acknowledges that a home is more than just a shelter from the elements”. A home “is a zone of personal intimacy and family security” and the forced removal from a home “is a shock for any family”. It does not make any difference whether that home is lawfully or unlawfully occupied.

“It is not only the dignity of the poor that is assailed when homeless people are driven from pillar to post in a desperate quest for a place where they and their families can rest their heads. Our society as a whole is demeaned when state action intensifies rather than mitigates their marginalization. The integrity of the rights-based vision of the Constitution is punctured when governmental action augments rather than reduces denial of the claims of the desperately poor to the basic elements of a decent existence. Hence the need for special judicial control of a process that is both socially stressful and potentially conflictual.”

The PIE Act confirms that a court must take into account all the relevant circumstances under which people occupy the land.

In the PE Municipality case justice Albie Sachs warned that a court should be slow to order the eviction of its citizens from state-owned land as “the state generally has further land to meet its obligations”.

The degree of emergency or desperation of people, who have sought a spot on which to erect their shelters, would always have to be considered. And persons “occupying land with at least a plausible belief that they have permission to be there” can be looked at with far greater sympathy than those who deliberately invaded land with a view to disrupting the organized housing programme and placing themselves at the front of the queue.

It is settled law that a court should be reluctant to grant an eviction against relatively settled occupiers unless it is satisfied that a reasonable alternative is available.

In City of Johannesburg v Blue Moonlight Properties the Constitutional Court found – in slightly different circumstances than the present – that the City’s housing policy was unconstitutional to the extent that it excluded some people evicted from privately owned property from consideration for temporary accommodation.

It found that such exclusion was unreasonable. This does not mean that the City would always have to provide alternative accommodation, but if it failed to do so in circumstances where people would be left homeless the eviction would almost never be granted.

In the end a court must consider all relevant factors, but should not do so in a mechanical way or in a way that gives too much weight to the bureaucratic needs and plans of the Municipality and too little weight to the needs of those who might be affected by the eviction.

In the Port Elizabeth Municipality, Sachs explained the approach as follows:

“The Constitution and PIE require that in addition to considering the lawfulness of the occupation, the court must have regard to the interests and circumstances of the occupier and pay due regard to broader considerations of fairness and other constitutional values, so as to produce a just and equitable result. Thus, PIE expressly requires the court to infuse elements of grace and compassion into the formal structures of the law. It is called upon to balance competing interests in a principled way and promote the constitutional vision of a caring society based on good neighborliness and shared concern.”

In this case, the residents were defrauded. They built structures on government-owned land, believing that they had bought the plots. They built solid structures, using their own money, believing they had a right to do so. They did not do so because they wanted to jump the queue for land or housing. Those who committed the fraud are being prosecuted, but it is unclear why those who were duped must be punished for their crime.

It is unclear what constitutionally permitted purpose is being served by the eviction of such innocent people from their homes.

How does the bulldozing of their homes demonstrate the Gauteng government’s commitment to a caring society, one which is animated by the principle of Ubuntu, which holds that we are all demeaned if some among us are treated without grace and compassion – all in order to pursue a cold-hearted and bureaucratic housing plan without any consideration of the feelings of those affected?

I wonder if the Gauteng premier and the judicial officer who granted the eviction and demolition order have had time to pause for a moment to consider the feelings of the unnamed woman in the picture. Have they asked themselves what must have gone through her mind as she desperately threw her body in the path of that bulldozer? Do they wonder about all the hopes and dreams she had about her new home and how these have now been shattered by the greedy fraudsters who sold these plots to innocent citizens, abetted by the Gauteng government and by the court who ordered the eviction?

Where is the grace? Where is the compassion? Where is the common decency? Or are these feelings only reserved for one “special” person, a person who might bleed and sleep and eat and have sex and defecate like the rest of us, but who somehow is viewed as more important and more worthy of concern and respect than the unnamed woman in Lenasia who planted her body in front of that bulldozer?

Why is it that we are told (in expensive adverts in the Sunday papers) not to care that the homes of some citizens are bulldozed, while we are also told that it is none of our business that more than R250 million of public funds are being used to upgrade the private homestead of our king, our leader, our father in chief – all while some of our people who contributed to the upgrade of the president’s house do not have a roof over their heads and will be forced to sleep under a bush or in a ditch tonight and for many, many more nights to come? DM

<http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2012-11-21-lenasia-the-haunting-abandonment-of-humanity/>

**Footnote 3: MTN shields corrupt government officials.**

Communications minister Dina Pule's boyfriend was paid R6-million in management fees for the ICT Indaba after her department apparently forced the conference organizer to hire him.

This emerges from two secret documents seen by the Sunday Times: a forensic report by law firm Werksmans for MTN, and an affidavit that conference organizer Carol Bouwer submitted to parliament's ethics committee.

This means Pule's boyfriend, Phosane Mngqibisa, was paid nearly the same for a four-day event as the R6.4-million basic salary paid to former Telkom CEO Pinky Moholi for a year's work - and more than twice the R2.66-million paid to President Jacob Zuma last year.

News of Mngqibisa's windfall was met with disbelief by senior sources in the Department of Communications because they had little or no dealings with his events company, Khemano.

"Most of the work was done by us and Carol Bouwer," said one, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "We never saw Khemano."

The Werksmans report is the first confirmation that Pule's boyfriend scored millions personally from the inaugural indaba held in Cape Town in June last year. The probe was unable to expose MTN's role in the scandal because the company "specifically instructed [us] not to interview any of the MTN executives involved in the arrangements surrounding the ICT Indaba".

Before the indaba, Pule sent letters to Telkom, MTN and Vodacom "inviting" them to "cooperate with the Department of Communications and Carol Bouwer Productions" - an "invitation" that one company executive privately described as "near extortion". The companies provided a total of R25.7-million and Pule's department chipped in another R10.5-million for the event.

Days later the Sunday Times revealed that Mngqibisa -unbeknown to sponsors - had been given access to Bouwer's bank account and withdrawn millions to "pay suppliers".

The Werksmans report reveals that Mngqibisa also took a R6-million "management fee". Bouwer, the main organiser of the event, only received a R2-million fee.

Mngqibisa could not explain this discrepancy. "He was very evasive when questioned on how he arrived at the amount of R6-million as a management fee," the report states.

Mngqibisa declined to answer questions sent to him this week. "If you have any evidence of unlawful conduct or of any crime by any entity or individual in connection with the ICT Indaba, you are encouraged to provide such evidence to the authorities," he said.

The report said Mngqibisa was "economical with the truth and became quite flustered when certain pointed questions were put to him [and] he refused to answer the questions around his relationship with the minister. Obviously, inferences can be drawn from this refusal."

Mngibisa's R6-million fee was in addition to "expenses" he recovered. Bank statements show that he withdrew R100000 from Bouwer's account on February 23 last year to fly to Barcelona, Spain, to attend a conference also attended by Pule. Mngqbisa told the Sunday Times he used the trip to "market the inaugural ICT Indaba".

Questions remain about why MTN's R15-million was diverted into the account of a company called ABR Consulting at the last minute, when other sponsors paid Bouwer's company.

Werksmans was told not to dig too deep.

"On the instructions of [two MTN officials], we have not interrogated the statements any further, despite our misgivings," the report said.

Because MTN effectively hamstrung the investigation, Werksmans could only conclude that "it appears at face value as if MTN's R15-million was, by and large, properly spent", although it warned "there might well have been sums taken from MTN's R15-million". MTN should bear part of the blame for the "insufficient controls" over how the millions in sponsorship cash for the indaba were spent, raising "red flags" over the explanations given, the report says.

Before Werksmans was hired, MTN blocked its own internal fraud investigator, Chris Baloye, from interviewing company officials. Baloye then produced what was said to be a damning internal report - and was fired for his troubles.

When the Sunday Times requested a copy of the Werksmans report in December, MTN refused. "The report was conducted for internal purposes and therefore cannot be used for public consumption," it said.

MTN spokeswoman Bridget Bhengu said the company was "satisfied there was no criminal activity, nor basis to consider recoveries of any monies".

Bouwer's affidavit submitted to parliament's ethics committee reveals that one of Pule's trusted confidantes pressured the organiser to include Mngqibisa's company, Khemano, among the indaba organisers.

<http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2013/02/03/minister-s-boyfriend-paid-r6-million-for-four-days-work>

**Footnote 4: Organizations who disinvest from South Africa.**

GhostShell have fingered the following organizations for disinvesting monies from South Africa, which are interrelated, and have provided leads for evidence, as follows:

* African Reinsurance Corporation - Mirror1:  http://textsnip.com/3588e8 Mirror2: http://paste.bradleygill.com/index.php?paste\_id=3638 Mirror3: <https://pastee.org/yjed6/preview>
* Woolworths Holdings Limited Part 1 - Mirror1: http://textsnip.com/5355b6 Mirror2: http://paste.bradleygill.com/index.php?paste\_id=3640 Mirror3: <https://pastee.org/4bbpv/preview>
* Woolworths Holdings Limited Part 2 - Mirror1: http://textsnip.com/785ae4 Mirror2: http://paste.bradleygill.com/index.php?paste\_id=3641 Mirror3: <https://pastee.org/jp64t>
* Woolworths Holdings Limited Part 3 - Mirror1: http://textsnip.com/9de735 Mirror2: http://paste.bradleygill.com/index.php?paste\_id=3642 Mirror3: <https://pastee.org/dr33p>
* Woolworths Holdings Limited Part 4 - Mirror1: http://textsnip.com/4e4d71 Mirror2: http://paste.bradleygill.com/index.php?paste\_id=3644 Mirror3: <https://pastee.org/sdgu2>
* Woolworths Holdings Limited Part 5 - Mirror1: http://textsnip.com/16a3bc Mirror2: http://paste.bradleygill.com/index.php?paste\_id=3645 Mirror3: <https://pastee.org/utysg>
* Woolworths Holdings Limited Part 6 - Mirror1: http://chopapp.com/#kwlcq6d3 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNccpKT Mirror3: <http://dumpz.org/417569/>
* Woolworths Holdings Limited Part 7 - Mirror1: http://chopapp.com/#qf0gpvi2 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcICwe Mirror3: <http://dumpz.org/417571/>
* Woolworths Holdings Limited Part 8 - Mirror1: http://chopapp.com/#n5j3121l Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcIBg9 Mirror3: <http://dumpz.org/417573/>
* Woolworths Holdings Limited Part 9 - Mirror1: http://chopapp.com/#lajjacxa Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcccov Mirror3: <http://dumpz.org/417575/>
* Woolworths Holdings Limited Part 10 - Mirror1: http://chopapp.com/#kctmnlew Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcccK2 Mirror3: <http://dumpz.org/417578/>
* Woolworths Holdings Limited Part 11 - Mirror1: http://chopapp.com/#fqk5yutk Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNccYdP Mirror3: <http://dumpz.org/417579/>
* Woolworths Holdings Limited Part 12 - Mirror1: http://chopapp.com/#fo84nlsy Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcoB60 Mirror3: <http://dumpz.org/417581/>
* Woolworths Holdings Limited Part 13 - Mirror1: http://chopapp.com/#mafw568j Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNco8bE Mirror3: <http://dumpz.org/417583/>
* Woolworths Holdings Limited Pat 14 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/5de43c0524 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcHyws Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?7yx5khvqjno0>
* Woolworths Holdings Limited Part 15 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/6842eb95f2 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNccDxN Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?1y75r22l8cay>
* Woolworths Holdings Limited Part 16 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/ebe30024fa Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNccAF1 Mirror3 A: http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?gi0f5y56azb8 Mirror3 B: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?n6soavdp184z>
* South African Diamond Corporation - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/4aed220f0b Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcHdWH Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?y9foeuevcoag>
* African Mining Part 1 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/4dab5c62bb Mirror2: http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?lsh7uxvs6bgk Mirror3: <https://pastee.org/9qjry/preview>
* African Mining Part 2 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/2f2b88d1ef Mirror2: http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?qthw6yhbtwuc Mirror3: <https://pastee.org/fh77r>
* BEE Network - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/00c3e9b5c5 Mirror2: http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?u6zem91ln400 Mirror3: <https://pastee.org/vkk9a/preview>
* Allied Technology International - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/1fe26eb4cc Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcbhrE Mirror3: http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?mtjremawvcv2 Mirror4: <https://pastee.org/hu7dm/preview>
* I Llovo Boulevard (I llovo Corporation) - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/59f2675419 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcnDFa Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?um5ew4lok7re>
* Genesis Insurance Brokers - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/fe7e1618b8 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcnA89 Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?xfh6plxxvkym>
* Omni ID Company Part 1 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/f26b9b167a Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcbV9S Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?7g1snfsctqzy>
* Omni ID Company Part 2 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/42117322fa Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcbS37 Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?9swt9kkmqnus>
* Ornico Marketing - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/5f69a408dc Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcbMN4 Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?rfr6dih0yo3l>
* Moolmans Africa Mining Corporation - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/6d53b1a285 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcbE6b Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?xb8hz6r07x27>
* Angola's National Diamond Corporation - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/9304502afb Mirror2: http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?u9wxqsth5ls4 Mirror3: <https://pastee.org/cbxnb/preview>
* Angola's Oil field industries, CIA teaser (spot the 4 obvious databases; vulnerable link has been posted alongside the server layout, retrieve the names, locations and time/dates from db "cia" and trace it back to Washington) - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/3f0673a107 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcxxDt Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?6osmgn1avw9l>
* South African Express Petroleum - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/d460321956 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcxrMb Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?73qw5aurpc67>
* State University Part 1 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/4e749354c1 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcarTq Mirror3 A: http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?nwk2399jtvv7 Mirror3 B: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?wnkaciqaqo2t>
* State University Part 2 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/a5472f22ad Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcaebt Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?f902cm698x59>
* State University Part 3 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/f3cc568df2 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcmPoN Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?q054a0fese6g>
* State University Part 4 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/00982423d0 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcxK4c Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?40vgwx72o7x6>
* State University Part 5 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/f0a949be81 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcxIZg Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?ao35sawdbazv>
* State University Part 6 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/d9227b1540 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcxGIy Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?14iqne1y433v>
* State University Part 7 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/d47706ff04 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcxDWx Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?bbr6kn7xivcl>
* State University Part 8 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/405441b41e Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcx8i8 Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?l0ueozurocz6>
* State University Part 9 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/5e2d2bf7f8 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNca6ya Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?mvio1siz9693>
* State University Part 10 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/f0fc3fbecf Mirror2: http://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcZzxi Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?lu6hle94apco>
* State University Part 11 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/46f82d2b85 Mirror2: http://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcZyXp Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?ce7hzlme9gz7>
* State University Part 12 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/f1fab43286 Mirror2: http://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcZuFW Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?wy1g5vsov265>
* State University Part 13 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/bb1a0cb8dc Mirror2: http://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcZqZd Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?p5pghjrthpjn>
* State University Part 14 - Mirror1: https://pri
* State University Part 18 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/ff3af43940 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcwbtT Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?3ex23vi0lty2>
* State University Part 19 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/6a6ccdaecd Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcZQ2L Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?ezozd0dmxmbj>
* State University Part 20 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/917e2a35b5 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcwSdM Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?k4qiy5uo0yad>
* State University Part 21 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/73401cb8d3 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcwN8o Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?n0hc5m5ltit2>
* State University Part 22 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/be1d090c6f Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcwIcn Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?qsas0sakwlqb>
* State University Part 23 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/85d5f1f374 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNclT8d Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?0ld7l3ifa3iq>
* State University Part 24 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/77f370a765 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcZ4or Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?ildhf52ce3jq>
* State University Part 25 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/c2dd4a1b95 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcZ0Kw Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?jw7zvfkwasdd>
* State University Part 26 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/4a1a492b1b Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcw6me Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?b4c02yizpwqj>
* State University Part 27 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/b89b3982c8 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcw1mn Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?vwg16dwvpcdc>
* State University Part 28 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/0a1fca9659 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcvxx6 Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?4zozzffajrkl>
* State University Part 29 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/50abc8761e Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcl7XF Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?6wm1qmmtfgei>
* State University Part 30 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste vatepaste.com/652269ff9e Mirror2: http://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcwpqG Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?eo3pefdz2gjf>
* State University Part 15 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/ba119d4e5e Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcwlFP Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?q2cq1tuu4mle>
* State University Part 16 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/af117a8fda Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcljCN Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?zje08bamfqvm>
* State University Part 17 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/c1b43f4d90 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcwfu6 Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?nwgsgbkgl8yy>
* .com/b7683a763d Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcvnX1 Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?ufaq7f1bbnc3>
* State University Part 31 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/37087c193c Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcvkFz Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?uitm334fqitc>
* State University Part 32 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/e6eadbdc3e Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcYZ5s Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?s3b164lzmflo>
* State University Part 33 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/cb7634c273 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcYQbC Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?zeqhvcyfawoe>
* State University Part 34 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/945600bce8 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcYNLB Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?s4itmgd81vcx>
* State University Part 35 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/2bd555f46d Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcYJC5 Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?9nxo2xaiivmi>
* State University Part 36 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/2022973e8d Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNckuM2 Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?x7zdlnk9cq9y>
* State University Part 37 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/5f50126621 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcvFIF Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?8r0rmv3u5m2m>
* State University Part 38 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/1a97cf3817 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcYA25 Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?3dohzpzefgtw>
* State University Part 39 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/9aba615994 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcuy58 Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?sx89crihwjhx>
* State University Part 40 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/9ec380a0ae Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcuqEy Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?8fejymwjq8a6>
* State University Part 41 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/4b81393841 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcuo9W Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?6g38tzsf2i3j>
* State University Part 42 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/07e81fb5ca Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcY4Wa Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?qr0jq5qg7u15>
* State University Part 43 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/2689cd40a8 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNck5YI Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?o5guj63t6ypv>
* State University Part 44 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/79d4e419be Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcubQl Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?co2jj2na7iwm>
* State University Part 45 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/984e7cc31a Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNd6FF1 Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?71k7aj6pb047>
* Westcol College - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/de8bafb878 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNd68hl Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?czizcax99kfe>
* The Inc Company (managing the big RSA newspapers, bought & paid media) - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/c5d99ccbee Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcuZiX Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?gksm65be8az2>
* Sasol Corporation - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/fdd30fcafc Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcuTnn Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?bqz0m7j9gp9w>
* Kenyan Business Directory Part 1 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/82ea8bedb2 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNd5yOE Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?aluiftp60jam>
* Kenyan Business Directory Part 2 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/7c202f4994 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcjQhv Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?yys12da5ueuj>
* Kenyan Business Directory Part 3 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/a4a85f1d07 Mirror2: <https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcuEc5>
* Kenyan Business Directory Part 4 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/730fdc5f44 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNd5j17 Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?xxiyfyyb9nx8>
* Kenyan Business Directory Part 5 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/2ff0a4b17a Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcu8gL Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?s9yo06uc69yv>
* Kenyan Business Directory Part 6 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/a60639bfb8 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcu3vD Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?whyzkccau9d6>
* Kenyan Business Directory Part 7 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/135f315ce5 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNd5U9S Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?aqxfrw7vjs05>
* Algerian Government website - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/27575e56a8 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNd5REx Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?cjqsiw19l9hm>
* PressOffice linked to BidOrBuy, South Africa's largest online store - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/357a00eb31 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNd5OLO Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?ljggsul5dcxv>
* FreightForwarders (transport) - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/81b682c1d1 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcti2M Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?qn91xury2hlh>
* PostNet Internet Services Part 1 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/3e1fef4c12 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcifGV Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?f7temsdeibqv>
* PostNet Internet Services Part 2 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/f6e2bbd862 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNciX8q Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?lip66y6l38t>
* PostNet Internet Service Part 3 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/c2d50594e5 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNd4yVJ Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?q0bkhtj00827>
* PostNet Internet Services Part 4 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/5505cb477d Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNctIwQ Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?26yden3c6xkg>
* PostNet Internet Services Part 5 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/4e91d440cb Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNci8zJ Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?8pomyo1jj0fn>
* PostNet Internet Services Part 6 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/a5daaa8926 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNd4Xb0 Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?i1jysns8ytiu>
* PostNet Internet Services Part 7 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/05992d5d9c Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcsjT2 Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?g3w58acb13me>
* PostNet Internet Services Part 8 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/efda641020 Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNchT88 Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?hyldafmffpne>
* PostNet Internet Services Part 9 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/c100506bcf Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNd432o Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?hwkojdya9yn8>
* PostNet Internet Services Part 10 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/981e263b2e Mirror2: https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcsPqf Mirror3: <http://www.everfall.com/paste/id.php?y8g0nktmqnbx>
* PostNet Internet Services Part 11 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/3a41e8a7c0 Mirror2: <https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNchC2j>
* PostNet Internet Services Part 12 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/3aa9523d0a Mirror2: <https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcs8zk>
* PostNet Internet Services Part 13 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/f288b353d5 Mirror2: <https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcs4tD>
* PostNet Internet Services Part 14 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/835490eb42 Mirror2: <https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNd3hVB>
* PostNet Internet Services Part 15 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/cc390ad8c6 Mirror2: <https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNd3XUi>
* PostNet Internet Services Part 16 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/a2c4ff07bf Mirror2: <https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNd3NXa>
* PostNet Internet Services Part 17 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/caf4b16fe5 Mirror2: <https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcrhKU>
* PostNet Internet Services Part 18 - Mirror1: https://privatepaste.com/e72acd3518 Mirror2: [https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcgd3n Mirror3](https://friendpaste.com/1OZc7BrY1a6gPWhfNcgd3n%20Mirror3):

