**Attachment 6: War against Southern Africans and Mass Extermination of Indigenous Tribes for the Creation of the Union of South Africa.**

The Crown, in its quest for power, annexed Southern Africa in a planned and organized manner, directly and indirectly, since the arrival of its agents and supporters of its ideals who used the Free Masonry as a vehicle for communication at the Cape Harbor in 1772. See Footnote 1 - Free Masonry influence in South Africa since 1772.

Direct annexation was done through instigating racialism, deceit and murder, which included military warfare, the imprisoning of women and children in concentration camps, confiscating land from land owners, wherein the “scorched earth” method to destroy tribes and force indigenous people of the land to become “subjects of the British Sovereignty” was used, and as their colonial masters, forced these conquered people to partake in warfare against other countries.

Human atrocities committed by the Crown onto the indigenous people of Southern African include the following:

* The degradation of individuals and communities through unfounded accusations, slander, insults and labelling them into groups which includes groups fit for slavery, both physically and economically; and labels such as the enemy to other groups whereby they can be identified as unacceptable to other individuals, communities and countries;
* The denial of individual and community rights to land ownership within the country of their birth; the sharing of the wealth of this country and other benefits which included judicial and protective rights;
* The denial of judicial, political and economical representation of the individual and community within the country;
* The removal of a means to survive and or the outright murder of individuals and communities within the country;
* Intentional deceit and lies in order to enrich themselves to the detriment of the individuals and communities within the country.

The Crown fought against many ethnic groups in the South African Wars since their occupancy of South Africa in order to add the wealth of Africa to their treasury.

Slave trade used to be a monetary commodity in many parts of the world, which became replaced by whatever mineral the Crown decided should be the currency whereby wealth is measured internationally. This mineral has alternated between gold and silver, depending on which economy posed a threat to the power of the Crown.

Once territories containing valuable assets had been established, they set about annexing these areas. Very often the Crown sent missionaries into unknown territories and paid diligent attention to their reports and findings. On behalf of the Crown, the “Society of the Elect," (led by Cecil Rhodes) would engage the members of their circle, such as the Kindergarten Group, to assess an area, its surroundings, and the people who lived in those areas. Promises of protection, land and wealth in the form of cattle, gold and ammunition, was given to the vulnerable indigenous tribes in an effort to build up allies against the strongest opposing parties they came across.

This document discusses various events of mass destruction within South Africa for which the Crown was directly responsible, and has made no apology.

In the early 1800’s there was great displacement, murder and regrouping of the indigenous tribes inside South Africa. The written records of South African history during that time period were recorded by British missionaries, military leadership and governors who lived in Africa at that time. They indicated that this great displacement, which has been labeled the ‘Mfecane’, ‘Dificarne’ or ‘Dithakong’ was due to the actions of the Zulu king Shaka. See Footnote 1 of Section A - The theory of Mfecane by Walker.

Since then facts have surfaced to prove that this propaganda was not true, and a manner by which the slave trade from the coast of Africa was concealed.

After the Mfecane, more battles followed, which included:

1. The Anglo-Xhosa Wars (1811-1878)
2. The Anglo-Zulu War (1879);
3. The Gun War (1880-1881);
4. The First Anglo-Boer War (1880–1881);
5. The Jameson Raid (1895-1896)
6. The Pioneer Column Invasion (1890);
7. The First Matabele War (1893–1894);
8. The Second Ndebele Matabele War (1896–1897);
9. The Second Boer War (1899–1902);
10. The Bhambadha Rebellion (1906–1907);
11. Walvis Bay (1914–1915).

After the Mfecane, many indigenous South African tribes were regrouped, and became commonly known as the Hottentots, San, Khoi-Khoi, Griqua, Ndebele, Xhoza, Zulu, Boers, Afrikaners, and British South Africans. To note, these are by no means all the various tribes in South Africa.

**Definition of Indigenous**

According to the Oxford Dictionary, "indigenous" is an adjective meaning "native, belonging naturally to the soil," (from the Latin indigena).

 An indigenous people are therefore a people occupying a territory whose roots can be shown to have come from that particular territory, and not some other part of the globe.

In this document, we will refer to the following:

Section A – Mfecane;

Section B – The main ethnic groups in the South African Wars from 1879 to 1915;

Section C - Various Anglo-South African Wars during annexation of the land of South Africa.

**Footnote 1: Free Masonry influence in South Africa since 1772.**

Free Masonry had spread from Britain into Holland, and through the officials of the ‘Hollandse Oos Indiese Kompanjie’ (Dutch East Indian Company) to other regions where the Kompanjie had influence. It found footing in the Cape in 1772, when the Dutch established ‘De Goede Hoop’ as a communication channel between certain staff of the Kompanjie who met in secret. A.A.Cooper referred to this in his book ‘The Freemasons of South Africa’ dated 1986, published in Cape Town by Human & Rousseau as follows on pages 16-17:

“Nederlandic Freemasonry in South Africa was first mooted about 1764....One of these, a sea captain Abraham Van Der Weijde, arrived at the Cape on 24 April 1772 and invoked a meeting on 2 May 1772 when ten Masons assembled under his presidency and the master and officers were elected.

“Two days later he issued a provisional warrant or authority subject to Holland’s approval and the Lodge De Goede Hoop, the first in South Africa, came into being.....In Lodge De Goede Hoop, Company officials of different rank and free burghers were meeting in secrecy to practice those ‘Enlightened’ principles which could then be seen as a danger to the stratified society at the Cape.”

**Section A: The Mfecane.**

Walker coined the term 'Mfecane' in 1928, meaning 'the crushing'. This neologism has no root in any African language.

The Mfecane is based on the migrations of two groups of people, the Mantatee and the Ngwane.

The Mantatees were of the original African Sai tribe, a nomadic, peaceful nation of slight build and light brown skin. After the arrival of the Europeans at the Cape harbor, these hunters and berry gatherers moved northward.

The Ngwane were of the darker skin Xhoza tribe, a friendly and quick learning pastoral tribe which had settled on the eastern side of the Cape harbor before the Europeans colonized the Cape.

Central to the movements of the Mantatees and the Ngwane in the early 1800’s, are the little-known battles of Dhakong (26 June 1823: north of Kuruman, northern Cape) and Mbolompo (27 Aug. 1828: near Umtata, Transkei, western Cape).

On the first occasion the British military, Griqua and Tlhaping defeated the Mantatees, and on the second, the British military, Khoi, Tembu, Gcaleka and Mpondo broke up the Ngwane (or Fetcani, as they were called by 1828). The British military and incumbent slavery are the common factor.

**(i) The Battle of Dithakong**

In 1829, Shane Bannister wrote of the early and mid-1820s:

“Amongst the Griquas and Bergenaars, who are... in considerable connection with the Cape, slaves obtained by barter, or by capture from Bootchuanas or Bushmen, are a common article of saleable property ...They sell some of them into the Colony at a low price.''' 1

To note: The relationship with the British governments, and the Griquas and Bergenaars is clarified in Attachment 7 subsection the Diamond Fields of South Africa.

The 'battle' of Dithakong2 was a slave and cattle raid.

It is clear from the writings3 of Moffat, Melvill and Thompson, the former two of whom, both missionaries who represented the Crown, were the instigators and organizers of both the raid and the disposal of the prisoners.

In early June 1823, Moffat interrupted a journey to the Ngwaketse and returned at top speed to Griqua Town on the basis of unsubstantiated rumors of a Mantatee presence.

It was Melvill who brought the three most feared Griqua leaders of their generation - Waterboer, Adam Kok and Barend Barends - together, and organized the arms and powder.

It was Moffat and Thompson who spied out the positions of the victims; and Moffat and Melvill who guided the army into 'battle' on 25 and 26 June.4

In a seven-hour massacre possibly two or three hundred Mantatees were shot dead and their villages burnt.5 The Griqua rounded up over 1,000 cattle, one of their major objectives in joining the expedition. Thirty-three cattle were given to Melvill 'according to the custom of the country'.

Moffat, Melvill and a mission laborer named Hamilton used armed Griqua to round up the women and children who were not dead or had not been able to escape. Over ninety prisoners were taken back to Kuruman on 26-27 June. There a squabble broke out between the missionaries and the Tlhaping chief, Mothibi, over their disposal. Griqua guns decided the issue in favour of the missionaries.6

During the next few days Melvill scoured the countryside and captured at least fifty more women and children. He avoided the men. Women and young males were what the Cape market preferred. Melvill immediately dispatched fifteen Mantatees for sale to Graaff Reinet7 in the north-eastern Cape, for which he received payment in ammunition. At least thirty remained with the Griqua in Griqua Town. Moffat kept several at Kuruman, and took one boy as a personal servant who was 'affectionately domesticated’ in the family of his benefactor. Others, including five women - who ‘fortunately' indicated nothing of cannibal8 ferocity' - and a ' fine boy ', Moffat took with him for distribution in Cape Town in January 1824 to the applause of the local press 9. To note: there was only British press by the British Crown in Southern Africa at that time.

Some men posing as missionaries depicted themselves as succoring the prisoners, and rescuing them from their evil chiefs, the Boers and starvation, without mentioning all the cattle they had raided. These men were fully and consciously engrossed in what they were doing, i.e. collecting slaves, and the cover of ‘kindness’ was intended to deflect the censure from the government in London, and from their seniors in the London Missionary Society, should it had leaked out that they were selling people into slavery.

The word Mantatee has been reported to have been coined as a euphemism for forced laborers taken from the Sai, Tswana and Sotho north of the Orange and driven south into the Cape, and that is what the word meant throughout the Cape in the 1820’s.

(ii) **British slave trade bred hatred between Black and White in the Cape colony**

In 1823 slavery had not yet been abolished in the Cape Colony, although Britain had ended slave trade in 1807.

Such hatred was bred between White and Black by British frontier expansionism that in I809, Hottentots (as opposed to Khoi) were prohibited from being employed on farms in the Colony, and in I812 Hottentots were liable to be shot on sight west of the Fish River; and after the offensive east of the Fish in 1819, west of the Keiskamma as well.

Hottentots surviving these regulations10 were repatriated when discovered. This left the numerically sparse Khoi who had once been free to move about the countryside, turned into serfs11 through Codes issued by Governors Caledon and Cradock in 1809 -12. Khoi children were compulsorily 'apprenticed' until the age of twenty-five.

There were never enough Khoi to serve the ends of the British colonizers. The pathological and genocide extermination12 of the San (Bushmen) made matters worse.

Attempts to stabilize the military frontier, cultivate the ground, and colonize the Boer republics, were made by bringing out more subjects from the British Empire of the Crown.

The labour shortage -most acute in the eastern divisions of Graaff Reinet, Albany (Graham's Town) and Uitenhage- threatened the whole British settler scheme, and with it, economic development and 'defense' on the eastern frontier. This threat made it impossible to be open about the origins and mode of capture of the Mantatees who started being driven back into the Colony by 1823.

Mantatees were ‘black’ (hence illegal), and had been captured slaves (doubly illegal). The misrepresentation of this to London tested the skill of Governor Somerset between 1820 and his recall in 1826. Truths, half-truths and lies were intermixed. It was said that the ‘Bootchuanas’ and Mantatees were ‘driven by hunger and pleading for refuge’; or ‘seeking their children kidnapped by Bergenaars’.

In contradistinction to the Xhosa to the east they were described as harmless. What had not been mentioned was whom the Bergenaars were working for and why children were being kidnapped in the first place.

Neither was anything said about the origins of the human-induced famine that accompanied the slave raids. Somerset was thus able to represent it as a kindness in a regulation of 1823 to 'allow' Mantatees to be turned into tied labourers13, as the Khoi already had been.

The Sothos also came under attack. O’Philip reported14 that the Boers' claimed the Sotho came to town voluntarily seeking food. The Sothos account expanded the situation, and said that they had been living peacefully 'when a people (called Bergenaars) riding upon horses, and with fire-arms, came upon them and killed many of them, and took away all their cattle and many of their children'. Attempting to follow their children, they were 'detained by the boors', as they were in no position to go to war.

The funneling of the Mantatees through to the settlers near the coast in Albany, where they were only to be apprenticed to 'respectable persons on whose humanity you can depend ' (also for Lord Bathurst's consumption) became ‘an act of charity’. 15

Note: Bergenaars were Griqua who broke away from the main group under Waterboer in 1822-23.

Somerset lied by saying that they would be permitted to return home or change their masters if they wished, and added that, “few Mantatees 'would feel inclined, even if they had the power, to rejoin their native tribes” (what was left of them). 16

Several thousand Mantatees had been captured and brought into the Colony by 1825. By June 1825 there were nearly three hundred acknowledged Mantatees in Graaff Reinet alone, excluding those already apprenticed under Somerset's order of 27 Aug. 1823.17

Regulations were set out by the British Administration regarding minimum wages for Mantatees and non-Mantatees. 18

Non-Mantatees were paid 310 pennies a month plus food and wine.

Mantatee adults were paid 116 a month in the first year and 310 a month thereafter. 'Children' were paid 116 a month (only considered as adult at age 25), hence their popularity at any age.

The minimum wage regulations led to a lowering of wages.

Note: Mantatees were sold as slaves. Slaves were compelled to work for their masters, but received minimum wages.

Farmers usually paid the Griqua or other suppliers of slaves (such as Melvill) in guns and/or gunpowder. Oxen and horses were also exchanged, especially for children. Rumors abounded that white farmers accompanied the slavers, or organized commandos to fetch them out free. However, facts have shown that such action by farmers would have been severely dealt with by the British administration.

The rumors, concealment and euphemism which accompanied the years of Mantatee procurement, reflected in the split between official policy and the requirements of the settlers. They were part of an intense debate about how to secure a permanent solution to labour supply when London forbade the slave trade, and was known to be on the verge of abolishing slavery itself, whilst access to black labour was still forbidden. This impasse was only to end with the passing of Ordinance 49 in July 1828, which sanctioned 'free' black labour.

The Mantatee 19 Hottentots were the first ‘Black’ forced laborers in South Africa's history – in the period between the intensification of the labour shortage with the arrival of the 1820 British subjects, and Ordinance 49.

After 1828, different designations were to be used. The status of Mantatees in these years hovered indeterminately between slave, serf and 'free' laborer." Most Mantatees were involuntary laborers seized 'in battle'.

**(iii) The hunted becomes the hunter.**

Griqua raids for slaves and cattle, such as the one at Dithakong, had been going on for years20, but in the early 1820’s they became systematic and their reach was extended. As horse-riding gunmen, they were based on the lower Vaal and middle Orange by 1823-4, penetrating deep into the Caledon and beyond to the upper Orange and even the upper Vaal, where the Ndebele had suffered half a dozen raids by 1827.

In 1834 Mokhoteli (Moshoeshoe's people) showed Smith their gunshot wounds acquired from Bergenaars in the early 1820s. 21

Nearer the Griqua bases in the western Orange Free State and the northern Cape, local Africans suffered far more damage. 'Kafir' commandos from the eastern districts of the Colony - groups displaced in the so-called frontier wars, and often mobilized and armed by 'frontier ruffians' - vied with the Griqua.22

Here it is interesting to note that the Frontier Boers had now armed and mobilized the Sothos and other victims.

Additionally, Kora bands (originally Khoi) on the middle Orange, having been displaced by the Griqua into the northern and western Orange Free State, acquired guns and horses from the Boers in and around the Boer Republics. Known as Koranna, they in turn became plunderers, operating both north and south of the Vaal bend. For instance, Koranna attacked both the Hurutshe at Kaditshweni, and Mothibi's Tlhaping in 1822-3, but then appealed to Mothibi for an alliance against the Hurutshe, just as the missionaries and Griqua were to entice the Tlhaping against the 'Mantatees' in June 1823. 23

Associated with the Koranna, being partly their victims and partly allies, were the Taung of Mophete (succeeded by Moritsane in 1824). In the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the Taung became partially 'Koranna-ized', acquired some guns, and absorbed neighbors to produce a new type of hybrid state.

The Taung24 were the group most frequently identified or disparaged as Mantatees.

Here we can see a relationship between the Boers, the Koranna and the Taung.

The activities of the slave and cattle raiders produced bewildering sequences of attack, counter-attack, and permutations of alliances, aggressors and victims, in which the missionaries were extensively involved.

In 1824, Taung attacks on Sifunelo's Rolong, induced the missionaries who were ‘protecting’ Rolong to employ Bergenaars as mercenaries against the Taung.

The Bergenaars attacked the Rolong instead, however, a 'mistake' which did not prevent Melvill from taking his customary cut of thirty of Rolong cattle. 25

Later in 1824, the Bergenaars, this time with Moffat's help, did what they were first asked and aided the Rolong against the Taung. 26

Here there was a relationtionship between the British, the Rolong, and the Bergenaars.

Further east in the north-central Orange Free State (Welkom - Virginia area) the Taung achieved a near hegemony in the early 1820’s. They absorbed the neighboring Ghoya, and either absorbed or put to flight Fokeng chieftaincies such as the Patsa. The Patsa of Sebetwane - later known as the Kololo -extricated themselves from Taung attentions by migrating northwest through Rolong and Hurutshe territory into the country of the Ngwaketse (Kanye area), where in 1824 the Ngwaketse chief, Makaba, was killed.27

The Patsa were only evicted when Sebego, Makaba's successor, hired White gunmen in 1826.

The disturbances in the northern Cape, south-western Transvaal, Orange Free State and western Lesotho were rooted in the Cape Colony's demand for labour and cattle, not in Zulu expansionism.

**(iv) Raiding patterns in S.A. 1818-1850’s**.

The Zulu never once raided into the Orange Free State, and the first Ndebele raid south of the middle Vaal came in 1829, and that was in retaliation against British initiated Taung-Bergenaar cattle raids.

In the north-eastern and eastern Orange Free State, Sotho groups came under pressure from invaders from the east during the period I8I8-26, not from the 'Zulu revolution' but from an expansion in the European demand for sugar.

Accounts of Tlokwa devastations in the Orange Free State go back to the error of eliding the word 'Mantatee' with the name of Sekonyela's mother, MaNtatisi. The Tlokwa did not migrate away from the upper Caledon.

### Livingstone28 claimed in the early 1850’s that Sebetwane's people told him the Tlokwa tribe of Sekonyela drove the Kololo from Kurutlele (near modern Welkom) 'in the first instance', after which they 'fled to Sekonyela's present country' (upper Caledon).

Ellenberger29has one part of the Patsa driven north by the Taung, and another by the Tlokwa. It is possible that this split is to accommodate both Livingstone and material from traditions.

### Both Livingstone and Ellenberger were conflating ‘Mantatees ' - a word applied to both Taung and Patsa-Kololo - with ' MaNtatisi ' (hence Tlokwa), and no Tlokwa attack took place.

Ellenberger's dating of the Tlokwa attack to June 1822 is purely imaginary: we have no information as to the chronology of the Patsa-Kololo before 1824 (when they were in Ngwaketse country).

Since Sekonyela was only a boy in 1821-3, Livingstone is likely to have supplied the name from missionary preoccupation with Sekonyela in the period 1834-54, during which time the mistaken Mantatees = MaNtatisi (Tlokwa) elision was becoming habitual.

The dominant flow of violence in the west was not from east to west, as Theal claimed, but rather from west to east, or south-west to north-east, or in the case of the 'Kafir' commandos originating in the Fish-Kei region, from south north to the Caledon and the Vaal.

Attacks by the Griqua on the more powerful of the black states north of the Orange in the 1820’s, was followed by the counter attacks of Moshoeshoe’s newly militarized Sotho state in the 1830’s.

Sanders has the Difaqane end30 with Moshoeshoe's defeat of the Koranna in 1835-6. This epitomizes the confusion about the Difaqane, as Moshoeshoe was Sotho and not Zulu.

**(v) Starvation north of the Orange River during the 1820’s.**

Although the region north of the Orange was in the grip of a drought in the years 1820-2, this may have aggravated, but was not sufficient, to cause the widespread starvation noted by observers.

In the 1820’s this starvation, and the 'bones littering the veldt' (words frequently used in Mfecane literature) has also been attributed to Griqua raids for women and children killed or captured; a greater percentage of men killed or wounded. But damage inflicted by fire-arms has been persistently underestimated.

The loss of labour to black societies, and the flight to safety during raids on fertile home bases, seriously impaired cultivation; and this, combined with the loss of cattle for milk, were contributing factors to a crisis of malnutrition in the years 1821-4, especially in the west. Some missionary reports of cannibalism correspond to the hunger memories which stand out in the traditions collected in later decades, although the causes were invariably glossed over.

Some survivors fled into the Kalahari (now why would people who were starving from hunger due to the drought, flee to the desert land of the Kalahari, if not in flight from bloodthirsty enemies?) or joined groups such as the Taung and Tlhaping. These became revolutionary accretions of people unlike anything that had gone before. Others flocked to join Matiwane, Sekonyela and especially Moshoeshoe in and to the east of the Caledon, or to Mzilikazi on the upper Vaal. This is how their states grew.

Other 'Bootchuanas' did flee south of the Orange into the Colony.

**(vi) Effects of slaver raids along the Orange and Vaal Rivers**

The acquisition of Mantatee labour in the Cape, the famine, and black state consolidation in the north were results of slaver raids.

A grand ‘peur’ accompanied these events, especially along the middle and lower Vaal. This was sometimes fanned by missionaries and traders, as well as opportunistic black chiefs, to justify 'self-defensive' raids. Not only did literate whites (the only ‘literate’ whites in South Africa were the British subjects as that stage) attempt to provide themselves and their Griqua, or 'their Africans', with personal alibis, but a more general psychological displacement took place, in which the victims were burdened with the guilt of being the aggressors. 31

**(vii) Propaganda about the Mantatees**

'Mantatee ' was a word deliberately used to convey at once an idea of terror, and that of the black man as Untermensch.

Melvill and Moffat fantasized about the Mantatees and their wars in order to create alibis for their own behaviour.32

Moffat and Melvill at Dithakong, and Bain at Dithubaruba in 1826, claimed Moffat loaded his guns with blank ammunition (for his readers), but in the attack used live bullets. 33

Moffat and Melvill spoke about a huge Mantatee army. Out of this emerged the concept of the 'horde'. The initial estimate of the number of Mantatees at Dithakong was 30,000. Melvill calculated this by guessing the area of ground covered by the 'enemy ', and allowing one square yard for each person. Within a few days 30,000 had become 50,000. To boost the alibi further, these engaged Mantatees were said to be half of the total Mantatee army, of which some from the slave raids were converted into marauding bands of semi-demonic women and children, as well as men, who ravaged the countryside like locusts and threatened the entire colonial civilization.

Such large numbers were enough to support claims of a danger to the Cape Colony. It is unlikely that the Mantatee army numbered more than about two thousand, and possibly less.

Mantatees were accused of self-propelling themselves into servitude. Mantatees ‘qua hordes’ were accused of driving south Mantatees ‘qua labour’, while the real suppliers of the labour and their white backers slipped quietly out of view. 34

It was alleged that the Mantatees destroyed their own villages and crops.

It became common to depict them as cannibals, a facet of the alibi that fitted in with the fantasies of African behaviour with which the British colonizers often started out.

These displacements justified the attacks on 'cannibals' and brought in the subscriptions to the mission societies in London, Glasgow, Paris and Boston.

Since there appeared to be no conceivable motive for this self-mutilation, Mantatee hordes had to be subject to laws of behaviour and motion completely mysterious to rational people. This 'knowledge' was planted in the 1820’s and 1830’s and explains the surreal atmosphere infusing modern accounts.

Black 'irrationality' became 'truer' with each repetition, and the impression was to be reinforced by the need for later alibis.

**(viii) The need for more slaves.**

In I822-3 a second 'horde' appeared, this time in the north-eastern Cape: the ‘Fetcani'35. This word the Tembu applied to enemy bandits, or sometimes to local rivals. After 1823 (and possibly earlier) it also came to be used for raiders and/or migrants from north of the Orange River. For example in March 1825, some Fetcani attacked Tembu groups near Hangklip Mountain to the north of modern Queenstown. The leaders of these Fetcani were Mosotho and Manguane - our first definite reference to the Ngwane. A colonial commando discovered they were from the Caledon and had been repulsed by the Griqua.

Ngwane movements between about 1825 and 1828 are unclear. It is not known when they left the Caledon. Either they directed their raids on the Tembu in 1827 from the Mbashe River, or they returned north of the Orange in 1827 and migrated later. It seems unlikely they were still engaging Moshoeshoe at the turn of 1827-8, as many accounts claim. Their route was most likely across the Witteberg towards the Stormberg.

The Tembu under Pawana threatened to cross south into the 'Neutral Territory'. This precipitated a frontier crisis.Troops were mobilized and Governor Bourke made a tour of inspection.

The Ngwane/Fetcani were only 'a problem' because of British expansionism to the Kei and Griqua raiding already referred to.

The timing of their flight south of the Orange in 1826 or 1827 was unfortunate. For one thing, British missionaries who had arrived at Butterworth in December 1826, were already focusing on further advances north through the Transkei to Natal.

In the meantime, the Ngwane started to settle down on the upper Mbashe River, right in the line of British reconnaissance, between 1826 and late 1827.

The ‘'frontier ruffians” (Frontier Boers) who had already established themselves on the UMzimkhulu River before 1826, relayed information via the missionaries in May 1828 to Bourke about a Zulu invasion of the Transkei. 36

Militant British expansionists used this news to plan an advance across the Kei.

Lt.-Col. Henry Somerset (the son of Bourke's predecessor) scoured the Winterberg with his cavalry; and the frontier military commandants strained at the leash to be allowed to fight ‘the invaders’.

Bourke equivocated, and first to ask the frontier military commandments to recross the Orange so the Tembu could recross out of British territory. This was urgent as the Xhosa leader, Ngqika, was demanding to be allowed back west of the Keiskamma with alleged Fetcani in his rear.

Bourke had proved responsive to Tembu claims that the Ngwane/Fetcani were devouring the countryside, while keeping in mind the need to solve the Cape Colony's chronic shortage of labour. The Fetcani could now be forcibly co-opted as the Mantatees had been earlier.

Despite their numbers, Mantatee laborers had only briefly helped the labour supply. By 1825 shortages of workers had put 'a stop to every undertaking, whether agricultural or of any other nature'. Albany was worst hit; but the problem was colony-wide.

The British Cape administration tried everything, including ordering the missionaries to send out laborers from the mission stations. ‘When these demands by the Graham's Town British military could not be complied with by the missionaries, when they could not send the number or the particular persons wanted, they received threatening letters or were summoned to appear at Graham's Town, as if they had been slaves themselves'37.

By 1826, it was understood that the problem could only be solved in the long term by utilizing black labour from beyond the Colony. This required a change in legislation. During 1825-8 a debate occurred which took into consideration the imminent abolition of slavery, and the likelihood of further frontier expansion.

More labour would then be required, and the Xhosa would be even angrier.

There was no unanimity. Some White farmers favored keeping Blacks out. Even for the realistic majority who, encouraged by the success of the Mantatee scheme, supported the utilization of 'Kafir' labour, the problem was that it had to be 'free', or voluntary, and in large amounts. Bourke urged London38 to agree to the Colony 'inviting' in not merely emaciated individuals (as the fiction about Mantatees went), but 'whole tribes'. It was the first time in British colonial experience anywhere that the dilemma of how to ‘attract’ free laborers, to work at very low wages and in perhaps appalling conditions, had to be faced.

The passing of an Ordinance permitting 'invitations' was unlikely to have much effect. Later, more thorough strategies were devised and perfected in the Cape to force out free labour: more extensive land alienation, hut taxation, the wrecking of the indigenous economy and thwarting national/international market opportunities.

But in 1828 the only quick way to obtain 'free' labour was to send in an army and fetch it out. As soon as Ordinance 49 permit the issue of invitations was safely drafted, Bourke seized on the news of the Zulu invasion as a pretext to send his armies across the Kei to bring out some labour.

**(ix) The 'battle' of Mbolompo**

In July I828 a commando under the military commandant of Albany, Major Dundas, hurried to Vusani's Tembu to prepare them for an attack on the Ngwane (Fetcani). While the Tembu were mobilizing, Dundas rode on to the Mpondo and discovered that **the 'Zulu' army was in fact that of H. F. Fynn and his fellow Natal adventurers**.

Dundas's commando then doubled back and reached Vusani again on 24 July.

The British and Hottentot gunmen, and the by now fully mobilized Tembu, moved east of the Hbashe and surrounded the Ngwane villages before dawn on 26 July. The Tembu climbed the ridges behind the imizi and drove the awakening victims onto the British guns. About seventy Ngwane were shot dead and 2,000 cattle plundered.

It is inconceivable that the combined Anglo-Tembu intelligence did not know that their victims were the Ngwane, for an account from the era of Theal, revealed that this British commando had included most of the 55th Regiment39. Yet publically, Dundas and Somerset persisted in claiming they believed the Fetcani were 'Chaca's people', and justified their actions by holding out that “there was now no realistic Fetcani problem to the east of the Tembu."

The main British army under Somerset was nevertheless not deterred from completing its mobilization, and advancing for a second attack. This clearly proves that the mere punishment of the Ngwane was not the essential objective of the offensive. Somerset was joined on the march by contingents of both Gcaleka and Alpondo, so impressed were Hintsa and Faku at the ease of Dundas's success. Vusani deployed his Tembu east of the Mbashe once more in anticipation of being 'rescued' a second time.

This huge army - one of the largest yet seen in Africa - attacked the sleeping imizi of Ngwane's people (or the 'Zulu', as Somerset gave out in his communiqués in order to maintain his alibi) before dawn on 27 August, and carried out an even more dreadful massacre. Several hundred Ngwane were shot down. Howitzer fire turned the Khambi and Waka forests on the ridges above the villages into a blazing inferno as the British raked the Ngwane escape routes with fire.

Droves of the remaining Ngwane cattle were rounded up and well over a hundred prisoners taken. "I directed the whole of my force, particularly the mounted part, to collect all the women and children they could find', Somerset noted, "this was Mbolompo.”

Somerset said between four hundred and one thousand Ngwane were killed during this ‘battle’.

Records indicate the British garrison had been about 16, 000 men, including 531 gun-armed Whites (five times the number who dispersed the Ndebele at llosega in January 1837). Yet Omer-Cooper described this event as a ‘skirmish’.40

To note: the scorched earth policy was be used again during the Anglo-Boer war in 1900.