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**Part 2 D. The ecosystem of South Africa.**

Preservation of all life in South Africa depends on the ecosystem in the country.

If the ecosystem is disrupted, food supply, water and all other living conditions are threatened. Not only are factors crucial to the survival of life in South Africa not maintained, but our wild animal life is being destroyed.

**1. Water**

Preparation for adequate water supply to the South African population is the responsibility of the government. See Footnote 1 – International protocols.

Life in the semi-arid South Africa depends on water. The present government is failing in providing adequate water capturing structures for the future of South Africa, as well as maintaining the present supply. There is no excuse for this, as South Africa has extensive high quality information on water resources.

The South African tax payer is being penalized for the inefficiency of the African National Congress in government.

**The Minister for Water and Environmental Affairs is calling for R580 billion for water resources infrastructure**

At a Cape Town briefing7 in April 2013, Minister for Water and Environmental Affairs Edna Molewa claimed that over R570-billion8 will be needed for investment across South Africa's water value chain in the coming 10 years. She said that the money is needed to pay for water resources infrastructure, water services and water conservation and demand management across national government, municipalities and the country's existing 12 water boards.

The call for R570 billion from the national treasury comes after many years of negligence to implement preventative measures by the relevant government departments.

**A Marine**

**(i) Ships that run aground do not get removed, which cause oil spills**

In 2009, the ship *Seli 1* ran aground off Bloubergstrand, near Cape Town. JP Smith, the local mayoral committee member for safety and security, was very vocal in his calls on the Department of Transport, and the Department of Environmental Affairs, to remove the wreck on numerous occasions.

In 2012, strong winds and big swells broke the wreck of the *Seli 1* into three pieces.

Two days later, there was oil within a 500m radius of the wreck, a slick of about eight nautical miles long and about 3m wide moving south between the harbor and Robben Island, and a 1km stretch of oil along Dolphin Beach.

“Like it or not - due to the department delaying the removal of the wreck - now we have to pay,” JP Smith stated,9 adding that, “It’s no use crying over spilt milk, the worst has already happened...It’s the transport department’s legal obligation [to remove the wreck] and they should do so.”

Smith estimated the removal would cost about R40 million, a figure which has steadily risen since the vessel first ran aground; its disintegration has made removal more complicated. This was the fourth time ratepayers would be called on to cover the costs. Since running aground in 2009, the ship has been hemorrhaging fossil fuel, polluting the surrounding waters and damaging the environment.
“If the wreck had just been salvaged as was suggested then we could have avoided the unnecessary costs,” Smith said.
Until the clean-up is completed, Blouberg’s Dolphin Beach will remain closed to visitors. “We have decided that the beach is unsafe as long as there is still oil being washed up on shore,” said Wilfred Solomons-Johannes, the city’s disaster management spokesman.

The clean-up would be labour-intensive, scouring the beaches to remove oil and debris. But the oil spills are not over. Solomons-Johannes warned there was still the risk of the wreck leaking more oil: “We don’t know how much oil is still in there. We can confirm there’s another fuel tank that we cannot access safely.”
The wreck was also damaging the shoreline, causing “dunes to erode and change shape”.

Major pollution incidents such as accidental oil spills have intense environmental impacts, such as loss of bird and fish life and soiling of beaches and coastal habitats.

**(ii) Coastal ecosystems are damaged by sewage and storm water discharge.**

Some 63 ocean sewage outfalls are located along the South African coast. Deterioration in coastal water quality threatens human and ecosystem health.

Pressures associated with shipping include oil spills and the discharge of ballast water and waste from vessels. These lower marine water quality, making it less suitable for marine life and human use, particularly around commercial ports.

**(iii) Waste is pumped into Estuaries**

Estuaries are important in the ecosystem. Various species of baby fish grow up in estuary waters before they go out to sea.

Along the South African coastline, it is common for sewerage plants to be positioned alongside estuaries.

Many of these estuaries have become polluted with domestic sewerage.

For years, Knysna residents have been complaining about toilet paper sighted in the Knysna Estuary, and the salt marsh area of the lagoon (alongside George Rex and the Leisure Isle causeway).
In an article published in the local *Knysna-Plett Herald* newspaper in October 2011, resident professor Allanson - aquatic and estuarine ecology specialist, explained that the concentration of nutrients released into the tidal waters of the Ashmead Channel, as a result of a sewage spill, had encouraged the rapid growth of the macro algae. At the time, Allanson explained, "In the pollution event recently, the concentrations of the nutrients released into the tidal waters of the Ashmead Channel encouraged the rapid growth of the macro algae and they grow so rapidly under these conditions that they cover extensive areas of mud-flat, particularly in the quite warm water of the upper Ashmead Channel." He further explained that macro algae, being so light and transportable, are caught on the tips of mud rush and accumulates near the tide lines of the salt marsh near George Rex Drive. "I can confirm that all the photos received [of the macro algae in the marsh area] is that of dry macro algae, which incidentally at a quick glance do appear to resemble toilet paper," explained Riley.

However, by 2012 SA Weather and Disaster Observation Service reported that residents are feed up with pollution in the Knysna lagoon.10 *Knysna-Plett Herald* journalist, Knysna News reported:

"For nearly a year now the municipality has pulled the wool over our eyes, and we just follow blindly like sheep; it's time that we stand up for our lagoon," said an irate Dylan Handel after noticing evidence of further estuary pollution.11

During the past three years, Knysna-Plett had received various complaints about the Knysna Estuary pollution.

On Monday, the 14th of May 2012, Dylan Handel noticed a municipal employee using a pool net in the Ashmead culvert. Handel stopped to investigate what was being fished out of the murky water. "It was totally disgusting; there were tampons, ladies' pads and other disgusting things in his net," exclaimed Handel. An upset Handel further said that he and his five-year-old son had walked along the beach on Leisure Isle two days prior to this and had noticed an octopus on the sand. "We tried to return it to the water but it just would not go back into the water - that is a sign that something is wrong with the water," he said. He added that being a Leisure Isle resident, he and his family often walk around the Island and notice dead pipefish and other marine organisms on the tidal line. "I have been living in Knysna for the past 27 years and have brought up my son on Leisure Isle. We can no longer take him swimming around the Island on an outgoing tide because he cries afterwards when he gets so itchy from the water," said this exasperated father.
A second Leisure Isle resident phoned in disgust, explaining that the salt marsh area of the lagoon (alongside George Rex and the Leisure Isle causeway) was littered with, what he termed, toilet paper.

A retired Knysna engineer reported that a sewage truck, known as a 'honey-sucker', had been spotted alongside George Rex Drive, at the Knysna Estuary.

Complaints further received included that the 'honey-sucker' pumps its load directly into the lagoon when the wastewater treatment works have reached capacity. When a resident enquired as to the reason for the activity alongside the river, the driver replied that they were busy with maintenance. A photographer captured toilet paper lying on the grass directly alongside George Rex Drive, close to where the 'honey-sucker' had last been spotted. This photograph was forwarded to the Knysna Municipality along with the allegations made.
Municipal Manager Lauren Waring had previously attributed the presence of toilet paper and condoms in the Knysna Estuary to people conducting "their activities illegally at Cathy Park and used condoms/paper/wrappers are then thrown into the reed beds and eventually find their way to the channel".

**(iv) Nuclear power stations at estuaries**

In 2012, it was reported that plans were being drawn up to erect a nuclear power station at the estuary mouths along the Great Tsikamma Mountains near Cape St Francis, an idyllic surfer town in the Eastern Cape. Protests by the residents in social media read “No nuclear tender for Cape St. Francis!”

Plans for 9600 nuclear generated megawatts, at an expected immediate cost of $40 million, are firm.  Between six and ten reactors are planned for completion by 2030, and preferred sites in the Eastern and Western Cape provinces have already been earmarked. The cost, however, is yet uncertain, as the governmental approval process is going ahead even with the reactor design process still lacking behind. At a recent media discussion in Johannesburg, Professor Thomas said that no one knows what the government’s planned nuclear energy programme will cost – it could turn out to be vastly more than ever budgeted for, with an associated economic burden boiling down to the level of the individual taxpayer.  Both Professor Thomas and Earthlife Africa pointed out12 that the government’s nuclear energy budget is based on outdated economic figures – the cost of generating one kilowatt of nuclear energy has increased from $4,000 to $7,000 since the government’s February budget review.

The greatest fear surrounding the government’s plans for nuclear reactors is the untested nature of the proposed reactors.

Under the Kyoto Protocol, nuclear energy generation is not a Clean Development Mechanism and even though greenhouse gases are not emitted during the energy generation process, emissions and harmful emissions that is, remain.

Nuclear energy is very far from being environmentally sound and its impact stretches from the first phases of uranium mining to the disposal of extremely hazardous radioactive waste.

The proposed nuclear plants will deliver less than 2.5% of South Africa’s current electricity generation capacity – yet, the country’s people and environment will need to live with the risks associated with nuclear hazards for many centuries.

**(v) Dead fish wash up on the beaches**

In 2012, the *Beeld* newspaper reported 13 that about 2000 dead fish had washed out on the popular angling beach at Blombos, between Stilbaai and Witsand in the south of the Cape. This is not a usual occurrence. Dr Stephen Lamberth, an investigator for the department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, put this event down to a sudden change in temperature of the water caused by a strong South Westerly wind blowing away the warm water on top of the ocean, upsetting temperature sensitive reef fish. However, such winds are common to the area, and fish are instinctively well aligned to move to water temperatures they are comfortable with under natural circumstances. Unnatural circumstances would include underwater nuclear testing. The South African coastline and its waters are discussed in Footnote 2 – The South African coastline.

On the 18th of March 2013, it was reported that the City of Cape Town was working with local and provincial authorities to remove 5 tons of mullet (estimating 1 mullet at 100 grams, this works out to about 500 000 dead fish) found in the Milnerton area14. The dead mullets commonly known as ‘harders’, were found washed ashore along the Lagoon Beach river mouth and the Milnerton Lighthouse.

**(vi) Ecosystem damage is irreversible, and has severely depleted the productivity of the systems**

Bays along the South African coastline tend to serve as major nodes of urban development and settlement. These bays and associated marine and coastal systems, particularly estuaries, have all suffered severe degradation of ecological functioning due to habitat loss and fragmentation, extensive pollution and resource exploitation. For most, ecosystem damage is irreversible, and has severely depleted the productivity of the systems and their important role in the overall productivity of the coast.

**(vii) Fishing resources are mismanaged by government departments**

Fishing is a primary economic activity in South Africa. However, some fish stocks have been over-harvested, and several species face local extinction. Destruction of these resources through unsustainable exploitation has and will have severe negative consequences for the economy and the communities dependent on them. The division of responsibility between national, provincial and local authorities has resulted in inconsistent and often contradictory approaches to coastal zone management.

High rates of harvesting of fish, mussels, crayfish and abalone also occur in rural areas where the communities depend on use of these resources for their subsistence.

In general, all South Africa's coastal and marine living resources are suffering declines from over-fishing, in particular, rock lobster, pilchards, anchovies and red-eye. Reasons for the general decrease in fish catches over the years include improvement of fishing methods, increase in fishing effort and establishment of associated fishing industries in coastal towns and cities. The accumulation of toxic pollutants in fish stocks raises another serious concern over the sustainability of current activities.

The main impact on the natural coastal environment is the loss of ecosystem integrity because of:

* the deterioration in marine water quality as a result of pollution;
* resource decline due to over-exploitation, habitat elimination and fragmentation;
* Reduced freshwater inflow into estuaries.

**(viii) Fish poaching**

Marine resources are often un-policed along the South African coast because of inefficiency and corruption, giving rise to fish poaching. Foreign fishing trawlers are often spotted by locals along the South African shoreline.

In April 2012, Seven fisheries and research vessels owned by the Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries returned to base and docked in the Cape Town harbor, pending a government decision as to who will run the vessels after an improper tender15 worth R800 million to Sejunala Investments Ltd was withdrawn. During this time, the South Africa’s waters remained unprotected “for the duration of the time” that the paperwork was being done. DA fisheries spokesman Pieter van Dalen predicted that fish poaching would rise inexorably.16

The South African Defense Department was put in charge of these vessels, which were sailed to the Simon’s Town Naval Base. A memorandum17 was signed between the Fisheries Minister Tina Joemat-Petersson and Defense Minister Lindiwe Sisulu putting the South African navy in charge of “the shipping management functions of the Fisheries Department’s fleet of vessels with effect from April 1”.

However, the South African Navy was not able to perform the required duties of policing the coastal waters efficiently. Since the Memorandum of Understanding between the two Departments (Navy and Agriculture) was signed last year, the navy had managed to conduct only six patrols, of which two were cut short due to technical problems. The remainder of the patrols was also cut short due to a problems ranging from lack of capacity, expertise and too few qualified technicians.

The government established a departmental delegation led by newly-appointed deputy Director-General for Fisheries Ms Greta Apelgren-Narkadien, to investigate the claims of members of the Portfolio Committee on Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, of that the country's coastal and marine resources are under considerable threat and fishing resources are vulnerable to illegal, unreported and unregulated exploitation.

Briefing the Portfolio Committee on the status of fisheries patrols, research vessels and the re-allocation of fishing rights, the Department told the MPs that the navy could not meet the requirements of managing the fleet of merchant vessels, which operate 24/7. As a result the Fisheries, Development and Monitoring Control Unit would be unable to meet their target for the year.

This led to committee member Mr Mzwenqaba Bhanga calling for Minister Tina Joemat-Pettersson to appear before the Committee, to account for the crisis around an achievable recovery plan.18

**B Fresh Water supply**

Although the African National Congress in government has been forewarned on the eminent collapse of adequate fresh water supply to the nation, it does not maintain, nor develop, water supply to the nation. State funds which are budgeted for the sustainability of water supply to the nation are misspent on salary bonuses, padding of corrupt tender deals with government associates, or squandered on business deals with other countries. Water in South Africa is becoming a limiting resource, wherein supply becomes a major restriction to the future socio-economic development of the country, in terms of both the amount of water available and the quality of what is available. South Africa's available freshwater resources are further discussed in Footnote 3 – Water Supply in South Africa

Gross neglect of this basic need of the South African population can lead to the death of many innocent citizens, both directly – as in the lack of drinking water, and indirectly – through poverty, as employment opportunities are stumped through the lack of water for industrial expansion.

**B1 Pollution**

The scarcity of freshwater resources has led to the need for every major river in South Africa to be regulated. It has been found that the scarcity of water is compounded by pollution of the surface- and ground-water resources.

Typical pollutants of South Africa's freshwater environment include industrial effluents, domestic and commercial sewage, acid mine drainage, agricultural runoff, and litter. Western Cape, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and the Vaal rivers have major problems with Total Dissolved Solids (TDS), and most of South Africa's rivers have eutrophication problems.