Later passages in Somerset's report, intended for London and the philanthropists, attempted to tone this down. They echoed Moffat and Melvill's embroideries in 1823, and were a sketch for Ayliff and D'Urban's version of the 'rescue' of the Fingos:

“I found on halting that about 47 women and 70 children had been collected, many of them seriously mutilated. I was desirous to have restored all these persons to their people and altho my force was very much exhausted I would have done so but I found these women positively refused to return unless I compelled them to do so, they stated that their tribe was too numerous and that they could not return, now they saw we took care of them.. .The Burghers having most kindly offered to take charge of these children to the Colony, I was glad to accede to this proposal, seeing no other way either of conveying them or securing their being taken care of. H”

As Fynn remarked much later (after the furore over this more publicized atrocity had died away, and the 'battle' of Mbolompo was establishing itself as part of the Cape's heroic past): “The prisoners captured on that occasion became the first Kafir laborers who entered service in the Old Colony."

The provision of cheap labour had been the primary objective of Somerset's commando, as it had been of Moffat and Melvill's in June I823.

To note:

Technically, the Mantatees were not ' Kafirs' (Xhosa etc.) but were mostly from the Khoi, San and Bushmen tribes. The Ngwane prisoners of 1828 were the first substantial contingent of laborers to be called Fingos. Previously the word had applied only to the odd individual who had gravitated to the mission stations. 41

**(x) The chain of violence in the east and hiding the facts on slave trade**

Mfecane theory has the Ngwane expelled by the Zulu, both initially from the upper Mzinyathi in 1817-21, and again from the Caledon into the Transkei in 1826-7.

The preciser study of Hedges depicts the Ngwane as being attacked first by the Mthethwa (who at times were stiffened with Portuguese-linked mercenaries) and the Ndwandwe, before they experienced Zulu raids. He wrote as follows:

“After Matiwane's subjugation by Dingiswayo, Zwide attacked the Ngwane and put them to flight through Hlubiland, thus initiating the Mfecane.” 42 In effect, the Ndebele escape north and out whereas the Ngwane were forced south by Griqua.

The Ngwane were only one of a large number of groups fleeing away from an epicenter of violence which was not on the Mfolosi, as Zulu centric theories hold, but further north, roughly to the west of Delagoa Bay. 43

The violence affected peoples to the north and north-west of the Bay as much as, if not more than, those to the south-west of the Pongola. This locus of violence was correctly identified by writers of the 1820s; and they attributed it to the Portuguese slave trade at the Bay. However, this is a specifically ‘British’ South African history developed after the 1830’s. The trail of violence along the north-west at the Bay accompanied the one on the lower Vaal to the Port Natal harbor.

The conceptual rift between southern Mozambique and Zululand was frozen as fact into history while forming the border between Portuguese Mozambique and the Union of South Africa after 1900, and by the particularistic histories of Bryant and Walker which followed. Accompanied by a virulent anti-Shaka literature, the curtain was drawn over the slave trade.

**(xi)**  **Slave trade figures during Mfecane time period.**

It was not until 1981 that Harries, using the abundant evidence available, proved the large scale of the trade at the Bay. The Portuguese trade had operated at a low level in the eighteenth century, but after 1818 it took off. The expansion was a response to a much-increased demand for sugar in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars.

The extra demand for labour on the Brazilian plantations was intensified by British attempts to restrict Portugal's slave trade to south of the equator.

The Portuguese turned with extra energy to the previously under-worked regions of southern Mozambique. Between about 1818 and the early 1830’s at least a thousand, and probably twice if not three times that number of African males were exported from both Delagoa Bay and Inhambane every year. These are only the official figures, and exclude those killed or maimed in the operations of the slavers, or taken out clandestinely.

Official population estimates to the Inhambabe region through displacements range from about 100 000 to 180 000 every year, which excluded those killed or maimed in the operations of the slavers, or taken out clandestinely.

This means a total loss in those years of at least 20,000, and probably a very much higher number, of mostly men from the 'Delagoa Bay Hinterland'.

Warries wrote in 'Free and unfree labour’: “In eighteen months of 1827-8, 2,800 slaves were exported from Lourenco Marques and Inhambane to Reunion alone. In the six years 1824-30, Rio de Janeiro alone received over four thousand officially declared slaves from Lourenco Marques, and 3,400 from Inhambane. 44

Harries estimated a total population of 80,000 to 120,000 for a hinterland extending to the lower Mkuze and upper Pongola in the south-west, and to the Limpopo and Oliphant’s River in the north. This gives a loss of between 20 percent and 30 percent of the entire male population, within the exact years of the Mfecane.

**(xii) Internal revolution for African tribes**

The pivotal importance of the slave trade is an internal revolution. After 1815, this slaving had dramatically heightened the previously critical, but continuing impact of the ivory and cattle trades.

Unprecedented convulsions of people redistribution throughout the region ramified inland. People fled up the Limpopo, Oliphant’s and Levubu River systems into the eastern Transvaal, where some of them were absorbed by the Maroteng (later known as Pedi) and by white landlords such as Albabani, Mafumo and Tembe immediately to the west and south-west of the Bay were ravaged by conflicts which have only partly been put together.

Eyewitnesses on the Maputo River in 1822-3 observed Tembe chiefs selling slaves and taking a percentage of the profit.

The Pongola valley was one avenue of violence. Dlamini groups moved north-west out of the valley onto the escarpment as Portuguese-linked gunmen moved south to the lower Mfolozi.

The Ndwandwe rose and collapsed.

Bryant's estimate for ' Zululand ', i.e. the area between the Pongola and Tugela, in about 1820 to have been 80,000 45

The Gaza and Jere (the latter later known as the Ngoni) migrated north into the Bay area and began trading in slaves themselves.

There is an analog with the Koranna and Taung on the lower Vaal. This scattering and relocation of Ndwandwe, of whom the Gaza and Jere were south-eastern components, had more to do with the exigencies of the slave trade than Zulu attacks.

A western fragment of the Ndwandwe, (the Khumalo chieftaincy of Mzilikazi,) fled west to the headwaters of the Vaal. In 1830, Philip attributed this expulsion to the slavers. The Khumalo were a mere thirty miles to the north of the Ndwedwe.

The Zulu themselves moved south (rather than towards the Bay) under the stress of these pressures, as taken from Kay's observation of 1831. They were closely followed by Ndwandwe remnants which had drifted south from the Pongola across the Mkuze.

Not only the Gaza and Jere, but also the Ndwandwe and Zulu raided neighbors for slaves.

The Dlamini were extruded from the south Bay region in approximately the 1780’s, from where they migrated to the north bank of the middle Pongola. Under Sdvungunye in the period 1790 -1810, they contributed to the regional violence. The subsequent move north-west under Sobhuza has not been dated nor explained. 46

The export of slaves from the Orange River to Delagoa Bay and Inhambane, a route which would have passed close to or directly through Ngwane territory was reported by Bannister. With reference to the early 1820’s, 47 Fynn reports:

“Trade with the Portuguese factories, on the east side of the English River, was equally beneficial. The ivory procured from the Zulus and Ndwandwe together with the prisoners taken in their wars (which they sold as slaves) then bartered with the Portuguese for beads and brass...”

**(xiii) The Caledon caught between fires**

The Ngwane first migrated into the region around the upper Wilge, near modern Harrismith. It was inhabited by 'Sotho' groups such as the Sia and Tlokwa.

For centuries this had been an established trade route to the Bay and had been used by 'Nguni' immigrants, sometimes peaceably, sometimes not.

Few Sia and Tlokwa villages did not have a number of Nguni residents.

Some of the Nguni had even advanced down the Caledon almost as far as the Orange confluence.

There had long been interchanges between the two language groups across the passes of the Drakensberg.

It was not the Nguni migrations of 1817-23, but their scale and cause that were unprecedented. 48

Note: mistakes made by historians have had far reaching effects. Ellenberger's largely fictional chronologies and battles have been accepted uncritically by recent historians. Sanders revealed in his book, ‘Moshoeshoe’ pg. 3I, how Ellenberger had mistaken dating of the alleged Kgwane-Hlubi battle to the 1820’s. In fact, the conflict was several years earlier.

Both the established residents, and the Kgwane and Hlubi, were now pushed further south-west into the northern Drakensberg, and by short stages into land on both sides of the upper Caledon.

There were conflicts. The 'battle of the pots' was one of the worst. But all the black groups - Mokhoteli, Tlokwa and Ngwane – sought out flat-topped mountains for defense; and local accommodations were quickly made, both of which facts suggest an exterior menace, or menaces, common to all.

The Sotho supplied recruits to Ngwane amabutho, as they did to Mzilikazi's further north.

Like the Ndebele, the Ngwane expanded more as a defensive organization than as an offensive one. 49

Smaller groups of Nguni refugees joined not only Mzilikazi and Matiwane, but Sekonyela and Moshoeshoe as well.

As mentioned, Sotho groups fled into the Caledon from the Griqua and Taung in the west.

By 1825 amicable relationships existed between the Ngwane and Moshoeshoe's Mokhoteli, as even admirers of Moshoeshoe accept. Yet the Ngwane migrated south at around this time.

The British historians of the 1830’s suggested the reason for this migration was: “Because the Ngwane or Fetcani 'found the distance a serious inconvenience in their habit of raiding Tembu cattle'.

Thompson describes Moshoeshoe as a vassal of Matiwane's50, but the two growing states were more equally balanced in power. After Mbolompo, many Ngwane returned to join Moshoeshoe.

Modern writers follow Ellenberger with stories of Zulu, alternatively Ndebele raids. But there is no evidence for either.

The more powerful Ndebele two hundred miles to the north-east of the Ngwane were being attacked by Griqua in the mid- I820’s. The Ngwane were far more exposed where they were west of the Caledon; even more so than the Mokhoteli to the east. Unlike the Ndebele, an escape route to the north had been made more difficult by their initial flight to the south-west. Only the route over the lower altitude passes of the Drakensberg to the upper Kei and Mbashe lay open.

There is the report in 1825 which said the Fetcani were repulsed by gunmen in the west. In 1829 Shaw was told by two of the prisoners taken at Mbolompo:

'They had seen when far to the north some white people with horses, which we suppose to have been some of the Griqua.'

Bannister heard from other prisoners that the Ngwane had been 'repelled by the Griquas about two years since, and twice they sought for a place to rest'. Finally, Stockenstrom referred to 'great atrocities' committed by Adam Kok's Griqua on 'black fugitives' and he meant the Ngwane -in the upper Caledon.51

There is no evidence of attacks from the Zulu or Ndebele sides. 'Zulu' meant any Nguni. The Zulu stories were part of the myth of Shaka which took off after about 1826.

The Ngwane were first expelled from the Mzinyathi by the direct or indirect attention of the Delagoa Bay slavers. They had the misfortune to run into the Griqua in the Caledon who attacked them from the west for Mantatees and cattle.

The peoples of the Caledon were thus caught in the transcontinental cross-fire of interrelated European plunder systems.

Driven into the Transkei, the Ngwane were at once set upon by the British who were raiding for 'free' labour in the aftermath of Ordinance 49.

**(xiv) Deceit to take over the Port in Natal**

The first ' Natal Fever' hit Cape Colony in 1827-8. Both the fever and the pejorative image of Shaka were orchestrated by H. F. Fynn, F. Farewell and J. King, would-be British conquistadores who had arrived on the coast of Natal variously between 1823 and 1825.

In 1823, Captain Owen had attempted to 'bounce' the Portuguese out of Delagoa Bay. He suggested to the Government in London that the Portuguese were not in effective occupation, and then faked a treaty dated 8 March 1823, in which it was claimed the King of Tembe had ceded all his land to Owen in return for knick-knacks. The British Government - at that moment confirming Portuguese ownership of the Bay in return for restrictions on the slave trade - declined to ratify the fabricated ‘Tembe’ treaty.

Farewell and his companions tried again, this time further south at Port Natal, not such a good port, but where the Portuguese had already been driven away by the British army. A British colonizing party landed in the hope of creating ‘afait accompli’ for the leaders of this party.

In August 1824, a more plausible treaty was faked in which the Zulu paramount, Shaka, who was well to the north of the area, was credited with ceding Farewell a thirty-five mile coastal strip around the Port, and a one-hundred-mile extension inland. 52

The Zulu do not appear to have found out about this until early 1828.

Mendacious propaganda was insistently relayed back to the Colony that Natal had been totally depopulated by the Zulu, and that Shaka was a bloody killer whom the British could virtuously and profitably crusade against. News of all this spread rapidly in the Colony during 1826-8.

**(xv) Deceit to change the Natal African politics**

The British military soon intervened in the local power struggles with a potency stemming from their possession of firearms and access to powder.

In 1826 the British military decided the famous series of conflicts between the Zulu and Ndwandwe in Shaka's favour; and in early 1827 secured the defeat of Khumalo groups who had moved south from the Mkuze towards the Black Mfolosi, and against whom Shaka had been helpless.

Both British military leaders Fynn and Farewell established personal followings of Blacks from Tuli, Tembu and Cele groups living south of the Tugela. The British leadership drew people who refused to submit to Shaka.

By 1827, Fynn had built up a remarkable private kingdom of over two thousand people in the UMzimkhulu valley, strategically well placed far from the Zulu, and within striking distance of the Colony. Fynn's people hunted elephants for ivory, intervened with increasing impunity in local politics, and were soon competing with Zulu tribute collectors. Contact between these rogues, and the newly arrived missionaries at Butterworth, was quickly established.

By I828 news of a ' Zulu' army was dispatched to the Cape. Fynn himself referred to this as follows:

“..reports being circulated in the Colony of an intended invasion by the Zulus, with me at their head.... supposed to be a division of Shaka's army. Reports such as these induced the Colonial Command of 1828 to advance against ‘Matiwane’.” 53

Another record was also given about Shaka's izinduna in the Cape, and the later denial of Stuart’s informants that there had been a Zulu army in the Cape. 54

In his 'diary' Fynn depicts Shaka as benignly, if not half-wit, standing by, more preoccupied with obtaining hair-oil than with worrying about his disintegrating southern security system.

There is every sign that by the early months of 1828, severe frictions between Shaka and the Fynn-Farewell team were developing.55

The Zulu were being wedged between two fronts of white activity. 56 On the one hand, the Boers, who had settled in Natal with the blessing of the Zulu monarch King Dingiswayo, and on the other hand the British, who were making increasing demands for ivory and slaves, and who did not favour Boer presence in Natal.

After the assassination of King Dingiswayo, Shaka followed the rules of tradition, and donned the same attitude as Dingiswayo concerning the Whites. The British could not manage to persuade Shaka to oust the Boers, but found an ear for their plan in Dingaan.

In May 1828 Shaka sent a delegation to the Cape to object to the British demands made at Port Natal. It was now that Fynn alleged Shaka intended to invade the Transkei as far as the Colonial boundary on the Keiskamma.This was a lie. It was Fynn's own force which now attacked the Mpondo57, faking a Zulu attack by Shaka. Fynn in his reminiscences has Farwell fall ill just before the battle, and Farewell watched the proceedings from a hill. 58

The British military under Fynn attacked the Mpondo without any sign of warning them. Major Dundas reached Faku in July and reported: “...’the invading army', and this was Fynn's ...Faku came in to me who said that the person who shot him was Fynn ... there were other white people with Fynn.”

Records provided by Isaacs reveal that Farewell and Ogle were among the Whites mentioned by Faku. 59

Faku also told Dundas that Fynn received enough cattle in rewards to establish his umtisi of Insimbi from this attack, which Fynn confirmed in his memoirs, admitting that ‘natives in our service' had raided Mpondo cattle.

Note the book named “Fynn Diary” is a welding together of later propaganda vessels written in the late 1850’s and early 1869’s with interpolations by Stuart from the early twentieth century, and combined editing by Stuart and Malcolm to create a major disaster of South African historical literature.

The sequence of events during the early years of South African history is only viewable through White accounts which are full of lies and concealments. What is clear is the following:

The British invasion of the Transkei took Shaka by surprise while his main army had been dispatched northwards, where it moved along the Oliphant’s River. News of the offensives of Dundas and Fynn was so critical, that Shaka travelled south with a small personal retinue to remonstrate with Fynn, and try to negotiate ex-tributaries back into the Zulu fold.

Fynn's motives for attacking the Mpondo, apart from the obvious one of obtaining booty, also served to intimidate the Mpondo into supporting the British, an issue which both Dundas and Somerset also pursued.

A row took place between Fynn and Shaka followed, and during the confrontation Fynn conspired with Dingaan and other Zulu dissidents to kill Shaka. Fynn wrote with insider's knowledge:

“There is little doubt that the intention of killing Shaka had been long in contemplation. As I have since understood, it was intended to have taken place at

my residence during the attack on the amaMpondos, at which time both brothers remained behind with Shaka feigning sickness, when an opportunity was wanting to effect their purpose."'

Shortly after his return to Dukuza, Shaka's anger was further stoked by the news brought by his delegation which in August had returned from the Colony.

The izinduna told him they had been cold-shouldered by the white authorities and had been refused permission to visit Graham’s Town, where military preparations for the actual British invasion of the Transkei were underway, or Cape Town.

The deteriorating situation led to confrontation with the British on the UMzimkhulu at a later stage.

On 26 August (the day before Mbolompo) Shaka informed Isaacs :

Those whom they [Fynn and Farewell] assumed to take under their shield, and to

support when assailed, were daily committing depredations on the tribes tributary to him and taking off their cattle: he [Shaka] should therefore go to war with them [Fynn and friends] when he thought it good policy to do so.”

Fynn acknowledged later that he knew that Shaka intended their deaths.

Farewell was also alarmed at Shaka's granting a real land concession to ‘King’ after King had accompanied the izinduna to the Colony, Such a land concession threatened his entire ambitions. The land concession to King in 1828 was a sort of Lippert Concession of the era.

King's own death a week before Shaka's has always been proclaimed (by Fynn et al.) as natural; but its timing was very convenient for Farewell. The possibility that King was murdered should be kept open. 60

On 24 September, less than a month after Mbolompo, Shaka was stabbed to death by conspirators under Dingaan. Fynn recorded that Dingaan would come into much property of considerable value and the whole stock Farewell was conveying to Natal, and many of the guns fell into Qwabe hands. 61 Fynn and an 'Mpondo' delegation were at Dukuza at the time. The conspirators spent an anxious month fearing the return of the army known to be loyal to Shaka. But its defeat seems to have removed it as a threat.

The British media sang the praises of Dingaan, and the British military aided him in the campaigns against Shaka loyalists which occupied much of the next two years. Farewell, for example, went to the Cape to advance his schemes and obtained considerable quantities of firearms for Dingaan. On his return with the guns in September 1829 he was himself killed by Qwabe supporters of Shaka.

Shaka's killing is routinely depicted as a popular move amongst the Zulu because he killed too many people. But we only have the word of the British for this. The innumerable defections from Dingaan which took place after September 1828 suggest that Shaka had the support of the bulk of his people.

Qwabe, Xlbo, Cele and several other groups refused to recognize Dingaan. 62

The assassination of Shaka's character and the role of the British in his murder is, however, too important a subject to be dismissed from history.

**(xvi) Mixed feelings between the Dutch and British about the raid of Mbolompo**

Unlike after Dithakong, the massacres of the Ngwane in 1828 provoked an outcry within sections of colonial opinion.

An English officer described Somerset's action as 'one of the most disgraceful and cold-blooded acts to which the English soldier had ever been rendered accessory'. Bannister dwelt on the 'mistake' by which a people 'who would have joined us against the enemy we were seeking', and called for a public reproof for Major Dundas.

Stockenstrom compared Somerset unfavorably with 'that monster Kana Sahib', an in view of the Indian strategies devised by Clive and Wellesley now being inflicted on Africans. 63

The lie of the British army that their negotiators had first been fired on at Mbolompo was exposed: there had been no negotiators, as these are not needed in surprise pre-dawn attacks, a specialty of the British.

The full horror began to sink in of using field guns against a people armed only with spears with which to protect their women, children and aged.

Kay wrote as follows: “Their weapons were met with rockets; and for spears they received balls”. 64

Sir Godlonton in the British owned ‘Graham's Town Journal’ referred to Dundas's 'gallant little band', and re-organized the South African history by creating a Fetcana 'in the full costume of a Zoola warrior.'

**(xvii) D’Urban’s War on the Xhosa**

The next land and labour expedition, D'Urban's War on the Xhosa of I834-5, was organized on such a scale, and defended with such an array of pretexts, as to be accepted as a 'war', subject to the adjustments of moral perspective which allowed collective criminal acts to be dressed up as another humanitarian blessing.

Whereas Somerset brought out a couple of hundred prisoners, D'Urban and his missionaries brought out 17,000, eighty-five per cent of whom were women and children. They, too, were described as “full of gratitude for being rescued from the 'bondage ' of their own rulers”, and, for further disguise, supplied with a fictitious past to confuse South African history even further. These prisoners became labeled as the Fingos, or Mfengu, updated Mantatees and Fetcani, who at last solved the labour supply shortage on a more permanent basis.

Mbolompo was fig-leafed over by the greater propaganda success of the British media version of D'Urban's war.

Godlonton's voice65 had an uncontended grip of the historical ‘facts’. By the 1870’s the South African history had been re-structured by the British and reinforced by Theal, Cory and Walker, who were heard in the Oxford History.

The Graham's Town Journal, dated 14 February 1833 prefaced: “The speaker observed that that expedition had been the cause of the salvation of thousands and tens of thousands lives, - inasmuch as the people dispersed by the commando were wretches of the most atrocious character.”

**(xviii)** **The Evolution of the MaNtatisi (Tlokwa) Mantatee elision**

MaNtatisi of the Tlokwa came to be framed as both enemy at Dithakong, and destabilizer-in-chief of the Orange Free State, and was blamed for the destruction of the twenty-eight 'tribes' that Thompson in I827 had scored to Mantatees.

The real slave raiders of the 1820’s were forgotten as false information invented Mantatee Horde. The Mantatees were almost immediately assumed to have spawned the Fetcani 'Horde'. The first versions had the Fetcani as a portion of Mantatees who rebounded directly from Dithakong into the north-eastern Cape. After 1828, when the geographical origins of the Ngwane had been shadowily established, this was amended to have a branch of the Dithakong Mantatees migrate to the upper Caledon. Here they either meta-morphosed into Fetcani, or chased a separate people called Fetcani

Methodist missionaries migrated with groups of Rolong and Taung into the eastern Orange Free State in 1833. They soon visited the Tlokwa and met Sekonyela66 and his mother, MaNtatisi. Missionaries Alison and Archbell made the Mantatee-MaNtatisi elision. A report to this effect appeared in the Graham's Town Journal in January 1834, and was seized upon by Godlonton, one of whose hobbies was the study of Mantatee flight paths. Andrew Smith picked up the elision on his visit to Lishuani and Marabeng in November 1834, and so did Casalis and Arbousset, missionaries with Moshoeshoe at Thaba Bosiu.'67 Via this propaganda, MaNtatisi soon began to rival Shaka as a monster of destruction. Aided by Mzilikazi, Matiwane and 'the cannibals', they were accused by Theal of a sub-continental holocaust in which nearly two million blacks were allegedly killed.

In the book ‘Theal, History of South Africa 1794-1828’ (London, 1903), pg. 389 Theal admits that his motives was to put white destruction in its 'proper perspective'. 68

In Ellenberger's chapter on 'Cannibalism' 69 he claimed 300,000 people were eaten by cannibals in the Caledon region between 1822 and 1830, a figure arrived at by guessing there were initially four thousand cannibals, who each ate one person a month over six plus years.

Theal's nonsense was embellished by Ellenberger, who injected additional fiction. He minutely depicted MaNtatisi's Tlokwa doing battle with the Kololo of Sebetwane near Dithakong just before 26 June 1823, and then engaging Moffat, Waterboer et al. on the day itself. Shortly before his death, Ellenberger confessed he had never believed that the Tlokwa were at Dithakong or had crossed west of the Vaal, news of which reached the world in an article by his granddaughter, Marian. Marian, and after her Smith, merely changed the dramatis personae of the battles, substituting the Hlakwana and Phuthing, whoever they were, for the Tlokwa, and retaining Kololo

participation. The fact that nobody saw the Kololo near Dithakong in June 1823 is sidestepped by Edwin Smith, who refers to this occasion as: “We may suppose that they .. . were hidden from view in one of the valleys.” The elision Mantatee-

MaNtatisi has been retained since, and the Tlokwa have thus continued, erroneously, to be held responsible by Lye and others for Mantatee occurrences east and south of the Vaal.

The pejoratively loaded word Mantatee was used as ammunition against the 'villainous' Sekonyela in the war of words conducted against him by the 'good' Moshoeshoe's missionaries in the 1840s and 1850s." One of these writers, however, linked the Tlokwa/Mantatees with the ones at Dithakong.

Note, the Ngwane, not the Tlokwa -located Mantatees for the first time in the upper Caledon.

The book “Mfecane in the Southern Sotho area” pg. 18-21 include Tlokwa incursions into the central Orange Free State, a migration down the Caledon to the Orange confluence, and another migration up and down the Caledon, all within three years.

Maps of the gyrations of MaNtatisi's Tlokwa have continued to be produced. Modern editors even 'correct' contemporary writers such as George Thompson in footnotes to reprints, inserting Tlokwa into contexts where it is clear they were not being referred to. Even Ellenberger is nothing compared to versions in South Africa's school textbooks with which children come into the universities fully armed.

From the book written by J. Cliff and J. Whiteside called ‘History of the AmaMbo Generally Known as Fingos’ (Butterworth, 1912), the war in the Tugela region is quoted in chapters I to 7, from which we quote: “The prisoners came from the Mzinyathi-Tugela region, survivors from an original 720,000 people.” But no evidence has ever been cited to back this up. Most of the 17,000 were likely to have been Gcaleka and Rharhabe.

**(xix) Fingos**

Fingo was a word given to any 'Kafir' who showed ‘willingness' to work for or in other ways identify with the whites, their missionaries, or mode of life. They were collaborators whose lives had been thrown into disarray by British militarism.

'" For the most detailed study of the Fingos see R. A. Moyer, 'A history of the Mfengu of the Eastern Cape, 1815-6' (PhD thesis, University of London, 1976).

Portuguese slaving at Delagoa Bay pushed the Ngwane into the Caledon; the south-western: Griqua-Bergenaars operating simultaneously from the opposite direction as the foraying arm of the Cape Colony's advance, expelled them out of the Caledon. These complementary exterior propulsions were both rooted in the imperialistic demand for labour, the slaves at the Bay being exported to the sugar plantations of Brazil and Reunion etc., and those taken in the region north of the Orange River going to work the farms and towns of the explosively expansive Cape Colony.

**(xx) Results of the Mfecane**

Nothing, apart from the lives of the Kgwane and Shaka, was ended in 1830, the traditional termination point of the Mfecane.

The Taung, Gaza, Zulu, Ndebele, Ngwane, Moshoeshoe's Mokhoteli, Maroteng (Pedi), Dlamini-Swazi, Tlokwa, Mpondo, Tlhaping and others are all examples of reactive states which formed through the need of self-defense and survival. They were not purely Nguni, but invariably combinations of previously independent groups with a mixture of languages, dialects, even of race. They located themselves either in mountainous regions or in otherwise marginal land such as the region north of the Tugela. Some were migrant; others evolved more or less in one place. Some endured; others (Nxaba, the Kdwandwe) were ephemeral. All the successful ones -not merely the Zulu (who were not imitated by anybody) - experienced military revolutions, usually super-imposing firearms, larger armies and new objectives of warfare onto pre-existing structures such as, but not only, the ibutho. All were eventually compelled to adopt British boundaries and concepts of private property, witness the destruction of their land use systems, and suffer their re-emergence in caricature. In some respects there was a convergence between them: enlargement of scale, use of firearms; in others a divergence: e.g. of structure, capability and fortune. Politically they were eliminated by global imperialism in the age of the transition to monopoly capitalism.

A general psychological displacement took place, in which Southern Africans were burdened with the guilt of various self-mutilations. Teleology became tautology. The first layer of alibi was concerned with concealing the strategies of obtaining forced labour already discussed, and concerns the era c. 1820-60. In the era of Theal, Ellenberger and Walker, roughly 1880-1940, this was overlaid by a second, which attributed the land distribution of 1913. The origins of the Natives Land Act were mystified as Ordinance 49 had been in the earlier period.

A re-examination of the 'battles' of Dithakong and Mbolompo suggests very different conclusions and enables us to decipher the motives of subsequent historiographical amnesias. After about 1810 the peoples of southern Africa were caught between intensifying and converging imperialistic thrusts: one to supply the Cape Colony with labour; another, at Delagoa Bay, to supply slaves particularly to the Brazilian sugar plantations. The flight of the Ngwane from the Mzinyathi inland to the Caledon was, it is argued, a response to slaving. But they ran directly into the colonial raiding-grounds north of the Orange. The (missionary-led) raid on the still unidentified 'Mantatees' (not a reference to MaNtatisi) at Dithakong in 1823 was one of innumerable Griqua raids for slaves to counter an acute shortage of labour among Cape British subjects after the British expansionist wars of 1811-20.

Similar Griqua raids forced the Ngwane south from the Caledon into the Transkei. Here, at Mbolompo in 1828, the Ngwane were attacked again, this time by a British army seeking 'free' labour after the reorganization of the Cape's labour-procurement system in July 1828.

The British claim that they were parrying a Zulu invasion is exposed as propaganda, and the connections between the campaign and the British-instigated murder of Shaka are shown. In short, African societies did not generate the regional violence on their own. Rather, they were transformed over a lengthy period in reaction to the attentions of external plunderers. The core misrepresentations of 'the Mfecane' are thereby revealed; the term, and the concept, should be abandoned and replaced by the truth.

**Footnote 1: The theory of Mfecane.**

Walker coined the term 'Mfecane' in 1928, meaning 'the crushing'. This neologism has no root in any African language. The word Mfecane was used to convey the theory of a cataclysmic period of black-on-black destruction in the era of Shaka (roughly 1810-30).

The main assumptions are these. After about 1790, a self-generated internal revolution occurred within northern 'Nguni" societies to the south-west of Delagoa Bay, and this culminated in the Shakan military revolution at the turn of the 1820’s.' The consequent ‘Zulu expansionism’ had a near-genocide effect.

Note: ' Like the 'Mfecane, ' the concept ' Nguni ' is a twentieth-century invention of European academics.70 This ‘internal revolution’, and suggestions of structural innovativeness, were given to justify a precipitated a series of destructive migrations into the interior of Africa.

Peoples as far away as Lake Nyanza (Victoria) were scarred by the playing-out of chain reactions initiated by Shaka. Instantly 'Zulu-ized' first migrants, such as the Ndebele and Ngwane 'set into motion' peoples further inland. Shaka became an explanation for everything, whereby the need for explanations was removed.