In 2011, trade union Uasa stated that South Africa’s sewage works are a disaster waiting to happen, and that, “The shocking state of the country’s waste water treatment plants [are] in need of an urgent high level intervention.”19

**(i) Waste Water Treatment Plants**

Recent reports say that over 70% of all Waste Water Treatment Plants (Sewerage) in South Africa are either under-performing, or completely out of order. Most municipalities, who are responsible for the upkeep of these sewerage plants, are suffering from a lack of funds due to corruption. Towns and cities are put under water restrictions as the municipalities are unable to purify enough water to serve the residents in their areas. Where staff is employed, positions are often filled by incompetent employees who gain their position through cadre deployment and not based on their work experience and abilities. In most places, the standard operating procedures which were put into place by the earlier governments, have been discarded by the African National Congress in government, in the same way as the school education system and names of streets, cities and airports in South Africa have been replaced.

On the 7th of November 2012, the media article 20 ‘Five die in sewage hell’ reported on the death of five municipal workers who died at Kimberley’s sewerage works that week. One of them had succumbed to methane gas fumes, and the other four were engulfed by rising sludge in a series of failed rescue attempts. It was stated that, “One worker was tasked to clean the pump house in which four pumps, all about six meters deep, are located. It appears as if sludge came out at one of the monitors and the worker was overcome by methane gas and sludge that filled the room. The sludge was about one and a half meters deep”

Four workers tried to their colleague who had became trapped inside the pump station while he was unclogging a pump that was overflowing. The workers became covered in sludge while fighting for their lives. Waste water had to be pumped out before rescue workers were able to reach the bodies. The first body was retrieved at about 3.15pm on Tuesday afternoon while the last body was brought to the surface at about 5.45pm.

Other workers at the plant were extremely emotional and traumatized by the incident and are no longer willing to work in the pump station, which they called a “death trap”. They pointed out that safety checks were rarely conducted and felt that their lives were in danger.

ER24’s operations manager, Albert Hensberg, who was on standby at the scene while emergency workers retrieved to bodies, stated that methane inhalation induced drowsiness and could result in instant death.

Not only did this negligence claim the lives of innocent people, but also engaged the energy of emergency workers which may have been required somewhere else. The report stated that, “The Kimberley fire brigade, the Sol Plaatje Municipality’s emergency workers and ambulance personnel, Hazmat, the police’s forensic unit, crime scene experts as well as the police’s diving unit raced to the scene at about 12.45pm on Tuesday afternoon.”

**(ii) Water purification shortage of technicians**

In 2012, it was reported that 60% of all the country's municipalities no longer had any qualified engineers for their purification plants, and more than 3,000 engineering posts are vacant.
"Their water-purification plants are collapsing and 63% of all the municipalities tell Rand Water that they are now 'uncertain about the safety' of their drinking water.
Those vacant posts needed to be filled urgently 'with qualified engineers' to stave off a major humanitarian disaster.

**(iii) Funds set aside to purchase chemicals to purify water has disappeared**

A water analyst, who has been testing water from the Vaal River for chlorine content for many years, recently said that the level is zero at the moment, although the Department of Water Affairs' recommended level is between 0.3mg/liter and 0.6mg/liter. Without intervention, it's just a matter of time until the whole system is fully contaminated. In 2011, it was reported that R300 million set aside to purchase chemicals, has disappeared.

**(iv) Money earmarked for boreholes has gone missing at the Limpopo municipality**

In Limpopo, villagers are sharing filthy water with cattle, because the municipal money which was allocated to sink boreholes has gone missing.

The thousands of vacancies for municipal water-engineers urgently need to be filled by qualified people or the country will face a humanitarian disaster of vast proportions.

**(v) South Africans are expected to foot the bill for damage caused to their environment by the mines which the Crown created to channel wealth from South Africa to their own pockets**

Derek Watts (Carte Blanche presenter) reported that after *Carte Blanche* reported on the mine water crisis across Johannesburg; this news had made headlines across the world. The South African government then appointed a technical task team which reported back to the ministers involved. This report outlined suggestions to fix the problem in the short term. The Minister of Water Affairs stated that the government had accepted the suggestion made by the team to begin action in the area around Krugersdorp, where the problem was very bad. She stated that after a long stalemate, the South African government had finally agreed to pick up the tab to pump and partially treat the water, adding that “Right now there is almost R400-million cost estimation. We do know that the amount needed is going to be close to a billion… thereabout. And that is not the end.”

**(vi) Government departments do not warn the public of poisonous water**

In an article21 by the *Beeld* newspaper dated 24 February 2012, titled ‘Woede oor groen mat’ (fury about green carpet), it was reported that homeowners at Millionaire’s Bend are furious with the Department of Water Works because for at least 10 kilometers the Vaal River looks like a green carpet due to sewerage.

300 Cattle drink from this water daily as there is no other water available. The article quoted a letter written by home owner Mr. Colin Daib to Mr. Marius Keet, manager of water quality at the department of Water Works, wherein he mentioned that the Vaal River is now a second Hartebeespoort Dam, and asks Keet if his department is not aware of the blue-green algae which is smothering the river. He also asks why warning signs have not been erected along the river to warn the public against the poisonous water. He pointed out that during an international skiing competition the previous weekend in the river, in which 11 countries took place, no one warned the participants against the algae in the water.

Keet replied that after he received the letter from Diab, the department sent out a team immediately to investigate the algae in the Vaal Barrage, and that this team was to report their findings in a weeks’ time. He also said that there were more than 22 sewerage purification centers to the catchment area of the barrage, but that they were not working properly.

Concerning warning signs, Keet said that it was not the mandate of his department, and that they only warn people on an ad-hoc basis, even though the water was deadly to swim in.

Mr. Greg Mulzack, spokesperson for Rand Water, also said it was not the mandate of his department to warn people against using the water from the Vaal River. He stressed that it was the duty of the Department of Water Works.

In this manner, people are sent from the one department to the other, whilst nothing gets done to correct the life threatening situation, and no responsibility is taken for the poison in the water, which is also letting off poisonous gasses into the atmosphere.

**(vii) Main rivers are declared disaster areas**

The Apies River, which feeds the Tshwane region, is one of the rivers which have been declared a disaster area. In an article22 called “APIESRIVIER IS AS RAMPGEBIED VERKLAAR’ (Apies River declared as a disaster area) in News Mobilitate during 2012, it is asked “Where are the Responsible Minister and Municipality?”

As far back as the 9th of November 2011, the New Age media reported in an article called ‘Sewage is ‘destroying; Apies River’23 that the Tshwane metro’s overworked and under-maintained Rooiwal works were spewing untreated water into the Apies River, and that farmers north of Pretoria have expressed concern about the latest bout of pollution, claiming it happens on a regularly. Isak de Beer said there were hundreds of dead fish and the smell was unbearable. The “Pollution of the Apies River, north of Pretoria, is ongoing,” the article reported.

**(viii) Water contamination of the Vaal River**

The shallow Vaal River system starts in the eastern Highveld plains, in the vicinity of Ermelo. On its course to the Vaal Dam, built in 1937, a number of other side streams join the Vaal River.

The Vaal dam is the sole source of fresh water 10-million people in the country's industrial heartland, but is so polluted you can walk across the sewerage waste.

The Vaal River is a green carpet of about 10km sewerage water which is poisoning birds and cattle, due to sewerage systems which have not been maintained.

The latest e-coli (Escherichia-coli, human fecal bacteria) count at the Vaal River barrage near Parys shows the highest count; with a whopping 1-million units per 100mF of water were measured. The safe international maximum is 10,000 units per 100mF of water.

Nearly all the municipalities along the river are now dumping their raw sewerage straight into the water, untreated. Added to this lethal mix of many tons of human faeces and urine, are the millions of tons of salty and chemical waste runoff from the mines and industries along the Klipriver - and which feeds into the Vaal.

In 2012, Environmentalist campaigner Thomas du Toit, who chairs the Save the Vaal Environment (SAVE), confirmed that his NGO and other environmental groups are being overwhelmed by thousands of calls from people living around the Vaal river barrage.
"They are falling ill all the way downstream to the town of Parys after ingesting the Vaal river water from municipal sources."

**(ix) High levels of ecoli in the Jukskei River while contracts to install equipment is not completed**

The Northern Sewage Works has experienced overload (overcapacity) problems for years. Maintenance and other operational issues have not been effectively dealt with. The rainy season compounds problems.

In 2012, Paul Fairall - the chairman of the Jukskei River Catchment Area Management Forum, described the situation at the Northern Sewage Works as a disaster, “with only two of the digesters at the plant working to handle 430 mega-liters of sewage flow per day”.
A disastrous discharge of raw untreated sewerage into the Jukskei River from the Northern Sewage Works has severely raised the level of ecoli in the river. This spill was ongoing for a considerable period. This will not only affect the health of communities living along the river but this water flows into the Hartbeespoort Dam. Major irrigation schemes are fed by the dam; these farms supply produce to vast areas.24

The problem has intensified since two belt presses became in-operational. By the end of September 2012, a contract to install and commission new belt presses was in the pipeline.

Mr. Fairall further mentioned on the management forum to the City of Johannesburg with regards to their financial statements of June 2012 that, “Failure, by Johannesburg’s Water Company, to do timorous maintenance on existing plant, the lack of capacity upgraded, emergency containment structures, coupled to unsustainable urban drainage systems have led to these ongoing, environmentally destructive, regular spillage in our catchment areas. Given the stale clichés: ageing infrastructure, budget constraints, lack of capacity no longer fool the Public given the inability to manage and the ZAR Billions being wasted or unaccounted for. In spite of the Corporate Governance Act enforcement of our Environmental Laws is sadly lacking or in most cases non-existent.”

**(x) Johannesburg water crises**

The shareholder of Johannesburg’s Water Company is the City of Johannesburg.
The financial position of Johannesburg Water reflected on their April-June 2012 quarterly report shows that they have been in overdraft throughout the 2011/12 financial year and are unable to accurately bill or collect revenue effectively. Therefore there are insufficient funds to carry out critical work involving maintenance and the upgrading and replacement of failing infrastructure.

Ms. Judith Taylor - Branch coordinator EarthLife Africa Jo’burg, commented on
Gauteng potable water threatened by rising levels of pollution, when she supported the statements made by Paul Fairall, as follows:
“A number of NGOs, including the Gauteng Water Caucus and the Wetlands Forum, have noticed that levels of pollution in our catchments and rivers have been rising steadily. The breakdown of numerous waste water treatment plants on frequent occasions adds to this. Much of the pollution comes from the Witwatersrand Ridge, where the habit of throwing everything down storm water drains or into rivers is long established. The Acid Mine Drainage water brings a further highly toxic burden into the mix.”

**C. MINES**

Historically, coal mining in South Africa is a mature industry and there are large numbers of closed collieries in the country’s major coal fields; the number of operating coal mines in South Africa has declined by almost half, from 112 in 1986, to approximately 65 in 2004

Prior to the Minerals Act 50 of 1991, most mining companies left the area they had used un-rehabilitated prior to them being liquidated or leaving the country.

Mine closures before 1956 were not subject to legislative closure requirements.

When a coal measure was exhausted, production ceased and collieries were boarded up and abandoned. These un-rehabilitated mines are now the considered the responsibility of the State, and the South African nation are footing the bill to rehabilitate these areas.

Problems which persist for many years after a mine has closed may include water pollution, spontaneous combustion and severe safety and health hazards. In other cases, mines awaiting closure certification effectively sterilize surrounding coal measures as these cannot be accessed if such mining will potentially disturb the rehabilitated mine. This state may persist for years before a final closure certificate is issued.

Natural ecosystems, which form the basis of all ecosystem goods and services upon which sustainable livelihoods and food security depend, have been destroyed or radically altered by mining activities. Full recovery of these ecosystems and their components may take many years, possibly even millennia. Consequently, the impacts on the biophysical environment caused by the mining and minerals processing industry have frequently been accompanied by a significant loss of biodiversity. This may pertain even when a mine is rehabilitated after closure.

**(i) Sinkholes**

Sinkholes due to mine excavation in South Africa are common and many buildings have been destroyed, and lives have been lost, through such sink holes.

At the old, abandoned Transvaal and Delagoa Bay colliery (T&DB), in Witbank, sink holes associated with in situ combustion of coal are evident. Bare patches are present around the sinkholes and gases are vented to atmosphere. The operation closed before rigorous closure practice was common. The former owners have not been held responsible. Rehabilitation of the site, now the responsibility of the state, may cost up to R100-million. The colliery began operating towards the end of the 19th century. Fires soon started, but were controlled while the mine was operating. Since closure in 1953, the fires have been out of control and in 1995; flames could be seen above ground. The 750 ha colliery site lies between the township of KwaGuqa and the industrial area of Ferrobank.

Footpaths crisscross it, passing close to burning areas.

Underground fires are not the only problem at the site. Acid water decants into the nearby Brugspruit. A R30-million treatment plant has been established treat this water but there are doubts about its effectiveness.

**Land subsidence**

Many board and pillar sections are between 50 and 60 years old and experience indicates that serious subsidence will only occur after between 100 and 120 years. As the old, closed sections age, mass subsidence may occur due to pillar runs and the collapse of whole areas.

A truism is that all underground excavations will collapse over time and pillars will spall. Where these excavations are near surface, rat holing and subsidence will follow. Even where such excavations are not very shallow, as in Springs on the East Rand, sinkholes have propagated 65 m up to surface.

**(ii) Mine shafts**

The rehabilitation of mine shafts is slow, and poses a risk to the lives of people who live in such areas.

In an article25 called “Skok oor oop skagte” (shock regarding open shafts) on 31 January 2012, the media *Volksblad* reported that gaping mine shafts in and around Welkom of up to a kilometer deep, and with unlimited entrance are creating fear amongst the residents and parents of that community. These shafts, of which one is hardly 100 meters from the nearest houses in Welkom, are mines which have been worked out and need to be rehabilitated. The report also said that the gold giant Harmony said that this was only a temporary interruption in a rehabilitation project, and was as a result of thieves who stole fencing and warning signs.

One of these, number 4 shaft at St. Helena, was in the news a few months earlier when illegal miners shot to death at least 10 of their opposition and threw their corpses into the shaft. The corpses could not be removed.

One of the employees at Harmony reported that he had heard from his children about the open shaft next to the residential area of Naudéville, and that a tragedy was waiting to happen there. He said that he was shock to realise that many children were riding on their bicycles on the level ground next to the shaft, and out of curiosity, climbed over the low wall and rubble to see what was happening there. *Volksblad* went to investigate and found at the number 4 shaft a wire restraint with warning signs on top of the rubble wall around the shaft. The wire had been flattened on some places. The shaft could be accessed by vehicle or by foot.

By the number 2 shafts next to the Naudéville and St. Helena residential area, clear signs of activity could be seen right up to the open shaft, and bags of household and garden rubbish and garden had been discarded there. The wire fencing which was on top of the rubble wall was rolled up, with the warning sign wrapped inside it.

After management accompanied *Volksblad* to a few of the many rehabilitation projects in the area, it was discovered that the rehabilitation of the number 2 shaft was postponed as the contractors were being replaced, and at the number 4 shaft because it was considered a crime scene after the shooting.

**(iii) Mine dumps**

Mine dumps are not geologically stable landforms and in addition to the problems experienced by other rehabilitated surfaces, soil erosion is a critical factor on dumps. Even on flagship dumps, preliminary soil loss modeling suggests that on steep slopes (steeper than 1:5), the soil cladding will have been eroded and coal will be exposed at surface within 50 years. Field observations have shown that a dump in Mpumalanga lost between 30 and 40 mm of its 300 mm thick soil cladding in just four years while, in KwaZulu-Natal, dumps with slopes steeper than 1:4 have lost about 150-200 mm of soils in 12 years.

Erosion is also not uniform over the dump surface. Through riling and gulleying, erosion proceeds at an exponential rate on some parts of the dump. Once coal discard is exposed, oxidation, acid burn and salt burn kill the vegetation cover, accelerating soil loss. This may lead to further acid generation, spontaneous combustion, increased permeability and groundwater pollution.

**(iv) Rehabilitation of mined land can only be marginal**

Rehabilitation of land cannot occur where land has been mined as land capability has been lost. Degraded lands can potentially support fewer land uses – no crops, for instance. Soil formation takes thousands of years and, by only restoring a fraction of the original land capability, future generations are deprived of the choices that are available to this generation.

In many instances, the pre-mining environment consists of bio-diverse grassland of varying agricultural potential. Through the rehabilitation process, land is returned to low levels of biodiversity as rehabilitation programs preferentially use commercially available seed, with high nutrient and water requirements. Through over-fertilization, grass monocultures are promoted, preventing the re-establishment of biodiverse pastures.

For example, a commonly used rehabilitation grass, Eragrostis sp., secretes a hormone from its roots prohibiting the germination of other seeds. This problem has been detected by environmental audits in many rehabilitated colliery landscapes. Once the high input regime, established during the rehabilitation programme ceases, after five years or so, the grass cover often deteriorates.

Mono-specific grasslands and pastures are not able to sustain economic grazing systems because of their dependence on one grass species that has high input requirements.

Deep soils generally have high agricultural potential while shallow soils have low potential.

Many old collieries have only rocky surfaces available for re-vegetation. Such surfaces can never be used for intensive crop production.

Grazing is also very difficult to re-establish as it requires natural top soil and other resources which cannot be re-introduced within a very short space of time.

Even where slopes are steeper than 1:5, soil loss only becomes evident after between 10 and 15 years. This loss is followed by the failure of rehabilitation and erosion.

Salt migration upwards through rehabilitated surfaces is also a significant problem, especially in discard dumps. Where the soil cover is less than 200 mm, salts can migrate to the surface and impact on re-established vegetation.

Where soils are thicker, clay accumulation layers may occur where salts precipitate between 300 and 500 mm from the surface.

Compaction caused by machinery during the rehabilitation process of mines has been unsuccessful due to the hard setting nature of soils when moved wet. On compacted shallow soils, plants are able to extract water from the underlying spoils which do not compact readily. However, red soils, with a clay content of less than 28%, are common on the Highveld and are highly compactable when replaced during the rehabilitation process. This is especially true if the soils are moved when they have soil moisture content in excess of 10%. The rehabilitation process often uses graders to smooth off rehabilitated surfaces to achieve a pleasing aesthetic landscape. The high bearing load on the wheels of this machinery promotes soil densification. Plant roots cannot penetrate such dense soils and water in underlying spoils cannot be extracted.