The Afrocentricism and the pervasive teleology of this approach are striking. It corresponds with the normal pattern of South Africa's historical texts in which whites and blacks are 'pluralistically' treated in separate chapters or books, and where interactions are generally ignored.

The Tomlinson Report of 1955 based its theme that White and Black South African tribes could never live peacefully together on the book ‘Zulu Aftermath’ by Omer-Cooper. This report was rejected by both Dr. Verwoerd, prime minister of S.A. at that time, as well as the leaders of the African tribes in South Africa.

The timing of the self-destruction immediately prior to the British colonization of the 1830’s is also noticeable.

**The foundation on which the Mfecane is based**

The Mfecane theory is based on empirical research into either early Zulu history, or into that of any of the other relevant African societies before 1830.

The 'internal revolution' consists of little more than claims that Shaka (or Dingiswayo; or Zwide) first invented the ibutho, and transformed tactics by introducing the short stabbing spear and 'horns and chest' battle formations. But both the ibutho and short-handled spear go back long before Zwide and Shaka, and 'horns and chest' signifies nothing very precise. No serious study of Zulu (let alone Ndwandwe or Mthethwa) military developments in the early nineteenth century has yet appeared.

Initial assumptions that a population explosion led to transformations of indigenous state structures also lack evidence71.

For inconclusive attempts to demonstrate rapid population growth after about 1790, see M. Hall, 'Dendroclimatology, rainfall and human adaptation in the later Iron Age of Natal and Zululand', Annals of the Natal Museum, XXII, 3 (Nov. 1976), 693-703; and J. Guy, ‘The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom (Johannesburg, 1982)’, 8-12.

Evidence noted below suggests population must have declined:

Hedges attributes the stimulus to state expansion in black societies to competition to supply cattle to American whalers at Delagoa Bay after a downswing in the ivory trade in the early 1790s - an unconvincing hypothesis in a nevertheless important study.

With references in:

D. Hedges, 'Trade and politics in Southern Mozambique in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries' (PhD thesis, University of London, 1978), especially chapters 6 and 7; as well as Hedges in X.Smith, 'The trade of Delagoa Bay as a factor in Nguni politics, 1750-1835 ', ch. 8, in L. Thompson (ed.), African Societies in Southern Africa (London, 1969).

Neither has there been any significant disclosure as to the impact of the imperialistic mercantile and early industrial capitalism with regard to the early Black population in Southern Africa.

With regards to the slave trade 72, there is scant reference made to records made by the Portuguese at Delagoa Bay at around 1800, and very little attention paid to the British raiding for labour and cattle out form the Cape and Natal colonies.

Earlier work on the Ndebele of hlzilikazi73 had revealed the absence of an explanation for their initial ejection in 1817-21 from the upper Pongola valley. The evidence of Zulu agency became more elusive the further back one went. M. Macmillan linked this first migration to the slave trade at the Bay74.

**Theal's Mfecane theory chain reaction**

The normally accepted version of the events which linked the Ngwane and the Mantatees appears to have originated with Theal in the 1880’s with his statements such as:

“In about 1819-2I, the Ngwane were thrust out of their home to the east of the upper Mzinyathi River by the Zulu revolution. After fleeing south-west into the upper Caledon valley, they established a secondary reign of terror which inaugurated the Difaqane. The most potent of the peoples set into motion by the Ngwane were the Tlokwa or Mantatees of MaNtatisi and her son, Sekonyela. They too became instantly Zulu-ized, although only for about three years, and gyrated their way westwards across the Orange Free State depopulating as they went. Amongst their victims were the Patsa, or Kololo, of Sebetwane, whom they expelled across the Vaal to the north-west.“75

Older versions of the chain reaction had the Tlokwa (Mantatees) cross the Vaal into the Northern Cape. Newer versions since the 1950’s dispute the fact that the Tlokwa moved west of the Vaal, have them return to the upper Caledon, and replace them in the west with sundry tertiary victims (the Kololo, the Phuthing, and the Hlakwana). Once across the Vaal the Mantatees turned south and continued their devastations. They were only prevented from destroying the mission station at Kuruman and perhaps invading the Cape Colony by the missionaries and a hastily improvised band of Griqua at the defensive battle of Dithakong on 26 June 1823.

While these events - the classic chain reaction of the Mfecane - unfolded, the Ngwane, whom we left in the Caledon, spent a few years plundering the Sotho, but were then forced south across the Drakensberg by more Zulu (or Ndebele: there is no agreement on this point) attacks into the upper Mbashe valley in the south-western Transkei. Here, at Mbolompo on 27 Aug. 1828, the Ngwane were at last halted by a British army coming to the rescue of their next prospective victims, the Tembu. Interestingly, the British thought they were attacking the Zulu, who were also reported to be operating in the Transkei in 1828. Cape historians have found this error amusing, but not worth investigating.76

Unlike historian Walker's Mfecane, which referred to a sub-continental pattern of destruction, Historian Ellenberger's77 Difaqane defined an alleged middle period, i.e. a time-span of Sotho history with particular reference to the Caledon valley. This period of bloody destruction (caused by Nguni invaders) separates a pre-1820 era of peace from a post-1833 (arrival of the missionaries) era of recuperation and progress towards civilization.

Mfecane and Difaqane are now in practice used interchangeably, although the Caledon stress of the latter often remains.

The Mfecane and Difaqane theories leave confusion as to the Ndebele movement, and the identity of the black opponents at both Dithakong and Mbolompo.

To note: Apart from the Cape Colony, which reached the Fish River in I8I2 and the Keiskamma in I820, no provincial boundaries existed in the 1820’s.

**Conclusions**

In the first place, the Afrocentricism, Zulucentricism, and both the spatial and chronological teleology’s of Mfecane theory are all untenable. The reconsideration of Ngwane movements, and the returning of the Tlokwa to the upper Caledon, breaks down the classic Thealean chain-reaction, or 'shunting sequence', not merely at a single but at every point in the concatenation.

This self-propelling chain dissolves, and is replaced -it is advisable to change the metaphor - by the jaws of a huge vice grip. The eastern jaw: Portuguese slaving at Delagoa Bay pushed the Ngwane into the Caledon; the south-western: Griqua-Bergenaars operating simultaneously from the opposite direction as the foraying arm of the Cape Colony's advance, expelled them out of the Caledon. These complementary exterior propulsions were both rooted in the imperialistic demand for labour, the slaves at the Bay being exported to the sugar plantations of Brazil and Reunion etc., and those taken in the region north of the Orange River going to work the farms and towns of the explosively expansive Cape Colony. The Caledon in the early 1820’s became one of the more spectacular points where these thrusts intersected. Black societies were caught in the cross-fires of European encirclement and interpenetration. Conversely, the Zulu were never the primary stimulus of forced migrations, and most frequently were not involved at all.

In none of these cases was there a single blow, but always a series. A re-examination of Gaza and Jere (ygoni) migrations north from the XIkuzi to the Limpopo, and in the case of the Ngoni from there on across the Zambezi, will almost certainly reveal similar patterns. The hard evidence for Zulu agency is conspicuously lacking.

Additionally, the sequence of labour exactions at geographically widely dispersed points in southern Africa provides one, if not the, vital key determining the chronology of interactions between black and white communities. The arrival of the 1820 settlers in the Eastern Cape had regional ramifications, and was considerably more decisive than the accession of Shaka. Ordinance 49 was more material than his assassination, though both were linked by British administration.

**References**:

1 S. Bannister, Humane Policy or Justice to the Aborigines of New Settlements (London, 1968 reprint [originally London, 1830]), 228.

2 For the 'battle' see I. Schapera (ed.), ‘Apprenticeship at Kuruman’ (London, rgjr), 77-103

3 Moffat's account was first published in The Cape Gazette, 26 July 1823.See also

below, nn. 28-30, for a discussion of the identification problem;

George Thompson, ‘Travels and Adventures in Southern Africa’, (Cape Town,

1967 reprint [originally London, 1827]),I, chs. xv and xvi.

4 Schapera: ‘Apprenticeship’, p.89; 91: “the coming on the old man and child”; and

p95, where the hlantatee 'poorer class' are depicted seizing and eating meat in the middle of the fighting;

Thompson,: ‘Travels and Adventures, I, ch, xv; Note the surreal atmosphere of Thompson's alleged sighting of the Mantatees and the deserted village reminiscent of the Marie Celeste in Travels and Adventures, I, p108-10.

5 Moffat (Schapera, Apprenticeship,) claimed 'the slain of the enemy was between 400 and 5oo', but it is probably advisable to allow for exaggeration. For the claim that Mantatees burnt their own villages see ibid., 93,and Thompson, Travels and Adventures, I, 146.

6 For the detail about Melvill see ibid., I, ch. xvi, headed 'Mr. Melvill's Narrative of

Transactions after the Battle, and of His Excursion to Rescue the women and Children of the Invaders ';

7 the quote about 'cannibal ferocity ' ibid., I,.

8 Regarding the quarrel over the prisoners, read J. Philip, ‘Researches in South Africa’, London, 1828), pg 142-6;

Regarding Melvill's dispatch of prisoners to Graaff Reinet, read R. L. Cope (ed.), ‘Journals of the Rev. T.L. Hodgson’ (Johannesburg, 1977)) entry for 23 July 1823, p. 182;

Regarding the payment, read ‘Bird to Landdrost Graaff Reinet’, 27 Aug. 1823, in Theal, Records, X1'1, 223;

Regarding a rare intervention in this field, read S. Newton-King, 'The labour market of the Cape Colony, 1807- 8', ch. 7, in S. Clarks and A. Atmore (eds.), ‘Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa’ (London, 1980);

Regarding the shootings, read Theal, Records, ~XIII, 212.

9 “Moffat in Cape Town” read the South African Commercial Advertiser, 7 Jan. 1824, reprinted in G. M. Theal, Records of the Cape Colony, 34 vols. (Cape Town, 1903-6), x1.1, 497-505;

10 For records these events see B. MacLennan, ‘A Proper Degree of Terror’. John Graham and the Cape's Eastern Frontier (Cape Town, 1986).

11 For liberal mystifications of these serf codes see C. W. De Kiewit, ‘A History of

South Africa. Social and Economic (London, 1941)’ pg. 45-6; and T. R.H. Davenport, section: 'The extension of freedom under the late', in Wilson and Thompson, Oxford History, I, 293 and 303.

Note, for Davenport, the Caledon Code was a point where 'the removal of the disabilities of colored persons reached an important stage'.

For an admission that the Codes led to enserfment, see ‘Walker, History of Soth’ (first edition, 1928), pg. 15-6. ; Newton-King, 'Labour market ', 182-9I.

12 Philip, Researches, 11, chs. 14 and 15. Note: This genocide also created psychological dehumanization, which probably facilitated later massacres.

13 See Newton-King, 'Labour market', 192-3 for the only source which correctly treats Mantatees as labour.

14 In ‘Researches’, volume 11, pg 85-6.

15 Theal, History of South Africa 1795-1872, rv (4th edition, London,), pg 446.

16 Somerset to Bathurst, 30 July 1825, in Theal, Records, XXII, 419-22;

Bird to Landdrost Graaff Reinet, 27 Aug. 1823, ibid., xv,223;

Secretary to Government to Landdrosts Graaff Reinet and Somerset, 21 July 1825, ibid., XXXII, 42.

17 Stockenstrom to Secretary to Government, I June 1825,in Theal, Records, xx~r, 422.

18 Ibid., xxx~v,Minutes of Council, 2 Feb. 1827. Also see Somerset to Bathurst, 31 March 1825 in ibid., xx, 400-1.

19 Philip, ‘Researches’, volume 11,p 91; letter from 'Journal, 30 Investigatus ' in Graham's Town, Jan. 1834; Legassick, 'The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana, and the missionaries, 1780-1840: the politics of a frontier zone' (PhD thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1970) 354-5

20 O Rasmussen, ‘Migrant Kingdom’,pg 46, 51;

Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', pg 21;

Philip, ‘Researches’, vol.11, pg. 85-6;

L. Thompson, ‘Survival in Two Worlds. Moshoeshoe of Lesotho, 1786-1870’ (Oxford, 1975), pg 57, dates the raids into the Caledon from 'about 1825', but this is too late.

21 T.F. Lye (ed.), Andrew Smith's Journal of His Expedition into the Interior of South

Africa, 1834-36 (Cape Town, 1975), p74, where Moshoeshoe's father, Mokhachane,

'called upon us to observe the many marks of wounds from musket balls'.

22  Lye, Andrew Smith's Journal, 48-50, for Dantzer's group; see also B. Holt,

‘Greatheart of the Border. A Life of John Brownlee, Pioneer Missionary in South Africa’ (King William’s Town, 1976),p 15.

23 Legassick, 'Politics of a frontier zone',pg. 326, 355-60;

Schapera, ‘Apprenticeship’, pg 65-6, 73;

P. R. Kirby (ed.), ‘The Diary of Dr Andrew Smith, 1834-36’ (Cape Town, 1939-40),

I, 358, entry for 17 April 1835.

24 Initial, but not always very reliable, information on the Taung is in G. M. Theal,

‘Basutoland Records, 1833-5, I’ (Cape Town, 1964 reprint), 517-18;

J. C. Macgregor, ‘Basotho Traditions’ (Cape Town, no date [c. 1906]), 58-67; Ellenberger, ‘History of the Basotho’, 54-67, 165-9, 173, 306; See also

Legassick, 'Politics of a frontier zone', 336-9. Legassick's pioneering study is marred by the symptomatic confusion of referring to the Taung as ' Difaqane marauders ', an error which is traceable to the Mantatee = MaNtatisi vision

25 S. Broadbent, ‘A Narrative of the First Introduction of Christianity amongst the

Barolong Tribe’ (London, 1865),pg 158.

26 Ibid., pg.131-3, 173;

Schapera, ‘Apprenticeship’, pg.145-55;

Cope, ‘Journal of the Red’. T.L. Hodgson, pg. 9, 246, 322;

Legassick, 'Politics of a frontier zone', pg 339.

27 M. Lister (ed.), ‘Journals of Andrew Geddes Bain’ (Cape Town, 1949), pg 65-71;

Legassick, 'Politics of a frontier zone ', pg. 352.;

Rasmussen, ‘Migrant Kingdom’, 62-7.

For allegations about Zulu devastations in the Orange Free State, see most Standard Eight school textbooks in South Africa.

### 28 Schapera, ‘Livingstone's Private Journals’.

### 29 ‘History of the Basuto’, pg.60 and pg 306

30 Sanders, ‘Moshoeshoe’, pg.51-2.

31 Sanders, ‘Moshoeshoe’, pg.51-2.

32 Stockenstrom to Secretary to the Government, I June 1825, in Theal, Records, XXII, 423;

Cope, ‘Journals of the Rec’. T. L. Hodgson, pg 184-5, wherein Hodgson described a case which he associated with the consequences of the Griqua raid at Dithakong.

33 Lister, Bain Journals, volume 58, pg 69-70.

34 Thompson, ‘Travels and Adventures’, I, 179; pg 11, 115;

Thomas Pringle, in ‘African Sketches’ (London, 1834), pg. 518-519; 359-60, has the labour driven partly by 'Mantatees' and partly by Griqua the first stage of the alibi."

**35** The word comes in many spellings: infanicama, imfetcanie, Fitcanie, fickanees

etc., but we have standardized on Fetcani. The word was used by Walker for his 1928 neologism 'Mfecane'. There are also linguistic connections between the 'Sotho' Difaqane and the Tembu-Xhosa Fetcani.

36 In Theal, Records, xxx~-2: O Van Wyk to Mackay; Pringle to Thompson, May 1825;

In Holt, ‘Great Heart’, pg 58-9; Rogers to Forbes, pg 27

37 Philip to Directors of London Missionary Society, Nov. 1826, in ‘Theal, Records’, chapter xxx, pg150-1.

38 Lord Charles Somerset to Bathurst, 31 March 1825, in Theal, Records, xx, 400-1 ;

see also Van der Poel et al. to Bourke, 30 June 1826, ihid., xxvrr, 90-8: We inhabit a country of which the population is not and never has been equal to the extent of Territory nor adequate to the proper cultivation thereof'.

39 Dundas to Lt -Col Somerset, chapter IX, 1828, in Van Darmelo, ‘History of Matzwane, pg. 239-40

40 B E Baker, 'The Fetkanie commando of 1828', Cape Illustrated magazine, (Sept 1894-Aug 1895)~347-4;

Van Warmelo, History Matizcane, 250-66, especially Somerset to Bourke, 29 Aug.

1828. The information about the burning forests was only obtained from several informants in early 1938;

For Hottentot participation see Bannister, ‘Humane Policy’, cclxxxii;

Somerset to Bourke, 29 Aug. 1828, in Van Warmelo, ‘History of Matizcane’, pg 254- 255.

41 R Hedges, 'Trade and politics', pg.193. Like Hedges, both Omer-Cooper in ‘Zulu Aftermath’, pg 29, n. 3, and P. Bonner in ‘Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires: The Evolution and Dissolution of the Nineteenth-Century Swazi State’ (Johannesburg, 1983), pg 28, relocate the inception of the Mfecane geographically from Zulu territory on the Mfolosi north to the Pongola and chronologically to the period before Shaka, but also without realizing the implications.

42 R Hedges, 'Trade and politics', pg.193. Like Hedges, both Omer-Cooper in ‘Zulu Aftermath’, pg 29, n. 3, and P. Bonner in ‘Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires: The Evolution and Dissolution of the Nineteenth-Century Swazi State’ (Johannesburg, 1983), pg 28, relocate the inception of the Mfecane geographically from Zulu territory on the Mfolosi north to the Pongola and chronologically to the period before Shaka, but also without realizing the implications.

43 P. Harries: “about migration from Mozambique to South Africa, with special reference to the Delagoa Bay hinterland, c. 1862-1897” (PhD thesis, University of London, 1983), 147-83; and

Harries: “History, ethnicity and the Ingwaluma land deal: a short account of the Trans-Mkuze in the nineteenth century”, J. Natal and Zulu Hist., VI (1983), 1-27.

44 Harries, 'Labour migration', pg.148.

45 A.T. Bryant, ‘Olden Times in Zululand and Natal’ (London, 1929), pg.81.

46Hedges, 'Trade and politics ', pg. 65;

J. Stuart and D. Malcolm (eds.), ‘The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn’ (Pietermaritzburg, pg.120;

Macmillan, ‘Bantu, Boer and Briton’, pg. 36.

47 Harries, 'Labour migrations', pg.160, 161-75;

P. Delius, ‘The Land Belongs to Vs: The Pedi Polity, the Boers and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Transvaal’ (Johannesburg, 1983), pg 15-19. Delius, I 5, admits : 'The full reasons for the apparent escalation of conflict in the region [c. 1780-1820 ] and the extension of political and military scale that emerged from it remain elusive'. The concept 'war-lord' is borrowed from Martin Hall (private correspondence) who, I gather, would apply the idea to a wide range of individuals, including Fynn, Shaka, Moritsane, Moshoeshoe, Barend Barends etc.

48 Kay, ‘Trails and Researches’, 403.

49 Thompson, ‘Survival in Two Worlds’, 35-40;

Mackay to Secretary to the Government, 8 Aug. 1827, in Theal, Records, XXXIV,

464, who described the Ngwane as 'two tribes formerly distinct "Basotu" and

"Banguana". For the Ndebele see Cobbing, ' Ndebele under the Khumalos', pg.32.

50 "Thompson,’ Survival in Two Worlds’, pg. 44.

51 A Stockenstrom, ‘The Autobiography of the Late A Stockenstrom’ (Cape Town, 1887) pg13.

52 Theal, ‘Records of South-Eastern Africa’, IX (London, 1903), pg 24-8, 68-268.

The failure of historians to connect the attempted annexation of Delagoa Bay in 1823 with the 1824 Natal 'treaty' is partly the result of the particularistic cutting off of southern Mozambique mentioned on p. 504. A very different picture emerges of the regional expansion of the British, when the two treaties are reconnected.

Bird, ‘Annals of Natal’ pg. 71-3; Stuart and Malcolm, Fynn Diary, 56-7,

"'This treaty is usually listed without comment by Cape historians; compare K. S. Hunt, ‘The Right to the Land’ (Cape Town, 1974) pg19.

53 ‘Fynn’s Diary’, page 148;

For another version of the alibi for attacking Shaka’s people, see Isaacs, ‘Travels and Adventures’, pg. 227-8.

54 Webb and Wright, James Stuart Archive, pg.11, 267, 274.

Note: In Stuart and Malcolm, ‘Fynn Diary’, pg 53, Fynn claimed that the 'Transkei army' was subsequently dispatched north from the Cape, but this was physically impossible if taken into consideration where else they travelled at that time.

55 James King, 'Some account of Farewell's settlement at Port Natal, and of a visit to Chaka', July 1826, in ‘Thompson, Travels and Adventures’, chapter 11, pg. 243-52. Note the change of tone from factual description to anti-Shaka propaganda at the bottom of page 248.

56 C. Webb and J. Wright (eds.), ‘The James Stuart Archive’, 4 vols. to date (Pietermaritzburg, 1976-86),pg. 11, 269;

Stuart and Malcolm, ‘Fynn Diary’, pg. 122-8.

57 Hedges, Trade and politics', pg 202.

58 S.Isaacs, Travels and Adventures in Eastern Africa (reprinted Cape Town, 1935-6 [originally 1836]), volume I, pages 162-71.

59 Dundas to [Somerset?], Aug. 1828, in Van D'armelo, History of Matizcane;

Stuart and Malcolm,’ Fynn Diary’, pg 148-149;

Isaacs, ‘Travels and Adventures’, pg 227-8.

60 Stuart and Malcolm, Fynn Diary, 157.

61 Stuart and Malcolm, ‘Fynn Diary’, pg.161-2, 170-171.

62 Isaac’s, ‘Travels and Researches, 331.

63 Bannister, ‘Humane Policy’, pg.43, 238 (both italics in original);

Stockenstrom, Autobiography, volume I, page 279

64 Kay, ‘Travels and Researches’, pg. 330.

65 Godlonton, ‘Eruption of the Kafir Hordes’, Introductory Remarks, 54; 269-70; and

Main Text, 229.

66 History of the Mantatees'; Godlonton, Irruption of the Kafir Hordes, Introductory Remarks, pg, 67-70;

Graham's Town Journal, 30 Jan. 1834;

Andrew Smith's Journal, pg. 92, and Smith's footnote.

67 History of the Basotho, pg. 217-26. Cf. his opinions on the origins of the San (Bushmen) pages 4-5 is totally incorrect.

68 Also see ‘Theal, History of South Africa 1795-1834‘ (1891).

69 For an uncritical acceptance of the anti-Tlokwa propaganda see P. B. Sanders,

' Sekonyela and Moshoeshoe: ‘Failure and Success in the Aftermath of the Difaqane', Afr. History (1969),439-55.

70 See the important essay by J. B. Wright, 'Politics, ideology and the invention of the "Nguni" ', in T. Lodge (ed.), Ideology and Resistance in Settler Societies (Johannesburg, 1986).

71 18-19th Century African population growth in SA.

72 Smith, 'Trade of Delagoa Bay', 176-7, mentions slaving but only to belittle it as a

cause of change in African societies: 'it can be seen that it [the slave trade] has little relevance for consideration of the trade hypothesis and the development of the Zulu nation '.

'V.Harries, 'Slavery, social incorporation and surplus extraction: the nature of free

and unfree labour in South-East Africa', J.Afr. Hist., XXII(1981), 309-30.

73 J. Cobbing, 'The Ndebele under the Khumalos, c. 1820-96' (PhD thesis, Lancas-

ter University, 1976), 12-13;

'' Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', ch. I ; R. K. Rasmussen, Migrant King-

dom: Mzilikazi's Ndebele in South Africa (Cape Town, 1978);

E. .A. Ritter in Shaka Zulu: The Rise of the Zulu Kingdom (London, 1955)) 150, 228-9, has a fictional account of Llzilikazi joining Shaka, rising to be a general, and then rebelling.

74 LI. Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton (Oxford, 1929), 19-20.

75 Outlined in Omer-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath, chapter 6

76 G. E. Cory, The Rise of South Africa r8~o-34(London, 1913), 363;

" Apparently first alleged by Livingstone; see I. Schapera (ed.), Livingstone's Private

Journals r8jr-r8j3 (London, 1960), 18, and footnotes 58 and 152 below;

'An alibi for Mantatis', African Studies, XIII, (1954), 65-76;

F. Lye, 'The Difaqane: The Difeqane in the Southern Sotho area, 1822-24', J. Afi. Hist., VIII (1967), 107-31;

E. V.Smith, 'Sebetwane and the Makololo', African Studies, xv (1956), 50, repeated in Omer-Cooper, ‘Zulu Aftermath’, ch. 8.

77 A concept invented by D.Y.Ellenberger in History of the Basuto Ancient and

Modern (London, I 9I 2), especially Second Period, ' The Difaqane wars ', pg 117 onwards;

“1822-4, after which they returned to normal”. See P. Sanders, ‘Moshoeshoe. Chief of the Sotho’, (London, 1975)) ch. 4.

**Section B: The main ethnic groups in the Anglo South African Wars from 1879 to 1915**

**Zulu**

The Zulu originated from the [Nguni](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nguni_people) clans which moved down the east African coast during the Bantu migrations. The Zulu tribe traditionally resided in the Natal province on the eastern side of South Africa.

The Zulu were involved in two major wars against British supremacy before 1902.

**Ndebele**

In the 1820s a branch of the Zulu led by Mzilikazi split from the main tribe to form the Ndebele people. Their people moved west from Zululand and settled near present day [Pretoria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretoria) and later on moved north to present day [Zimbabwe](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zimbabwe), which caused territorial pressure with the [Shona people](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shona_people). The Ndebele were involved in two major wars against British supremacy before 1902.

**Xhosa**

The Xhosa are part of the South African [Nguni](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nguni_people) migration which slowly moved south from the region around the [Great Lakes](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_Great_Lakes), and occupied much of eastern South Africa from the Fish River. In the last two centuries they spread out to the southern and central-southern parts land inhabited by Zulu-speakers south of the modern city of Durban

[Xhosa-speaking](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IsiXhosa) peoples are divided into several tribes with related but distinct heritages. The main tribes are the [Mpondo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pondo_people), Mpondomise, Bomvana, Mesibe, and [Thembu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thembu_tribe). In addition, the [Bhaca](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bhaca_people) and [Mfengu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fingo) have adopted the [Xhosa language](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_language). The name "Xhosa" comes from that of a legendary leader called uXhosa. There is also a theory that the word Xhosa derives from a word in some [Khoi-khoi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khoi-khoi) or [San](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bushmen) language meaning "fierce" or "angry", the amaXhosa being the fierce people. The Xhosa refer to themselves as the amaXhosa and to their language as isiXhosa.

Presently approximately 8 million Xhosa people are distributed across the country and Xhosa is South Africa's second most common home language, after Zulu, to which Xhosa is closely related. Many Xhosa [live](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_people) in [Cape Town](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cape_Town) (iKapa in Xhosa), [East London](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_London,_South_Africa) (iMonti), and [Port Elizabeth](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_Elizabeth) (iBhayi).

As of 2003 the majority of Xhosa speakers, approximately 5.3 million, lived in the Eastern Cape, followed by the [Western Cape](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Cape) (approximately 1 million),

[Gauteng](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gauteng) (671,045), the [Free State](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_State_(South_African_province)) (246,192), [KwaZulu-Natal](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KwaZulu-Natal) (219,826), [North West](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_West_(South_African_province)) (214,461), [Mpumalanga](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mpumalanga) (46,553), the [Northern Cape](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Cape) (51,228), and Limpopo (14,225).

**Boers**

The Boers originated from the Cape Frontier and to be free from British rule, they pioneered the interior. The Boers established three independent republics - Natalia, the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek (ZAR) and the Oranje Vrystaat (OFS – Orange Free State) - and also an independent country landlocked within Southern Africa (Die Nieuwe Republiek). The Crown annexed Port Natal and some of the Zulu Kingdom to prevent the Boers from having access to the sea as a trade route. Once diamonds and gold was discovered in the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek and Oranje Vrystaat, the threat of annexation by the British Government led to two Anglo-Boer Wars in the late 19th century. Paul Kruger was the key organizer for the Boers in these two conflicts. After a Peace Treaty between the Boers and the Crown was signed, a Boer Diaspora happened. It followed a smaller exodus in the 1890’s to other areas of Africa and also other parts of the world, including the United States. In rebellion against the Union of South Africa, the Boers lost the battle against the Crown called the Maritz Rebellion in 1914, and their leaders were imprisoned.

**a) The difference between the Afrikaners, the Boers, and the British South Africans**

There are three distinct ethnic groupings within the White population of South Africa:

(i) the British South Africans;

(ii) the Afrikaners; and

(iii) the Boers.

The distinction between these three ethnic groupings, and particularly the last two (the "Afrikaners" and the "Boers") is of crucial importance in determining the Boers' rights as an indigenous people.

There were 3 notable stages during which the Boer nation developed.

**Stage 1. The Free Burghers**

**Stage 2.** [**The Cape Frontier: birth place of the Boer Nation.**](http://www.republicantrekkervolk.blogspot.com/2009/07/cape-frontier-birth-place-of-boer.html)

**Stage 3. The Groot Trek**

The first Europeans, who landed at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, did not come as settlers. They were Hollanders who came to set up a refueling station for their ships travelling to and from the east. The first Hollander ashore, Jan van Riebeeck, left Africa never returned.

It was a number of other Europeans who came to the Cape shortly after this Dutch supply station had been set up, who formed a core of real settlers, based around the Western Cape. These settlers came from various European countries such as Holland, Germany, France and a number of other smaller nations.

The Dutch East India Company imported slaves from Angola, Mozambique, Madagascar and other parts of the Dutch Empire to work on large plantations close to Cape Town. The semi-nomadic European farmers expanded their settlement further from the Cape and came into conflict over land with local African populations. Their contact with the local Dutch government became more and more tenuous and most of them lived hard rural lives, moving farmsteads frequently, and independent of government and education. By 1745 they were known as Trekboers, which means "wandering farmers," a term which was later shortened to Boers. They were unaware of the changing politics in Europe1.

Many of these people were members of the Protestant Churches in Europe, and came as religious refugees. This wave of Protestants firmly established a Protestant ethic in South Africa.

**b) The Free Burghers**

Slowly but surely a section of these white settlers, many of whom had already once fled persecution and had already established a tradition of independence, began to agitate against the Dutch colonial rule. This agitation resulted in the "Vryburgher" movement (the "Free Burghers") which pressed the Dutch colonialists for more and more independence.

The rise of an expanding settler society fuelled tensions between free burghers and the VOC. Free burghers criticized the autocratic powers of the local VOC administration, in which the governor had full control and the settlers had no rights of representation. They denounced the economic policies of the VOC that fixed the prices at which settlers could sell their agricultural products. They called attention to the corrupt practices of VOC officers, who granted themselves prime land and sold their own crops at higher prices to the company. They also complained about the VOC's failure to police the frontier boundaries and protect the settlers' crops and herds from Khoi-khoi and San raiders2.

The Free Burgers were the first Whites in South Africa to make the transition from "settlers" to an indigenous people growing "out of the soil". Most of the Vryburgers had been born in Southern Africa, and many were two or more generations removed from Europe. It was members of this community which started migrating away from the Cape, motivated by a desire to escape Dutch Colonial rule. This migration was called the Vryburger movement - which was the Boer nation in germination. These attempts to escape colonialism were the origin of the Boer people.

The majority of White settlers at the Cape did not support the Vryburger movement. Most of them were satisfied with the colonial situation and remained under the Dutch flag. These people formed the core of what is today known as the "Afrikaner" people - mainly Cape based.

A third wave of White settlers arrived in South Africa in large numbers after 1820. The British Crown had by this stage occupied the Cape during the Napoleonic wars in Europe to protect the eastern Sea Route.

As a result of the British occupation of the Cape, a large number of English speaking settlers arrived in the Cape, bringing with them their language, religion and other cultural expressions.

**c)** [**The Cape Frontier: birth place of the Boer Nation.**](http://www.republicantrekkervolk.blogspot.com/2009/07/cape-frontier-birth-place-of-boer.html)

The Boer people are often presumed to be "Europeans", and are also often conflated with the Cape Dutch Afrikaners but in fact the Boer people were not born in Europe nor were they born among the Cape Dutch. The Boer people were born on the Cape frontier.

When a number of the poorest members of the Caucasian folks at the Cape began to trek northward and eastward, and consequently away from the population which the trekkers began to refer to as the Cape Dutch during the late 1600’s and all throughout the 1700’s, they became the earliest migrating pastoralists who left the towns of Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Franschhoek and Paarl. They were soon called Trekboers, named after the nomadic and pastoral lifestyle they adopted in order to survive on the harsh Cape frontier. The Cape frontier was the crucible which created the Boer Nation. The Cape frontier consisted of everything to the north of Cape Town and the Paarl, and to the east of Stellenbosch, right up to the Brak and Sundays Rivers.

The town of Swellendam, which was established in 1745, was the first town the Dutch East India Co. set up within the Cape frontier in an attempt at controlling the Boers. This town would be one of the first Boer Republics established in 1795, when a number of the frontier Boers declared their own republics, and rebelled against the power of the V.O.C. These frontier Boers passed the V.O.C and declared them subject to the Dutch Government in The Hague directly.

The Boers developed their own language on the frontier which historians have classified as Eastern Border Afrikaans, or Cape Frontier Afrikaans, which is further evidence of where the Boer people germinated from. In fact the language spoken by the Boers is one of the newest languages on earth. Many of its words have origins in Africa, which are not found in any European language.

Professor Wallace Mills defined Afrikaans (at the time almost always referred to as ‘die Taal’—the Language) as a spoken, not a written language3.  
The Afrikaans Language Museum refers to the Eastern Border Afrikaans as follows:

“Eastern Border Afrikaans has its roots in the farming community that moved further and further from the Cape. A large number of residents in the Cape were Dutch [Note: High Dutch] speaking and they made up part of the farmers that moved away from the Cape. At the end of the 18th century this group settled on the East Border and they lived a very secluded life and spoke their own type of Afrikaans until well into the 19th century”3.

Reverend S. J. Du Toit and his brother D. F. Du Toit (in partnership with Gideon Malherbe) of the Western Cape started the Society of True Afrikaners in 1875, an Afrikaans language rights movement which started to get Afrikaans recognized4.

By the mid 1700’s there arose two distinct Afrikaans versions, to which its speakers referred as Dutch, ‘die taal’ and Boeretaal. The largest group of these speakers were centred in and on Cape Town up to the Paarl and Stellenbosch, and were often known as the Cape Dutch who were pro Colonial and had no desire for independence as they saw no reason to break with the Colonial power.

This group stood in strong opposition to the fledgling Boer population and differed with them on all levels - starting with their approach to colonialism and extending all the way through even to language. There are marked accent and pronunciation differences between Afrikaans spoken by the Boers and the "Cape Dutch".

Those who stayed behind in the Cape were all V.O.C. Dutch citizens, and became known amongst the independence minded Boers as the "Cape Dutch" - symbolizing their attachment to Europe. When the British occupied the Cape, they became loyal British citizens. They supported any European colonial government, and vehemently opposed all attempts by the fledgling Boer population to break ties with the colonial governments.

To refer to the Cape Boers as being part of the Cape Dutch is historically incorrect and perpetuates a fraud which marginalizes the existence of the Boer people.

The Boers struggled to survive on the harsh Cape frontier in the face of danger, and paid for their distinct identity which they carved out on the Cape frontier in blood and sacrifice. The Cape Dutch looked down on the Boers, and never understood why the Boers wanted freedom in Africa as they could not understand why anyone would want to be independent from the Colonial power.  
  
The vehemence with which the Cape Dutch opposed the Boer population was underlined when the Boers were excommunicated from the Cape Dutch Reformed Church when they moved away from the Cape. This group of Cape Dutch settlers opposed the Boers' drive for independence and anti-colonialism, and, along with the British settlers, were the true colonial masters of Southern Africa, while the Boers tried to get away from this mentality and state of affairs5.   
A small group of Boers had spread out over the expanding Cape frontier from Swellendam right up to the Sundays River. It was overwhelmingly from the Boer communities of the Cape frontier that the participants of the Great Trek were from, due to their long standing anti-colonial nature. From these Boers came those who left the Cape and trekked northwards, and who became known as Voortrekkers (front pullers).  
  
The ‘Great Trek’ started from the towns and communities in the eastern provinces of the Cape, known as the Cape frontier, which were populated by the Boer people, and not from Cape Town itself, which was populated by the Cape Dutch.

(i) **The British South Africans**

After the Crown occupied the Cape for the first time in 1795, they decided that Africa should be added to their then expanding British Empire. For this purpose the British government engaged in large scale settlement of its citizens from various British colonies to move to South Africa.

The first large wave of immigrants arrived in 1820, and these people first settled in the Cape, and then later in what became known as Natal to form the second major ethnic grouping of Whites in South Africa.

A few of the British settlers immediately assimilated themselves in the mindset of the Boer frontiersmen, and became assimilated into the Boers as quickly as other nationalities did. The larger number retained the British link and has remained loyal to Great Britain throughout their history in South Africa.

The reaction of the Boers to the British occupation of the Cape is important because it provided an impetus for the continuation of the migratory process away from the Western Cape, a process which had already started in protest against the V.O.C. rule.

The Boer rebellion against rule by the Crown in the Cape reached a high point with an armed rebellion in 1812 known as the Slagtersnek rebellion. Although this rebellion failed, it did exemplify the difference in mindset between the Boers and the White settlers, irrespective of language.

As the first anti-colonialist drive began under the Dutch colony in the Cape, so did the most zealous Boers begin to move away from the Cape in search of freedom and independence. These people were continually moving further and further away from the Cape and eventually met the first great Nguni migrations - the Xhosa people - who were moving South at the same time. This meeting took place in what is today known as the Eastern Cape.

As the two great migrations - Boer and Xhosa - met at the Fish River in the Eastern Cape, so did these two migrations stop for a while. In the interim however, the Crown occupied the Cape Colony, and the Boers, who had sacrificed so much to escape their White colonial Dutch masters who served the Crown, once again found themselves under White colonial rule, by the British colonial masters who represented Crown in southern Africa.

**d) The Groot Trek**

The main cause of the Great Trek was the British colonial masters trying to colonize the Boers of the Cape frontiers and the Boers' desire to be free and independent of colonial rule.

To note that whenever reference is made to the Great Trek, history writers always refer to the "Boers" who took part in the great Trek. There was no "Afrikaner" Great Trek, and there were no "Afrikaner" Great Trek leaders, but only Boer Great Trek leaders. This is an indication that at this stage the Boers had already developed an identity of their own, as distinct from the Cape Dutch and English settlers of the Cape.

The Boers who left the Cape during the era of the Great Trek came from towns on the frontier, like: Grahamstown, Uitenhage, Swellendam, Graaff-Reinet, Somerset East and Cradock6.  
The independence minded Boers packed up their belongings and headed north - into what today is known as the Orange Free State, Transvaal and Natal.

Although there were scattered Nguni speaking peoples living in these territories, particularly in Natal where the Zulus held sway, large parts of these territories were vacant, having been decimated by the Difaquane, or inter tribal wars.

The first Boer movement into Natal attempted to negotiate land from the Zulu King, Dingaan. These attempts to trade land with the Zulu ended in failure and the Boer leaders were murdered. After Dingaan declared that all Boers were to be murdered, his army was defeated at a Battle which became known as the Battle of Blood River in 1838. The Boers felt that the victory of this battle was divinely inspired and they regard it as the symbolic birth of their nationhood against overwhelming odds.

The Boer Trekkers had taken an oath to the Christian God that if they were given the victory that day they would hold the day as holy - and the Boers have held this tradition ever since.

Immediately after the Battle of Blood River - and the defeat of Dingaan - the Boers renewed negotiations with the Zulus, and their new King, Mpande. Mpande agreed to let the Boers have territory in Natal. It can be seen that from this early period then, the Boers were recognized by other peoples in Southern Africa as an independent nation and not part of the colonial governments - in other words already then they were recognized as an indigenous people.

However, the Crown still wished to colonize the Boers, and in 1840 annexed Natal. After a few skirmishes with the British, the Boers once again packed up their belongings and left Natal, leaving behind only a small number in Northern Natal.

The Boers from Natal then went and joined their fellow Boers in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, which had in the meantime been put on the road to nationhood as well.

One of the major clashes of this period took place at a place called Vegkop in 1836, where a Boer party was attacked by an advance army of Matabeles, many miles before the Boers had actually penetrated Matabele territory. The Matabele were defeated, and fled across the Limpopo River, where they are to this day, in what is now called Zimbabwe.

While there were scattered Black indigenous tribes living in the territories which became known as the Orange Free State (OFS) and the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek (ZAR), there were very few other major clashes between them and the Boers. When such clashes did take place, they were usually over matters such as stock or grazing rights - things over which indigenous peoples would clash, rather than the battles of conquest which conventional colonization produces.

**e) The Sand River Convention of 1852 recognized the sovereign independence of the Boer Republic called the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek**

In 1852 the British Crown recognized Boer independence at the Sand River Convention, during which the sovereignty of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek was acknowledged on contract, in ink. This year marks the firm establishment of the Boers as an indigenous people in international law, in the same manner in which American independence was achieved.

**f) The Orange River Convention of 1854 recognized the sovereign independence of the Boer Republic called the Orange Free State.**

The Crown recognized the sovereignty of the Orange Free State during the [Orange River Convention](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orange_River_Convention) of 1854. Therefore, at this early stage of South African history after British occupation of the Cape, two independent Boer Republics were recognized by the whole world, and were granted contractual capacity as with any other independent indigenous nation. The mere fact that the British colonial masters accepted this state of affairs shows that even the European powers recognized the independence of the Boer nation, and also accepted that this independent was not a colonial experiment.

It is also of crucial importance to note that when any mention is made of the independent republics is made; they are always called "Boer Republics" - and never “Afrikaner Republics". This is also confirmation that the Boers had a separate identity from the Cape Dutch and British settlers.

**g) The Boers had developed their own culture**

The Boers developed their own culture during their pioneering *treks*. Having been eexcommunicated from the Cape Dutch Reformed Church when they moved away from the Cape, they developed the Nederduitse Geherformeerde Kerk (NGK).

The dangerous lives they had led daily on the frontiers of civilization, instilled courage and confidence in their personalities. Their youth became competitive and excelled in all fields of sports, of which rugby became one of their favourite pastimes. Their music was greatly influenced by a “Boere Orkes” (Boer Orchestra) which consisted of one or more people playing the “trekklavier” (piano accordion), ‘konsertina”, a violin, and sometimes a guitar, to which folk dances known as the “sakkie sakkie” and “sokkie dans” evolved.

The preservation of meat on their long treks involved the salting and drying of raw meat, commonly known as “biltong”, a Boer delicacy. Cooking meat along the road on open, controlled fires became a tradition known as “braaivleis” (barbeque).  
A quote from the book titled ‘The Anglo-Boer Wars’ on page 9 by Michael Barthorp reads: “The Boers' self confidence in their military prowess in the first half of the 19th century stemmed from the robust, often dangerous lives they led daily on the frontiers of civilization”.

**h) The Crown tried to annex the Boer Republics which led to the First Anglo-Boer War**

Although the Boers thought they had at last found freedom from colonialism, they were wrong. The Crown launched two more attempts to decolonize them - the second time being successful.

The first attempt to colonize the Boers came with the occupation of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek by a small British contingent led by representatives of the Crown in 1877. This event led directly to the First Anglo Boer War (note again that it is called an "Anglo Boer War" and not an "Anglo-Afrikaner" war) and by 1881 the British forces had been defeated by the Boers to such an extent that the British were forced to once again recognize the independence of the Boer republics.

**i) The London Convention of 1884 recognized the independence of Boer Republics**

Recognition of the independence of the Boer Republics after the First Anglo-Boer war was given formal effect by the London Convention of 1884 - the second time that the Boers had been recognized as an independent and indigenous people in international law.

It is a sobering thought to realize that the very first liberation war against colonial masters was in fact fought by the White Boers against the White British colonialist - preceding any Black liberation war by many decades. It can be argued that only an indigenous people can wage a liberation war, and that this therefore shows once again that the Boers had by this stage firmly established themselves as an indigenous people of Africa.

**j) The Peace Treaty of Vereeniging in 1902 recognized the right of the Boers to govern their own Republics**

The second attempt by the Crown to colonize the Boers resulted in an unsuccessful Jameson Raid. The third attempt by the Crown to colonize the Boer Republics led to the Second Anglo Boer War of 1889-1902 (once again note that it is called the Anglo-Boer war and not the Anglo Afrikaner war). This war resulted in the development by the Boers of the guerrilla warfare method, since used by many liberation movements in all parts of the world.

Although the Boers fought bravely against overwhelming odds, the British used a cruel, and till then unheard of, measure of fighting - they rounded up as many Boer women and children as they could find and put them into concentration camps scattered around South Africa. In these camps, as a result of judicial executions, starvation, disease and ill treatment, more than 24,000 Boer children and over 3000 woman died - some 20 percent of the total Boer population of the time.

Against such inhumane methods the Boers could not fight, and eventually the British succeeded in their dream of colonizing the entire Southern Africa in 1902, when the Peace Treaty of Vereeniging, ending the Second Anglo Boer War, was signed. Even thought the Boers agreed to lay down their arms, their right to self determination was recognized under international law, and Britain agreed to assist the Boers in their recovery from war losses until such time that the Boer leaders were capable of resuming their duties as government of their Republics.

**k) The Cape Rebels**

The position of the Cape Dutch and British settlers during this conflict also goes to show that these people did not associate themselves with the Boers. Although a few Cape Dutch did take up arms and fight on the side of the Boers, (they became known as the "Cape Rebels" for this reason - and they were severely punished if caught) the vast majority of the Cape Dutch and British settlers in the Cape and Natal supported the British colonization of Southern Africa, which then also included today's Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia and territories even further north.

The following sourced article demonstrates that the Cape Rebels were in fact mainly Boers, and not Cape Dutch, simply because the vast majority of those who became Cape Rebels were from the Boer people of the Cape frontier:   
“The Cape Rebels were mainly Boers from the north-eastern Cape frontier who fought on the side of the Boer Republics, which were located across the Orange River. As inhabitants of the Cape Colony they were British subjects, and therefore often paid a huge price for siding with their cousins of the republics, which included the confiscation of their farms and many years of imprisonment”.

The Cape Dutch were the folks who inhabited the south Western Cape region who coalesced into a community at a time [circa 1700] when the Boers were becoming a distinct people on the Cape frontier which shaped them into a distinct people.

The treaty of Vereeniging therefore marks the subjugation of the Boers by White European colonial masters - a fate shared by countless other indigenous peoples while the British and other European empires still regarded Africa and other parts of the world as their personal possession. The Boers were, however, unique in that they were the only White indigenous people in Africa to be subjected in this way.

**(ii) The Afrikaners**

At the time of the ending of the Second Anglo Boer War, there were three distinct ethnic groupings amongst the broad White population of South Africa:

The internationally recognized and indigenous Boer people;

The Cape Dutch Settlers, loyal to the British Crown; and

The British settlers, also loyal to the British Crown.

The Crown realized that it had to bring the Boers under control for once and for all, and therefore devised a plan to neutralize the Boer Republics - a plan to make them join up with the other two White segments of their colonies in South Africa.

Representatives of the Crown in the British administration of southern Africa engineered the National Convention of 1908, which saw the creation of the Union of South Africa. This union consisted of the former Cape Colony, the Natal Colony, the two Boer Republics, and all other unclaimed land in southern Africa. This union was not merely a geographic convenience, but a deliberate plan to try and destroy the independence minded Boers by mingling them with the Cape Dutch and British settlers.

It is worth noting that the Crown used their technique in other parts of Africa as well - reference can be made to the short lived federation of Nyasaland (Malawi); Northern Rhodesia (Zambia); and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

One of the key role players on behalf of the Crown in South Africa, Sir Alfred Milner, put it this way: "The new tactic (to subjugate the Boers) must be to consolidate the different areas of British South Africa into one nation. Although unification will initially put the Boers into political control of the entire South Africa, it will, ironically, eventually lead to their final downfall."

This was of course precisely what happened - but not until a new name had been developed for the new "nation" which Milner spoke about. They could not continue to call the new nation a "Boer" state, because the Boers had been subjugated.

They could not call it a "Cape Dutch" state, as the Dutch colonialists were now British colonialists, and they could not call it a British state. The answer then was to give a general term to all the White inhabitants of the new union - “Afrikaners". Although the word originally meant "African" it as politicized by a group of Western Cape Dutch propagandists under S.J. Du Toit in 1880 (the same year the Boers in the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek took up arms to fight the British colonialists) in literature of the time. It was then decided to try and blend the Boers into the Cape Dutch and British populations by calling them all Afrikaners instead of referring to their real cultural bases.

This then is how the world began to hear of "Afrikaners" - although 80 years earlier there was no such word in the international vocabulary.

That the concept of an Afrikaner is all embracing, is underlined by the fact that in 1998 the former Afrikaner Broederbond announced that it classified all those sharing a broad Afrikanerism to be Afrikaners - to this end they acknowledged that many Cape Coloureds, who speak Afrikaans and who attend a NG Church are Brown Afrikaners.

A Colored will readily agree with the definition that he is an Afrikaner, but will emphatically deny being a Boer.

By forcing the Boers into the Union of South Africa, the British made them co-responsible for the policy of racial segregation, which had been established and legislated by the British colonial government.

The new "Afrikaners" - in fact a coalition of Cape Dutch, British and some Boers – tried to come to grips with the racial and geographic legacy left to them from the British colonial times - and it was from this disaster that the policy of Apartheid was developed.

It is of supreme importance to note here that the Boers were dragged unwillingly into the Union of South Africa - and at the first opportunity which presented itself they tried to extricate themselves by force of arms. This was the unsuccessful 1914 Boer rebellion, which ended with some Boer war era general’s court martialled and killed or imprisoned by the pro-British Union of South Africa government.

It is a little known fact that the manifesto which was issued by the 1914 Boer rebellion leaders contained as its primary demand the restoration of the Boer republics and the dissolution of the Union of South Africa.

 It is thus unfair of the international world to regard the "Boers" as having been responsible for what happened in South Africa during the second part of the 20th century - the Boers were just as much victims of the colonial powers as were any other indigenous people of Africa.

Milner's words were true - by forcing the Boers into the Union of South Africa, he was forcing them to be subjugated by the broad South African British colony, and this has led directly to the situation the Boers find themselves in today.

**(iii) The Boers**

The Union of South Africa led directly to the attempt to extend and hold the British originated policy of racial separation in South Africa - an attempt which culminated into the election of April 1994 and the coming to power of the African National Congress in South Africa.

This change over of the reins of power does not however mean that the underlying causes of the downfall of the Union of South Africa (later the Republic of South Africa) have been removed. They are still there - namely the reality that there are numerous different ethnic groupings in the greater Southern Africa, all wrestling to establish their own territory and space.

The Boer nation is one of these groups. The Boers have not disappeared - the Crown and their unitary state merely tried to define them out of existence - in vain.

The existence of the Boer nation has nothing to do with racism or apartheid - the Boers existed long before Apartheid, and continue to exist after Apartheid. The Boers are a well established indigenous grouping who fought some of the first anti-colonial liberation wars in Africa.

If the Boers were, as the world might like to view them, just "white racists" then they would never have come into conflict with the White colonialists.

The subjugation of the Boers does not negate the fact that they are a people all by themselves - they have their own unique history, their own traditions, own festival days, political dispensation, political philosophy, they had their own territory (state), own symbols, own flags, anthems and so on - all developed in Africa.

The Boers do not want a state or territory for the "Whites" of South Africa. This is a falsehood which must be dispelled for once and for all. All the Boers want is an own independent territory, just as they had before the White colonialists took it away from them. Nothing more and nothing less will do.

This has nothing to do with race or racism - merely the desire of an indigenous people to be themselves, and to rule themselves, in their own territory - a right, incidentally, enshrined in the United Nations charter.

**l) Additional:** [**Population of the Boer Nation.**](http://www.republicantrekkervolk.blogspot.com/2009/11/population-of-boer-nation_30.html)

The Boers have only ever been a minority of the total White Afrikaans speaking population.

The Boer population is estimated at around 1.5 million out of a total White Afrikaans or Afrikaner population of about 3.5 million, according to an article in <http://www.pology.com/article/051213.html>. The fact that the Boer population is the smaller segment of the White Afrikaans population demonstrates that the Boers are marginalized under any umbrella macro designation [ like Afrikaner ] referring to White Afrikaans speakers in general, and as such any attempts the actual Boer people make from time to time to find self determination is often erroneously, even maliciously, labelled as an "extremist" segment of a non-existent monolithic population, which was a technique started with the Maritz Rebellion of 1914 [ i.e.: it was a Boer movement not an Afrikaner one ] and continued up to the present.

Just imagine the obvious absurdity of asserting that Canadians are "extremist" for exercising [or even seeking to pursue] self determination outside of the context of the bulk of the North American population.

It can be clearly seen that there are differences between the cultural groupings making up the White South African population. It is important to note that the cultural differences are to a large extent determined by the groups themselves, with no force or law creating these divisions.

Many English speaking South Africans will never agree to being defined as Boers, while equally some Afrikaans speaking Whites will never agree to being defined as Boers. The multi-racial nature of the Afrikaner grouping, as evidenced in the 1998 decision by the Afrikaner Bond is another differentiating characteristic. It was not until the 1930’s when Afrikaner Broederbond historians began re-writing the history, that the Boers of the era were called Voortrekkers, in retrospect as that act was part of the Afrikaner's attempt at co-opting the history of the Boers in order to promote a State based teleocratic agenda, which was inimical to Boer self determination. The insinuation behind the deft promotion of the term Voortrekker was to imply that those Boers who trekked, were "pioneers" for a macro mythological "Afrikaner" group, when in reality it was mainly Boers who trekked [who were 500 miles separated from the Cape Dutch, and rarely interacted with them], as the Cape Dutch did not share the Boer outlook of wanting independence.

Those Trekkers [later called Voortrekkers] soon established various Boer Republics north of the Orange River two of which were internationally recognized.   
Therefore by the time of the second Anglo-Boer War there had long since been established two distinct Caucasian Afrikaans speaking groups. Indeed even since a century to 150 years before the Great Trek. Even the term "Afrikaans speaking" is presumptive because it was Cape Dutch intellectuals who coined the term Afrikaans to describe the macro language which developed at the Cape since the 17th century.

The Boers were not the ones who coined the term Afrikaans, as they simply referred to their dialect as “die taal” or Boeretaal. The Boer dialect was distinct from the Cape Dutch dialect; historians have classified the Boers' dialect as Eastern Border Afrikaans after the region where they and their dialect were formed.

**m) The Broederbond rewrote Boer history to destroy their independence**

There exist intricacies and events that were often not taught to people after the Afrikaner Broederbond began to rewrite the history of the Boers, thereby co-opting them into a synthetic and artificial pan Afrikaans political movement which was aimed [as part of its goal] at securing control of the macro State of South Africa as created by the Crown with British Acts of Legislation.  
  
Part of this agenda labelled all White Afrikaans speakers as "Afrikaners", and turned Boers retroactively into Afrikaners, thereby denying the Boers the right to their own history and heritage. This created the artificial condition in which the Boers had to share their history and heritage with a people who were not part of it, and many of who often opposed the aspirations of the Boers during the time frame in question.

As the Boers were now arbitrarily within the political sphere, made to be part of larger Cape Dutch population, [whose intellectuals began to propagate the term Afrikaner to describe themselves in the late 19th century, at a time when the Boers were mainly independent within their Boer Republics]: the Afrikaner establishment was able to control the destiny of the smaller Boer people by simply implying that the Boers were now part of them, instead of the distinct nation that the Boers had been since circa 1700 during the bifurcation period, which led to the existence of the Trekboers on the expanding Cape frontier.

**n) The cultural concept of a Boer is transferrable**

One of the clearest differences in the cultures of Boers, Afrikaners and British South Africans is illustrated by the political divide. At the time of the referendum over the republic of South Africa, the Transvaal and Orange Free State voted overwhelmingly in favour of breaking ties with Britain, while the Cape and Natal voted in favour of staying on as a British vassal. Because of this division, it was only by the slimmest margin (51 percent) that the “Republic of South Africa” was created.

This north/south division continued to present times, with the north always being known as more conservative than the south.

This does not mean that only the descendants of the original inhabitants of the Boer Republics qualify as Boers. The concept of a Boer (as opposed to an Afrikaner or a British South African) is a cultural concept and is as such transferable. Such assimilation must however be mutual - it is possible for anyone to become a member of any of the groupings mentioned - providing they are amenable to the notion, and providing the group they are assimilating into fully accept them as such.

It is possible for Afrikaners to join the British group, and for British South Africans to join the Boer grouping, in the same way that many Irish or other European nationalities have done.

**The Boers can ultimately be defined as a group with a common genetic heritage (European) and a common cultural heritage, which has its roots in the desire to be part of a new and independent nationhood.**

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<http://www.bowdoin.edu/cbbaway/CapetownSA/CTGeneralinformation.html>

2 From: Library of Congress Country Studies.  
Found at: [lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/refry/custody:@field (DOCID+za0017](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+za0017))

3 Found at: [ [stmarys.ca/~wmills/course322/11Afrikaner\_natm.html](http://stmarys.ca/~wmills/course322/11Afrikaner_natm.html) ]  
3aFound at: www.museums.org.za/afrtaal/English/o3.htm

4 <http://www.rsa-overseas.com/historical-sites/afrikaans-language-monument-afrikaanse-taalmonument-and-museum.htm>;

and we also refer to Theuns Cloete of Boervolk Radio, who noted this himself during the first interview he had with an American shortwave radio program called The Right Perspective found at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c6yo6adPSQY>

5 From: The Boers of Southern Africa. Arthur Kemp.  
[web.archive.org/web/20060717091306/http://www.arthurkemp.com/whoaretheboers.htm](http://web.archive.org/web/20060717091306/http:/www.arthurkemp.com/whoaretheboers.htm)

6 Noted throughout the article: History of South Africa of History World at: <http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?ParagraphID=orl>

**Section C - Various Anglo-South African Wars during annexation of the land of South Africa.**

1. **The Xhosa Wars**

The **Xhosa Wars**, also known as the **Cape Frontier Wars**, were a series of nine wars which ebbed and flowed over a period of about 100 years between the [Xhosa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_people) people and European settlers, from 1779 to 1879 in what is [now](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_Wars) the [Eastern Cape](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Cape) in South Africa. They are also known as **"Africa's 100 Years War"**; with the different conflicts seen as a series of flare-ups in [one](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_Wars) long war of attrition - the longest in the history of colonialism in Africa.

The wars saw the beginning of the use of firearms by the Xhosa armies. However they nonetheless saw the [Xhosa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_people) people's loss of most of their land, and the incorporation of its people into the [British Empire](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Empire).

The first three Xhosa Wars set boundaries between the Xhosa kingdoms and the European settlers based on rivers.

Interference in the domestic governance of the Xhosa kingdoms by the British military led to subsequent Anglo-Xhosa Wars which endedon the Eastern Cape frontier in June 1878 with the annexation of the western areas of the Transkei and administration under the authority of the Cape.

**a) First wars, causes and developments**

The first settlers from Europe in the Cape were the Dutch who established a colony in and around current day Cape Town. This was initially just a small settlement for supplies for ships stopping on their way around the Cape to and from India.

Over the years more and more Europeans arrived. They first settled in and around Cape Town and later moved away from Cape Town into the valleys further afield. Over time, settlers began migrating further away from the areas around the Cape to find new farming land, and because the Cape Peninsula has a Mediterranean-type climate with a warm dry summer and a cold, wet winter (the early explorers named it the Cape of Storms because of the north-west gales sweeping up from the Antarctic in the winter months) which made cattle and grain farming difficult. Further along the Eastern Cape seaboard the climate changes with milder and dry winters, and rainfall during the warm summers, suitable to the cultivation of grain, sorghum and millet, and to cattle-keeping. The expansion was principally to the east along the coast because to the north of Cape Town was the vast, open, semi-desert of the Namaqualand, Karoo and Kalahari.

During the second half of the 18th century, the migrants from the Cape (predominantly [Boers](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boers)) encountered the [Xhosa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_people) people in the region of the [Fish River](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Fish_River). Both cultures were heavily based and reliant on agriculture and cattle farming in particular.

Cattle raiding became endemic on all sides, with punitive and retaliatory raids launched in response.

The arrival of missionaries created confrontations with hostile chiefs who saw them as undermining the traditional Xhosa ways of life, conspiracies with friendly chiefs, and led to the arming and mounting of Xhosa warriors.

Conflicts flared into small wars, the first of which was in the vicinity of Bosberg, near the [present](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_Wars) day Somerset East.

As pressures grew, the settlers organized into local militia but they were limited in their tactics as they could not leave their farms, homes and families undefended for long, and vulnerable to attack, and hence could not follow Xhosa raiding parties far. Both sides were limited in the conduct of wars by the demands of seasonal farming, and the need for labour during harvest.