Although a compacted soil profile may contain soil water at field capacity, the inability of the roots to penetrate deeply into these soils means that the stored water is unavailable for plant growth. Under such conditions, one meter of soil is replaced, but only half a meter is available for growth. Even deep-ripping of re-emplaced soils has proved ineffective.

Hard setting follows the first rains after deep ripping due to the lack of organic materials and microbes in the soils. This arises in soils stored too long, due to a lack of aeration, reducing the likelihood of crop re-establishment on previously mined land.

**(v) Water impacts on old mines**

Water impacts on mines have not been as successful as initially imagined they would be in stabilizing their acidity, nor in filling the holes. Many old mines are still not full of water. Experience indicates that mines that have ceased production less than 20 years ago have not yet reached a steady state where water starts to decant. The complexity of the mine’s hydrology and geochemistry may result in decant running acid at first and then becoming neutral. Other mines decant when only a portion of the mine remains flooded and the effluent runs acid or alkaline and can stay that way indefinitely. Geochemical reaction kinetics is very complex and serious water pollution problems may arise long after closure.

**(v.1) Water pollution caused by mines**

Many abandoned mines cause water pollution in the form of acid or saline drainage.

**(v.2) Government negligence has compounded the water pollution problem created by the mines which belonged to the Crown**

Non maintenance of equipment to purify water has compounded the solution of getting rid of the poisonous radioactive acid mine drainagefrom the country’s drinking water. Prof McCarthy explained that according to the technical task team the government had employed to research the problem of toxic water caused by mining, the recommendations are to “return the situation to the status quo as it was in the case of the Central basin to 2008, in the case of the Western basin to 2002, and in the case of the Eastrand basin, what it was before Grootvlei stopped pumping. So that will involve pumping and basic treatment, which involved precipitation of the iron in the heavy metals with the addition of lime and oxygen, and then the release of the sulphate rich water into the rivers.”

However, the water is so toxic it needs to be treated properly before it’s released into the rivers. For this, the team proposed that government neutralise the water. What that means is that lime is added. Lime attracts the heavy metal particles to settle to the bottom as a toxic sludge. This would mean that around 100 000 tonnes per year of this sludge will need to find a home in pits. The rest of the water would be released into rivers, but still contain salt or sulphate levels way beyond any international or locally acceptable levels. Prof McCarthy added that, “It’s not a long term solution because you need high quality water to dilute but you also need to use that high quality for consumers. So you are caught between a rock and a hard place: you have to throw away good water simply to improve the quality of bad water and that is an enormous waste.”

Already a million tonnes of sulphates per year are going into the Vaal barrage. Clean water from the Vaal Dam is released simply to dilute the water so it can be cleaned up for drinking downstream. High salts means your water costs could double.

In The Brugspruit catchment, where some of the earliest mining in the Witbank coal field took place, is particularly affected by acid mine drainage. It is estimated that up to 35% of the salt load to the Loskop Dam is from abandoned mines.

**(v.3) Pollution from old mine dumps destroy world heritage sites in South Africa**

On 12 November 2012, News24 reported in an article titled ‘Pollution reaches Cradle of Mankind’ that acidic mine water which had been bubbling out of an old ventilation shaft on the West Rand had now reached the Cradle of Mankind, (the oldest heritage site in the world, which yielded fossils of some of the earliest known dinosaurs, at least 200-million years old), and is believed to have killed over 60 fish in a nearby dam.

**(v.4) Poisons dumped through mining operations is threatening the lives of people in the Johannesburg area**

Despite intensive and extensive investigations undertaken and reports issued by several government departments several years ago into the health hazards associated with a toxic environment in the Johannesburg region, the situation persists with little to no remedial action taken to date.
This means the health of some of Johannesburg’s residents and many communities living downstream and upwind of the city’s mine dumps could be under threat from potentially dangerous levels of uranium in some water supplies, windblown radioactive dust and radon gas.

As far back as the 7th of March 2011, the media made public in an article26 called ‘Sinking Solutions for Mining Water Pollution’ the report by Professor Terence McCarthy from the geology department at the University of the Witwatersrand, titled “The decanting of acid mine drainage (AMD) in the Gauteng city-region”, in which he warned that South Africa’s largest city, Johannesburg, faced the looming threat of toxic water spewing out of idle mines as early as 2012, unless government stepped in to prevent an “environmental disaster”. McCarthy said the toxic water was trapped in the mine void in the Witwatersrand, which stretches from Roodepoort to Boksburg, where most mines in this region are no longer operational, and that AMD occurs due to the outflow of acidic and heavy metals-laden water from Witwatersrand-based mines, which threatens to pollute surface and ground water.

According to his findings, McCarthy said in 2011, possibly 2012, AMD will seep up through the main shaft at Gold Reef City, and this underground facility will be forced to shut down. Boksburg, he warned, could see acid mine drainage rising up through drainage points, spewing toxic filth into the town.

The geologist said the mine void, a large hole left after decades of mining, will have filled and underground water carrying sulphuric acid, heavy metals and a number of other toxins will spill out and could compromise “our cities and towns, our economy and environment, our reputation, and arguably, our future”. McCarthy said the Department of Water Affairs had indicated in 2010 that AMD from abandoned mines could result in catastrophic ground and surface water pollution.

The article also reported that already, the Western Basin of the Witwatersrand was decanting, meaning that acidic and heavy-metals-laden water from the mines were spewing into rivers and the surrounding environment.

Environmental activist Mariette Liefferink warned that AMD was not only associated with surface and ground water pollution and degradation of soil quality, but also harms aquatic sediments and fauna, and allows heavy metals to seep into the environment.

On the 4th of January 2012, *The New Age* media reported in an article27 called ‘Mine dumps toxic threat’ that water supplies from the Upper Wonderfonteinspruit catchment area, stretching from Johannesburg to Potchefstroom, and including the West Rand Goldfield, are contaminated with potentially dangerous levels of uranium. It quoted the 2007 report from the National Nuclear Regulator in a 2007 report, as follows:

*Radiological Impacts of the Mining Activities to the Public in the Wonderfonteinspruit Catchment Area.
Uranium is chemically toxic and uranium in drinking water has been identified as an important source of risk to the public. People have been using the contaminated water in households, agriculture, recreation and fishing.
For more than a century, major gold mining activities, with the potential for pollution of surface and ground waters, have been carried out in the West Rand.
The gold ores contain appreciable concentrations of uranium and its radioactive progeny. Mining has resulted in the dispersal of radioactive material into the environment.*

*Sources of radioactivity in the West Rand include large active gold mines, old and abandoned mine workings and deposits of mining and milling residues, especially the so-called slimes dams in the area.
Elevated levels of radioactivity have been recorded over urban areas of the Johannesburg CBD.*

According to a Draft Regional Mine Closure Strategy for the West Rand Goldfield 2008 report, released by the Department of Mineral Resources, the use of contaminated material and mine residues in construction has also been identified as a means of dispersal of radioactive material into the environment, stating that:
Tailings dams (containing toxic mining residue) must be vegetated and seepage of water from tailings dams must be controlled to prevent the pollution of ground and surface water. Contaminated soil must be removed and replaced with uncontaminated soil,” says Liefferink.

In an article28 dated the 1st of April 2013, called ‘Here comes the poison’ *Noseweek* reported that by October 2013, the acidic, radioactive liquid lurking under central Johannesburg is expected to pass a critical point, and stated the following:

*After decades of inaction, a mad scramble is underway to save the city and its neighbors. In January, site clearing began for a pumping and treatment station aimed at preventing a tide of radioactive acid mine drainage (AMD) from flooding the streets of Johannesburg. At least until a more permanent solution can be found.
The contractors, Group Five, have been given ten-and-a-half months and R319 million to complete the project that would normally take two years and cost a lot less. Even in the unlikely event of nothing going wrong, that’s cutting it fine. The plan is to start pumping in October, the very month in which the deadly liquid is expected to reach the Environmentally Critical Level (ECL) of 186m below the surface.

The new plant, at a disused shaft in Germiston, will have to remove and treat 57 million liters of AMD daily just to prevent it topping that mark. Any higher and it will drown Gold Reef City, eat away at Joburg’s subterranean infrastructure, contaminate its dolomitic aquifers and start percolating upwards to seep out of the ground in the CBD and Boksburg. The rising water is also expected to increase seismic activity and promote the development of sinkholes.

It’s unthinkable. Unless you live a few kilometers to the west, where the unthinkable has already happened. In 2002, the first underground AMD water reached the surface of the Witwatersrand and decanted into the heavily populated Western Basin, which includes the towns of Krugersdorp/Mogale City, Randfontein, Kagiso and Potchefstroom as well as a mosaic of informal settlements.
The mining companies, political authorities and the nuclear regulator were taken by surprise since they’d only known about the coming catastrophe for six years. There were no contingency plans, so the highly corrosive, radioactive and poisonous water, decanting at a rate of 20 million liters a day, was either allowed to flow uncontrolled into watercourses and wetlands, or was pumped into nearby dams and lakes. The flow has barely slackened since.

In the wet year of 2010 the decant spiked at 60 million liters a day. The state-owned Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority is now pumping as fast as it can to keep the AMD one meter below the surface. The pumped water is partially neutralized before being piped into the north-flowing Tweelopiespruit, but it is still acidic and radioactive and after treatment, also highly saline.

The upper Tweelopies is now designated a Class 5 river, meaning “acutely toxic”. Further downstream, it has been blamed for contaminating dams in the Krugersdorp Game Reserve, leading to the deaths of hippos and many smaller creatures. This poisoned stream then enters the Blaauwbankspruit which flows through the Cradle of Humankind before adding its taint to the Crocodile River which transports it all the way to the Hartbeespoort Dam.
On the other side of the watershed, the decant has added a massive extra burden to the Wonderfonteinspruit catchment, a river system already overloaded with acid mine drainage from surface sources.

With regard to the hasty installation of pumps in Germiston, knowledgeable sources point out that pumping deals  with only half the problem: “totally inadequate provision has been made for plant to clean up the pumped out water before it is released into local watercourses, just creating a different problem."

From the time mining began, more than 125 years ago, heavily polluted water has been leaking from the hundreds of uncovered, crumbling, unlined dumps and dams that line the catchment’s rivers and streams. That’s aside from the radon gas and the uraniferous dust spread far and wide whenever the wind blows.

The Witwatersrand ores may have been rich in gold, but they were 10 times richer in uranium. And until a use was found for the stuff, it was discarded with the rest of the mine residue, along with significant amounts of polonium, cadmium, arsenic and lead.
Across the entire Reef, mine dumps occupy a footprint of 400km² and contain an estimated 600,000 tons of uranium at a concentration of 100 parts per million – higher than the tailings of many specialized uranium mines.
Like the exposed rock faces of the underground shafts, the dumps are also rich in iron pyrite which forms sulphuric acid when exposed to water and oxygen. The acid liberates the heavy metals and other chemicals from the tailings and waste rock so they can be washed away by the rain, blown away by the wind, or leached through the unprotected, porous dolomitic ground to further contaminate the AMD already flooding the voids beneath.

In 1934 the water in Lancaster Dam outside Krugersdorp was considered so pure it was counted among South Africa’s seven natural wonders. But as the piles of detritus around it have grown, so has its toxic load. Recent measurements indicate that the uranium concentration is up to 4,000 times higher than the regional natural background for water. As you would expect, the dam is now completely sterile – devoid of all life.
From this poisoned source, the Wonderfonteinspruit (its name long a cruel joke) winds its way among abandoned mines, working farms, towns and sprawling shanty-towns, dispersing and collecting radioactive and other toxic chemicals for almost 100km before it drains into the Mooi River (a tributary of the Vaal) near Potchefstroom.
It took a while before the effects of this pollution began to be felt in the lower reaches of the catchment, but by the 1960s, the farmers were beginning to complain. Their concerns were ignored for more than 30 years until the first official survey of pollution in the area was conducted by the Institute of Water Quality Studies (IWQS), a research unit of the then Department of Water and Forestry.
The results of the two-year study confirmed what had been long-suspected: parts of the Wonderfonteinspruit catchment were contaminated with potentially harmful levels of radioactive chemicals as a result of the careless habits of the mining industry. (And this was well before the decant.)
The water quality report was followed by a flurry of other studies by a range of parties including government agencies, universities, international experts and NGOs, most of which agreed that something ought to be done, especially after 2002.
But the one that caught the public’s imagination was carried out by a team from the Water Research Council, led by geoscientist Dr Henk Coetzee, which in 2006 said bluntly that the level of radioactive contamination throughout the catchment posed a significant threat to the health of all who lived there or consumed its produce.

The National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) which is supposed to protect the public from just such contamination, instead managed to have the report suppressed after a mining company complained that it reflected badly on the industry.
Only after two years of relentless pressure from environmental justice campaigner Mariette Liefferink (see separate profile, Wonder Woman, Gauteng's Last Hope) was the report published. It caused a sensation. Wonderfonteinspruit became an international cause célèbre. The media was scandalized, the public was shocked, politicians promised to do something and sales of bottled water soared in the posher parts of Potch. But South Africa’s nuclear protector refused to accept the results. Instead, it commissioned new research from a German firm. Embarrassingly for the NNR, the so-called Brenk Report’s conclusions were even starker than those of Coetzee et al. There was renewed outrage, further promises of immediate action, and more reports.

In his 2013 budget speech, Pravin Gordhan specifically mentioned both derelict mines and acid mine drainage. Then he tossed R150 million at the problem which the Auditor General calculates will take more than R30 billion to fix.
But the toxic flood continues unabated. A recent series of studies by Professor Frank Winde of the North-West University indicates that an estimated 2,200 tons of uranium is lying in the sediments of the Wonderfonteinspruit. Every year another 6 tons are added, along with a further 3.5 tons suspended in the water.

The ongoing contamination is not only a passive process. Ever since nuclear power came back into fashion and the uranium price shot up, mining companies (with much encouragement from the government) have been keen to salvage this abandoned treasure. New technology and a higher price has also made re-mining the waste for gold a profitable venture.

Old dumps and dams are crawling with heavy machinery, stirring up the dust, remobilizing the toxic and radioactive elements and speeding their dispersal. Containment walls have been breached, releasing torrents of radioactive slurry into the environment. Pipes carrying hazardous sludge for kilometers to new (and unlined) “superdumps” close to the Vaal have broken, spewing tons of the stuff on to fields and into watercourses.

In its 2009 Remediation Action Plan, the Department of Water Affairs fingered waste-remining companies like Mintails, Mine Waste Solutions (owned by AngloGold Ashanti) and DRDGold for making a bad situation worse. But the miners don’t seem to care and the nuclear regulator is clearly unwilling to apply the law.
So while certain government agencies work frantically to stem the radioactive tide threatening the entire Witwatersrand, the so-called “independent” regulator has proved incapable even of reducing the flow from traceable sources over which it has jurisdiction. As usual, the job of policing the industry has been left to unpaid members of the public, underfunded NGOs and academics.*

*In March 2011, Mariette Liefferink’s Federation for a Sustainable Environment (FSE), reported Mine Waste Solutions to both the Nuclear Regulator and Water Affairs after the wall of a dam it was reworking at Stilfontein collapsed, flooding large areas of private and public land with radioactive slurry. The regulator inspected, wrote a report and took no action.

Nine more spills were recorded before July 2012, when AngloGold Ashanti bought the company and the dumps.
Things didn’t change much. The leaks from broken pipes, unlined trenches and failed containment walls continued; Liefferink’s Federation for a Sustainable Environment reported them to the nuclear regulator; the regulator did nothing – that is, apart from issuing a directive to AngloGold Ashanti and then withdrawing it. In December, the federation lodged an appeal with the Gauteng High Court against that decision.
In January, Liefferink laid criminal charges against AngloGold Ashanti with the SAPS in Klerksdorp. In her affidavit, she says the mining company and its individual directors are in breach of both the South African Constitution and the National Environment Management Act and should be prosecuted.
“It has become overwhelmingly evident that the organs of state whose duty and mandate it is to regulate the mining industry and to enforce environmental contraventions, have failed,” says Liefferink. “[This] failure... necessitates that I now lay these charges and request that justice be done.”

AngloGold Ashanti spokesperson Alan Fine, reassured Noseweek that the company “duly reported all incidents of (waste) water spillages... to the relevant regulators” and took “full responsibility for any environmental incident resulting from its mining operations”. He said they would “co-operate with the authorities in any investigation they may carry out in that connection”.
Noseweek’s latest appeal for a response from the Nuclear Regulator was still unanswered after three weeks.****Beware low-level radiation*** *Up until 2003, the World Health Organization regarded water with a uranium concentration of anything higher than 2 micrograms per liter (2μg/l) as unsafe for drinking. But with the nuclear renaissance, that limit was increased in 2004 by a staggering 750% to 15μg/l.

The South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) has adopted the same figure. The Department of Water Affairs considers 80μg/l safe – higher than the limit in any other country. (Before 1996, South Africa’s water ministry regarded 1,000μg/l as safe, and even 8,000 as only “low risk”.)
By comparison, the global freshwater average is 0.4μg/l, the average for unpolluted rivers near the Wondersfonteinspruit catchment is 0.8μg/l, acidic water decanting from the flooded mines of the West Rand initially contained some 16,000μg/l and the current outflow of the Wonderfonteinspruit, the least contaminated part of that polluted river, is 79μg/l, 100 times the regional background, but still within the Department of  Water Affairs’ liberal limits.
That’s just the water. The hundreds of thousands of vulnerable, malnourished, immunity-compromised people who live in shacks among the abandoned mines of the Far West Rand are exposed to radioactive poisoning from every possible source. Uranium contaminates the food they grow, the fish they catch and the air they breathe. And what they don’t ingest bombards them from the outside with electron-   stripping waves of ionizing radiation. Not to mention the deadly radon gas.

Worldwide, the safe limit for external radiation has been set at 1 milli-Sievert (mSv) a year. The National Nuclear Regulator’s own Brenk Report found half the sites they measured in the Wonderfonteinspruit catchment exceeded that by a factor of up to 100.
Internationally respected radiation epidemiologist Chris Busby measured a dose amounting to 9.72 mSv a year inside a shack at the Tudor Shaft settlement near the heavily polluted headwaters of the Waterfonteinspruit. How much damage this is doing to the people living there, we do not know. For all the counting of uranium levels in the water, soil, plants and animals over the past two decades, no-one has bothered to do any epidemiological studies on the people.

The growing body of international research on the effects of prolonged exposure to low-level radiation indicates that it’s more dangerous than current safety limits would suggest.
What has also become clear is that uranium is chemo-toxic as well as radioactive. Even a tiny amount, if ingested, chemically attacks the kidneys and the brain, disrupts the endocrine system, compromises the immune system and damages the DNA.

The desperately poor people living among the mine dumps have more pressing concerns that invisible particles and waves that could make them sick years down the line. But the threat is now becoming evident among communities under less existential pressure. Like the people of Potchefstroom, who get most of their drinking water from the Boskop Dam, which receives 15% of its water from the Waterfonteinspruit. The uranium levels in the town’s tap water have shown a drastic rise recently, from less than 0.2μg/l to over 5μg/l and the people have lost faith in their leaders’ bland assurances.
Even further east, in the Johannesburg suburb of Riverlea, the residents have recently begun complaining about breathing difficulties and skin lesions, which they blame on the dust kicked up by the re-mining of their neighborhood mine dump by DRDGold.
Soon, like the AMD, their voices will reach a critical level. And, as with acid mine drainage, the authorities will act too late.*

(vi)**The African National Congress in government is allowing the degeneration of mines**

Crown members have sold old and used mines which are still in existing order to family members of leading government members in South Africa.

These mines are not maintained and add to the further pollution of South Africa. Within months, these mines stop paying the workers their wages, and within a couple of years, these mines close down, leaving thousands of workers without employment. Investigators into such issues are victimized by the government, prosecuted in court, and assassination attempts are made on their lives.

To point, we give the Aurora Empowerment Systems (AES) as example. On the 10th of September 2012, in an article29 titled “Corruption exposed at Orkney and Grootvlei mines”, the media reported that the director of AES is Khulubuse Zuma, the nephew of President Jacob Zuma, and the managing director is Zondwa Mandela, the grandson of Nelson Mandela, retired president of South Africa.

AES acquired the rights to operate Pamodzi’s Grootvlei and Orkney gold mines in October 2009. Six months after its takeover of the Grootvlei and Orkney mines, AES stopped paying workers’ wages. The mineworkers are owed approximately R20 million (US$2.5 million) in unpaid wages, with some mineworkers having not received a salary for four years

Zuma and Mandela, with the connivance of Faizal and Suleman Bhana, Aurora’s financial advisors, plundered the mining operations they acquired. Liquidators reported that several shafts had been reduced to skeletons, with all the headgear, winding machinery, pipes and water pumps removed by management. It is estimated that R1.8 billion (US$225 million) worth of the mines’ assets has been looted, effectively destroying them. The asset stripping continued up until at least March 2012, some six months after AES had been liquidated.

The liquidators reported that approximately R240 million (US$30 million) in gold earnings was unaccounted for. They stated that AES directors and managers sold R122 million (US$15.3 million) worth of gold from the mines and paid themselves and their families instead of paying workers, operational costs and creditors, and that AES concealed gold and failed to properly record gold transactions..

Between 2009 and 2012, AES stripped the mines’ assets and effectively destroyed their productive capacity. Hundreds of millions of rand obtained from the theft of assets and gold were funnelled to Zuma, Mandela and several others. In addition to this, AES halted workers’ wages in early 2010, plunging more than 5,000 workers and 40,000 dependents into abysmal poverty.

Investigations have further shown that AES failed to pump acid mine water from mine shafts, causing the destruction of sensitive wetland ecosystems in the area.

While the assets of the mines were being looted and workers were going without wages, Khulubuse Zuma and Zondwa Mandela enjoyed the lifestyle of the fantastically wealthy. Zuma, it is reported, owns 19 vehicles, including a R2.5 million (US$312,500) gull-wing Mercedes and is known to spend between R3, 000 (US$375) and R15, 000 (US$1,875) at a time on his twice-weekly visits to an upmarket Durban restaurant.

National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) advocate Glynnis Breytenbach was instructed by her superior to investigate the corrupt manner in which tenders were handled by government officials during the sale of the Aurora Empowerment Systems (AES). When she discovered the names of Zuma and Mandela involved in the matter, she was instructed to cease her investigation by her superiors. She refused, and was suspended from the NPA in May 2011 for sub- in-ordination to her superiors. All her files and documentation was seized by the NPA, and in April 2012, her car was shot at while she was driving, and someone tried to push her off the road.

Breytenbach was then forced to enter a lengthy and expensive court proceeding. 410 She pleaded not guilty to 16 charges brought against her by the NPA, which included gross insubordination and improper conduct for allegedly not handing over her work laptop to the NPA, and for having information on it deleted. Other charges relate to Breytenbach bringing the NPA into disrepute by speaking to the media, either directly or via her attorney, without authorisation. On the 18th of July 2012, the Johannesburg Labour Court dismissed Breytenbach's challenge against her suspension.

**D. The African National Congress in government restrict information on weather and air pollution providers**

On the 1st of August 2012, in an article titled ‘Controversial weather bill canned’, the Independent Newspapers reported on the controversial South African Weather Services Amendment Bill which was introduced in January 2012 after it sparked a storm of protest from environmental groups.

The bill had initially included draconian penalties for unauthorised weather alerts, with fines of up to R10 million and 10 years in jail for people who issued such warnings without written permission from the government's South African Weather Service (SAWS), hereby excluding all weather and pollution warnings by TV weathermen, online weather sites and community-based weather services.

DA environment spokesman and committee member Gareth Morgan said the draft law was “certainly highly controversial and poorly drafted”, but pointed out that the portfolio committee had set about redrafting it into an acceptable form, stating that, “It’s evident that the bill attracted substantially more interest from stakeholders when Parliament ran public hearings compared to when the minister (Edna Molewa) put it out for public comment.”.

If the bill is passed in its current form, it may have a range of undesirable consequences, ultimately making businesses as well as the general public less safe.
Some of the existing provisions inspiring the most contention are the following:
•    The bill makes it illegal for someone to issue warnings about severe weather or air pollution without written permission from the National Weather Service, but fails to define what is envisaged by the terms “severe weather event”;
•    The bill introduces penalties for those who “supply false or misleading information about the Weather Service”, or for any act or omission “which detrimentally affects or is likely to detrimentally affect the Weather Service”;
•    The bill limits the liability of the Weather Service for any damage, loss or injury caused by its actions, but also allows a Court to compensate the Weather Service for any monetary advantage an accused has gained by committing a listed offence; and
•    First-time offenders could face up to five years in prison or a R5 million fine, while subsequent offenders could face a maximum of 10 years imprisonment or a fine of R10 million.

It is quite evident that the above-mentioned provisions have the potential to impact greatly on a variety of businesses, organizations and even internet websites. The proposed amendments may actually limit access to weather and air pollution-related information that would be in the interest of the general public’s health, safety and well-being.
The proposed law, if put into effect, would affect weather outlets including the SA Weather and Disaster Observation Service (SAWDOS), which relies on weather reports submitted by the public. SAWDOS was recently credited with issuing timely warnings for three storms that may have helped to mitigate property losses and damage.

"As the amendment bill now reads, nobody will be able to issue any warning of approaching severe weather," SAWDOS founder Johan said in an interview with the Daily News. The bill provides that the SA Weather Service will be the sole agency entitled to issue severe and weather-related warnings. "Experience has taught us that to get permission from any institution takes time — that is if you can get hold of the designated person," he added, stating that, “The bill will make it an offence for anyone to issue warnings about severe weather or air pollution. Once this bill is passed the SAWDOS will not be allowed to issue real-time observation warnings of severe weather as we have done successfully since 2008. The SA Weather Service will be the only entity that can issue such warnings.”

The SA Weather and Disaster Observation Service (SAWDOS) has been a non-profitable community service that renders a free weather and disaster observation service, which includes an early warning system for severe weather and disasters, to the general public since 2008.

In an article titled “Bill gives weather bureau sole mandate to issue air pollution warnings’ by BusinessDay dated 5 January 2012, SAWDOS put matters into perspective by quoting from an email they had received, which mentioned that:
*The new weather service amendment bill which will have far reaching consequences for everyone in the weather business, including forecasters and end users of any weather warning...
Needless to say this goes to the core of my business as well as anyone else in the weather business as well as the various climate departments etc; it also puts us all at a disadvantage to all the foreign companies who will continue without this requirement. This is all in addition to the anti-competitiveness of this where one commercial organization will be able to dictate to us what we may or may not tell our clients.
Furthermore the ramifications seem endless, strictly interpreted a fleet manager warning his vessels of a storm that he has found on an internet weather site could also be engaging in a crime.*

*An institution doing climate forecasts indicating a drought in a region could also be undertaking criminal activity.*

*Several metro's measure air quality and thus any warning based upon these measurements could also be constituted as criminal activity.*

*Finally pubic warnings by disaster management of rescue services could also be constituted as illegal activity.
This bill has not been widely publicized and so please pass this message on to any affected parties and encourage them to make submissions...
Kind Regards
Jean Pierre Arabonis
Oceanography and Meteorology
Ocean Satellite Imaging Systems*

Responding to the severe criticism, the Department of Environmental Affairs indicated that Parliament was “highly likely” to call for a review. Its officials pointed out that unauthorised weather alerts had been illegal since the SA Weather Service Act had come into force more than a decade ago, and said the public outcry had only erupted in response to their efforts to make the existing law enforceable and to attach “criminal consequences” to offenses.

The South African Weather Service Amendment Bill, 2011 is said to align with the provisions pertaining to the Weather Services Board with the PFMA and the National Environment Management Air Quality Act, 2004.

**Funds to maintain the power grid is spent on unexpected salary increases by government officials**

In August 2012, Deon Louw, the deputy director of electro-technical services in Overstrand municipality, Western Cape, told public hearings on the electricity distribution industry --hosted by Parliament's portfolio committee on energy -- that the lifespan of a distribution network was 50 years, and said the various components of South Africa's had an average age of 47 years. "It is going to collapse in stages, as some parts are older than others. We will see power failures."
He said power failures were often wrongly blamed on Eskom's generation capacity, when in fact the fault lay with ageing distribution infrastructure.
Two days of hearings have seen experts reiterate warning that the country faced a R35 billion backlog in distribution maintenance, of which R10 billion was needed on the Eskom network, while the rest referred to municipal networks. But Louw said municipalities often "stole" from their maintenance funds to cover other unforeseen expenses, such as higher than expected public service salary increases, adding that, "That is often the one area where they can reduce expenditure."
Louw said at the moment R3.5 billion was spent annually on maintenance, but the figure needed to increase to R6.5 billion.
The hearings have heard calls for maintenance funding to be ringfenced, which can only be done through legislation, and for a one percent levy to be charged on distribution.

**E. DESTRUCTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN WILD LIFE**

At present, the most prominent species of wild life which is being exterminated in South Africa is the Rhino through illegal poaching.

**The link between poaching and the South African government**

The involvement of government in the poaching of wildlife in South Africa dates back to the late 1980’s during the National Party regime, and has carried over into the African National Congress in government.

Poaching took on an unprecedented high level when Mr. Jacob Zuma took presidency of South Africa in 2008, and is yet climbing. The significance of this cannot be ignored, as Mr. Zuma was head of military intelligence for the African National Congress whilst in exile, and also worked as a spy for the military intelligence for the National Party who was in governance in South Africa at that time. See Attachment 10 - South Africa is bound as a possession by the Crown, sub-section i) Political leaders were kept or positioned in strategic positions of governance.

The Military Intelligence of South Africa pre 1994 during its war against Communism also made use of hired armies in its neighboring states. Although payment of these hired armies came from national budget, some members in government and the defense force formed alliances with leaders of these hired armies to form syndicates used for smuggling products which would enrich themselves, which included diamonds, rhino horns and elephant tusks. See Footnote 4 – Pre 1994 South African government involvement with poaching.

Most wildlife poaching is carried out by syndicates who are involved in other illegal smuggling activities including drugs, diamonds and money laundering, which connected to the very top level in government; investigators into these problems are often assassinated.

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**The Kruger National Park**

The Kruger National Park is presently governed by the African National Congress, and has become a huge money spinner for the state as an international tourist attraction. The Kruger National Park is one of the largest game reserves in Africa. It covers an area of 19,633 square kilometers in the provinces of Limpopo and Mpumalanga in northeastern South Africa. See Footnote 5 - Geography of the Kruger National Park

South Africa’s 22,000 white and black rhinos, of which 12,000 are found in Kruger, represent some 93% of these species' world population.

**The establishment of the Kruger National Park**

The Sabie Game Reserve wasestablished by the Zuid Afrikaanse Boer Republiek in 1898. See Footnote 6 – The Sabie Game Reserve was established by the ZAR Boers. After the British Crown annexed the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek in 1902, the Crown expanded the borders of the Sabie Game Reserve to include the Shingwedzi River and adjacent farms to create the Kruger National Park in 1926.

In 1969, the Makuleke tribe of about 1500 people who lived in the northern most tips outside the Kruger National Park was forcibly removed with very little compensation and relocated to land in the south by the government, so that their tribal land could be integrated into the Kruger National Park. In 1996, the Makuleke tribe submitted a land claim for 19,842 hectares (198.42 km2) in the northern part of the Kruger National Park. In 1998, the land was given back to the Makuleke people; however, they chose not to resettle on the land but to engage with the private sector to invest in tourism, thus resulting in the building of several game lodges.

**Fencing of the Kruger National Park**

During 1959, work commenced to completely fence the park boundaries. Work started on the southern boundary along the Crocodile River, and in 1960 the western and northern boundaries were fenced, followed by the eastern boundary with Mozambique. The purpose of the fence was to curb the spread of diseases, facilitate border patrolling and inhibit the movement of poachers.

**Removal of the fences of the Kruger National Park - The African National Congress in government concludes reckless agreements with neighboring countries.**

After Mozambique and Zimbabwe got their independence in the late 20th century, both countries suffered terrible losses of their wild life through illegal poaching. Yet, in full knowledge of this, the African National Congress in government of South Africa took down the fencing original fencing of 150 km between the Kruger National Park and the Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe, as well as the Limpopo National Park in Mozambique to incorporate all three parks into a “peace park” called the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park in 2002.

The increases in rhino poaching in South Africa have gone hand in hand with cross-border poaching activity in Mozambique. For example, the Sabie Game Reserve concession close to the border with Mozambique which is contiguous with the Kruger National Park has lost at least 50 rhinos over the past five years. These rhinos most likely all dispersed from the Kruger National Park following the border fence being taken down in support of creating the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Conservation Area. In recent years, poaching incursions into the Kruger National Park from Mozambique have also grown more frequent; with SANParks law enforcement personnel concerned that at least two well-connected poaching gangs are undertaking multiple rhino kills. In fact, Mozambicans seem to be continuing to play a very active role in the illegal killing of South Africa’s rhinos, both in the Kruger National Park and beyond.

**The South African government has stock piled ivory in storage at the Kruger National Park which it sells.**

The Kruger National Park experienced significant elephant poaching in the 1980s, which has since abated. It holds over 48 tons of ivory in storage. According to Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES), it is allowed to sell 30 tons.

Following approval by CITES, 47 metric tons of stockpiled ivory from the Kruger National Park were auctioned by the South African government on the 6th of November 2008. The sale fetched approximately US$6.7 million, which was supposed to be used towards increasing anti-poaching activity. The average price for the 63 lots on auction was US$142/kg.

**Rhino poaching in South Africa**

Rhino poaching crisis has been identified as a critical problem in South Africa by CITES and other international biodiversity conservation forums. It is not only the rate at which these animals are being killed but also the manner in which this happens that has many South Africans calling for more stringent action. In a recent incident in the Kruger National Park (KNP), poachers hacked the horn from a rhino while it was still alive, leaving the animal to stumble about with its face mangled to a bloody mess until the traumatized animal was spotted by horrified tourists.

From 1990 to 2007, apart from a very short-lived spike of poaching activity in 1994 (the year of South Africa’s historic election that ushered in political change), the loss of rhinos has remained at a very low level, averaging some 15 rhinos annually, or slightly more than one rhino each month. In 2006, rhino poaching losses hit a then record of 36 animals, the highest level in decades, but then dropped back the following year to previous levels of only 13 rhinos in 2007. Since then, however, poaching levels have escalated dramatically, increasing every year since. In 2008, 83 rhinos were reportedly poached and, in 2009, the number poached reached 122. As the TRAFFIC/ IUCN document (2012:70) to CITES CoP15 reported at the time:

*Since 2006, 95% of all detected or presumed rhino deaths in Africa from illegal killing have occurred in Zimbabwe and South Africa. These two nations collectively form the epicenter of an unrelenting poaching crisis in southern Africa. In South Africa, the illegal off-take has reached the highest levels in recent history, impacting not only Kruger National Park on the country’s border with Mozambique, but also other protected areas in KwaZulu-Natal and a range of private sector game ranches for the first time in Limpopo, Gauteng, North West and Eastern Cape provinces.*

In 2010, poaching in South Africa escalated dramatically throughout the year, nearly tripling and reaching a previously unimaginable 333 rhinos killed. In 2011, rhino poaching again climbed to a new annual record of 448 rhinos lost, which equals one rhino death every 20 hours throughout the entire year. In 2012, the Department of Environmental Affairs (DAE) reported that 668 rhinos were killed by December 30, 2012.

By the end of February 2013, the country has lost almost 100 rhinos within the first two months of 2013, with the Kruger National Park (KNP) being the hardest hit in terms of numbers at 33, followed by the North West Province at 18 and 12 from the Gauteng Province. The least affected province has been the Eastern Cape Province with a loss of only two rhinos. The provinces’ protected areas lost 32 rhinos while the private sector lost 27 rhinos.