After **the first war** (1779–1781), the border was established between the [Fish](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Fish_River) and Sundays Rivers.

Eight years later, after a **second war** (1789–1793), the boundary was moved west to Sundays River.

**The third war** was some 5 years later (1799–1803) and confirmed the Sundays River boundary.

In 1800 the Xhosa state was a large decentralized kingdom of perhaps 70,000 people, occupying most of the territory between the Bushmans and Mbashe Rivers

In what is now the Eastern Cape region of South Africa.1

Effective political power was concentrated in the hands of the various chiefs, and the

Power of the king, or head of the royal lineage, over his nominal juniors was, in practice, severely limited.

The chiefs ruled their districts as they saw fit but, having no standing armies or permanent bureaucracies, they depended heavily on the co-operation of their councilors, who were mostly men of wealth or senior members of commoner lineages.

**Reference:**

1 For the early history of the Xhosa, see J. B. Peires, ‘The House of Phalo’ (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1981).**b) Anglo-Xhosa Wars**

After the Crown annexed and permanently occupied the Dutch colony of the Cape in 1806, the authorities turned their attention to the Eastern regions amid complaints and petitions by the settlers about Xhosa raids. As the administration personnel changed, so did their policies of governance.

The Crown sent British expeditions, in particular under Colonel John Graham in 1811, Governor Somerset in 1817 and later [Harry Smith](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sir_Harry_Smith,_1st_Baronet) in 1834, into southern Africa, not only to secure the frontier against the Xhosa, but also to impose their authority on the settlers, and to establish a permanent British presence to represent them in governance.

The professional troops from the British Empire were better trained and equipped than local settler militias, and in particular were not burdened by the constraints of families and farms, and the need to attend to harvests. Military forts were established and manned permanently, and British expeditionary forces could pursue the Xhosa raiding parties across the border in punitive actions for as long as it took. Over time the Crown came to dominate the area both militarily and through occupation with the introduction of British settlers. The imposition of British authority led to confrontations not only with the Xhosa, but also with disaffected Boers and other settlers, and other native groups such as the Khoi-Khoi, the Griqua and the Mpondo.

The amaFengu ("Fingoes"), known across southern Africa as skilled gunmen, were invaluable allies of the British Cape administration in its frontier wars.

In 1811, the Xhosas lost the Zuurveld grasslands to the Crown.

In 1819, the Xhosa attacked the frontier village of Graham's Town with 10,000 warriors but were defeated and lost even more land.

In 1834, the Xhosa again invaded the Cape Colony, but were again driven back and lost more land to the British. Spoils of the war of 1834 to 1835 were 60,000 cattle which the British took over. These wars between the Xhosa and the British military took place along the east coast of Cape Colony, between the Great Fish and Great Kei rivers.

In the war of 1877 to 1879, the British took over 15,000 cattle and around 20,000 sheep. In the aftermath, all Xhosa territory was lost to the Crown and integrated into the Cape Colony.

**c) Fourth war (1811–1812)**

The fourth war was the first war that featured professional British soldiers who could pursue the enemy with single-minded intensity, and in the fourth Xhosa War they drove the Xhosa back to the east of the Fish River.

The district between the [Great Fish River](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Fish_River) and the Sundays River known as the Zuurveld had become a sort of buffer zone, with the Boers and British to the East and the Xhosa to the West.

In 1811, the [Xhosa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_people) had taken control of the neutral ground and there were various flashpoints with the colonists.

In order to expel the Xhosa from the Zuurveld, Colonel [John Graham](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Graham_(Albany)) took the field with a mixed force in 1811 for a campaign in which the Governor of the [Cape Colony](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cape_Colony), Lt-General [John Cradock](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Cradock,_1st_Baron_Howden), said no more blood had been shed "than was necessary to impress on the minds of these savages a proper degree of terror and respect".

The campaign ended with [Xhosa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_people) being driven beyond the [Great Fish River](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Fish_River).

On the site of Colonel Graham's headquarters arose the [town](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grahamstown) which bears his name, Graham's Town, subsequently becoming [Grahams Town](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grahamstown). About four thousand British colonists arrived and were stationed on the [Great Fish River](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Fish_River).

**d) Fifth war (1818–1819)**

In 1814, Lord Charles Somersetbecame the British Governorat the Cape.Somerset indicated that he wished to police the boundary and end cattle theft, and preferred collaboration with a Xhosa leader to direct intervention.1

In the late 1700’s, the Xhosa nationcomprised of two main components: the Rharhabe or western Xhosa, and the Gcaleka in the east.

At the death of Rharhabe in 1782, his grandson Ngqika (also called Gaika) was to succeed him. His uncle Ndlambe assumed the role of regent because Ngqika was deemed too young.

Somerset acknowledged Ngqika as paramount chief of the western Xhosa and engaged him in politics. This caused resentment between the different Xhosa tribes including the other Xhosa chief, Ndhlambi.2

Somerset’s ‘mistake in recognizing Gaika as the paramount chief of all the Xhosas’ and in overlooking the claims of his uncle, Ndlambe, ‘led to a power struggle between the followers of the two chiefs’.3

In 1817, Somerset called for a meeting with Ngqika, who hesitated to attend the meeting without the other chiefs being present. 4

A textbook by E Syphus referred to this meeting as follows:

“Somerset had arranged it with an eye to putting on a ceremonial display that would impress the Xhosas, so successful was Somerset that Ngqika and his retinue were too terrified to come to the conference and had to be escorted there”.[5](http://books.publishing.monash.edu/apps/bookworm/view/Orb+and+Sceptre%3A+Studies+on+British+Imperialism+and+its+Legacies,+in+Honour+of+Norman+Etherington/141/xhtml/chapter06.html#ch6en35)

Discussion at this meeting, which became known as the Kat River Conference, included the problem they were experiencing of stock theft. D.C.R. Clear’s 1947 textbook describes the meeting in a dialogue form, from which we quote the following excerpt:

“I have always done what I could,” said Gaika, “to stop cattle stealing. Whoever steals another man’s beast shall be punished with death.”

“… Good,” replied Somerset, “for I intend to hold responsible for the theft of the cattle that man to whose kraal the track leads.”6

Somerset and Ngqika reached a mutual protection agreement, despite Ngqika’s initial reluctance.7 This agreement granted Ngqika a trade monopoly. In return, Ngqika was charged with the task of preventing the Xhosa from stealing settlers’ cattle.8 This led to the Spoor Law (‘spoor’ refers to the tracking of animals by following their trail).

The Spoor Law made Ngqika even more unpopular among the Xhosa.

Many chiefs were not pleased with Ngqika over the settlement he had made with Somerset as they were not present at the meeting yet Ngqika had spoken for them.9

Syphus suggested that the Spoor Law ‘was not the solution to the frontier problem. The Spoor Law was to become a source of great dissatisfaction among the Xhosas because of its misapplication.10 Having explained the law, H A Lambrechts claimed that ‘chiefs were sometimes unjustly punished for thefts by others. As a result, hostility on the frontier was not a one-sided affair’.11

Those who lived nearest the Fish River could easily be visited often by colonial forces claiming that the tracks of cattle which had been lost or stolen led to their homesteads. As a consequence, innocent people could then be forced to hand over cattle demanded of them by the colonists.12

The historian Theal explained the Spoor Law as follows: ‘persons from whom cattle were stolen should be at liberty to follow the spoor into Kaffirland, and upon tracing it to a kraal, the people of that kraal should make good the damage’. He also presented the law in practice as follows:

“Within a month after this arrangement some cattle were stolen from the colony, and a detachment of a hundred soldiers was sent in pursuit. The spoor was traced to the kraal of a captain named Habana, who refused to make compensation, so the officer in command of the troops seized some oxen, and was driving them away when the Kaffirs attempted to rescue them. A skirmish took place, in which five Kaffirs were killed, but the troops kept possession of the cattle, and returned to the colony without loss.”13

**e) Battle of Amalinde**

The Spoor Law resulted in escalating reprisal. Ndlambe mustered support from his war doctor, the traditional healer Makana (also known as [Maqana, Mabena and Nxele](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maqana_Nxele)) and his ally Hintsa (Paramount Chief of the Gcaleka, and the nominal superior of Ngqika), and waged war on Ngqika in October 1818. Upon his defeat, Ngqika turned to Somerset for assistance.

Acting upon Ngqika’s request, Somerset directed Colonel Brereton and his regiment to rescue Ngqika.

For his part, Ndlambe asked Somerset for peace, and asked him not to interfere with Xhosa politics.14

Governor Somerset ignored Ndlambe, and invaded his territory. In December 1818 the British, aided by Khoi-Khoi reinforcements, attacked Ndlambe and seized 23,000 cattle.

Ndlambe, spurred on by the traditional healer Makana, planned a reprisal attack. Makana promised “to turn bullets into water.”

On the 22nd of April 1819, Makana led an army of 6 000 amaXhosa into the colony and attacked Graham’s Town, then held by a garrison of 350 troops. Taken by surprise the garrison town was almost overrun. A band of Khoi hunters led by Jan Boesak rode into Grahamstown and helped the British. With their combined firepower they were able to drive the Xhosa back. Makana suffered the loss of 1,000 soldiers.

The British enlisted help and three months later ‘a strong army of colonists and soldiers’ under the command of Colonel Wilshire, launched follow-up operations in the area between the Buffalo and the Kei.15 **The British burned Xhosa homes and crops, shot those who resisted them,** and carried off 30,000 head of cattle. The old chief Ndlambe was driven over the Keiskamma River, his power completely broken.16 The suffering of the Xhosa was intense.17

D.C.R. Clear wrote the following with regards to that time period:

“Citizens from all over the colony pursued the Kafirs, burning their kraals and slaying them in hundreds, until they had driven them across the Kei River. After about two months of warfare, an astounding thing happened. One day Makana of his own accord walked into the white men’s camp. He had determined to try to save his people by giving himself up18. He was banished to Robben Island19 and afterwards drowned in trying to escape. So ended the Fifth Kafir war of 1818–1819.”20

In lieu of the protection Ngqika had received from the Crown, he was forced to relinquish his 4000 square miles of ‘ceded territory’ between the Kat and Keiskamma rivers to Somerset.21 The land between the Fish and the [Keiskamma](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keiskamma_River) rivers became a neutral buffer zone, which the Crown tried to populate with loyal Africans. The Albany district was established after the subsequent arrival of 5000 British immigrants to the ceded land in 1820.

The Grahams Town battle site is still known as Egazini, or Place of Blood, and a monument was erected here for fallen amaXhosa soldiers.

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2    Lategan and de Kock, ‘History in Perspective’: pg. 115.

3    B E Paynter. 1974. ‘Junior Secondary History for Standard 6.’ Cape Town: Nasou: pg. 24.

4   J Nisbet et al. 1985. ‘History Alive Std 6’. Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter.

[5](http://books.publishing.monash.edu/apps/bookworm/view/Orb+and+Sceptre%3A+Studies+on+British+Imperialism+and+its+Legacies,+in+Honour+of+Norman+Etherington/141/xhtml/chapter06.html#ch6en35)    E Syphus et al. 1978. ‘Man through the Ages Standard Six’. Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter: pg. 177.

6    D C R Clear. 1947. ‘Our Country: A Concise History of South Africa for Standard VI’. 3rd edn. Cape Town: Juta: pg.49.

.7    Jeff B Peires. 1989. ‘The British and the Cape; 1814–1834’. In Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee, editors; ‘The Shaping of South African Society, 1652 1840’. 2nd edn. Cape Town: Maskew Miller: pg. 482.

8    Timothy Keegan. 1996. ‘Colonial South Africa and the Origins of Racial Order’. Cape Town: pg. 63; MacLennan, ‘A Proper Degree of Terror’: pg. 171, 218. MacLennan (171) suggests Ngqika realized the deal was unfair but other Xhosa representatives persuaded him to agree.

9    C J Joubert and J J Britz. 1985. ‘History Std 6’. Johannesburg: pg. 125.

10   Syphus, ‘Man through the Ages’: pg.177.

11    H A Lambrechts et al. 1985. ‘History 6 New Syllabus 1985’. Cape Town: Nasou: pg. 73.

12    Nisbet et al., ‘History Alive’: pg.188.

13    Theal, ‘Short History of South Africa’: pg.207.

14    Peires, ‘The British and the Cape’: pg 482; Peires, ‘The House of Phalo’, pg. 63, 70.

15    Nisbet, ‘History Alive’: pg.188.

16    Lambrechts, ‘History 6’: pg. 73; Joubert and Britz, ‘History’: pg.126.

17   Nisbet, ‘History Alive’: pg. 188. See also Angus MacLarty et al. 1995. ‘Discovering History Std 6’. 2nd edn. Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter: pg. 93, which replicates this passage with some terms modified: Nxele ‘was almost defeated. But, helped by a band of Khoi-Khoi who rode into Grahams Town in the nick of time, the British were able to regroup. With their guns they were able to drive the Xhosa back’. The modified words are indicated by italics.

18    Theal, ‘Short History of South Africa’: pg. 209.

19    Peires, ‘The House of Phalo’ : pg. 71.

20    Clear, ‘Our Country’: pg. 50.

21    Peires, ‘The House of Phalo’: pg. 79.

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**f) Sixth war (1834–1836)**

Known as **"Hintsa's War"**. On the eastern border, further trouble arose between the British government and the [Xhosa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_people), towards whom the policy of the Cape government was marked by much vacillation.

On 11 December 1834, **a British government commando party killed a chief of high rank, incensing the Xhosa**: an army of 10,000 men, led by [Maqoma](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Maqoma&action=edit&redlink=1) - brother of the chief who had been killed, swept across the frontier, pillaged and burned the homesteads and killed all who resisted. Among the worst sufferers was a colony of freed Khoi-Khoi who in 1829, had been settled in the [Kat River](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Kat_River&action=edit&redlink=1) valley buffer area between the Xhosa and the British settlers by the British authorities. Inhabitants of the farms and villages took to the safety of Graham's Town, where women and children found refuge in the church.

There were few available soldiers in the colony, but the governor [Sir Benjamin d'Urban](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_d%27Urban) acted quickly, and all available forces were mustered under [Colonel Sir Harry Smith](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harry_Smith_(army)), who reached Graham’s Town on 6 January 1835, six days after news of the uprising had reached Cape Town. Retaliatory attacks against the Xhosa were launched from the town, and hostilities continued for nine months.

In total 40 farmers (Boers) were killed and 416 farmhouses were burnt down. In addition 5,700 horses, 115,000 head of cattle and 162,000 sheep were plundered by ama[Xhosa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_people). In retaliation sixty thousand amaXhosa cattle were taken or retaken by British army.

The war ended on 17 September 1836 with the signing of a new peace treaty. All the country as far as the [River Kei](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=River_Kei&action=edit&redlink=1) was acknowledged to belong to the British Crown, and its inhabitants declared British subjects. A site for the seat of government was selected and named [King William’s Town](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/King_William%E2%80%99s_Town).

By the end of the war 7,000 people of all races were left homeless.

Cape governor [Benjamin d'Urban](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_d%27Urban) took far-reaching steps to prevent similar conflict in the future. These **peace keeping measures were however not to the liking of the British minister of colonies**[**Lord Glenelg**](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lord_Glenelg), who revoked all the measures and accused the Boers of instigating the conflict. As a result, the Boer community lost faith in the British justice system and often took the law into their own hands when cattle rustlers were caught.

The conflict was the catalyst for [Piet Retief](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piet_Retief)'s manifesto and the [Great Trek](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Trek).

In 1840, Commander-in-Chief of the Cape Colony garrison, Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Smith, was transferred by the Crown to India.

The Crown felt that the policies of his successor, Andreas Stockenstroom, were too lenient on the Xhosa, and in 1844 the new British Governor, Maitland repealed Stockenstroom's policies. This allowed White settlers to enter into Xhosa territory to retrieve what they said were "stolen" cattle. Maitland also undermined the power of the Xhosa chiefs by ruling that Christianized Xhosa were not subject to their tribal laws.

##### During this time period the demand for wool in Britain was growing and the British settlers moved further into Xhosa territories east of the Fish River - into land they deemed to be prime sheep country.

##### Drought once again gripped this part of southern Africa, driving the desperate Xhosa into cattle rustling in order to survive.

**g) Seventh war (1846–1847)**

Also known as the **"War of the Axe"** or the **"**[**Amatola**](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amatola_Mountains)**War"**.

In addition to the regular British columns, the war involved several groups of mixed "Burgher forces", comprising mainly [Khoi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khoikhoi), [Fengu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fengu) and [Boer Commandos](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boer_Commando), who were recruited locally to fight on the [colonial side](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cape_Colony) under the leader [Andries Stockenstrom](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andries_Stockenstrom). Relations between the British Imperial troops and the local Commandos broke down completely during the war.

On the [Xhosa side](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_people), the [Ngqika](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ngqika) ("Gaikas") were the chief tribe engaged in the war, assisted by portions of the [Ndlambe](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ndlambe&action=edit&redlink=1)1, and the [Thembu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thembu). The Xhosa forces were over ten times greater in number, and had by this time replaced their traditional weapons with modern firearms. It was their new use of guns that made the Xhosa considerably more effective in fighting the British.

The war saw widespread use, by both sides, of [scorched earth tactics](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scorched_earth_tactics). 2

**(i) Background**

Tension had been simmering between farmers and marauders, on both sides of the frontier, since the previous conflict. A severe drought forced desperate Xhosa to engage in cattle raids across the frontier in order to survive. In addition, land that had been captured in the previous war was scheduled by the government to be given back to the [Xhosa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_people). However there was great agitation from the Crown via the British tabloid ‘Graham's Town Journal’, of Eastern Cape settlers who wanted to annex and settle this territory.  
The event that actually ignited the war was a trivial dispute over a raid. A [Khoi-khoi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khoikhoi) escort was transporting a manacled [Xhosa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_people) thief to [Grahams Town](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grahamstown) to be tried for stealing an axe, when he was attacked and killed by [Xhosa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_people) raiders, and the thief was set free. The Xhosa refused to surrender the murderer and war broke out in March 1846.

**(ii) Initial British setbacks**

The regular British forces suffered initial setbacks. The British forces on the frontier amounted to about 1,000 men. The Xhosa had upwards of 15,000 warriors. The British planned to make a quick strike against the Ngqika Xhosa chief, Mgolombane Sandile, and a British column was sent to confront [Sandile](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mgolombane_Sandile). They began their march into the Amatola Mountains with a wagon train three miles long, yet with no stockpiles of ammunition, food, or fodder. The Xhosa attacked the middle of the column which was not being defended, carrying away the British officer's supply of wine camping equipment, medical and cooking supplies.

In previous actions, the assegai was the weapon used by the Xhosa. In this attack the musket was their primary weapon, resorting to the spear only for hand to hand combat. The British retreated to the Keiskamma River and established an improvised fort.

As an increasing number of Xhosa poured across the frontier into the colony, the outposts were abandoned. Fort Peddie, halfway between the Great Fish and Keiskamma Rivers, was all that was left between the Xhosa and Grahamstown.

##### The Xhosa then attacked an Mfengu village near the fort. For five hours the Mfengu held off the Xhosa attacks before a British relief force arrived on the scene. However, the British Commander of the force only ordered a few shots to be fired from his cannon and then retired to Fort Peddie. The Mfengu finally beat off the Xhosa, but they lost all of their cattle.

On 28 May 1846, a force of 8,000 [Xhosa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_people) attacked the last remaining British garrison at Fort Peddie. The British were inside the fort while the Mfengu (also known as Fingo), with the cattle, were left outside to fend for themselves. As the Xhosa charged, the British opened up with cannon and rockets, the noise of which stampeded the cattle. As they closed in, the muskets of the British and the Mfengu opened up. For two hours the 8,000 Xhosa warriors rushed in then fell back, before they finally melted away into the veldt.

The British felt they had won the battle of Fort Peddie because they only lost 12 Mfengu in the action. The Xhosa felt they had won because they had made off with the British cattle.

After the battle the Xhosa began marching towards Grahamstown. However, Henry Somerset mustered a strong cavalry force and was able to turn the warriors away. The cavalry continued to patrol the frontier and they finally caught the Xhosa army in the open a few miles from Fort Peddie on 7 June 1846. Somerset led his troopers through the Xhosa masses twice before the warriors broke and ran, and were pursued right into the brush. The British spent the next ten days running up one side of the mountain and down the other. But the only time they saw the Xhosa close up was when they were being ambushed.

##### However the slow-moving British columns, like the Xhosa, were considerably hampered by drought and were becoming desperate. By this time the drought was taking its toll also. Whatever fodder could be found, was dry and withered. Water was so scarce that men would give a month’s pay for a drink. Eventually the Xhosa set fire to the dry plains below.

It was becoming clear that the campaign could not be won in the Amatolas.

After much debate, the British infantry called in [Andries Stockenström](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andries_Stockenstr%C3%B6m), leader of the local Burgher forces. 3

**(iii) The local Burghers' campaign signed a peace treaty with the Xhosa**

Stockenström proposed a foray across the Kei River to see the paramount chief of all the Xhosa, Sarili.

Stockenström formed a commando of local Burghers. They were much more effective in the rough and mountainous terrain, of which they had considerable local knowledge. After inflicting a string of defeats on the Gaika, [Stockenström](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andries_Stockenstr%C3%B6m) and his mounted party rode to Sarili's village, deep into the [Transkei](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transkei) Xhosa heartland. After some bantering, Sarili agreed to the British terms. He assumed responsibility for any Gaika attacks, and the return of any raided cattle and other property, and to surrender the land west of the Kei. A treaty was signed and the commandos departed on good terms.

**(iv) The British General rejected the peace treaty with the Xhosa**

[Stockenström](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andries_Stockenstr%C3%B6m) was satisfied with the negotiations he had concluded with the paramount Xhosa chief and returned to camp treaty in hand. Maitland thought that the Boer was played the fool. He sent a sharp, insulting letter to Chief Sarili renouncing the treaty, demanding proof that the Xhosa wanted peace, demanding greater acts of submission and servility. Furious, Stockenstrom released his Burghers from service, resigned his command and departed from the war, leaving the British and the Xhosa - both starving and afflicted by fever - to a long, drawn-out war of attrition.

The situation was now critical for everyone. The effects of the drought were worsened through the use of the scorched-earth policy of the Imperial troops, which systematically devastated Xhosa land, burning all the crops and capturing all the cattle which could be found.

The British lost most of their cavalry and were short on supplies - morale was at an all time low. What fodder the drought didn't kill, the fires did. Cattle and oxen on both sides of the frontier were dropping in droves.

Things were so bad that the British army moved to the coast in hopes of getting supplied by sea. Gradually as the armies weakened, the conflict subsided into waves of petty and bloody recriminations. Then, suddenly, the rains came. For days it rained. The barren earth was soon turned into a quagmire. Men and animals, weakened by the drought became exhausted trying to move through the mud. Then fever raced through the British camp. For the Xhosa the war was over. It was washed away by the rain. The Xhosa would no longer fight the British, but they would not move either. They would just sit down when the British came, even when they rounded up their cattle. The British were at a loss as to what to do.

On the 17th of September, 1846, the British sent demands to the Xhosa. By returning cattle they had stolen, surrendering their guns, and moving east of the Kei River, they could end the war. The Xhosa refused the terms and still they refused to resume the war.   
The British decided to bluff the Xhosa into submission. After the rains, the British massed their army at the foot of the mountains as if to attack. The Xhosa, fearful of further destruction, gave in to the British demands. They turned over a few old muskets and some cattle. The British were not satisfied and wished to move the Ngqika East. After the fighting was over, many Xhosa were left without a calf or a bag of seed corn. As the old networks of mutual assistance collapsed, men and women were forced into migrant labour on white settler farms. Absolute deprivation was aggravated by relative deprivation, for contact with colonial commerce had created new wants, so that imported manufactures such as blankets, tinder-boxes and iron hoes had become socially necessary to most Xhosa.

In June, 1847, the Crown found a reason to move the Ngqika East. Four goats came up missing from a Mfengu village in the neighboring Kat River Settlement. The Gaika tribesmen were blamed for this, and it was determined by the British governor that Chief Sandile was responsible for the errant livestock. He offered 12 goats that he said were found wandering on his territory. The Crown refused them.A force of 150 redcoats was sent to arrest the Ngqika Chief, but he eluded capture. The British settled for snatching some cattle. The Xhosa warriors rose up against the patrol and in the running battle in that followed, the British ran out of ammunition and were nearly destroyed. Angered by the Xhosa attack, the British undertook a slash and burn campaign against the Ngqika. The fighting spilled over the Kei River and into chief Pato's territory. Fearing the complete extermination of his people, Sandile went to the British camp to seek terms. He was promptly arrested and sent to [Grahams Town](http://www.southafricaholiday.org.uk/places/c_ec_grahamstown.htm). Although Sandile was soon released, the other chiefs gradually stopped fighting, and by the end of 1847, the [Xhosa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_people) had been completely subdued after twenty-one months of fighting the Crown.4

As the last of the Xhosa warriors were being run down, the Crown sent a new governor with a familiar face arrived at the Cape. In the last month of the war (December 1847) Sir Harry Smith reached Cape Town as governor of the Colony.  
Harry Smith was the rising star of the Crown and it was hoped that he could pacify the frontier. The only thing left to do in the War of the Axe was to formalize the Xhosa surrender. Of this Harry made a fiasco. He embarrassed and belittled the Xhosa chiefs. He insulted the Xhosa people. Then in a final display of British superiority, he blew up a wagonload of gunpowder.

On the 23rd of December 1847, at a meeting of the Xhosa chiefs, he announced the annexation of the country between the Keiskamma and the Kei rivers to the Crown, thus reabsorbing the territory abandoned by order of Lord Glenelg. It was not, however, incorporated with the Cape Colony, but made a Crown dependency under the name of [British Kaffraria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Kaffraria) Colony,5 with [King William's Town](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/King_William%27s_Town) as capital.

This was the second time the Crown took all of the land west of the Kei River.

The land west of the Keiskamma had to be abandoned, and those Xhosa that lived between the Keiskamma and the Kei would be subject to the authority of the Crown.

As in 1835, a string of forts was built up along the Keiskamma River to monitor the movements of the Xhosa.   
Many tribes had to start over in a new land. Crops needed to be planted and villages to be built. Yet even though they rebuilt them in the traditional manner, things would never be the same. The land they were moved to was not as good as that which they left. The displaced tribes were packed into an area that could not possibly support such a large pastoral society.

**References:**

1 [Cana 1911](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_Wars#CITEREFCana1911), p. 239.

2 [SAH staff 2012](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_Wars#CITEREFSAH_staff2012).

3 [SAH staff 1836](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_Wars#CITEREFSAH_staff1836); [SAH staff](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_Wars#CITEREFSAH_staff), 1800s time-line.

4 [Cana 1911](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_Wars#CITEREFCana1911), p. 239; ["South Africa Holiday: Xhosa frontier wars 1840-78"](http://www.southafricaholiday.org.uk/history/hist_xhosawars1840-78.htm). [South Africa Holiday](http://www.southafricaholiday.org.uk/index.html). Retrieved March 2012.

5 [Cana 1911](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_Wars#CITEREFCana1911), p. 239.

**h) The Plough Battle**

Even though the fighting was over, the Xhosa were still under attack. This battle was not fought with bullets but with ploughs. The ploughs were given to the Xhosa chiefs who were expected to learn how to use them and then teach the others. Farming in Xhosa society was woman's work and so the ploughs sat idle. Young men, women, and children were removed from their villages and moved west to work on colonial farms. The transplanted Xhosa were forced to wear European clothing and to attend church. Several other changes to Xhosa society were also discussed. Among these was a ban on polygamy, the gift of cattle given to the parents of a prospective wife (known as lobola) whom the British saw as trading cattle for wives, and the sale of red clay which the Xhosa painted themselves with.   
Harry Smith felt confident that he had done a good job with the Xhosa, and decided to bring the trek Boers back under the control of the Crown. He annexed the territory between the Orange and Vaal Rivers. The Boers were unwilling to come under rule by representatives of the Crown again and a revolt broke out which was put down, and several of the ringleaders were hanged.Smith's actions were not popular with the Home Government, and the territory Smith took was partially given back to the Boers. There was also talk of giving responsible government to the Cape Colony. Harry had to reduce his expenditures, which meant reducing his forces on the frontier by 20 percent. This left 4,700 men to protect the colony against a possible 35,000 warriors. At the beginning of 1850, Harry Smith thought he had everything under control, but he was mistaken. The Cape Colony Burghers were upset about the way that the Orange River rebellion was suppressed. The Mfengu and Khoi-Khoi were riled by unscrupulous officials that set exorbitant taxes. The Xhosa were suffering from over- population in the small area they were assigned to live in, and the assault on their traditional lifestyle.With June came the coldest winter remembered. Along with the winter came a drought of equal proportions. It was at this time that British officials decided to remove Xhosa squatters from the Kat River region. As many Xhosa families were left to wander homeless about the countryside, Mlanjeni the Xhosa prophet fell in with them. Within a month the Xhosa were agitated to a dangerous level. Those that were working in the colony began to return to their tribes. Warriors were being instructed on how to make themselves invincible. Mlanjeni also ordained all dun colored cattle evil and therefore had to be destroyed.

**i) Eighth War (1850–1853)**

Also known as **"Mlanjeni's War"**.

**(i) Background**

Large tracts of Xhosa territory were lost in the Frontier Wars of 1812 and 1819, and in 1847 about half of Xhosa land was annexed to the Crown under the name of  British Kaffraria. The Ngqika Xhosa, who lived in this territory, rose in revolt in the War of Mlanjeni (1850-3), named after the Xhosa prophet who doctored the amaXhosa armies. Mlanjeni predicted that the Xhosa would be unaffected by the colonists' bullets.

Throughout October colonists retreated from the frontier. Believing that the chiefs were responsible for the unrest caused by Mlanjeni's preaching, Governor Sir Harry Smith travelled to British Kaffraria to meet with the prominent chiefs. None of the important chiefs showed for the meeting. When the Ngqika chief [Sandile](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mgolombane_Sandile) refused to attend a meeting with the British governor outside Fort Cox, Smith deposed him and declared him a fugitive. Smith instated Charles Brownlee, commissioner of the Ngqika, as the new chief. 