That the year-on-year rhino poaching losses have continued to grow in the face of heightened awareness, constant media attention and concerted law enforcement effort is testament to just how well structure the rhino poaching syndicate in South Africa is.

The techniques used to kill rhinos have changed in recent years from wildlife poachers recruited from local communities living close to protected areas, followed by poachers who have had specialized training to develop tracking or shooting skills, usually using AK47 assault rifles, and heavy-caliber weapons, such as .375 and .458 rifles. More recently, cross-bow shooting has also appeared which involves highly-developed professional skills and equipment rarely available to an archetypal poacher. More commonly, the advent of darting rhinos with immobilization drugs either from a helicopter or from the ground and removing their horns has occurred in recent years. Again, as with cross-bows, this method of “hunting” is silent with a lower risk of detection than the sound of gunshots. These methods of rhino killing can only be conducted by trained professionals who have access to restricted veterinary medicines and other specialized equipment.

**The role of Mozambicans in rhino poaching**

Problems associated with rhino poaching activities in the Kruger National Park (KNP) across the South Africa/Mozambique border are not unprecedented, though they have never before occurred at the worrying scale observed in recent years. As far back as October 2003, a cross-border operation by a joint South African and Mozambican law enforcement team which included SANParks, KNP rangers, SAPS, Mozambican border police and Mozambican conservation officials, arrested six Mozambican men during a two-week operation. In this operation was found that the poachers had shot and removed the horns from two adult male and one heavily pregnant female rhino.

Mozambican authorities revealed during 2012 that former REMANO, and FRELIMO and Community Militias are involved in Rhino poaching.

The increases in rhino poaching in South Africa have gone hand in hand with cross-border poaching activity in Mozambique. For example, the Sabie Game Reserve concession close to the border with Mozambique which is contiguous with KNP has lost at least 50 rhinos over the past five years. These rhinos most likely all dispersed from KNP following the border fence being taken down in support of creating the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Conservation Area.

In recent years, poaching incursions into KNP from Mozambique have also grown more frequent, with SANParks law enforcement personnel concerned that at least two well-connected poaching gangs are undertaking multiple rhino kills.

In fact, Mozambicans seem to be continuing to play a very active role in the illegal killing of South Africa’s rhinos, both in KNP and beyond.

In March 2011, three Mozambican citizens, who were arrested in October 2010 in the Crocodile Bridge section of KNP, were convicted in the Nelspruit Regional Court for illegally hunting rhino.

In May 2012, five Mozambicans were arrested in Polokwane (Limpopo) for illegal possession of rhino horns and their vehicle also contained a rifle with 10 live rounds and an axe. Three Mozambican poachers were also implicated in the deaths of five rhinos at Atherstone Nature Reserve.

In recent times, “runners” connected with middleman rhino horn dealers have been tracked rapidly driving from Gauteng province to key border crossing points with Mozambique, lingering for a short period of time and then racing back to Gauteng in what appear to be either a pick-up or transfer of rhino horns.

Increasing evidence of an escalation of illegal consignments of elephant ivory and timber from Mozambique is cause for concern that country will also begin playing a greater role in rhino horn trade. In fact, a Vietnamese national was arrested at Maputo International Airport in May 2012 in possession of seven rhino horns.

**The role of criminal syndicates**

In rhino poaching, the primary focus of criminal activity is directed at acquiring rhino horns through legal trophy hunting, augmented by a concerted effort to purchase privately-owned and generally unregistered rhino horn stocks illegally.

**Involvement of South African national and provincial conservation officials with poaching**

Not only have local guards at game reserves been known to take part in poaching or give information to poachers, but some national and provincial government officials, all the way up to senior levels, which include management staff, have been involved with poaching operations in South Africa.

In 2012, *Traffic* reported four SANParks officials based in Pretoriaskop section of KNP were arrested in connection with rhino poaching activities.

Walter Nkuna, the Reserve Manager for Atherstone Nature Reserve in Limpopo, committed suicide after his alleged involvement in a rhino poaching incident at the reserve in March 2012, assisted by three Mozambican nationals and resulting in the death of five rhinos.

**The leaders of rhino poaching syndicates**

At the highest level of the Africa-based rhino horn trade chain are the leaders of the Asian-run syndicates that monopolize the flow of rhino horn from South Africa to Asian end-use markets. They are linked to the middleman traders collecting “loose” and poached rhino horns, and they form the vital connection with deeper trade channels in Asia through which illicit rhino horns reach end-use markets. As national syndicate bosses they are typically involved in many other forms of trade in illegal substances and are often part of known organized crime groups, such as the Chinese triads. Many of these individuals first became involved in rhino horn trade in the nascent days of legal, “risk-free” rhino hunting between 2003 and 2005. Some are now permanent residents in South Africa and some openly acquired multiple legal export permits before the trade was exposed and came under pressure.

**The involvement of diplomatic Embassy personnel with rhino poaching**

The invocation of diplomatic immunity prevented prosecution.

The involvement of Embassy personnel first came to light when Viet Nam’s Commercial Attaché, Khanh Toan Nguyen, was arrested on 1 April 2006 with two rhino horns, as well as diamonds and large sums of cash. Under interrogation, he indicated that he had used a diplomatic bag to move rhino horns to Viet Nam on previous occasions. Although Nguyen was removed from his position in the Embassy, there has been concern within law enforcement circles that this individual may have re-entered South Africa on a non-diplomatic passport on at least one occasion since his initial arrest.

**Vietnamese-run syndicates for rhino horns**

By 2007, South African law enforcement officers had identified at least five separate Vietnamese-run syndicates of close-knit networks of operatives that actively probed the country’s sport hunting industry for opportunities to come into the possession of rhino horns. Whilst the scale of Asian-run rhino horn trade operations in South Africa seems to have steadily increased, the basic assumption has been that most Vietnamese-hunted rhino horn trophies end up being exported to Viet Nam for internal use. Other Asians, when they do appear in the trade, seem to be linked to the Vietnamese operations. Thai businessmen have also been implicated in the illegal export of rhino horns from “pseudo-hunts” in South Africa to Asia via an export/import company, which is based in Lao PDR but has extensive wildlife trade dealings in Viet Nam.

On the other hand, far less prominent Chinese operations in South Africa appear to be more directed towards the acquisition of poached rhino horn, which may then be sold on to Vietnamese operatives or be exported on to China.

Thai and Cambodian nationals have also surfaced in the trade, playing roles in the illegal movement of rhino horn to Asian markets and sometimes appearing as “sport hunters”.

Illicit rhino horn trade occurs along a chain that extends from the poacher at a local level in an African range State to an end-use buyer at an international level, generally in an Asian country and, more specifically, usually Viet Nam. Middleman buyers, exporters and couriers all play roles along the trade chain, dealing with horns derived from all sources, including sport hunted trophies, stock thefts and poached animals.

**Even though rhinos are becoming extinct in South Africa, the government refuses to call for a national moratorium on rhino hunting in SA and issue hunting permits which are abused.**

Even though local conservation officials have been alert to the abuse of hunting permits in several provinces for almost a decade, Environment Minister Edna Molewa rejects calls for a national moratorium on rhino hunting in South Africa, which is one of the few countries in the world where this increasingly threatened species can still be hunted legally.

The country’s oldest wildlife conservation body, one of several groups making verbal or written presentations, reports that South Africa’s estimated population of 20 000 white and black rhino could be extinct within eight to 10 years unless the country acts swiftly to curb poaching immediately.

**Government officials assist crime syndicates with fraudulent hunting permits**

On the 9th of November 2011, *IOL* news media reported in an article420 called “Game farmer in court with rhino accused” that Marnus Stely, a prominent safari operator Marnus Stely, who had allowed his farm to be used by a syndicate to hunt rhinos, with Thai prostitutes and strippers posing as bogus rhino hunters, was arrested at the OR Tambo International Airport along with Thai nationals Punpitak Chunchom and rhino poaching kingpin Chumlong Lemthongthai. Steyl was released on a R100, 000 bail while Phumiphat Chumchom was to be kept at a separate prison and could strike a plea bargain with the state. He was prosecuted for heading a syndicate suspected of abusing hunting permits to export rhino horns.
The spokesperson for the People for the Liberation of Animals organization said government officials who helped with the fraudulent permits must also be brought to book.

**The South African government carries hunting laws with legal loopholes to favour crime syndicates with permits**

On 26 January 2012, the *Mercury* reported an article titled ‘SA’s rhinos heading for extinction’ by Tony Carnie that:

*Amid shocking predictions that SA’s rhinos are headed for extinction within a matter of decades – unless the runaway poaching rate is arrested – bogus hunters from Vietnam, China and Thailand are still slaughtering the country’s dwindling rhino population using perfectly legal loopholes in local hunting laws.*

*An official list of hunters who killed rhinos in North-West province over the past three years shows that the vast majority are from countries in the Far East most deeply implicated in the illegal trade in rhino horns by organized crime syndicates.*

*In North West province alone, more than 90 percent of the more than 180 legally sanctioned hunts over the past three years appear to have been awarded to Eastern nationals. While far fewer rhinos were hunted in KwaZulu-Natal, almost 50 percent of the rhinos legally shot in this province in 2009 were killed by Vietnamese nationals.*

**The South African courts allow serial poachers out on bail**

Not only is the wild life in South Arica being depleted by serial game poachers who are allowed out on bail by the South African justice system, but the police forced are spending additional man hours setting traps to recapture these repeat offenders. On the 3rd of February 2012, *Die Burger* reported in an article31 called ‘Stroper vasgetrek met lyk op bakkie’ (poacher caught with corpse on pick-up truck) that Mr. Fernandez “Frenk” Ubisi, a Mozambican national, became one of the most renowned serial poachers in South Africa after the South African court had let him out on bail in June 2010 following his arrest in the Kruger National Game Reserve where he was caught in possession of an illegal gun. Ibisi skipped his bail hearing, but continued poaching game in the reserve, and escaped the police until the 2nd of February 2012, when he appeared at the state morgue in Pretoria to claim the corpse of one of his Mozambican friends, Mr. Zacharia Solomone Chichongue, which Ubisi wanted to take back to Mozambique. Chichongue had been part of a gang who the police had set a trap for near the farm of a rhino breeder near Malelane. The gang escaped but Chichongue had been shot. His corpse had been sent to the state morgue from the Lebombo border post near Komatiepoort en route to Mozambique, where police discovered it inside a coffin on the back of a pick-up truck, which was being driven by one of his Mozambican friends.

**The South African government stock piles rhino horns**

Conservation activists have threatened to push for a global boycott on South African products if the government does not immediately stop all trade in rhino horn. 32
In a petition delivered to the presidency in Pretoria in February 2012, they also demanded the destruction of the state's rhino horn stockpiles within 60 days.
The international mobilization of a boycott on local goods would affect agriculture, tourism and service provision sectors of government.

The director of the non-profit body Section 24 Rights Coalition said that not only the people represented by them in South Africa, but the international community is deeply concerned with the ongoing killing of the animals in South Africa, stating that,
"The concern also centers around our government's lack of a strong will to stop the problem."

Another director at Section 24 said South African authorities cannot be denouncing trade in rhino horn and at the same time they are sitting on a large stockpile of those horns.

The activists burnt a model wooden rhino horn at the Union Buildings in a symbolic act intended to convince the government to destroy its horn stockpiles, a move they believe will save the endangered rhino.
Section 24 of the Constitution dealt with "the protection of the environment for the benefit of present and future generations.

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15 The provider of policing along the coastal areas for the last 12 years, Smit Amandla Marine, handed over the vessels as its contract expired on Saturday.

Smit Amandla, a black empowered subsidiary of a Dutch company, failed to have its bid extended. Instead Sekunjalo Consortium won the preferred bidder status last November but that was later withdrawn with Joemat-Petersson acknowledging that the process had been bungled.

16 [Marine resources unpoliced - Business News | IOL Business | IOL.co.za](http://www.iol.co.za/business/business-news/marine-resources-unpoliced-1.1269890)

17 The memorandum will remain in place for a year subject to the signing of a service level agreement.

The Defence Department’s spokesman, Siphiwe Dlamini, said that an inventory had to be carried out and the new arrangement required gazetting. The vessels would be “flagged” under the SA National Defence Force.

Joemat-Petersson’s special adviser Rams Mabote said the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry was “happy to announce” that the navy would perform the management functions of the Fisheries Department, which would include the crewing of the vessels, the technical management, operation and provisioning of the vessels, safety and seaworthiness.

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24 “The Star” [http://www.security.co.za/fullStory.asp?NewsId=22990](http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.security.co.za%2FfullStory.asp%3FNewsId%3D22990&h=3AQFJOUttAQFXMyC1n2JZ3BHoZd26OaB48qFJf2_JkyS5rw&s=1) and
“The Fourways Review”

[http://www.looklocal.co.za/looklocal/content/en/fourways/fourways-news-general?oid=6442978&sn=Detail&pid=null&Sewerage-spill-in-Jukskei-and-dam](http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.looklocal.co.za%2Flooklocal%2Fcontent%2Fen%2Ffourways%2Ffourways-news-general%3Foid%3D6442978%26sn%3DDetail%26pid%3Dnull%26Sewerage-spill-in-Jukskei-and-dam&h=wAQHHF8ZHAQEFKGtd92uW-Gjlr_vlfADr3CbpjCHoA-PQOQ&s=1)

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**FOOTNOTES:**

**Footnote 1: International protocols.**

South Africa is a signatory to several international protocols that are important to water management, which includes the Water Services Act (Act 108 of 1997) and the National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998), which falls under the authority of the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry.

The Water Services Act is important in ensuring that people's basic needs are met, i.e. water supply and sanitation. It ensures that there is sound planning and that water service providers are set up country-wide to cater for everyone.

The National Water Act has replaced the old Water Act (Act 54 of 1956), and is based on the principles of sustainability of use and equity of distribution.

Policy pertaining to land-use practices throughout the country impact on water quality and availability. Sustainable development and use of natural resources is dependent on adequate accurate, current information.

**Footnote 2: The South African coastline.**

South Africa's economy is evolving from one based on natural resource extraction and sale, to one of manufacturing and services, and is increasingly dependent on port facilities for the export of processed goods. Much of the country's coastal development is centered around the seven large commercial ports situated at Saldanha Bay, Cape Town, Mossel Bay, Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban and Richards Bay. These facilities have triggered extensive industrial and urban development and are the centers of government initiatives such as the Spatial Development Initiatives (SDI's).

The South African coastline stretches for about 3000 km between Namibia in the west and Mozambique in the east. It is rugged, its rocky shores exposed to high wave energy. It has few sheltered embayments (coastal inlets sheltered from the high wave energy), two of these being Saldanha Bay and Durban Bay. There are also strong winds along the coast for most of the year.

There are 343 estuaries along the coast, two thirds of which are found on the east coast between Cape Padrone in the Eastern Cape Province and Mtunzini in KwaZulu-Natal. The eastern region of South Africa receives most of the rainfall, much of which falls in summer.

South Africa's east coast is characterized by relatively warm waters (20-25°C), the west by colder Atlantic waters (9-14°C) and the south by intermediate temperatures (16-21°C). The nutrient-rich Benguela Upwelling System off the south-west coast supports large numbers of marine animals. The Agulhas Current off the east coast has a smaller quantity of fish, but a greater diversity of species. These resources offer massive opportunities for tourism, recreation, food, export and associated economic development. Thus their sustainable use and management is critical to the country's future development.

**Footnote 3: Water Supply in South Africa**

Water supply in South Africa is dependent on:

* The climate - which is characterised by low rainfall and high evaporation rates. Together these create low available run-off water which can be captured;
* The amount of water consumed by the public – which is characterised by a rapid population growth. Population growth requires more job opportunities and available food and other human consumables, which leads to further economic developments in a country;
* The amount of water consumed by industry to keep up with the demands of economic developments. This leads to mass water pollution and spillage.

South Africa sources fresh water from rivers, underground water tables, and rain.

At present, most major rivers in South Africa are already dammed up for human consumption and industries; in most areas wetlands have been converted for other land-use purposes, with more than 50% of the country's wetlands already lost; industrial and domestic effluents are polluting the ground- and surface waters; the underground water tables are being polluted through industry such as fracking and mining; changes in habitat have affected the biotic diversity of freshwater ecosystems, and rain catchment is inadequate in the semi-arid climate of South Africa. Despite extensive degradation of the freshwater resources, an estimated overall increase in demand of some 52% over the next 30 years is predicted.

**Rivers and dams.**

South Africa's available freshwater resources are already almost fully-utilized and under stress.

South Africa is a semi-arid country, with only 8.6% of the rainfall available as surface water. This is one of the lowest conversion ratios in the world. The mean annual runoff (MAR) for South Africa is estimated at some 50 million m3 a-1. This is not distributed evenly throughout the country, with the Eastern seaboard having some 80% of the country's runoff, whilst the western regions tend to have low runoff. Nor is it consistent over time, with great variability between years. Similar to surface waters, South Africa's groundwater resources are relatively limited compared to world averages.

**Footnote 4: Pre 1994 South African government involvement with poaching.**

From 1960 to 1994, South Africa was involved in three wars (Namibia, Angola and Mozambique). The South African Defense Force (SADF), under the leadership

of P.W. Botha in the 1970’s and later under General Magnus Malan, openly supported Jonas Savimbi’s rebel Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) movement in South Western Angola from the mid-1970’s until the late 1980’s, as well as Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) rebels in Mozambique. This took the form of direct military intervention (attacks) in Angola on civilians, the Angolan military as well as South West Africa People Organization (SWAPO) and African National Congress (ANC) freedom fighters. The SADF also assisted Jonas Savimbi by supplying him with a generous annual budget, weapons and military support in his battle against the Angolan government.

By the late 1980’s, news began to trickle out that senior SADF personnel have been involved in profiteering while waging war in Angola, Namibia and Mozambique.