The situation continued to degrade. November saw a steady stream of colonists heading west and a steady stream of Xhosa laborers heading east. In December Smith called up the militia and deployed his troops for action. Five hundred and seventy men were sent to Fort Cox, 457 were sent to Fort Hare, 389 men were sent to the Kabousie Neck and the remainder, between 400 and 500 men, were spread between King William's Town and the frontier outposts. On the 19th of December, Smith offered a $500 reward for the capture of Sandile. He also promised the local chiefs that no redcoats would hunt the Ngqika chief.

To Smith, his promise did not include sending a column up into the mountains to try to scare Sandile out. On December 24, 1850, a British detachment of 650 men under Colonel Mackinnon was sent up Boma Pass to attempt just that. The column was led by the Kaffir Police, made up of Xhosa loyal to the Crown, and followed by the Cape Mounted Rifles with the British regulars bringing up the rear. After a two hour breakfast the column entered Boma pass.The pass was a mile long tunnel through the bush. To one side was a sheer cliff, to the other the rushing Keiskamma River. The path itself was so narrow that it could only be followed in single file. The two native units made it through the pass without mishap, but as the first regular exited the tunnel the Xhosa attacked. In the battle that followed, the British lost 23 killed and 23 wounded along the pass. The outlying pickets were not as lucky. Fifteen men of the 45th Regiment of Foot were overwhelmed by hundreds of warriors and killed. 

**(ii) Bloodshed on Christmas Day**

It was on Christmas day that all hell broke loose. In the towns of Woburn, Auckland, and Juanasburg, seemingly friendly groups of Xhosa came in to enjoy the holiday with the settlers. But at a given signal, the warriors murdered the men who allowed them into their homes. With this attack most of the Ngqika tribes joined the war. The Kaffir Police also threw in their lot with Sandile and went over with their weapons. The only Ngqika chief to remain friendly was Pato.

**(iii) Fort White**

All along the frontier the situation was critical, but at Fort White it was desperate. The outpost defended by 120 men of various units, was a fort in name only, until Captain Mansergh, the officer commanding, threw up a defensible earthwork in preparation for a Xhosa attack. When the attack came it lasted two days, and the men at Fort White were able to beat back every rush.

**(iv) Fierce battles throughout the Cape**

While the battles at Fort White were raging, Harry Smith was besieged at Fort Cox. Somerset tried twice to break through to the fort, but both times he was defeated. He finally got a messenger through to Smith, advising him not try to break out with infantry as he would be chopped to bits. Smith took Somerset's advice and with 250 men of the Cape Mounted Rifles he made the 12 mile ride to King William's Town.   
Now that Smith was free he was ready to take action. The problem was that he didn't have any men to take action with. The Boers and Burghers were still in a huff over the Orange River affair.

Smith could not mount a major offensive, but he continued to patrol the bush. The Xhosa and rebels also continued their attacks. They mounted a major assault against the town of Whittle sea. Captain Tylden, R.E., along with 60 volunteers and 300 Mfengu, fought off a dozen separate attacks before the Xhosa retreated. The defense of Whittle sea has been credited with stopping an all-out invasion of the colony.

With the Governor cut off at Fort Cox, the Xhosa forces advanced on the colony. British military villages along the frontier were burned, and the post at Line Drift captured. Meanwhile, the Khoi of the Blinkwater River Valley and the natives from Kat River Settlement, where many of the levies came from, rose up in rebellion under the leadership of a half-Khoi, half-Xhosa chief Hermanus Matroos - to whom the government was indebted for prior service - managed to capture [Fort Armstrong](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Fort_Armstrong_(South_Africa)&action=edit&redlink=1).

For the most part, Smith's regulars were besieged in their forts.

Large numbers of the "Kaffir Police" - a paramilitary police force established by the British to combat cattle theft - also deserted their posts and joined Xhosa war parties. For a while, it appeared that all of the colored people of the Eastern Cape were taking up arms against the British.1

Colonial secretary Montagu, working without orders was able to levy a force of Khoi-Khoi to garrison the frontier forts. This allowed Smith a small field force for offensive actions. At the same time, Somerset was able to put down the Kat River Rebellion when he assaulted and captured Fort Armstrong with a force of loyal Burghers and Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR).Many of the men of the Cape Mounted Rifles were drawn from the Kat River settlement and still had friends and relatives living there. Concern over the treatment of the prisoners captured at Fort Armstrong prompted a large number of the Cape Mounted Rifles to defect to the rebellion. As a precaution, Smith had the remainder of the corp. disarmed, leaving the British with no cavalry. He took his infantry and defeated a band of rebels on the Keiskamma River then moved on to Fort Hare. Smith was joined there by Somerset and together they made a foray into the Amatola Mountains. Another rebel force was defeated and Smith rode back to King William's Town with 1,000 head of enemy cattle. 

On 7 January, Matroos and his supporters joined the rebels who launched an offensive on the town of [Fort Beaufort](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Beaufort), which was defended by a small detachment of troops and local volunteers. In the battle, Matroos was shot through the head and, without a leader, his army disintegrated.2

By the end of January, the British had received reinforcements from Cape Town and a force under Colonel Mackinnon was able to successfully drive north from King William's Town to resupply the beleaguered garrisons at Fort White, Fort Cox and Fort Hare.

With fresh men and supplies, the British expelled the remainder of the Matroos rebel forces (now under the command of Willem Uithaalder) from Fort Armstrong and drove them west toward the Amatola Mountains.

AmaXhosa led by Maqoma established themselves in the forested Water Kloof. From this base they managed to plunder surrounding farms and torch the homesteads. Maqoma's stronghold was situated on Mount Misery, a natural fortress on a narrow neck wedged between the Water Kloof and Harry's Kloof. The Water Kloof conflicts lasted two years.

Maqoma also led an attack on Fort Fordyce and inflicted heavy losses on the forces of Sir [Harry Smith](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sir_Harry_Smith,_1st_Baronet).

By February, 1851, Harry Smith had about 9,000 men in hand, 3,000 of which could be called "regulars."

He was able to resupply forts Cox and White. On his way back from that mission, Smith defeated a large Xhosa army. In March, Sir Harry scored another victory against the Xhosa near Fort White. Two days later he made off with another 1,000 of the enemy's cattle and returned to King William's Town. 

By May the first reinforcements arrived. The 74th Highlanders were immediately sent to the front. Once there they marched on the rebel stronghold of Theopolis. At the sound of the pipes, the rebels routed off and the 74th scored a bloodless victory.   
  
Hereafter Smith was ready to strike at the heart of the Xhosa. With his infantry and a unit of reinstated Cape Mounted Rifles, Smith made a sweep through the Amatolas destroying crops and capturing cattle. In early July, Somerset went back through the mountains and was chased out only after the Xhosa set fire to the grass. Meanwhile, Smith was beating the Fish River bush as more reinforcements began flowing in.   
  
As Smith was turning things around, a new enemy took the field. Moshesh had built the Basotho nation from the refugees of the Zulu expansion. Up to now they had been British allies but this time Moshesh threw in with the Xhosa. The movement of a large native force close by prompted the Boers to action. In their only engagement of the war, the Boers defeated Moshesh and sent him back to his stronghold. 

In August, the Queen's 2nd Infantry arrived followed closely by the Infantry which arrived on the 12th September, which saw the 60th Rifles and 200 other replacements land. In October the first British cavalry unit, the 12th Lancers took the field.   
  
Somerset spent the next two months cries-crossing the Amatolas, finally driving the Xhosa out to the east. Smith then took an expedition to the Kei River. Despite heavy rains, Harry's men captured 30,000 head of cattle. Upon his return, Smith sent Somerset back up into the mountains to flush out any remaining Xhosa.   
  
Even though Smith had received his reinforcements, he had not achieved a decisive victory. The Home Government assumed this was the fault of Smith and not his foe. It was therefore decided to replace Sir Harry with Major-General George Cathcart.

In February, 1852, as Harry Smith's replacement steamed for the Cape, replacements for his infantry were heading for Algoa Bay. On the 25th the steamship Birkenhead struck a rock off Danger Point at Gansbaai. As the ship sank, Major Seaton, as ranking officer, paraded the men on deck. The troops, mostly new recruits, fell in and remained in ranks as the lifeboats were loaded with the women and children. They stood silently on parade even as the ship slipped below the waves. In all, 349 men and 14 officers went down with the Birkenhead.By March the Xhosa had lost 6,000 warriors, 80 chiefs, 80,000 cattle and a vast number of goats. Though the war would drag on for almost another year, the Xhosa would not be able to mount a serious threat to the colony. On the 26th of March, Cathcart took command of the Army of South Africa, and early in April Sir Harry Smith sailed for home.   
  
Throughout the next 6 months, the British continued to scour the countryside, evicting bands of Xhosa and Khoi-Khoi rebels. In November, Cathcart mounted his only major offensive. His target was the Basotho stronghold. He moved into Moshesh's country with 2,300 men, 3 guns, and some rockets. In the poorly run engagement, the British captured 1,500 cattle. If Moshesh had been willing to press an attack, it is possible that the British could have suffered a defeat as bad as Isandlwana. Moshesh said he had seen the power of the Great Queen and had no wish to quarrel with her. As Cathcart marched back to the colony, the Basotho warriors could be seen dancing around the column wearing the uniforms of dead British soldiers. 

**(v) The Surrender of the Xhosa brought Peace**

The 8th Frontier War lead to the eventual capture of the Xhosa strongholds in the Amathole mountains, when they were again driven Eastwards, away from the steep forested terrain, and eventually back across the Kei River.

In February 1853, Sandile and the other chiefs were ready to surrender. The treaty that followed pushed the Xhosa east of the Amatola Mountains. The Xhosas were forced into a still smaller area while the frontier settlers had to rebuild their farms one more time. The next four years were a time of rebuilding for everyone.The grandiose plans of Sir George Grey, who arrived at the Cape in late 1854, were designed to accelerate the disintegration of the Xhosa way of life. On behalf of the British Crown, Grey appointed British magistrates over the heads of Xhosa chiefs to break their authority and usurp their political, judicial and fiscal prerogatives. Vast public works were instituted to teach the Xhosa the value of labour, and schools and missions were founded to inculcate the values of Christian Europe.3

The experience of defeat, the memory of thousands of brave young men wiped out by superior military technology, and the sight of the collaborators enjoying the fruits of their ancestral lands overwhelmed the Xhosa with depression and a sense of great loss. They clung ever tighter to the reassuring and comforting beliefs of the old cosmology, while at the same time casting about for some new but complementary element of belief which would make the universe logical once again, and provide the Xhosa with a God who was the equal of the God of their colonial enemies.

At the same time, rumors of British defeat in the Crimean War greatly excited Xhosa hopes of some external intervention which might free them of the British yoke.

**References:**

1 [Abbink & Peires 1989](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_Wars#CITEREFAbbinkPeires1989).

2 [Abbink, Bruijn & Walraven 2008](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_Wars#CITEREFAbbinkBruijnWalraven2008).

3 J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey (London, 1961), chs. 21-3.

**j) Cattle-killing movement (1855–1858)**

The cleavage caused by the great cattle-killing movement cut right through the heart of the Xhosa kingdom, dividing the Xhosa into two distinct parties: the majority amathamba ('soft' ones) or believers, who accepted the truth of the cattle-killing prophecies, and the minority amagogotya ('hard' ones) or unbelievers, who rejected it.

The vigorous attempt to break down tribalism in British Kaffraria by Sir George Grey, was greatly aided by the 'cattle-killing movement' among the Xhosa ethnic groups on both sides of the Kei which left the Kaffraria Xhosas destroyed. The 'cattle-killing movement' led to starvation of the Xhosa nation, increased crime and cattle theft, the 8th Frontier War and the eventual capture of the Xhosa strongholds in the Amathole mountains, when they were again driven Eastwards, away from the steep forested terrain, and eventually back across the Kei River. Soon after, British Kaffraria was incorporated into the Cape in 1866.

The chain of events that led up to this annexation focused no more than three kilometers from Kei River Mouth as the crow flies, at the Gxarha, the first small river in the Transkei that forms a lagoon most of the time, breaking out, discharging into the sea and becoming tidal only after persistent rains.

The bond between Xhosas and their cattle was extremely powerful.

Cattle represented tangible proof of wealth for everyone to see. Those walking bank balances played a pivotal role in almost everything they did, including spiritual slaughter feasts and celebrations, bartering for brides, ploughing and planting, sleigh pulling, daily milk supply and as ordinary currency for goods and services, especially when they were faced with sudden unexpected costs. Even their hides were put to use in manufacturing strops, “riems” (a fairly thin strip of hide) and shields.

Lungsickness, a disease which plagued cattle, arrived in southern Africa aboard a Dutch ship carrying Friesian bulls which reached Mossel Bay in September 1853. A general outbreak saw cattle slowly losing condition as foam and mucus streamed from their mouths and nostrils, and thousands died, or were slaughtered, to put them out of their misery. That debilitating and incurable disease had a profound impact on the Xhosas who believed it had been intentionally introduced by white people to kill off their beloved cattle and by so doing further humiliate them.

By March 1854, it had reached Uitenhage, whence an Mfengu, travelling with five cattle, brought it to Fort Beaufort on the borders of Xhosa land. From Fort Beaufort, it passed through Chief Kama's territory on its way to King William's Town, the capital of British Kaffraria, which it reached in March 1855. From King William's

Town, Lungsickness spread through the coastal territories of Chiefs Mhala and Phatho, and along the wagon road to Natal, reaching Butterworth in King Sarhili's country in January 1856. Last to be affected were the Ngqika Xhosa under Chiefs Sandile, Feni, Xhoxho and Anta, recently banished to an out-of-the-way location north of King William's Town. 1

There was no cure for the disease, and no telling where it would strike next. As many as 100,000 cattle, painfully preserved through three years of war or wearily earned in farm labour died a lingering and horrible death. Losses of 80 per cent or even 100 per cent per stockowner were not uncommon.2

The seven chiefdoms in question are those of Sandile, Mhala, Phatho, Maqoma, Botomane, Xhoxho and Feni.

It was in those areas first affected by lungsickness that the first prophecies of cattle-killing were heard. The meat of lungsick cattle could not be eaten, and it was illegal to sell the hides of cattle which had perished from the disease.3

Across the Kei, the spread of lungsickness was directly linked to prophecies of resurrection. A number of prophets appeared in various parts of British Kaffraria, and announced that if the people killed their cattle and destroyed their corn, the dead would rise and the 'Russians' would drive the whites into the sea.4

'The Galekas [Sarhili's people] firmly believe that Umlanjeni (the wardoctor of 1850) has risen from the dead – that the sickness among the cattle was predicted by the prophet and that he can bring all their cattle to life again.'5

By October 1855, there were five prophets operating in the districts of Chiefs Kama and Phatho, ordering the people not to cultivate and to slaughter their cattle. The situation in these areas, where drought and crop failure had aggravated the effects of lungsickness, was described as follows: 'The utmost destitution prevails throughout the country we traversed; they have lost nearly all their cattle... Those who have a few cattle left are slaughtering them rather than run the risk of losing them by lungsickness.'6

Chief Sandile's Ngqika Xhosa were located off the wagon roads and took strenuous precautions against lungsickness, burning the pasturage on their perimeter and forbidding the introduction of strange cattle to their district.7

Sandile received King Sarhili's orders to kill without enthusiasm, and Chief Commissioner Maclean reported that the Ngqika Xhosa generally remained indifferent to the prophecies, ' the excitement being confined to those districts in which from the prevalence of the lungsickness the people have lost their wealth and chief means of subsistence'.8

Very few Ngqika killed their cattle during the early phase of the movement prior to the first failure of the prophecies on 15 August 1856.9

Lungsickness never reached the herds of Chief Anta high up in the Windvogel-berg in the far north of the Ngqika location, and Anta's chiefdom entirely refused to participate in the cattle-killing. Where there was no lungsickness, the words of the prophets fell on deaf ears. Lungsickness was not the only cause which completely explains the entire cattle-killing movement. The Cape Colony's Mfengu allies suffered extensively from lungsickness with reported cattle losses of 90 per cent and more. Yet virtually all Mfengu, even those residents in Xhosaland under the orders of Xhosa chiefs, refused to kill their cattle.10

Sarhili put more than twenty people to death for witchcraft or for breaking the quarantines established on the movement of cattle, but he could not check the spread of the disease. By 1856, it was reported that many cattle had died of lungsickness in the lower part of Sarhili's country, where Nongqawuse lived, and in April 1856 she began to prophesy.

In that very month, lungsickness broke out among the homesteads bordering Sarhili's own Great Place.11

The Xhosa king Sarhili became a firm convert of the prophet Nongqawuse and her guardian, Umhlakaza, which predicted that a fresh stock of cattle free from lungsickness' would arise.

**(i) Umhlakaza**

Willem Goliath - his “white man's name,” or Umhlakaza, as he was known to the Xhosa people, lived in Grahamstown, had learnt to speak Dutch fluently and was baptized into the Methodist church.

Anglican Archdeacon Nathaniel James Merriman, newly arrived from England to serve the Crown, was looking for a suitable man, one who could perform the dual role of gardener and interpreter.

To note that there were connections between the Merriman family and the Illuminati bloodline. 12

Umhlakaza was recommended to him and he was duly employed. Merriman soon began his evangelizing with long trips into the countryside in search of Xhosa settlements. As that was his style of meeting the people, his gardener accompanied him, to act out his secondary role as interpreter and companion during trips into the wilderness, whilst the preacher introduced them to the Christian messages.

The Xhosa language is extremely rich with its delicate differences in shades, colors, nuances, meanings and feelings. A saying among Xhosas claims that “Xhosa never ends”. Interpreters can easily, and do become carried away in their interpretation of someone else's messages, especially if they begin to believe that it is their rhetoric that is actually being reacted to by the audiences, and not the original speaker. The more enthusiastic and loudly the audiences respond, the more carried away becomes the language and gesticulations of the interpreter. As Umhlakaza became more practiced in Merriman's routines, he hardly needed to follow the script, because he knew what to expect from them with each sentence and gesticulation, receiving enthusiastic responses from his audiences. With time in his own mind Merriman's messages actually became his messages.

Complications arose when they returned home to Grahamstown. Umhlakaza was employed primarily as a gardener in the Merriman’s opinion, and was expected to continue with those menial tasks. Mrs. Merriman complained about his sulky aloof attitude, and laziness. She even complained that he was ignoring her. Umhlakaza, on the other hand had become an important Preacher man in his own mind, and mundane gardening tasks such as weeding, digging and watering were definitely beneath his new-found self-image, and dignity. The status quo could not be maintained and Umhlakaza left Grahamstown. He journeyed eastwards where he met up with a young “niece” orphaned during a battle in the Amathole Mountains - there has always been confusion over the relationship between Umhlakaza and the young girl Nongqawuse, thought to be his girl or child.

He established a kraal sight in the Transkei, near the Kobonqaba River above the shipwreck of the disintegrating Jacaranda.

Umhlakaza began practicing the art of being a tribal doctor and prophet. His ability to communicate and draw reactions from audiences caused his reputation to grow to such an extent, and so rapidly, that King Sarhili used him as a Councilor in matters of importance. His strong character soon saw him dominating Council meetings and he began overshadowing longer serving members.

In 1856 King Sarhili paid Umhlakaza a visit. He explained that he was feeling very depressed, because nothing was going right for the Xhosa nation. The British had previously murdered his brother King Hintsa, and subsequently a string of military defeats, and the loss of great areas of land and livestock at the hands of the enemy, were making him believe that he was losing credibility amongst his subjects. The once all-powerful King was feeling vulnerable and insecure because his power base was slowly disintegrating.

Umhlakaza intimated that he would speak to his niece and prophesying medium Nongqawuse, and try to make contact that evening through her with the ancestral spirits, to try and find some answers to the King's problems.

**(ii) Nongqawuse**

Nongqawuse has been described by historians as “a simple girl with a silly look, who paid no attention to her dress and appearance.”

In the presence of an entranced Nongqawuse, Umhlakaza hinted to his King that the ancestors were beginning to speak of better things to come for the Xhosa nation. A more bountiful future and a time of resurrection ahead were hinted at, with great herds of cattle and filled grain pits. Sarhili slept much more peacefully that night than he had for a long time, and went away the next morning uplifted by Umhlakaza's wisdom and spiritual messages. Before he departed Sarhili assured Umhlakaza that he stood at the head of all his doctors and advisors.

Shortly after the King's visit Umhlakaza moved his residence about five kilometers Westwards above the Gxarha River estuary, again establishing a kraal sight. His messages were so compelling and full of hope that people did not want to challenge his judgment. As in his previous situation with Merriman, Umhlakaza actually believed that his prophecies would take place. The consequences of his actions led the Xhosa nation into chain of events where there was no turning back. Events built up their own tragic momentum, accelerating to a climax that caused more deaths by so called suicide, than any event of its type in recorded history.

In April 1856 Nongqawuse and a friend were sent down to a maize field near the Gxarha River, to chase feeding birds away from ripening grain. That evening she reported to her uncle that two strange men had appeared, coming out from the reeds by the river, claiming that they were risen ancestors with a message for the Xhosa people. She reported the same story the next day, adding that the strangers had instructed her to bring Umhlakaza to the river on the following day. During the course of the next few weeks the story took shape, with many people believing that they had also heard lowing cattle and strange sounds coming from the direction of the river, and some had actually seen the strangers. Visions were also conjured up from a pool in the upper reaches and strange appearances were observed out to sea. The strangers’ instructions were very direct and simple to understand. In any event it would have been stupid not to obey them, because they promised a complete turn-around for the Xhosa Nation with prospects of a better life, a land filled with milk and honey, culminating in the disappearance of the dreaded white people. Some of the messages given were as follows:

“Slaughter all your cattle - and feast upon them. Make beer and consume all existing grain. Stop tilling, planting and cultivating your lands.”

“As a result of these actions - on a given day - Xhosa ancestors - all in good health - would arise from the ground - together with great herds of healthy fat cattle - grain pits would be filled to capacity - and all whites would be driven back into the sea from whence they had originally come.”

The news of the sixteen-year-old [Nongqawuse](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nongqawuse) spread like wild fire - she had received a message from her ancestors that promised deliverance from their hardships such as horses, sheep, goats, dogs and fowls, all kinds of clothing, and everything you wish to eat will come in great amounts. The old will become young and the settlers will be driven into the sea if they destroyed their cattle. This was a big sacrifice for their ancestors.

People came from near and far to seek proof of the messages. Assisted by her uncle Umhlakaza, Nongqawuse took enquirers to certain reedy and cavernous places on the Gxarha River, and 'showed' them the 'new people', black shapes in the water, waiting to rise when the last head of cattle was finally slaughtered.

Although the original strangers did not appear in person to visitors, many went away convinced by prophetess Nongqawuse that they had seen visions, and heard voices.

Not all Nongqawuse's visitors were convinced, and some who came prepared to believe departed as committed unbelievers.

**(iii) Results of the calls for the Cattle Killing**

When Chief [Sarhili](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sarhili&action=edit&redlink=1) killed his cattle, more and more people began to believe that Nongquwuse was an igqirha (diviner) who could communicate with the ancestors. They too killed their cattle and destroyed their crops and refrained from cultivating during sowing season.

The Xhosa nation waited for the old to become young again and the settlers to be driven into the sea. They waited for clothes, crops and cattle, but nothing happened.

Chiefs who took a strong stand against the cattle-killing found that the majority of their subjects effectively deserted them in favour of pro-Nongqawuse members of the royal lineage. Thus Chief Kama lost most of his followers to his nephew Mate, Chief Siwani lost his to his nephew Bangayi, and the young chief Jali was challenged by his genealogically junior brother, Tabayi. Vadana, the disgruntled ex-Regent of the Thembu, recovered a prominence lost for over twenty years, as hundreds of Thembu abandoned their unbelieving chiefs and rallied to his leadership.13

The Christian chief Kama and his son Samuel opposed the movement, even though their district had suffered heavily from the epidemic. Chief Toyise, resident near the centre of infection at King William's Town, refused to kill and carried the majority of his people along with him, even though in their district 'the lungsickness had made such ravages that but comparatively few [cattle] were left'.14

Many of the leading believers had been in the forefront of the War of Mlanjeni, which had ended a mere three years previously. Sarhili, Sandile, Maqoma and other lesser chiefs had been strong fighters and now turned strong believers. Chief Mhala, another strong believer, though outwardly neutral had secretly aided the belligerents with supplies and refuge. Conversely, the unbelieving Mfengu and the majority of chiefs on the unbelieving side - Kama, Toyise, Siwani, and Jali - were either allies or clients of the colonial government.15

Sarhili, Mhala and Phatho, who lost no land whatever in the 1850-3 War, who took the lead in killing cattle, while the Ngqika, who lost most, lagged behind and Anta, a Ngqika chief, slaughtered not at all.

Soga, a leading unbeliever in Sandile's chiefdom, played a leading part in the 'Tyhume valley massacres' of military settlers in 1850.

Mjuza, the son of the war-doctor Nxele, led the attack on Butterworth mission in 1851 and was later shot in the stomach by British troops. When he heard that the Russians were coming, he prepared to place himself at their head. Yet he became one of Nongqawuse's most determined and effective followers.

The disobedience of the steadfast minority of unbelievers who refused to kill their cattle, enabled Nongqawuse and Umhlakaza to blame the failure of their prophecies on the stubbornness of the unbelievers since the new cattle would not rise until the old ones had all been slaughtered. With every failure, therefore, the pressure of the believers on the unbelievers increased to the point almost of civil war as the believers attempted to kill the cattle and raze the gardens of the unbelievers. 16

The unbelievers could not stop the general slaughter and feasting. Eventually the movement's believers in many cases overwhelmed the unbelievers and their cattle were slaughtered for them, as they stood by helplessly, unable to resist the power and momentum of the masses.

The movement gained in strength throughout the winter, spring and summer of 1856. Lands were left unploughed, in any case there were no more oxen to till the soil, and grain pits were emptied. On the brink of starvation they waited with great expectancy for the prophesized great day to dawn

The date of the first resurrection was set for 11 August 1856. The failure of this prediction was blamed on the unbelieving Xhosa, who refused to kill their cattle. As disappointment followed disappointment, similar rationalizations brought Xhosaland to the brink of civil war.

“D-Day” was named by Nongqawuse as 3rd January, 1857. The day dawned with the whole nation waiting expectantly for signs of the great uprising - and nothing happened. At first Umhlakaza told the people to be patient because there might have been a miscalculation and things could take place on the following day or maybe the day thereafter.

By that time, some 80 per cent of the Xhosa people were either dead of starvation or homeless wanderers seeking food.17

The return of the [ancestors](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ancestor_worship) was then predicted to occur on 18 February 1857. The [Xhosa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_people), mainly chief Sarhili of the Gcalekas, heeded the demand and enforced it on others, only to be disappointed on the destined day.

**(iv) The attitude of the Xhosa nation after the cattle-killing**

The Great Disappointment of February 1857 weakened Sarhili's confidence in

Umhlakaza and Nongqawuse, but he was so far committed to their prophecies and so devoid of any alternative that he did not altogether give up hope of an eventual resurrection.

Umhlakaza attempted to blame his failures on the unbelievers who had not slaughtered, and this led to interminable fighting and disorder within Xhosaland itself. Many left their homes to seek new cattle or to preserve whatever they still possessed. Others attempted to keep themselves alive until the next season by digging roots and stripping the trees of their bark.

Their mood was anything but aggressive. One observer described them in April 1857 as “very quiet and downcast, fearing rather an attack from us than inclined to attack us.”

During the period of confusion and final realization that the world was not going to change overnight, Umhlakaza and his niece disappeared from Gxarha village, never to return again.

They had prolonged the life of the cattle-killing movement to such an extent that when Sarhili finally renounced all belief in July 1857, some fifteen months after its commencement, the Xhosa nation was destroyed beyond any hope of recovery.

By July 1857, Sarhili was a beggar indeed and repeatedly approached the Colonial Government for help. His words of one such fruitless visit to the offices of Sir George Grey had been recorded wherein he refers to himself as Kreli, which reads as follows:

“The chief Kreli has been here today and with tears begged me to write to your Excellency for assistance in his present great need. He remembers your letter to him advising him not to kill his cattle and not to throwaway his corn - he is sorrowful for having neglected that advice and for having followed that of UUmhlakaza. He hopes Your Excellency will deal kindly by him, as you have by the Hottentot Rebels - that you will make him your friend again, and not leave him to perish on the mountains. He has offended you in destroying his own, he has not thrown as assegai at the Governor.

He looks to Your Excellency for a few milch cows, and seed for his gardens, so that he may keep life in his children: for himself, he wishes the dead to call for him, for he has sinned greatly.”

The trader John Crouch, who provided the Colonial authorities with most of their information on trans-Keian matters, also reported that the king himself, his mother and brothers had nothing to eat.

The cattle killings continued into 1858, leading to the starvation of thousands. Disease was also spread from the cattle killings. Many amaXhosa turned to the colonists for food, blankets and other relief.

Disappointment turned to apathy, hopelessness and resignation as people finally realized how serious their situation was. They searched and scavenged for anything to eat. Wild berries, edible roots and thorn tree gum were collected from the countryside and eaten. The end result was catastrophic. Mass starvation and malnutrition quickly set in and whole families, too weak to fend for themselves, died in their homes. The very old and the very young were the first to die, followed thereafter by others who had become too weak and dispirited to carry on. Many thousands poured across the Kei River into British Kaffraria, begging for food from those who could help, but the sheer numbers made the situation virtually impossible to handle. Footpaths leading to Kingwilliamstown and even its streets were littered with corpses of people who died along the way in their desperate search for anything to eat.

**(v) Colonial reaction to the cattle-killing**

The authorities in Kingwilliamstown offered three to five year contracts to starving families and many were quickly dispersed as far away as the Western Cape where they were employed in near slave like conditions.

A petition sent to the Commander in Chief of Her Majesty's colony, signed by 308 inhabitants of the Uitenhage district, spoke of a large body of displaced Natives that had been allowed to settle during 1859 in that area of the Colony. It complained bitterly that no good government or controls had been established to administer such large numbers, resulting in many problems for the community. “They had been allowed to retail and practice all their native and heathen customs and laws, among which the petitioners particularly noticed the selling and buying of women, and the shameless exposure of the persons of men, and many other customs too disgusting to mention.” Stock theft and farm murders were rife and farmers were getting into trouble with the law when they retaliated.

Records of that time include the Fick family of the Alexandria District, cooking with large three legged black pots, full of whole mealies over open fires trying to stave off starvation. Thereafter they were called the “Pekinkobe Family” by local people, or “The Cookers of dry Mealies.”

No accurate statistics exist, but starvation, malnutrition and disease accounted for between 40,000 and 50,000 deaths amongst the Xhosas. This figure is calculated from the 'Population Returns for British Kaffraria', enclosed in Maclean, Compendium.

The difference in male population between January 1857 (the height of the cattle-killing) and December 1857 (by which time most of the believers had left their homes in search of food) The precise figure for those who remained is 16-6per cent, but this would include the believing chiefs and their close associates, as well as believers who found refuge on mission stations. Figures from the other chiefdoms, which experienced an influx of refugees from the core believer districts, were not considered.18

The combination of lung-sickness and wholesale slaughtering and feasting resulted in the loss of an estimated 400,000 cattle.

A part of John Crouch's letter to Sir George Grey in October 1857 reported that Sarhili, who had once possessed more than 6,000 cattle of his own, was sharing the milk of seven cows with his brothers and sixty women and children. It was all he had. “You may guess he is hard up, for I know for certain there have been two horses eaten at Sarhili's place.” Eating horsemeat is taboo amongst Xhosa people, although some other African people have no problem with that practice.

It appears that no further records of Umhlakaza could be found. Nongqawuse was later “captured” by the British authorities and from the 9th April 1858, housed at Fort Murray near Kingwilliamstown, where their curiosity led them to try and piece her story together. Eventually they realized that she was unable to provide any accurate account of events because her confused mind wandered and statements made previously were denied soon thereafter. A stay on Robben Island where she had been sent for her own safekeeping was followed by repatriation to a farm in the Alexandria District.19

Crouch once again painted a graphic picture of Sarhili’s utter helplessness in November 1857 to the British colonial office:

My opinion is that Kreli cannot recover his power, and although he is reconciled with unbelievers, not able to do mischief. . . You have him in your power to do as you like with him. . . You could take his whole country with a force of 100 men - for the whole of his country is nearly desolate. 100 cows would buy all their guns - they even offer powder for corn. You can dictate any terms to him. . . He will be beat if he crosses the Bashee, for I am quite sure he can't muster more than 500 men. They can't mount more than 200.”

This view of Sarhili's helplessness was endorsed by Maclean himself.

And yet in February 1858, Grey sent a massive punitive expedition against Sarhili, pleading urgent military necessity to the Colonial Secretary to which he added the following statement:

“No sooner does [Sarhili] find out we are pressed for troops in India than he again begins the same system... I cannot send enough troops to India with such a thorn in my flesh.”

Major Gawler was given instructions to capture Sarhili, or to drive him so far away that he would not be heard of again.

To justify his actions against Sarhili, Grey referred to information his offices had gathered regarding the cattle slaughter.

In a 7 month period the population of British Kaffiria dropped by two-thirds. The Colonial authorities were understandably puzzled by this unprecedented sequence of events, and concerned with their implications for the peace of the Cape frontier. They freely recognized the sincerity of the ordinary believers, but chose to insist that the root of the delusion was a sinister pIot – which became known as the ‘chiefs plot’ - to destroy Colonial power in southern Africa, based on two lengthy official dispatches by Chief Commissioner Maclean, which constitute the most detailed and coherent exposition of the "chiefs' plot" interpretation.20 See Footnote 1 on the chiefs plot.

The ‘chiefs plot’ implicated the Sotho king Moshoeshoe, the Xhosa king, Sarhili, and the traditional Xhosa chiefs, which led to the slandering of their reputations and a hunt on them as well as the interrogation of them and their people, such as Chief Mlala, which is also discussed in Footnote 1.

Moshoeshoe's alleged purpose was to distract Colonial attention from his wars with the Orange Free State, while Sarhili was supposedly exploiting the opportunity offered by the Crimean War to launch yet another war against the Cape Colony - he could not do this openly, since the Xhosa people did not want to fight, and he therefore deceived them into war through the manipulation of witch doctors. Starvation and hunger would force the common people into thefts, and Colonial retaliation would provoke them into war. Killing their cattle would free the warriors from the duties of herdsmen and hunger would drive them on to fight more fiercely than ever before.

The "chiefs’ plot" depended on three general premises, none of which can be sustained:

1. that men fight better if they are starving;
2. that the chiefs were immune from the beliefs which they manipulated in their followers; and
3. that the sole motivation of the cattle-killing was the desire of the Xhosa to rid themselves of the Colonial presence.

The facts were that "hungry bellies won't fight."21

Hunger had never before driven the Xhosa to greater fighting efforts, as king Sarhili well knew. They had fought three major frontier wars in his adult lifetime, and experienced starvation in each one. This had not roused them to greater fighting fury. On the contrary, it was directly responsible for their surrender on two occasions,22 and had severely debilitated them on the third.

The Gaika Commissioner reported that the Xhosa themselves said that famine always did more to conquer them than the forces brought against them, and “wars have never been begun in a season of scarcity, but the Kaffirs have always been most unruly and unmanageable in the years of their greatest plenty”.23

The Chief Commissioner himself admitted that thefts usually completely ceased on the eve of a frontier war.24

Nor is there any reason to believe that the Xhosa chiefs felt that their earlier defeats had been owing to a lack of manpower. The Xhosa had always vastly outnumbered the Colonial forces. Their greatest losses had occurred when they concentrated large numbers of warriors,25 and their greatest successes had occurred in guerrilla warfare fought by small bands. Throughout the major Xhosa military difficulty had been the problem of supplies, not the problem of numbers and it is hard to believe that they would have destroyed their supplies simply in order to boost their numbers.

"Chiefs are firm believers in the national superstitions.” It was well-known to all -Xhosa commoner as well as Colonial official - that the diviners often used their influence in the economic and political interests of the chiefs. This does not mean that they were mere tools of the chiefs, or that the chiefs were cynical about magical power. Commissioner Maclean put the point very forcefully early in the delusion:

“A Kaffir chief is not a whit more civilized and not a whit less ignorant and superstitious than any other Kaffir, in most instances he is less intelligent than many under him. Because he or some of his councilors make in some instances use of superstition to "eat up" some obnoxious person. and [sic] it does not follow that he or they disbelieve in these superstitions; many a monk doubtless believed in the efficacy of certain shrines, and in the dead saints relics preserved in their own and other churches, though they may have been engaged at the time in pulling the strings of some miraculous image, or making a picture wink. We also know that Kaffir chiefs are firm believers in the national superstitions, and are as readily influenced as anyone of the Kaffir herd.”26

Attorney-General Barrington was implicitly aware of the sincerity of the Xhosa chiefs whom he brought to trial for their actions during the period of the cattle-killing:

“I think the chiefs must have a sort of belief in the prophet though they know it is a got up affair – their uneducated minds are too weak to reject the imposture though they are aware it is one; and of their own getting up.”27

**(vi) The cattle-killing did not emphasize hostility to Colony or to the settler presence in southern Africa.**

Although there were occasional references to great natural disasters which would sweep away whites and unbelievers, on the whole the expectations of the partakers in the cattle killing rite were positive rather than negative. They looked forward to a millennium in which their dead ancestors would return and new healthy cattle, free from lungsickness, would arise. The general demeanor of the Xhosa people was “Now very civil, high spirited and witty”.28

Chief Maqoma told his followers that there would be no need to attack the settlers because “all necessary things would be furnished to them.”29

Colonial observers found the Xhosa very friendly whenever such expectations were at their height:

“I never saw such a deplorable sight as the neglected fields in Umhala's location.

Everywhere, I found the people cheerful although the neglected fields spoke of future starvation and death. I spoke to several but they merely smiled.”30

In considering the ban on cultivation, the facts were that unlike cattle, maize and sorghum were not usually guarded in wartime.

Commissioner Maclean argued that the Xhosa did not bother to sow because they knew the troops would destroy their crops when the war broke out. But the refusal of the believers to cultivate despite intense pressure from the Colonial authorities indicates that more was at stake than the casual neglect implied by Maclean.

Chiefs such as Mhala and Phato resorted to endless subterfuges—to the extent of simulating cultivation without actually planting anything—and eventually lost their salaries because they refused to allow cultivation.31

The notion that the cattle-killing originated in a plot by the Xhosa chiefs to bring about war was not an unreasonable one for a Colonial official to hold during the early days of the movement. All were aware that the prophecies of Mlanjeni had done much to bring about the Eighth Frontier War, which was palely three years over, that Sarhili was sending secret messages to his subordinate chiefs, and that a frenzy of religious excitement was sweeping through Xhosaland. It was known that Nongqawuse had predicted the imminent destruction of the white man, and that there was some talk of recouping cattle from the settlers if the prophecies failed. It seemed logical that starving people would rob and even kill to get at food. Small wonder that every Colonial administrator from the authoritarian Maclean to the sympathetic Brownlee initially suspected that the prophecies were put out by the chiefs to foment war. Grey was informed accordingly, and he made every effort from promises to threats to stop the people going ahead with the destruction of their cattle and corn.

From the beginning, however, there were clear signals that the cattle-killing was the result of a sincere belief and, as the movement progressed, these signals grew louder and louder. It became increasingly clear, for instance, that many of the initial reports were exaggerated, that the ordinary believers were well-disposed towards the whites and had no thought of war, and above all, that starvation and destruction were wreaking much havoc among the Xhosa that they were incapable of fighting or doing anything at all. As late as September 1856, Grey could still write:

“The most vigilant exertions on the part of the authorities in British Kaffraria failed to elicit any proofs of combination for evil purposes amongst the chiefs, whilst conclusive proof has been obtained of the entire erroneousness of several reports of an unfavorable nature.”

Even later, in December 1856, in rejecting the statement of the Christian Thembu which he was to put to such great use afterwards, Maclean considered that "it is too suicidal for a mere political move.”

It was only after the Great Disappointment that Grey requested Maclean to write up the proofs of the "chief’s plot." By that time, the failure of the movement had become apparent, and all disturbances had been put down by Gawler's police and Grey’s Proclamation of 3 March 1857 that all robbers might be shot on sight. Whatever the truth of the "chiefs' plot" theory, whatever the chiefs may or may not have intended, it was incontestably true that the crisis was over and that not one chief had actually done anything that could be construed as an attack on the Colony. As Sarhili said, "he has offended in destroying his own. He has not thrown an assegai at the Governor."

**(vii) Grey plotted for the annexation of land**

We cannot locate the source of Grey's apprehensions in Sarhili’s plotting, for all of

Grey's own informants agreed that, militarily speaking, the Xhosa king was a broken reed.

We do find that in Grey's plans for the future of the trans-Keian region, he was an ardent annexationist and supported the longstanding settler call for the colonization of the independent Nguni lands between the Cape and Natal. He first announced his intention of settling Europeans in the Transkei in April of 1857, well before the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny. In November of 1857, he plotted with Crouch to seize Sarhili’s person.

Clearly, it was Grey who was scheming against Sarhili, and not the other way round. Grey justified his action against Sarhili in a memorandum entitled "Kreli's conduct." We refer to Footnote 5 for a discussion on this memorandum by Grey on Kreli.

The pursuit of the "chiefs’ plot" was more than an act of retributive justice, it was an integral part of future policy. From the very beginning of his Governorship in 1855, Grey had wanted to fill up British Kaffraria “with a considerable number of Europeans of a class fitted to increase our strength in that country”.

Just before the commencement of the cattle-killing, he had begun to implement this scheme by concentrating the normally dispersed Mfengu homesteads of the Crown Reserve into villages with strictly demarcated plots, thus clearing the way for extensive European settlements on their vacated land. The death and exile of tens of thousands of Xhosa during the cattle-killing opened the way for an extension of this scheme to the remainder of British Kaffraria and even beyond.

In April 1857 Grey announced to the Colonial Parliament:

“I hope. . .that I may be able to devise means which will not only enable the

Government to fill up the vacant portions of British Kaffraria with a European population sufficiently large to maintain itself. . . but which will also enable it to establish a European settlement in Kaffraria Proper, sufficiently strong to control and keep in check those tribes beyond the Kei.”

The arrest and conviction of Chief Maqoma, the greatest of the Xhosa fighting leaders, on a charge of instigating the murder of an informer prompted the notion of a clean sweep of all the chiefs, many of whom were transported for receiving stolen property.

Mhala's trial and conviction opened up the whole of the coastal district to white settlement. The expulsion of Sarhili more than doubled the size of British Kaffraria, and was also intended for European settlement. Only the financial reticence of the Colonial Office baulked this particular design of Grey and Maclean.

The "chiefs' plot" was thus imperceptibly converted from an honest mistake to a

Specious rationalization. Thereafter it became, for Grey, a weapon with which to save his reputation.

**References:**

1 On the spread of lungsickness, GH 28/70, J.Jackson to G. Grey, 5 Feb. 1856; GH 8/28, C. Brownlee to J. Maclean, 6 Feb. 1856; E. Robertson to J. Maclean, 30 July 1856; Ace. 793, J. Gawler to F. Reeve, 7July 1856; Grahamstown Journal, 24 March 1855;MS 7639, Cory Library, Grahamstown, B. Ross to J. Ross, 8 May 1854; N. J. Merriman, The Cape Journals of Archdeacon Merriman (Cape Town, 1957), 215.

2 See, for example, the list enclosed in G. Grey to H. Labouchere, 3 Oct. 1856,Imperial Blue Book 2352 of 1857, 35.

3 GH 8/49. J. Maclean to G. Grey, 21 July 1856; G. Grey to H. Labouchere, 3 Oct.

1856, Imperial Blue Book 2352 of 1857, 34 ff

4 J. Peires, The House of Phalo (Johannesburg. 1981), 152-54.

5 GH 8/27, C. Canham to B. Nicholson, 30 Sept. 1855, enclosed in J. Maclean to J. Jackson, 16 Oct. 1855.

6 GH 20/2/1, 'Information received from a shrewd and trustworthy native', 14 Oct.

1855; GH 8/28, J. Ayliff to J. Maclean, 26 May 1856.

7 BK 70, C. Brownlee to J. Maclean, 18 Aug. 1856.

8 BK 373, J. Maclean to W. Liddle, 4 Aug. 1856 on the crucial question of when lungsickness became general in the Ngqika district, but it is tempting to ascribe the increasing tempo of Ngqika cattle-killing after the second wave of prophecies, in September 1856, to the slow spread of the disease. Important support for this hypothesis comes from the case of Chief Feni, who opposed the movement from its inception in May1856 right through the Great Disappointment of February 1857 until April 1857, when lungsickness broke out among his own cattle and he too began to slaughter despite the palpable failure of the prophecies.

9 BK 71, C. Brownlee to J. Maclean, 1 May 1857.

10 Grahamstown Journal, 29 Sept. 1856; BK 24, J. Douglas to J. Maclean, 21 Oct. 1856.

11 Merriman, Journals, 216; Grahamstown Journal, 4 Aug., 8 Sept. 1855; GH 8/49,J. Maclean to G. Grey, 31 July 1856; GH 8/28, C. Brownlee to J. Maclean, 5 April 1856;GH 28/70, J. Jackson to G. Grey, 5 Feb. 1856.

12 **John Xavier Merriman** (1841 – 1 August 1926) was the last prime minister of the [Cape Colony](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cape_Colony) before the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910.

He was born in [Street, Somerset](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Street,_Somerset), England. His parents were Nathaniel James Merriman, curate of the parish of Street and later third [Bishop of Grahamstown](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bishop_of_Grahamstown), and the former Julia Potter.

He was Treasurer-General under Rhodes from 1890 to 1893 but he ended his relationship with [Rhodes](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cecil_Rhodes) after the [Jameson Raid](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jameson_Raid) in December 1895. Note, so did Jan Smuts.

Thereafter he became an opponent of the mining interests and British [imperialism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperialism) in Southern Africa. This gained him the sympathy and cooperation of the [Afrikaner Bond](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afrikaner_Bond) led by [Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_Hendrik_Hofmeyr). He was a [member](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_X._Merriman) of the Cape Commission charged with investigating the [Jameson Raid](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jameson_Raid) and was responsible for writing its report. He [again](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_X._Merriman) served as Treasurer General of the Cape in the ministry of [W.P. Schreiner](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Philip_Schreiner) from 1898 to 1900. He tried but failed to prevent the [Second Boer War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Boer_War).

In 1908 his [South African Party](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_African_Party_(Cape_Colony)) together with the Afrikaner Bond won control of the Assembly and he served as Prime Minister of the Cape Colony from 1908 until the formation of the [Union of South Africa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_of_South_Africa) on 31 May 1910.

He was a leading figure in the National Convention which brought about this Union.

 He carried on a lively correspondence with [Jan Christiaan Smuts](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_Smuts), constantly warning him about possibilities of rebellion and civil war with [Afrikaner](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afrikaner) sections of the white population who objected to South African cooperation with Great Britain against Germany in World War I, especially the South African invasion of [German South West Africa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_South_West_Africa), [now](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_X._Merriman) [Namibia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Namibia).

Members of the Illuminati bloodline which carry the Merriman name also included:

* Dwight L. Merriman, Jr; and
* Philip E. Merriman

13 BK 83, H. Vigne to J. Maclean, 27 Feb. 1857; BK 86, F. Reeve to J. Maclean, 27 Nov. 1856; GH 8/31, R. Hawkes to J. Maclean, 17 March 1857; CO 2949, J. Warner to R. Southey, 2 June 1857.

14 GH 8/34, J. Ayliff to J. Maclean, 23 Jan. 1858.

15 Ace. 793, J. Gawler to J. Maclean, 28 July 1857; H. Smith to Earl Grey, 10 May 1851, Imperial Blue Book 1380 of 1851, 19; CO 4386, Information received from Toise,18 March 1852.

16 For the early prophets, see Cape Archives (all following references are from the Cape Archives, unless otherwise specified): BK 70, C. Brownlee to J. Maclean, 11 May 1857.This paragraph and the next draw on my forthcoming book on Nongqawuse and the Xhosa cattle-killing resistance of the unbelievers delayed the inevitable discovery that the prophecies were false. Nongqawuse initially fixed

The date of the general resurrection for mid-August 1856, but she was able

To keep the movement going through disappointments in November 1856, January

1857 and February 1857 until its final extinction with the disappointment of May 1857.

17 See J.B. Peires, 'The central beliefs of the Xhosa cattle-killing', J. Afr. Hist, xxvm (1987).

18 GH 8/35, "Native information received," 7 June 1858.

19 A sojourn in Port Elizabeth found her fleeing back to Alexandria because her life was in danger. Nongqawuse’s grave lies amongst the neat pastures and flat rolling hills on the Fick's property, Glenshaw. They have preserved a small coppice with indigenous trees and shrubs, leaving it looking like a piece of State Forrest where she was originally buried. A large ironstone boulder and bronze plaque erected by an historical society stands at the head of a small mound of earth marking her grave. She died in 1897 aged about fifty-six years, and her two daughters are buried on either side of her grave.

20 Cape Archives, BK 373. The dispatch of 20 March, implicating Moshoeshoe, was published in Blue Book 2352 of 1857, pp. 72, 84. The second dispatch, which is much less plausible, was not, to my knowledge, ever forwarded to London.

21 BK 81, Gawler to Maclean, 21 December 1856.

22 J. Peires, The House of Phalo (Johannesburg. 1981), 152-54.

23 Cape Archives, GH 28/71, Brownlee to Maclean, 2 August 1856.

24 BK 373, Maclean to Grey, 25 March 1857.

25 For instance, the battles of Grahamstown (1819), Gwangqa (1846), and lmvani (1851).

26 GH 8/49, Maclean to Grey, 25 August 1856.

27 BK 14, Barrington to Maclean, 20 June 1857.

28 BK 81, Cawler to Maclean, 14 October 1856, describes Mahala at his most confident.

29 BK 70, Brownlee to Maclean, 19 December 1856.

30 GH 8/49, Maclean to Grey, 3 November 1856.

31 BK 140, H. Vigue to Maclean, 10 November 1856; BK 81, Gawler to Maclean, 23 December 1856.

**Footnote 1: The chiefs’ plot.**

The ‘chiefs’ plot’ was fabricated by officers of the British government to implicate the Xhosa chiefs in a plot of treason against the Crown.

The Crown saw themselves as world conquerors, with an Empire stretching around the globe, ‘where the sun never set.’ They were determined during those times to stamp their authority on this part of our country with their military might, language, culture, religion and colonization, using arrogance and deception to attain their goals. This area was only a small part of their drive to conquer and subdue many nations and territories around the world. Pitted against them were the Xhosas, fiercely independent people with their own well structured society, their own language, culture and religion, all revolving around their powerful Kings, Chiefs and specialist Priest Diviners. Conflict was inevitable and the Xhosas faced insurmountable odds and superior weapons. They also used deception to try and defeat the British and regain their lost land. In many instances individual farmers and traders bore the brunt of their aggression. Everyone who lived in this area during that time made huge sacrifices.

One should be disturbed to think that the Xhosas beheaded British soldiers, taking their heads back to their King as trophies. However it was all-out war, with no holds barred on either side. Sir George Grey, British Governor and High Commissioner in southern Africa made it part of his strategy to undermine and destroy the power of Xhosa Chiefs in a more subtle, insidious way, which included using Robben Island to where he banished indigenous Chiefs for long periods. Chiefs, summonsed to meetings with him, were expected to grovel on their knees, and kiss his feet in a supposed demonstration of their subservience to British authority.

A determined Colonial Governor, sheltered by time and distance from his superiors in London, found it easy to manipulate official dispatches. Sir Benjamin D'Urban destroyed the arrangements of his hated subordinate Stockenstrom by the simple expedient of delaying to forward his dispatches.

Sir Harry Smith won Colonial Office approval for many of his acts by writing hopelessly optimistic accounts of his victories.

The nineteenth-century Colonial Office had very little control over a Governor once his ship had sailed. There were no effective sanctions short of total recall in unpredictable circumstances where Governors who went by the book, often came to grief. A governor who delivered the goods was forgiven any number of detectable misrepresentations, and even the occasional downright lie.

Resident Missionaries, during the turbulent years of conflict, were despised by the Military, because they tended to report back to England in a different vein from military reports, and were judged as troublemakers. Heated debates in Parliament bore witness to those differences, and conflicting reports appeared regularly in the British press.

The time for deception, senseless violence, judgment of the past and racism has been left simmering over more than two centuries between the races.   
The noble spirit of “Ubuntu”, still so prevalent amongst Xhosa people, needs to come forward and dominate, because that alone will defeat the cancerous, destructive power of “Umona,” conspired to destroy the South African nation.

After the ‘cattle slaughtering’ by the amaXhosa that left their nation starving, Commissioner Maclean formulated indictments against the Xhosa chiefs.

**Maclean’s indictments**

Maclean himself recognized that his indictments failed to produce anything convincing, when he concluded his dispatch against Sarhili as follows:

“While aware that many of the points adduced carry little weight when taken singly, yet it appears on a general view that some are not to be explained on the supposition of a mere political delusion, while all agree with the view that the superstition was made use of to attain a political result.1

Most of Maclean's dispatches were taken up with a recitation of information which was perfectly correct, but quite consistent with the 'sincere belief' interpretation (for example, that many of the chiefs involved were hostile to the Colony or that Sarhili had ordered his subordinates to kill their cattle).

Maclean also retailed a number of quite unfounded rumors (for example, that Sarhili and Umhlakaza had secretly preserved their own cattle2). See Footnote 2 for Maclean’s political style.

Maclean devoted an entire dispatch to the alleged involvement of Moshoeshoe in a conspiracy with Sarhili to use the “cattle slaughter” as a tool by which to instigate war against the British Crown,3 to which he included statements of those who claimed to have heard personal declarations from Sarhili himself that his object was war.3a

Many senior Cape officials dismissed the Moshoeshoe dispatch with expressions such as "little more than hearsay" and "no adequate proof,”4 including Cape Attorney-General William Porter, who was skeptical all along of the notion of a "chiefs' plot.”5

Charles Brownlee, the Ngquika agent, was an experienced frontiersman and fluent in Xhosa, and was prominent in supplying the information on which the "chiefs' plot” hypothesis was based. In his later years he rejected the "chiefs’ plot” as an explanation of the cattlekilling.6

The Cape Governor Grey was determined to return the recently independent Orange Free State to be ruled by the Crown, and it was very much in his interests to quarrel with the neighboring Moshoeshoe of the Orange Free State. 7

The evidence against Moshoeshoe, such as it was, was a godsend, and he used it extensively in order to enlarge the scope of his High Commissionership and justify his intervention in the affairs of the Free State. 8 See Footnote 3 - Grey’s political style.

The major obstacle to reunification of the Free State to the British colonies which Grey desired would involve displacement of Moshoeshoe. At that stage, the British government had no taste for any more expensive wars fought for the benefit of land speculators - 139 speculators held 2,500,000 acres9 - and military contractors.

**Alleged involvement of Moshoeshoe**

Moshoeshoe had enormous prestige among the Xhosa after the Battle of Berea in

1852 - as early as 1854, Sarhili's brother Ihoxho had sent to him for the charms which had enabled him to defeat the English.

Moshoeshoe had been in communication with Sarhili since the beginning of the cattle-killing, and he had lied about this when reprimanded by Governor Grey. This communication between the two chiefs formed part of the argument which Maclean used to build the “chief’s plot”. Maclean deduced, from Moshoeshoe's untruth and from the apparent coincidence of phases in the cattle-killing with phases in Sotho-Free State negotiations that Moshoeshoe had helped Sarhili engineer the cattle-killing so that the ensuing frontier war would prevent Cape Boers volunteering to assist the Orange Free State in war.

To note, the Cape Boers were not a major fighting force, and were also not known for their eagerness to volunteer for wars.

The following detailed report of what passed between Moshoeshoe and Sarhili shows clearly that Moshoeshoe was only trying to find out what was going on:

“When they left home they left six Basutos at Kreli's kraal, which had been sent by

Moshesh to their chief to ask the news, and also to see if it was true that the Kaffirs were killing their cattle, and if it was true what Umhlakaza had been telling their people. They also told me that Moshesh was very anxious to know what it all meant,

as he (Moshesh) wished to make himself ready for anything that may happen. Kreli's

men also told me that their chief said to Moshesh's men that all was true.”10

The evidence which Maclean produced to link Sarhili's cattle-killing with the intention of making war on the Colony was based on three statements only, wherein:

(1) Sarhili was supposed to have boasted to Nonesi, the Thembu Regent that he was “prepared for war with the English at any moment.” The report originated with the unbelieving chief Anta, who was anxious for the Colonial authorities to establish a military post in his distant and exposed chiefdom.

To counter this, Honesi's Agent J.C. Warner, a fierce enemy of Sarhili, dismissed this news, saying that “it is not Kaffir policy to make such statements except to those in whom they have the utmost confidence, and who they are quite certain are heart and hand with them.” 11

(2) Major Gawler, the special Magistrate with Mhala, heard that Moshoeshoe had sent the following message to Sarhili:

“My new cattle and people have been given out; are you ready? On the return of this messenger I will move down and join you.” Kreli answers "I am ready," and forwards this news to Sandili, Macomo and Umhala.

Yet Charles Brownless, the Xhosa-speaking agent with the Ngqika, in reporting the same rumor that inspired Gawler's letter, made no mention of this interesting message.12

Neither Moshoeshoe nor Sarhili who had allegedly said they were “ready,” made any aggressive move whatsoever at the time.

(3) A “trustworthy native” informed Maclean on the 8th of December 1856, that Sarhili told him that “it was his intention to make war with the English; that he killed his cattle so as to have not to guard, and therefore have more men available to fight.”

Maclean neglected to mention that when he first received this ‘information’ he dismissed it out of hand because the “trustworthy native” was a Thembu mission Christian who wore European clothes, and he knew that Sarhili would never confide in such a man.”13

**Kwitshi's statements with inference to Chief Mhala in the ‘Chiefs Plot’.**

Mhala, the second-ranking chief in British Kaffraria, ruled the amaNdlambe, whose territory stretched along the seacoast all the way from west of modern East London to the Kei River. At the time of cattle-killing Mhala was growing old and rheumatic. He longed to see his dead father and brothers, and to be made young again. From the beginning, he rushed headlong into the delusion, steadily ignoring skeptical reports about the sacred pool and repeatedly sending fresh delegations to bring back better news. 14

In January 1857, the last desperate month before the Great Disappointment, an eleven-year old girl named Nonkosi began to prophesy at the Mpongo River in Mhala's country.15

She continued to prophesy after the Great Disappointment of 18 February, almost up to the day she was captured.

There was nothing original in Nonkosi's prophecies - they derived from those of

Nongqawuse and simply confirmed that the new people would rise when the cattle were all slaughtered - but they did much to comfort and reassure Mhala, who took to visiting Nonkosi and listening to her tales of the new cattle she had seen and the old chiefs she had spoken with.

On the 22nd of September 1857, Major Gawler's police, “in a playful humor," visited

Nonkosi's place. They found one woman and three children dead, and Nonkosi's crippled father in the last stages of starvation. "He died apparently of fright, when they brought him outside the hut.”16

Maclean wrote to Grey that Nonkosi would be examined, and that "if nothing could be made of her,” she would be kept under surveillance at the Native Hospital in King Williams Town.17

Gawler's initial investigations failed to prove a “chief’s plot” and two weeks after her capture, Maclean wrote to the medical superintendent and asked him to take charge of the prophetess, "as she is reported to be of weak intellect.”

By 15 October Gawler had extracted a ‘coherent’ statement from Nonkosi, in which she described her interviews with the spirit of the war doctor Mlanjeni, in the occasional presence of six departed chiefs, who sat silently on the water "as we sit on the ground."

Gawler concluded that Nonkosi had been "imposed upon by the half-dozen fellows chosen for their general resemblance to the old chiefs they represented.”

When Nonkosi was given over to Maclean, she suddenly and mysteriously broke down and confessed that she had acted on the instructions of Kwitshi.

Nonkosi’s uncle Kwitshi was a leading believer who was councilor in charge of the Mpongo river area.

In his dispatch Maclean remarked that he had asked no further questions "as all necessary information had been obtained, and I was unwilling to continue ... lest ... she should begin to conceal further particulars, or suspected [sic] of inventing them.”

Gawler, who had got nothing out of Nonkosi, sought to make amends with his successful interrogation of Kwitshi. Kwitshi was made to confess that Nonkosi said nothing of her, and included the following statement:

“All that she said was from Umhala through me...The object was a war... the cattle-killing was got up to deprive the people of property that required so many to look after, the people would go more free to fight, and the English would have nothing to take. It failed because it was not done quick enough; half were starved before the other had killed.”

By the time Kwitshi got as far as Maclean, his story had become further embellished. He described how he had impersonated cattle bellowing in the water, and an interpolation in the original script stated the following:

“Whenever I was alone. I could not refrain from laughing when I thought of the deceptions I practiced at vley, and I often roared out "Are Kaffirs fools to be thus deceived?"