In 1988, a United States (US) environmentalist, Craig van Note, testified before the US House of Representatives that senior members of the SADF and the government were involved in Africa’s biggest ivory smuggling ring, which had slaughtered almost 100,000 elephants to help finance the civil war in Angola and Mozambique. The tusks and rhino horns were being smuggled through South Africa, Burundi and Zaire (the Democratic Republic of Congo) for resale abroad. This led to the establishment of the “Roos Inquiry” by the SADF IN 1988. However evidence suggests that this in-house SADF probe conducted was a whitewash. In its findings, the enquiry stated that “there was no evidence to prove that the defense force was responsible for or involved in the killing of elephants. However, small quantities of ivory captured by UNITA from poachers and others in Angola were transported by the Defense Force on behalf of UNITA over an 18-month period from mid-1978 to the end of 1979.

In 1994, former President Nelson Mandela appointed Justice ME Kumleben to inquire into the alleged smuggling of ivory and rhino horn, particularly of Angolan and Mozambican origin, to and through South Africa by the SADF. The Commission found substantial proof of SADF involvement in the ivory trade through a front company, Frama Inter-Trading, which was later supposedly privatized.

The commission heard how the SADF had provided covert vehicles to transport ivory from the Angolan border to a Veterinary Services quarantine station at Rundu in Namibia. It was stored there until an SADF employee and Portuguese-speaking refugee, Francisco Lopes, collected it for the purpose of selling it on behalf of UNITA. The Commission also heard that officers in the SADF had been involved in illicit of ivory and rhino horn movement at least until 1986.

One person who witnessed the wholesale slaughter of Angolan wildlife, and was prepared to talk out about it, was Colonel Jan Breytenbach. Among other things, he founded the SADF’s 32 Battalion, and spent a large part of his career in the SADF based in north-eastern Namibia. Breytenbach eventually wrote a book, *Eden’s Exiles*, which presents an account of his experience during that time.

In an interview with the Sunday Times in 1988, Breytenbach described what he witnessed while based in the Caprivi in the late 1980’s. Breytenbach saw the bush, which was teeming with wildlife in the 1970’s, turn into a “green lifeless desert” by the 1980’s.

He received reports from informants in south-eastern Angola and Caprivi that animals such as rhino had been shot almost to extinction. Simultaneously he also learnt of reports of soldiers coming across ammunition boxes full of ivory and rhino horn, either in transit to South Africa or waiting for transport at SADF military bases.

South West African Nature Conservation set up roadblocks at that time and began

coming across cars carrying Kiaat wood and some ivory and rhino horns as well. Rumor also had it that there was an ivory ‘pipeline’ that members of the SADF were using to channel diamonds (from Angola) and drugs (primarily mandrax) from Zambia. When Breytenbach attempted to raise his concerns with a number of senior officers he was effectively blocked. However, he realized that there was more at play when at least two people investigating the matter died mysteriously. Furthermore, Captain Hennie Brink of the Diamond Branch in the South West African Police met with Breytenbach and confirmed that a number of people were involved in the ivory and rhino horn trade - some potentially higher than the generals. It was then that Breytenbach realized that ivory and rhino horns smuggling was organized at the highest level. Brink, who some time thereafter (1989/1990) died in a car accident, maintained that the ivory and rhino hunting operations had been knocked together at a ministerial level and would have been a joint operation between the military and the administration. In order to get tusks registered in South Africa there would have had to be co-operation with the then Northern Transvaal Nature Conservation Department (whose responsibility this was at the time). Furthermore, there are further allegations that before Brink investigated the matter, a Nature Conservation official (Muller or Mulder), who had also been investigating the ivory trade, was killed in a car accident.

In his book Breytenbach alleges that a friend of his in Nature Conservation, Manie Grobler, was played an audio tape recording that implicated the military in smuggling ivory and rhino horns. The tape contained incriminating evidence and Grobler told Muller to make a duplicate copy as soon as possible. Muller then placed the tape in his briefcase and left by car to Grootfontein from Rundu where he was to hand the tape over to another official. Before he could do this he was killed when he drove into a large grader that pulled out in front of him.

When Muller’s contact in Grootfontein heard about the accident he rushed to the scene, but the briefcase containing the evidence had disappeared.

According to official SADF accounts, the money that would have been recouped from the sale of ivory would flow back into funding the UNITA and RENAMO rebels. However, Breytenbach knew that in the year 1986/1987 alone, the SADF’s assistance to UNITA through military intelligence totaled R6 Billion, and this excluded the supply of almost all UNITA’s hardware and fuel. It is therefore unlikely that this was the reason behind the SADF’s interest in ivory and rhino smuggling. It is more likely that the potential for self-enrichment that this presented to SADF officers was enormous.

General Chris Thirion, former Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, agreed at that time and suspected that Savimbi was in fact over-funded at the time.

Stefaans Brummer, an investigative journalist, compares the access that the SADF had to diamonds and ivory in UNITA territory, to the mining concessions provided to the Zimbabwean government and generals who were involved in supporting Josef

Kabila’s government in the DRC.

General Thirion also pointed out that numerous highly placed generals were allegedly invited to hunting parties in Angola at the state’s expense (directly or via UNITA). The excuse used was that they were Jonas Savimbi’s guests. Savimbi had started to develop a personal relationship with many highly placed SA military officials, and had ways of thanking them for fighting his battles in Angola (and in South Africa, with the South African securocrats).

General Thirion also stated that, when he was employed as Director of Foreign Liaison in Pretoria towards the end of his career in the SADF (1990/1992) he went through the inventory of SADF gifts (usually purchased for visitors to the SADF) and found that a lot of items had not been given away. Soon thereafter he visited the Military Intelligence stores to decide what should be written off. He then stumbled across four to six large elephant tusks, but nobody could tell him where they were from and what they were meant for. This does not prove anything other than the fact that the ivory was not necessarily all sold off to aid UNITA.

Whoever kept the ivory in the Military Intelligence stores may have had more to hide.

**Footnote 5: Geography of the Kruger National Park**

To the west and south of the Kruger National Park are the two South African provinces of Limpopo and Mpumalanga. In the north is Zimbabwe, and to the east is Mozambique.

The Kruger National Park is one of the largest national parks in the world, with an area of 19,485 square kilometers (7,523 sq mi) The park is approximately 360 kilometers (220 mi) long, and has an average width of 65 kilometers (40 mi). At its widest point, the park is 90 kilometers (56 mi) wide from east to west.

To the north and south of the park two rivers, the Limpopo and the Crocodile respectively, act as its natural boundaries. To the east the Lebombo Mountains separate it from Mozambique. Its western boundary runs parallel with this range, roughly 65 km distant. The park varies in altitude between 200 m in the east and 840 m in the south-west near Berg-en-Dal.

**Footnote 6: The Sabie Game Reserve was established by the ZAR Boers**

In 1895, Jakob Louis van Wyk introduced in the Volksraad of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek, a motion to create the game reserve which would become the Kruger National Park. That motion, introduced together with another Volksraad member by the name of R. K. Loveday, and accepted for discussion in September 1895 by a majority of one vote, resulted in the proclamation by Paul Kruger, president of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek, on 26 March 1898, of a "Government Wildlife Park." This park would later be known as the Sabi Game Reserve and was expanded into the Kruger National Park in 1926. The park was initially created to control hunting and protect the diminished number of animals in the park.

**Part 3. How the African National Congress managed the power and funds entrusted to its care during the liberation struggle.**

The coalition between various anti-Apartheid organizations with the African National Congress in the ‘liberation struggle’ put a huge responsibility on the shoulders of the African National Congress leadership, as they became the face of the leaders of the struggle.

Members of their allied organizations were unified through their leaders under the auspices of the African National Congress.

With great power, comes great responsibility. Not only was the future freedom of these various members in their hands, but also the donations from various funders channeled to the African National Congress to disperse to the poorest of the poor in South Africa.

To have a clear picture on the nature of the African National Congress, we need to consider the manner in which their leadership managed the power and funds entrusted to their care during the liberation struggle before they took over governance of South Africa.

We find that the African National Congress leadership joined forces with the civics movements in the townships to uplift the poorest of the poor, where-after these movements merged into a single unit, named SANCO shortly before governance of South Africa was handed over to the African National Congress in 1992, which spread tentacles into corporate business.

Once SANCO had tremendous buying power, the townships were neglected.

Funding that went into SANCO was unaccounted for, and had mostly been absorbed by the officials that were in charge of the funding.

African National Congress leadership in government was taken from the SANCO leadership, and SANCO was left with little power of authority, but remained a financial arm of the African National Congress.

**(i) Money that flowed into the ‘liberation struggle’ turned into corporate business opportunities for members of the African National Congress**

Funding to uplift the poor communities and liberate them from poverty to provide them a humane life style was donated to various ‘liberation struggle organizations’ throughout the 20th century, which is discussed in Attachment 12 - Zionist Jewry supported the pre-1994 reigning NP South African government and the anti-government movement, Section C: Apartheid was a money spinner.

During the anti-Apartheid meeting of 1973, the different political organizations agreed on the promotion of ‘civics’ which included the acquisition of funding.

To generate income, membership fees were established, and various awareness programs were instituted. Worldwide demonstrations were arranged, and collections to fund the ‘freedom movement’ were established.

In the 1980’s, civic organizations in the townships became a vehicle for ANC supporters to contribute to the liberation struggle.

Civics exerted some influence on state policy through opposition, mostly on the streets, sometimes through negotiations (most notably in 1985-86 and again from 1989).

After 1990, however, civics moved into important and powerful positions in the design and implementation of a range of public policies, including especially those pertaining to development and the reform of local government.

At the local level, civics leadership was key players in development.

It became almost impossible to discuss, plan or implement development in South Africa without engaging with, or at least having to take account of, civic associations.

When the ANC was unbanned in 1990, many senior civic leaders moved into senior positions in the ANC.

The ANC and civics formulated a general division of labour, with the former taking responsibility for constitutional and national political issues, whilst the civics took the lead in struggles around urban development and, by default, urban local government.

As ‘civics’ expanded, it developed business enterprise branches in different provinces under the name South African National Civic Organization (SANCO) in 1992.

From Footnote 1 – The development of SANCO (South African National Civic Organization), we take the following information:

* SANCO offered insurance for funeral expenses to swell its membership fees, even though it was unsure of being able to provide funeral services;
* Monies received were not dispensed to the higher levels in the organization as they should have been;
* Membership and distribution of fees were unclear;
* SANCO officials entered corrupt business deals;
* SANCO developed massive purchase power;
* SANCO was unreliable in business deals:

(i) Slow membership drives were given as the reason for low membership fees to SANCO business partners;

(ii) SANCO could not prove what it did with the funds it collected;

(iii) Did not pay accounts for work done;

(iv) SANCO leadership was involved with financial irregularities;

(v) Inactive SANCO leadership officials collapsed international businesses;

(vi) Inefficient SANCO officials did not provide marketing tools on time for business promotions which could have saved their members some money.

**(ii) SANCO leadership officials were spring boarded into government positions**

SANCO played a central role in the negotiated reform of local government during 1992-93, and contributed to debates and struggles around urban development, especially concerning the roles and activities of banks and other financial institutions.

SANCO was also a leading player in the Local Government Negotiating Forum in 1993, where most of the 1994 Local Government Transition Act was negotiated. Local civics played important roles in the local negotiating forums established under that Act.

At the national level, SANCO played an important part in the drafting of the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) during 1993 - 1994, and in 1994 published its own report on development finance, Making People-Driven Development Work.

The ANC government was elected with a manifesto - the RDP -that committed it to governing the country in consultation with organizations in civil society.

Since 1994, SANCO has participated in a range of consultative bodies. These include: the Development Chamber of the National Economic Development and

Labour Council (NEDLAC); the Transitional National Development Trust (TNDT, which administers funding to non-government organizations); the National Electricity Forum; the Steering Committee of the Working for Water programme; and the National Telecommunications Forum.

Similar to the manner in which the previous National Party in government chose its cabinet ministers from its Broederbond organization, the African National Congress choose its leadership officials from its NEC in SANCO.

Since 1994, SANCO’s national profile declined as its leadership officials were spring boarded into government positions and big business deals, often associated with criticisms regarding policies. See Footnote 2 – SANCO leaders were elected as government officials.

Along with the decline of SANCO's public profile at national level, went its service to the townships throughout the country.

Vacuums in leadership positions after SANCO officials took government positions, caused disorganization within SANCO in the run-up to the 1994 election. These vacuums limited SANCO influence. To point, SANCO did not fill its seats on the National Telecommunications Forum.

SANCO 'departments' - especially its Department of Education - was challenged with capacity-building, and a lack of continuity in SANCO's representation.

Moreover, SANCO was no longer treated with great respect anymore.

NEDLAC’s Development Chamber is probably the least important of NEDLAC's four chambers, and even in this Chamber SANCO and other 'community' representatives complain of their marginalization.

**(iii) SANCO became overpowered by the ANC government**

Although SANCO supported the ANC in the April 1994 elections - there was already evidence of tension in the relationship.

One of the most important reasons for the deteriorating relationship was the transformation of local politics that accompanied the democratization of local government.

Whereas in the early-1990’s local ANC leaders and branches generally allowed civics to play the leading role in local politics, by 1997 the ANC had taken the lead and relegated SANCO to a minor position. This shift was in part due to greater assertiveness by ANC branches, and in part to SANCO's policy.

A second reason for the deteriorating relationship was an ideological wariness of representative government and of political parties that prioritized participation in it.

Some SANCO leaders - such as Mzwanele Mayekiso - seem to view representative government (and the ANC) as inimical to the interests of the working-class and poor.

**(iv) The marginalization by the ANC government of SANCO’s powers causes neglect of the poor**

The crisis facing SANCO's national and provincial structures goes beyond the general crisis facing the civic movement as a whole.

As Mayekiso has written, “SANCO seems to have 'succumbed' to playing the role of a lapdog since 1994, 'notwithstanding the vibrancy of so many individual SANCO locals in our townships and villages and the courage of so many leaders and activists'.” 1

As civics' activities were increasingly localised, the civic movement became fragmented, lacked coherence and a sense of direction and purpose.

The marginalisation of SANCO in policy-making, especially around the Masakhane campaign and housing policy, is interpreted in terms of the ANC 'selling out' to capital and neglecting the poor. The Masakhane campaign was embarked upon to convince the poor to pay rent and rates to their municipalities rather than take part in boycotts and strikes against poor service delivery. Such boycotts had branded civics in the past, but since it had become SANCO, could no longer take part in boycott action.

There has been considerable evidence that civics was marginalised in key areas - especially in local government 2 and in development planning. 3 Moreover, future government policy proposals envisaged even smaller roles for 'civil society' organizations. 4

SANCO leaders acknowledged that the organization has been excluded from key decisions around

* Housing: The Government-led Masakhane campaign (primarily concerned with the payment of rents, bond instalments and service charges) and the restructuring of state development agencies;
* The National Economic Development; and
* Labour Council (NEDLAC) (DiA, September 1996).

Soon after coming into power, the African National Congress government sold off many state assets. One of these being crude oil reserves which had been stored underground in dormant coal mines in South Africa, as well as three of the world’s largest oil tankers, and which was expected to be able to support South Africa for a period of 15 years, should the need arise. The reason for the sale hereof was supposed to create finances to build low cost housing. These oil reserves were sold back to Iran at the exact same price it was purchased for - even though oil was 5 times more expensive on the open market. By rough calculations, this would have return over R10Billion to the economy. However, very little of this money trickled into the RDP low cost housing schemes, which were supposed to be controlled by SANCO. Most of the money disappeared.

In an article published on 8 February 2012 by Associated Press called ‘South Africa's close ties to Iran under scrutiny’, Wheeler, from the independent South African Institute of International Affairs, said Iran, which supported the ANC when it was an anti-apartheid movement, had close ties with the South African government. Iranian oil made up nearly a third of South Africa's oil imports at that time. Sasol, a major South African energy and chemicals company, added that Iran supplied it about 12,000 barrels a day of crude.

**(v) SANCO became a tool for the government, rather than for the poor**

Historically, SANCO represented the poor to the government. After the African National Congress came into power, SANCO changed face and represented the government to the poor, calling for the ending of boycotts against poor service deliveries, and became little more than a rent and rates collector for the government.

In 1996, SANCO's then national president, Mlungisi Hlongwane said that the organization had already made 'a complete break with the past'; it would 'never is the same again', and emphasized that SANCO distanced itself from boycotts: 'If you want to be an instant revolutionary these days and be involved in boycotts, SANCO is no longer a home for you'. 5

**After the ANC took over control of SANCO, SANCO entered big business**

By the beginning of 1996, donations to the liberation struggle had come to an end.

Between the 1995-96 and 1996-97 financial years, grants and donations fell from R1, 6 million to R0, 4 million (according to the unaudited accounts tabled at the 1997 conference). As expenditure remained at almost R2m per annum, SANCO accumulated large debts.

African National Congress officials, who were in government positions, took over control of SANCO and entered big business. Thus the historical power of civics in the running of South Africa was largely taken out of the hands of the SANCO leadership, and held by the hands of the African National Congress government.

SANCO had negligible influence on the new constitution in 1996, and all other changes to it thereafter; and has had strikingly little influence on housing policy.

Although SANCO is represented on the tripartite national and provincial housing boards, it only provides one of the six 'community' representatives on the national board who meet with delegations from business and government, and its views have been largely ignored. According to SANCO:

*Our relations with the Department of Housing can best be described as lukewarm. They have a perception that SANCO does not understanding [sic] the complexities and nature of housing delivery, we are still lost in Uhuru politics and are negative, that SANCO is not the only true representative of the community, etc.*

SANCO accuses the government of working with business to formulate a housing policy that ignores SANCO's constituency of 'the poorest of the poor'.

SANCO was not party to the Record of Understanding between the government Department of Housing and Association of Mortgage Lenders. SANCO has lobbied, unsuccessfully, for an alternative policy drawing on the American Community Reinvestment Act. 6

**The African National Congress entered corporate business through SANCO**

The prospective new SANCO was to engage in a range of business activities to promote its members' interests. The first step in this was the formation of a subsidiary company, SANCO Investment Holdings (SIH), to invest in commercial businesses.

Through SIH, SANCO would play an active role in development and empowerment. SIH profits could be used to finance SANCO's running costs as well as be ploughed back into development.

**SANCO Investment Holdings (SIH) and SANCO Development Trust**

SIH was established in early 1996 with Rl, 5m start-up capital from Liberty Life. Liberty Life initially owned 20 per cent of SIH, but that share declined to 16 per cent when the Malaysian SMG Corporation bought a 10 per cent share.

The remaining 74 per cent is owned by the SANCO Development Trust, set up by SANCO with SANCO's national office-holders as its trustees. 7

SIH was run by Moses Mayekiso, who resigned as an ANC Member of Parliament in 1996 to become chairperson of SIH.

SIH has rapidly been involved in a range of investment deals - or, at least, prospective deals. Early reports of a joint venture with the National Hostel Residents Association (NAHORA), to be called Simunye ('we are one'), seem to have come to naught. 8

More recently it has been reported that SIH holds a 26 per cent share of Vula Communications, which has been reported to be negotiating an investment in an American-based satellite telephone company.

SIH is part of a consortium (also including Sasol Oil) set to launch a new oil retailing company, Naledi Petroleum. Naledi Petroleum will acquire eighteen service stations and commercial fuel contracts from Sasol in return for Sasol taking a 22, 5 per cent share. Naledi plans to open many more service stations.

SIH also owns a 20 per cent share of Solid Gold Commercial Radio, which bid for a broadcast license from the IBA. It has a controlling, 51 per cent share in a door-to-door sales company it set up called Price Tag Wholesalers. 9

SIH initially told the press that their policy was to invest in joint ventures that were socially responsible and labour-intensive, especially relating to reconstruction and development or the privatization of state assets 10 - but this is hard to reconcile with investments in, for example, Naledi Petroleum.

SIH was also reported to be 'scouting for opportunities in ... commercial catering, security and cleaning'. 11

It is unclear precisely what will be done with the profits earned by SIH.

Mayekiso says that 'the benefits from SANCO Investment Holdings will ultimately be channeled to the RDP and the community'. 12 But it has also been reported that dividends would accrue to SANCO regions, or branches, in an apparently unspecified way, to be used for development activity.

Mayekiso has described SANCO's membership as the shareholders of SIH. 13

Already, at its April 1997 conference, SANCO acknowledged that there had been tension between it and SIH over the allocation of funds. The secretarial report noted that SANCO was 'consistently on the brink of bankruptcy' whilst SIH could afford a well-run office; it called for a balance to be found between the SIH's role as a business and its role as financial support for SANCO. 14

By the end of the 1996-97 financial year, SANCO apparently owed over Rl,2 million - including a substantial sum to the Receiver of Revenue (for unpaid PAYE tax).

Half of SANCO head office's income has been spent on salaries, with most of the other half going on office expenses.

Some of the provinces were also deeply in debt - the Western Cape by R200 000. Court sheriffs often raided the national office to attach assets against provincial debts. 15

The financial pressures of 1996-97 meant that telephones and fax lines were cut off intermittently because accounts had not been paid. Assets were not insured - which proved a costly mistake when cars, computers, a television and a video machine were all stolen.

Finances pressures were also blamed for the high turnover of administrative staff in the national office. 16

There has rarely been money available for national meetings (which, in 1992, cost about R50 000 each in transport and accommodation). Hlongwane lamented that, 'we only convene NECs if there is a sponsor'. 17

In fact, AIG is said to have also put up most of the R4 million needed to hold the 1997 national conference.

The national office was reportedly kept going only through financial assistance from SANCO's business wing, SANCO Investment Holdings, and its business partner, American Insurance Group (AIG). 18

**The African National Congress uses its arm, SIH, which is hidden in SANCO to take over state privatized enterprises**

Among the prime opportunities for new joint ventures between the African National Congress and SIH are enterprises being sold by the state as part of its privatization strategy.

In early 1996, SIH was reportedly intending to tender for privatized work (in cleaning, catering and security, especially) - without the support of the trade unions. 19

Later, SIH was controversially involved in a bid, financed by a British firm, to take over the to-be-privatized municipal water and waste services in Nelspruit. This privatization was seen as a pilot scheme for other municipalities.

Moreover, SIH's British partner, Biwater, is itself controversial, having close links to the British Conservative Party. 20

This bid was strongly opposed by the national leadership of the COSATU-affiliated South African Municipal Workers Union.

However, SANCO leadership endorsed SIH at its 1997 conference. Hlongwane took the opportunity to congratulate Mayekiso publicly, commenting that 'now we know how efficient a communist can be in business'. 21 A committee was reportedly appointed to help the provinces form their own investment initiatives. 22

**The African National Congress government awarded SANCO a tender in 1996 through Ilima**

Besides SIH, SANCO also established the Ilima Community Development Company.

In late 1996, it was reported that Ilima had won a R1 million tender from the RDP office in the Eastern Cape 23 - perhaps to facilitate a R147 million project to improve roads and water supplies in rural areas. 24

Ilima management also took a leading role in the authority which SANCO management had regarding the upliftment of poor communities in South Africa previously.

Government funding for the upliftment of poor areas became a business plan, wherein, comparative to the amount of government officials who spear headed these business plans benefitted from government expenditure on these upliftment plans, very few poor members of the public benefitted.

In December 1996, it was reported that Moses Mayekiso, national president of SANCO in 1992, “Laments the declining 'spirit of voluntary community commitment', which in the 1980’s had been 'part and parcel of the logic of liberation politics and self-activity of the masses', 25 explaining that, *Now, too many activists were 'degenerating into "on-the-make" activities, not progressive organizing'.*

This view is widely shared by civic activists at the local level. As one Cape Town activist put it, *people are falling over each other to get in there* - i.e. into local government - *and it's not because they want to look after people's needs, it's because they want the money.* 26

Mayekiso, and his suspension from SANCO after he sought to secure government grants for himself, is discussed further in Footnote 3 – SANCO president suspended for self enrichment in 1997.

**Trade Unionists entered business deals with SANCO**

The trade union movement has moved heavily into economic activities. At first concentrating on worker cooperatives, then (more controversially) promoting employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), some trade unions have now formed their own investment companies.

Moses Mayekiso's resignation from parliament to head up SIH preceded the resignation of former trade unionists Marcel Golding and Johnny Copelyn to head up union investment companies, and that of Cyril Ramaphosa to join New African Investments Limited, or NAIL.

SANCO's Gauteng region and COSATU are reported had participated together in a consortium bidding for a casino license for the Randburg Waterfront in Johannesburg. 27

**The African National Congress in government sidelined SANCO during internal elections in February 1997 because it saw SANCO as a threat**

In February 1997, after local government elections had been held throughout the

country, SANCO and the ANC held a second national bilateral summit.

The report provided examples of the ANC sidelining or undermining SANCO, from different parts of the country.

In the Transkei, the ANC had unilaterally suspended SANCO from the Alliance, suspended SANCO members from the ANC and closed down SANCO offices.

In Port Elizabeth, the ANC refused to meet with SANCO.

In the Northern Province, ANC-controlled provincial and local government had disseminated anti-SANCO propaganda. 28

The report tabled at the summit apparently also reiterated the threat that SANCO would contest local government elections - presumably as a way of securing a more favorable deal within the ANC-led 'Alliance Plus One'. 29

**By April 1997, the power of SANCO in government was extremely weak**

SANCO's first major opportunity to address its crisis of power in government decisions came in April 1997, when it held its second ever national conference in Johannesburg.

The conference was some time overdue as SANCO's previous full national conference had been held in June 1994.

The national general secretary reported that the three years since that last conference 'had not been an easy period'. The organization’s finances were in chaos, its membership was in a mess, and it was increasingly ignored by ANC leaders in government. 30

The secretary also lamented the inability of members in the past 'to differentiate between genuine leaders and political opportunists and careerists'. *Henceforth*, he urged, *SANCO must elect 'comrades who are sincerely committed to the organization' and not just serving 'their own ambitions'*. 31

In 1997, SANCO's president similarly told the conference that:

*We are now confronted with the insipid, incipient unprecedented careerism, laxity and political opportunism of the worst kind - all threatening to undermine the culture of what it means to belong to SANCO or civics.*32

Hlongwane, then SANCO national president, told the conference that the 'sweeping political changes' in South Africa had been 'revolutionary in their pace', catching SANCO unprepared. 33

**To note the following in the references:**

The following abbreviations are used in the text:

AW -New Nation;

M&G - Mail and Guardian;

CT/BR - Cape Times,

BusinessReport;

DiA -Democracy in Action;

BD - Business Day;

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**FOOTNOTES:**

**Footnote 1: The development of SANCO (South African National Civic Organization).**

Initially ‘civics’ had been able to solicit small donations from township-based businesses.

By the mid-1980’s, civic organizations and especially civic coordinating structures (such as the Cape Areas Housing Action Committee and Western Cape Civic Association, both based in Cape Town) began to receive substantial funding from foreign donors. The largest conduit was Kagiso Trust, which channeled almost R14 million to civics advice offices between 1987 and 1992 (as well as a larger amount to service organizations that provided civics with technical and even organizational back-up). 1

From 1990, the civics officials were able to tap into the rich seam of developers involved, or wanting to be involved, in housing and urban development schemes.

In Port Elizabeth, for example, the local civic arranged for R800 monthly donations from each of the developers involved in the upgrading of Soweto-By-Sea2.

From 1991, some of the major foreign donors sought to promote greater self-reliance among civic organizations. Given that civics claimed a large membership or support base, donors proposed that civics achieve financial self-reliance through a well-administered system of membership dues.

Schemes were introduced in several parts of the country, including in Gauteng, 3 the Free State and Port Elizabeth,to establish the necessary administrative infrastructure to become an organized entity.

Also in 1991, Levinsohn planned for Llima to become 'an integral part of the communication channel between communities and business' to facilitate development projects, and set out to combine forces with civics.

It is unclear how Ilima is controlled. It is possible that it is a joint venture between SIH and other partners; Swedish firm Ericsson is said to have a 6,6 per cent shareholding in Ilima9

Regional civics organizations and branches were unified and renamed civics as ‘The South African National Civic Organization’ (SANCO) which was launched in March 1992.

SANCO's national leadership comprises of political members loyal to the African National Congress movement, rather than people who had studied at an educational institution and were qualified to perform services required in the business field.

A National Executive Committee (NEC) was chosen, which was made up from six top office-holders, and nine additional members who head up ‘departments' with responsibility for areas such as housing or education.

Thus through this, for the first time, township-based civic organizations of a political system were brought together in a national civic structure.

**Membership fees**

SANCO itself had a formal membership fee. According to the SANCO constitution, members would pay a R2 joining fee and a R6 annual subscription. These would be divided equally between the national, regional, sub-regional and branch levels, thus it was agreed that R1,5 million of the annual membership fee would accrue to the national office.

**(i) SANCO offered insurance for funeral expenses to swell its membership fees, even though it was unsure of being able to provide funeral services**

As part of their membership fee, SANCO members were offered insurance for funeral expenses and children's education in the event of death.

The monthly premium would be around R13, with an additional administrative cost of between R6 and R812. Members would receive R1000 towards funeral expenses, and R1500 per annum for up to three children for up to three years. 5 In addition, SANCO members could pay voluntary premiums into a further life insurance scheme.

As SANCO did not have an organized system to record how much money was received from membership fees, from where, and to whom, SANCO could not know for sure that the services it promised its members could be provided.

**(ii) Monies received were not dispensed to the higher levels in the organization as they should have been**

Interviewed in late 1992, SANCO's national treasurer expressed great zeal for building up SANCO's membership and hence financial base.

Indeed, one million paid-up members nationwide would generate at least R6 million per annum, excluding the initial joining fee.

However, because SANCO never instituted a coherent paid-up membership system,

branches and provinces widely failed to dispense revenues to higher levels whenever possible.

**(iii) Membership and distribution of fees were unclear.**

In late 1992 there was general confusion within SANCO as to how any income should be distributed within SANCO.6

Western Cape provincial leaders admit to keeping the national share of membership dues on the grounds that SANCO's head-office had reserve for itself the sole right to collect funds from foreign donors, and therefore should be dispensing rather than receiving funds from the regions and provinces. 7

At one point, SANCO Western Cape was receiving donations of up to R1000 per month from each of a number of firms.

**SANCO officials entered corrupt business deals**

The national president of SANCO in 1992 was Moses Mayekiso, who said that SANCO structures could 'negotiate their own approach as long as the agreement is clean, and added that, “... We have to be careful that civics are not used in a corrupt way, such as to help one developer compete against another”.

In Cape Town, some developers sought to woo SANCO leaders through the promise of holidays, computers and other offers. 8.

In the Free State, SANCO was alleged to have helped developers win contracts in return for large donations to SANCO's coffers. One provincial secretary noted, sadly, that 'people in business want to see something; there is nothing for nothing'.

Even if no special favours were performed, corporate sponsorship depended on civics providing useful advice and assistance in facilitating development projects.

As SANCO's role in development declined, such corporate sponsorship became scarce.

**SANCO developed massive purchase power**

Initially, in 1992, SANCO received substantial donations from the European Union, the Swedish labour movement and US AID - with a total income of over R0,5 million in its first eight months.

Some of SANCO's provinces also received smaller grants from foreign church or developmental organizations. These funds were generally seen as contributions to the struggle against apartheid and for representative democracy. They therefore dried up rapidly as soon as an ANC-led government was elected in 1994, causing 'severe difficulties at all levels, from head-office downwards', according to one provincial official. Yet SANCO's claimed membership of over one million clearly had massive purchasing power, which it set out to harness. SANCO's second major business venture involves deals with private sector firms based around SANCO's membership.

**SANCO was unreliable in business deals**

**(i) Slow membership drives were given as the reason for low membership fees to SANCO business partners**

In mid-1996 SANCO reached an agreement with American International Group (AIG), a New York-based firm offering financial services.

However, the deal with AIG was plagued by uncertainty and confusion. The precise amount and distribution of administrative fees are unclear. SANCO's membership drive was so faltering that AIG got cold feet. According to Tonti’s report to the 1997 conference:

AIG were on the verge of pulling out because of the slow membership drive, and because we failed to honour our promise of two million members. ... However, the NWC was able to convince them to continue their partnership ....9

**(ii) SANCO could not prove what it did with the funds it collected**

SANCO at national and provincial levels relied on three sources of funds: foreign donors, membership dues and corporate sponsorship.

Most donor funding had gone to the national office, corporate sponsorship went to both national and provincial offices, and membership dues had been retained at local or provincial levels. Each of these sources declined in the mid-1990s after SANCO had been able to provide adequate financial accounts. SANCO was apparently unable to produce audited accounts for any period since its formation.

**(iii) Did not pay accounts for work done**

The 1994-95 accounts for SANCO were audited, but the auditor who SANCO had employed to do the work, Price Waterhouse, would not release the records until his company had been paid. 10

**(iv) SANCO leadership was involved with financial irregularities**

SANCO's first secretary general is said to have left SANCO on account of financial irregularities.

**(v) Inactive SANCO leadership officials collapsed international businesses**

A Swedish-backed Study Circle collapsed when it’s national coordinator 'absconded', and the Gender coordinator had been suspended for inactivity.

In the aftermath of the conference, with SANCO's membership growing slowly, the future of the insurance deal remained shaky.

 **(vi) Inefficient SANCO officials did not provide marketing tools on time for business promotions which could have saved their members some money**

SANCO also entered into deals with a range of manufacturers and retailers, offering access to its membership in return for discounts on purchases.

SANCO had reached agreement with eight firms, including Tiger Oats and Ster Kinekor.

SANCO members would be issued with booklets of coupons, entitling them to discounts. The face value of the discounts totaled about R4000. But this scheme, too, remained clouded in uncertainty. Late in 1996 the booklets of coupons had still not been printed11.

1 Seekings et al, 1993:11.

2 Seekings et al, 1993:97.

3 Cullinan, 1993a.

4 Star, December 28, 1996

5 M&G, October 11, 1996

6 Seekings et al, 1993:93-4

7 M&G, September 1, 1995.

8 Cullinan, 1993b.

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11 Star, December 28, 1996

**See Footnote 2: SANCO leaders were elected as government officials.**

SANCO has lost many leaders into government, both as elected representatives and as civil servants. Of the original NEC, the president and one other member were elected to the national parliament in April 1994; the vice-president joined them in 1995 to fill a seat vacated by another ANC MP. Four other NEC members were elected to provincial legislatures in April 1994, and two more were appointed as senior provincial civil servants. SANCO's provincial executive committees (PECs) were also depleted through elections.

In the Western Cape, for example, the provincial secretary was elected to the provincial legislature in 1994, and the vice-chairperson and three of the most active members of the provincial executive committee were elected to local government in 1996. Senior SANCO officials have had to be co-opted to fill vacant positions. Hlongwane, for example, was co-opted as national president in 1995. At the time he was not even a member of the NEC.

Rapid turnover in SANCO top leadership since its formation in 1992 included the following:

Three national presidents between 1992 and 1995, namely Moses Mayekiso (1992-93), LechesaTsenoli (1993-95) and Mlungisi Hlongwane, 1995-);

Three national general secretaries between 1992 and 1997, namely Dan Sandi (1992-1993), Penrose Ntlonti (1993-1997) and Mboneni Ngubeni (1997- ).

Not one member of the NEC elected in 1997 had been on the original NEC, elected just five years earlier.

**Footnote 3: SANCO president suspended for self enrichment in 1997.**

SANCO resolved in 1995 to establish a SANCO Research and Development Institute (SRDI).

In early 1996, Mzwanele Mayekiso was appointed to set up and run this Institute.

Mayekiso, a former treason trialist, had studied urban planning in the USA and written widely on civic organization and development (especially Mayekiso, 1996). The Institute was awarded a grant of Rim from the TNDT, and Swedish funders had promised help. Thereafter, however, the relationship between Mayekiso and the SANCO national leadership degenerated rapidly. According to the Secretarial Report to the 1997 Conference, Mayekiso 'opted to further his own interest above those of the organization', was 'uncooperative and arrogant', tried to make the 'his' RDI autonomous of SANCO and sought to secure the TNDT grant for himself. 1 Mayekiso was suspended from SANCO in July 1997 2

1 Ntlonti, 1997b:28-9

2 SI, July 20, 1997; CT/BR, June 26, 1997

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