Grey urged that Mhala be brought to trial for levying war against the Queen if evidence could be found to convict him. Gawler obligingly persuaded Mhala to visit Maclean and beg for forgiveness so that the Chief Commissioner could arrest him without too much trouble.

Attorney-General Barrington warned that the evidence was yet inadequate and Mhala was allowed to depart in peace.

Barrington personally solved the evidence problem by threatening Kwitshi with a prosecution for robbery, which carried a sentence of twenty years transportation.

Kwitshi then ‘remembered’ several warlike conversations between various chiefs and councilors. He also attempted to break out of prison.

The prosecution of Mhala which followed in October 1858 was led by Major John Cox Gawler, the man responsible for his capture, as well as that of Nonkesi and Kwitshi.

Formerly Mhala's Special Magistrate, Gawler had been three times publicly humiliated by the old chief and finally forced to leave his Great Place.18

Gawler was a great lover of the shambok and the whip. His colleagues joked that one could recognize his men by the welts on their back. His methods of interrogation were described as follows by a mission resident whom Gawler wrongly believed to be a witness to a murder:

“Major Gawler then said, the Missionary has bribed you to deny any knowledge of the case, say what he has given you. I denied the charge when Major Gawler jumped up and struck me thrice with his hand on my face and called for a stick. He ordered a riem to be put around my neck, and taken away a prisoner and tied to a pillar of a hut. Some days after I was taken down to the river, and met some police there who stated they were ordered to take me aside and interrogate me. They then added ‘'What did the missionary do at your place. He must have gone to warn you what to say." I held to my former statement. I was then taken to the kraal and the two police went in the direction of Major Gawler's house. At the kraal, all the police surrounded me saying “Why will you die by hiding what the Missionary said to you. You will be transported with Sibunu. Say did he give you a cow or money”.”

Gawler's actions had been based on the casual evidence of a nine-year-old boy, and the case was solved when the alleged murder victim was found to be still alive.

Kwitshi's confession to Gawler conflicted with that of Nonkosi in respect of the all-important issue of MhaIa's complicity in the alleged deception. In his initial statements of October and November 1857, and again in January 1858, Kwitshi stated that he had instructed Nonkosi on Mhala's orders. In this early version Mhala had never himself given Nonkosi instructions. By the trial (October 1858), Kwitshi was saying that Mhala had personally described to Nonkosi the appearance of his dead relatives, and that he had told her he approved of Kwitshi's actions.

Nonkosi's evidence was consistent throughout, and stated that Mhala was not implicated in the deception in any way. In one (unpublished) examination, Nonkesi maintained that Kwitshi deliberately misled Mhala into thinking that he was away precisely so that Mhala would not guess that he was manipulating Nonkosi from the bushes.

This discrepancy was not questioned by the court during Mhala’s trial. **British**

**Kaffraria had been under martial law since its inception and Grey had set up special tribunals to try chiefs and other offenders for the purpose of transporting them. The court was composed entirely of officers and officials. There was no jury and no defense counsel.**

Of the six witnesses Mhala had wished to call, only two, namely Gawler and Mhala's

renegade son Smith, actually appeared. Although he was not familiar with British legal procedure, Mhala was able to make one telling point in cross-examining Nonkosi - that the alleged deceptions were instigated not by himself but by Kwitshi.

William Porter, the Cape Attorney-General, commented that the verdict was a foregone conclusion, in his following statement:

“I cannot, however, say that the evidence appears to me to be such as would satisfy a Jury composed of strangers to the country. I mean no disrespect to Members of the court when I say that, in all probability, they were perfectly satisfied before the trial began that plots had been hatching, and that, where plots were hatching, the old

Kaffraria Fox was sure to be at work. They had no need of witnesses. But had they brought skeptical doubts, instead of formed convictions, to the trial of the case, I lean to the conclusion that much more evidence would have been obtained, and that the evidence actually given, would scarcely have been deemed conclusive.”

Porter attacked the court for failing to ask Nonkosi whether she had ever been personally instructed by Mhala, and added that the evidence of the child Nonkosi should have been preferred to that of Kwitshi in the event of any discrepancy.

On the broader legal front, Porter pointed out that Mhala was being tried under laws passed after the creation of British Kaffraria, and therefore inapplicable to it. There was considerable doubt that Mhala was a "subject of our lady the Queen" in the legal sense, which meant that he could not be charged with treason. Porter concluded his comment by pointing out that if Mhala was indeed a threat to the peace of the country, it would be far better for the integrity of British justice that he be detained under martial law than convicted "under an inapplicable statute, supported by what strikes me as somewhat defective evidence."

Grey could have called a mistrial and started all over again, as he had done when his kangaroo court had found chief Phato innocent of the charges against him.

Instead, "so that Umhala might have the benefit of the Attorney-General's opinion,” Grey sentenced the old chief to five years' transportation, with provision for remission of sentence, "if it should subsequently be thought that the Attorney-General is right and I am wrong.”

Whereas the other chiefs had been convicted for ordinary crimes committed after the Great Disappointment, Mhala alone was charged with treason. Not only he, but the whole cattle-killing movement, was in the dock for levying war against the Queen. Had the trial been successful, Mhala would have been transported for life and the cattle-killing exposed as a treacherous plot. By retreating in the face of Porter's carefully reasoned arguments, Grey tacitly admitted that he was wrong, that Mhala was innocent, and that the "chiefs' plot' remained, at most, an unproven assumption.

Having already destroyed all his cattle and all his corn, having already driven his subjects into a state of utter want and desperation, having already defied and antagonized the terrible Gawler and Maclean, Mhala had done more than enough to provoke a war, had such been his intention. There was no need to waste time listening to the stories of a nine-year-old girl, or to slaughter his last surviving beast, the great ox of his revered father. As Mhala told his judges, he had slaughtered on account of Nongwawuse, not on account of a war. His final appeal included the following statement:

“I have nothing further to say but I wish this recorded and await what is in the heart of the court and beg them to remember that words do not perish, that though I may die, that nothing hereafter may arise to disturb you. People die of sickness, and are killed in war; my words seem few but they are long enough.”

Although Grey had intended the trial of Mhala to be the final proof that-the cattle-killing was a plot of the chiefs, it proved instead that if any plots were afoot, they were the plots not of the chiefs but of Sir George Grey himself.

**Footnote 2: McLean’s political style**

Colonel John Mclean was chiefly responsible for executing Grey's policy in British Kaffraria. His entire administrative career was spent on the Cape Eastern Frontier.

Maclean remained a strong advocate of colonial expansion and was reproved by Governor Cathcart for advocating settler colonization of the Keiskammahoek Crown Reserve.19

Like Grey, Maclean had a strong sense of his own dignity and resented advice from other officials, particularly those who, unlike himself, spoke the Xhosa language. He viewed a man such as Charles Brownlee as unduly sympathetic to the Xhosa and therefore liable to be misled by them.20

Maclean also resembled Grey in his inclination towards conspiracy theories. In 1854, before Grey's arrival, he became convinced that the Mfengu were conspiring with the Xhosa against the Colony- -a ludicrous suggestion, considering that the British had recently settled the Mfengu on land confiscated from the Xhosa, and one which was conclusively refuted by an official enquiry.21

Nevertheless, in later years, Maclean and Grey were in the habit of referring to the "Fingo alliance" as an established fact.22

The views of Grey and Maclean on the future of British Kaffraria were consistent and identical. Both wanted to turn a Crown Colony inhabited almost exclusively by its indigenous population into a colony of white settlement modeled on Grey’ s beloved New Zealand. Grey was the more visionary of the two and saw more readily the opportunities opened up by the cattle-killing. Maclean was initially more hesitant, but when he saw that the power of the Xhosa was indeed broken, he joined in the pursuit with a vengeance. The “chiefs' plot" was their rationalization for the ruthlessness with which they treated a shattered people.

**Footnote 3: Grey's political style**

As a writer of misleading dispatches, Grey stands in a class of his own.

the military historian Ian Wards found it difficult "to find one important subject about which Grey did not lie or, the more favorable view, which he did not misrepresent.”23

Dalton refers to Grey's "ruthless egotism, to which he would sacrifice anything and anybody, his contempt for truth.”24

The biographer Even Rutherford remarked that Grey "did not stop short of defamation and untruth in his ruthless determination to have his way.”25

When Grey was recalled from South Africa in 1859, he claimed that the reason therefore was not because he had defied the Colonial Office over German immigration, over troops for India, over the British Kaffraria constitution, and over federation with the Orange Free State, but because he had ‘heroically’ refused to appoint a relative of Lord Derby to a vacant post.

Through sheer luck and brilliant opportunism, Grey's Xhosa policy turned out a resounding success. Not so his other ventures. By the time of his recall, Grey had disregarded direct instructions from London on no fewer than five occasions, each sufficient in itself to warrant his recall.

He had failed to promulgate the Letters Patent for British Kaffraria, preferring to keep the territory under his unchallenged control;

He had failed to render accounts for the £40.000 per annum subsidy spent there;

He had refused to send the troops which the War Office demanded for the Indian Mutiny; and

he had ordered more German settlers after being refused permission to do so; and he had kept the German Legion on full pay when they were supposed to be pensioners.

When he was recalled from New Zealand in 1867, he claimed that this was not because he had twice reversed himself on the vital questions of land confiscation, or because he had quarreled pointlessly and provocatively with two successive military commanders, or because he had delayed the embarkation of troops for more than two years, but because his army Commander had poisoned the mind of the British Government by a series of malicious secret reports.26

In several of the official dispatches, there can be no mistaking the note of genuine hysteria which underlay Grey's habitual pose of injured innocence. Grey reasoned as follows:

“I may be wrong, but I ought to state my belief that it is impossible to read these communications without coming to the conclusion that a feeling of personal ill-will towards myself is manifested in them. I am beset by cares and difficulties, which occupy my mind incessantly and wear out my health ... I certainly feel it hard that the reward I should receive should be to have my spirit broken.27

“I can assure you, that under present arrangements, there is but little use in my being here, and I can not help suffering under the depressing feeling that the means necessary to give me any fair chance of success are denied to me.28

In New Zealand, Great Britain had guaranteed Maori land by the Treaty of Waitangi, and the Crown had chartered land companies whose chief objective was to take it away. Grey took his stand with the Crown, and legitimated his actions in terms of convenient Maori conspiracies. In the Maori War of 1846, for example, Grey was frustrated by his inability to capture his principal opponent, Te Rangihaeta. Desperate for a decisive victory, he seized Te Rangihaeata's unsuspecting uncle, Te Rauparaha, instead, and denounced him—without any hard evidence—as the “head of a very dangerous and extensive conspiracy.”29

Similarly, when Grey decided to clear the Waikato district for European settlement (in his second New Zealand governorship, 1863), he justified himself by claiming that the Waikato Maori intended to attack Auckland. Of the eighteen letters he cited as evidence, only three had been written before he took the decision to invade the Waikato, and of these three only one might have been received.30

The hallmark of Grey's political style was to disguise his victims as evil conspirators by means of dubious and often fabricated evidence.

**Footnote 4: Official Dispatches**

Initially Colonial Governors and their subordinates had used official dispatches to convey information and explain their actions. But because many of these dispatches were eventually published, official dispatches came to contain not so much the whole truth, but rather as much of the good news as the responsible official wanted to send and as little of the bad news as he thought he could get away with.

Along with the official dispatches, which were intended for public consumption, there arose a parallel correspondence of private letters, euphemistically referred to as "demi-officials." No historian who has seen the private correspondence of a pair of friendly officials wastes too much time with their official correspondence.31

Several of the surviving private letters of Grey’s officials at the Cape clearly demonstrate the light in which they viewed their official correspondence.

Grey's private secretary, Major Travers, went so far as to ask Maclean not to bother him with official correspondence:

“Do not blame me if you do not get your schedules, for since I was knocked off my interest has declined and I never open the officials though they are sometimes given to me by Sir George.”32

Maclean himself was not above using the official format as a means of playing an ironical joke on his friends, as this response shows:

“Thank you for your note and official which occasioned me a good laugh. Only don't think you have taken the rib out of me as you may imagine--I enclose an answer to the official which you will be pleased to consider written from the Military Chaplain to the High Commissioner and not from George Dacres to his old friend of the 27th, and therefore can be interpreted in a Pickwickian sense even as your official has been interpreted by me.”33

The private/official distinction was employed more often for sinister than for humorous purposes. Sir Walter Currie who commanded Grey's Thembu filibuster in 1858, preferred to keep his account private, “believing that I can convey more information in this way than would be expedient or necessary to put in an official shape.”34

When the pro-Government chief Siwani committed a particularly brutal double murder, his magistrate wrote privately to Maclean that “I have not entered my letter in the letterbook nor shall I till I hear from you whether it is necessary to put it on record."35

**Footnote 5: Discussion on the memorandum by Grey on Kreli’s conduct.**

This document clearly demonstrates the manner in which Grey deliberately twisted information to suit his own purposes. Grey borrowed many of his points from Maclean's dispatches, to which we have already referred.

Great weight was laid on the 8 December statement of the Christian, Thembu, which Maclean had initially rejected. Another important piece of "evidence'" was that of Possi, an official messenger sent by Sarhili’s to Maclean to inform him that the Thembu had killed Sarhili’s brother, and to ask his permission to launch a retaliatory attack against them.

Possi repeated Sarhili's request for help and forgiveness painting a picture of starvation and depopulation. He also spoke rather freely about matters that can have formed no part of his official message--that Sarhili was frightened by the transportation of the other chiefs that rumors about the Indian Mutiny were rife, and that Kreli has not abandoned plans for war. In his house, he states that at present there can be no war on account of the destitution, but he still looks forward to a time when the people will have plenty and be in a position to renew hostilities against the English.

It is unlikely that this was a total fabrication, and yet it is even more unlikely that an official messenger would thus casually divulge an important secret which utterly contradicted the message with which he was sent. The most probable explanation is that Maclean, by means of leading questions and lavish presents, elicited some of Sarhili's reminiscences about past glories.

Taken as a whole, Possi's information shows clearly that Sarhili was militarily very weak and so frightened of the power of the Colony that he was unwilling even to avenge his brother without asking Maclean's permission first. But even if the damning quotation is taken at face value, it does not justify Grey's writing to the Colonial Secretary that “Kreli was openly proclaiming. . . that he looked forward to a speedy time when his people would be able to renew hostilities with the English.”

Possi had, after all, said that Sarhili's alleged comments were made "in his house" and he had said nothing about a "speedy" time.

Grey's memorandum to the Cape Assembly said that, in the light of Possi's information “the matter [Sarhili's expulsion] now became one of life and death to the Colony." As we have seen, Possi had confirmed Sarhili's weakness, and Grey had decided to settle Europeans in his country more than nine months previously.

For the rest, Grey's memorandum amply confirms the judgment of one Colonial official who had personal dealings with Grey:

“He throws out such a cloud of words that it is difficult to know what he does assert and what he does not.”

In this particular memorandum, Grey demonstrated his mastery of the art of insinuation, as the following extracts show:

“. . . whilst professing the greatest friendship, with extraordinary secrecy and cunning,

Kreili formed a plot, which soon assumed a formidable aspect. To encourage those who embarked on it, allegations were made that the: English had been worsted in the Russian War.”

The casual reader would infer that Sarhili himself had made these allegations, and it is clearly Grey's intention that he should do so. But if Grey was challenged by someone who knew that this was nonsense, he could excuse himself on the grounds that he had not actually named Sarhili. Into this plot Kreili drew nearly all the Kaffir Chiefs, had several of those robbed and murdered who did not fall in with it.

The positioning of this passage near the beginning of the memorandum suggests that the murders and robberies occurred during the organization of the cattle-killing. In fact the robberies began only after the Great Disappointment and there was only one political murder. Grey did not have any direct evidence linking Surhili to any of these crimes, and named no examples.

To his statement: “On our North Eastern border, close to Kreili's residence, hostile movements were made against us, who had in no way offended him, who had done him no wrong. People were attacked, plundered, slain; our farmers were robbed by hostile bands made up in part of his people, and booty was swept off into his Territory, himself and his followers took their share of it,” Grey did not mention that the "hostile movements" were organized by the Thembu chief Fadana, or that he knew from Fadana's own confession that Sarhili was implicated only in a single raid, which had been directed against Thembu unbelievers and not against the Colony and had yielded no more than eleven cattle.

But the most astonishing crime of all that Grey laid at Sarhili's door was the following:

“By his intrigues compelled the Government to receive a large number of people within the Colony in rear of our lines where they were so scattered throughout it, that in many parts, every farm house was garrisoned by Kreili. . .His scouts may be said to have been everywhere.”

So this was it, the true explanation of the cattle-killing! Sarhili's grand design had not therefore been to send desperate hordes rushing into a determined attack, as Maclean and Grey himself had always maintained. Nor was the cattle-killing movement itself a dreadful failure, as Grey had asserted whenever he wanted to prove his worth at the Colonial Office.

On this new interpretation, the misery and degradation of the cattle-killing was a resounding success, precisely what the crafty Xhosa king had aimed at from the very beginning. 30,000 warriors had cleverly infiltrated the Colony on the pretence of starving to death!

Only the foresight of Sir George Grey had prevented them striking a mortal blow.

With this final rhetorical flourish, Grey achieved the reduction ad absurdum of his interpretation of the "chiefs' plot," contradicting, as if incidentally, everything that he and his officers had ever said about it. It only goes to show how far Grey was prepared to push an argument that had, from the first, lacked any basis in fact.

This last extract was written in September 1858, eighteen months after the Great Disappointment, and six months after Sarhili had been driven out of the country:

“Nearly every Tribe in the Interior of Kaffraria, from the Bashee to the Umzimvubu.

has its prophet, who almost daily harangues the people and tells them that the black

nations of the East have nearly extirpated the English; that Moshesh has settled the

Boers; and that we are a doomed people.”

Grey continued with his reports on wars until he left South Africa, of which we show the following:

“The chiefs are still plotting, but now the guilty chiefs are those who live between the Mbashe and the Mzlmvubu, the next slice of independent black territory alongside the swollen boundaries of British Kaffraria.”

The following month, Grey returned to another familiar theme. Efforts were being made "to form a general combination of the colored races against the European population of this country”.

Grey's greed for the Orange Free State (which led to his recall in June 1859) prevented the discovery of more chiefs' plots which would have 'necessitated' the annexation of all the black-ruled territory between the Cape and Natal. Certainly, Grey did all he could during his brief second Governorship (1860-61) to further this objective.

**References:**

1 BK 373, Maclean to Grey, 20 and 25 March 1857.

2 For Umhlakaza, BK 14, Examination before the Chief Commissioner of Nombanda the prophetess, 28 February 1858; for Sarhili, GH 8/33, Crouch to Maclean, 9 November 1857.

3 BK 373, Maclean to Grey, 20 March 1957

3a BK 373, Maclean to Grey, 20 March 1957.

4 GH 20/2/1, H. Rivers, 1 April 1857; W. Field, 31 March 1857.

5 GH 8/36, Memorandum by William Porter, 6 November 1858, enclosed in Schedule 129, 5 October 1858.

6 Brownlee loc cit 142. W.R.D. Fynn, Gawler's interpreter, however reaffirmed his belief in the "chiefs' plot" many years later; see Cape Parliamentary Paper G4 of 1883, 26970.

7 George E. Cory, The Rise of South Africa, (6 vols. Cape Town, 1910-40), 6:12.

8 Our interpretation here reverses that traditionally held, namely, that Moshoeshoe's plotting drove Grey to seek greater powers for the High Commissionership. See, for example, C.W. De Kiewiet, British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics (London, 1929), chapters 7 and 8.

9 George E. Cory, The Rise of South Africa, (6 vols. Cape Town, 1910-40), 6: pg ll4.

10 Office of the Justice of the Peace, Wittebergen, 28 October 1856, Annexure in 2352 of 1857, p. 80

11 GH 8/49, J. Warner to Maclean, 29 Nov. 1856. Warner was not himself averse on other occasions to spreading false rumors about Sarhili. See GH 8/48, W.G.B. Shepstone to Maclean, 15 June 1860.

12 Both versions enclosed in 2352 of 1857, p. 82.

13 GH 8/30, "Information communicated to the Chief Commissioner,” 8 Dec. 1856.

14 BK 81, J. Gawler to Maclean, 7 November 1856.

15 The first report on Nonkosi is BK 81. Gawler to Maclean, 26 January 1857.

16 Acc 793, Gawler letterbook. Gawler to Maclean. 22 September 1857.

17 GH 8/50. Maclean to Grey, 24 September 1857.

18 Gawler had formed a special police force of unbelievers which rampaged through the coastal district, searching out property stolen by the starving believers and revenging themselves for earlier sufferings during the height of the delusion. Gawler’s reign of terror led Vigne, the neighboring magistrate, to complain to Maclean as follows:

“If you approve of all these acts, which are in my opinion defeating justice and degrading the office of magistrate into one I have no wish to fulfill the duties of, I trust you will inform me. Things are daily happening that I neither have conscience nor inclination for.”

19 G. Cathcart to Maclean, 19 January 1854, #1969 of 1855, 17-18.

20 Cape Archives, Acc 611/7 Maclean to J. Bissett, 19 March, 4 June 1860.

21 Report of Special Commissioner appointed in inquire into the present state of the Fingoe Locations. 22 January 1855, 1969 of 1855, 42-5 1 .

22 For example, in BK 373, Maclean to Grey, 20 March 1857.

23 Ian Wards. The Shadow of the Land (Wellington, 1968). 39l.

24 B..J. Dalton, War and Politics in New Zealand, 1855-1870 (Sydney, 1967), 259.

25 James Rutherford, Sir George Grey K.C.B. (London. 1961). 141.38. Ibid., 425.

26 Dalton, War and Politics, 212-17, 258.

27 Quoted in Rutherford, George Grey, 399.

28 Quoted in Dalton, War and Politics, 160.

29 Wards, Shadow, 276-81; Rutherford, George Grey, 110-1 4 .

30 Rutherford, George Grey, 489; Dalton, War and Society, 176-79. I would like to thank Professor Dalton for his helpful comments on Grey's career in New Zealand.

31 For example, the private correspondence of Sir Benjamin D'Urban and Colonel Harry Smith. MS 2033, Cory Library. Rhodes University, Grahamstown.

32 BK 2, F. Travers to Maclean, 27 November 1858.

33 BK 90, G. Dacres to Maclean, 22 September 1854.

34 CH 20/2/1, W. Currie to Grey, 12 March 1858.

35 GH 8/50, R. Hawkes to Maclean, 14 March 1857.

**k) The 9th Anglo-Xhosa War 1873**

Known as **"Ngcayechibi's War".**

The last war marked the last attempt by the [Xhosa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_people), many of whom were returning from diamond fields, to regain control of their land.

**(i) Background**

In 1857 the Cape received a new group of settlers. These were the Corps of German Volunteers. They were raised in Britain for the Crimea, but the war ended before they were shipped out. Instead of releasing them to wander about England, they were offered the chance to go to South Africa. They gratefully accepted the offer and 3,000 people, mostly men, moved to the Cape. They arrived fully armed and would be used, if the need arose, as an emergency militia. Many were to join the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (FAMP).

In 1869 the Tembu, another Xhosa tribe, suffered from witchdoctor problems. Then in 1873 the Langalibalele Rebellion broke out.   
By the mid 1870's the fortunes of the Xhosa hit rock bottom while those of the Mfengu were on the rise.

An inter- tribal barroom brawl between the Mfengu and [Sarhili](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sarhili&action=edit&redlink=1)'s [Gcalekas](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gcaleka) triggered the 9th - and final - Cape Frontier War.

On the same day as the bar fight, the Gcaleka attacked a police outpost in the Gwadana Mountains. Even though the outpost was reinforced by a party of Mfengu, it was forced to retreat when their cannon broke down. When summoned to meet the British Commissioner [Frere](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frere) at [King William's Town](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/King_William%27s_Town), the Gcaleka chief refused.

**(ii) The War**

On September 29th 8,000 Gcaleka warriors attacked the police station at Ibeka. With the firepower of breech-loading Snider rifles, the Frontier Armed And Mounted Police (FAMP) were able to drive off the Xhosa.

At N'Amaxa and Kentani the warriors charged across open ground against British forces in defensive positions. With the increased firepower of the Martini-Henry the British soldiers were able cut down the charging warriors before they could get close.

On October 9th two more engagements were fought. A troop of under Major Elliot defeated a minor Xhosa tribe. Meanwhile Inspector Hook had his hands full with the attack on the outpost of Lusizi.

With a force of police and Native levies, Colonel Griffith was able to push the Xhosa east, past the Bashee River.

Thinking the Xhosa were defeated, Griffith released his levies from service. The Xhosa were only regrouping, however. In December, Sandile and the Ngqika joined the war and several small actions were fought. In one of these, Major Moore, of the Connaught Rangers, won the first Victoria Cross awarded in South Africa while defending a postal convoy.   
The battle at Kentani ended the war for the Galeka, but Sandile was still on the loose.

The Ngqika Chief was chased through the mountains and down into the Great Fish River bush. It was there, near the outpost of Isidenge, that Sandile was brought down by a “stray” bullet. Sandile's son, Siyolo, was killed by a German volunteer shortly thereafter.   
  
The loss of the great chief Sandile brought the last Cape Frontier war to an end. The new leaders of the Xhosa were men educated in the missionary schools, not the hereditary chiefs or witch-doctors of the old days. The ancient and traditional Xhosa way of life had come to the "End of the trek."

**(iii) Outcome of the war**

All [Xhosa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xhosa_people) territory became part of the Cape Colony after the 9th Anglo-Xhoza War.

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  + The First and Second Wars p. 238
  + Third War pp. 238–239
  + The War of the Axe p. 239
  + Extension of British Sovereignty p. 239
  + War of 1850–1853 pp. 239–240
  + The Great Amaxosa Delusion p. 240

Further reading:

* [List of wars](http://www.justdone.co.za/ROH/List_Wars.asp)
* [Irregular units of the 7th Xhosa War](http://rapidttp.com/milhist/vol013jh.html)
* [Burgher Commandos of the 7th Xhosa War](http://rapidttp.com/milhist/vol021jh.html)
* [HIS 311 Lecture on Southern Africa 1800–1875](http://courses.wcupa.edu/jones/his311/lectures/22sa-boe.htm)
* [Fifth Kaffir War 1818–1819](http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/kilo/kaffir1818.htm)
* [Nxele, Xhosa prophet who predicted that Xhosa ancestors would rise from the dead and win the battle](http://www.bethel.edu/~letnie/AfricanChristianity/SSAXhosa.html)

**The Anglo-Zulu War 1879**

The Anglo-Zulu war of 1879 followed shortly after Sir Theophilus Shepstone invaded the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek Boer Republic which bordered the Zulu kingdom in 1877 and became administrator of the Transvaal.

He set about expanding the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek border into Zulu territory and called a meeting with Zulu notables at Blood River in October 1877. Shepstone attempted to placate the Zulu with paternal speeches, however they were unconvinced and accused Shepstone of betraying them. Shepstone's subsequent reports to Lord Carnarvon then began to paint the Zulu as an aggressive threat where he had previously presented Cetshwayo in a most favourable light.1

The Zulu chief [Cetshwayo kaMpande](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cetshwayo_kaMpande) was against the British colonization of South Africa, and his premonitions were correct. It turned out that he was the last independent Zulu King. The name Cetshwayo means ‘The Slandered One’.

In February 1878 a commission was appointed by [Henry Bulwer](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Ernest_Gascoyne_Bulwer), the lieutenant-governor of Natal since 1875, to report on the boundary question. The commission reported in July and found almost entirely in favour of the contention of the Zulu.

Sir Henry Bartle Frere, then high commissioner of the Cape, was pressing forward with Lord Carnarvon’s federation plan to annex South Africa as a colony of the Crown. Frere characterized the award as "one-sided and unfair to the Boers,"2 stipulated that on the land being given to the Zulu, the Boers living on it should be compensated if they left, or protected if they remained.

In addition, Frere planned to use the meeting on the boundary commission report with the Zulu representatives to also present a surprise [ultimatum](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultimatum) he had devised that would allow British forces under Lord Chelmsford, which he had previously been instructed to use only in defense against a Zulu invasion of Natal, to instead invade Zululand.

In July 1878, Frere began claiming that Natal was threatened by a possible Zulu invasion and pushed for war despite London’s desire for patience and doing everything to prevent war.

A lack on a contiguous line of communication from London to South Africa enabled Frere and Shepstone to push their agenda faster than London could react.

Three incidents occurred in late July, August and September (see Footnote 1. Zulu incidents used as an excuse for war by the Crown), which Frere seized upon as his ‘[causus belli](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causus_belli)’ and were the basis for the ultimatum to which Frere knew Cetshwayo could not comply,3 giving Frere a pretext to attack the Zulu kingdom.4

Frere felt that the technological advantage of Lord Chelmsford’s British army would facilitate a quick end to the conflict. Frere intercepted a request from Bulwer regarding the incidents to Cetshwayo and turned it into a demand. See Footnote 2 for Correspondence between Bulwer, Cetshwayo, Frere and others.

After considerable discussion and exchanges of views between Sir Bartle Frere and Sir [Henry Ernest Gascoyne Bulwer](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Ernest_Gascoyne_Bulwer), it was decided to arrange a meeting with representatives of the Zulu king. The ostensible reason for this ‘indaba’ was to present the findings of the long-awaited Boundary Commission to the Zulu people. The occasion was also to be used to present the king with an ultimatum.

By the time the ultimatum was presented, the incidents which had formed the bases of the interference of the Crown with the domestic situation of the Zulu Kingdom were only part of the justification used, as several matters had been added to the list in the meantime. One of these was Cetshwayo’s apparent breaking of promises he had given to the then Mr Theophilus Shepstone at the king’s 'coronation' in 1872. This farcical piece of theatre had been agreed to by Cetshwayo simply to satisfy the wishes of Shepstone and meant nothing to the Zulu people. His real Zulu installation had taken place several weeks earlier when he had been acclaimed by his izinduna.5

A second addition to the ultimatum required the surrender of Mbelini kaMswati. Mbelini was the son of a [Swazi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swazi_people) king who unsuccessfully disputed the succession with his brother, resulting in his exile from the kingdom. He took refuge with Cetshwayo and was granted land in the region of the [Intombe River](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intombe_River) in western Zululand. Mbelini kaMswati had taken up residence on the

[Tafelberg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tafelberg,_South_Africa), a flat-topped mountain overlooking the river, from where he made raids on anyone in his area, Boer and Zulu alike, accruing cattle and prisoners in the process. With the annexation of the Transvaal, Britain had also to deal with Mbelini and because Frere was convinced that the bandit chief was in the pay of the Zulu king, his surrender was included in the ultimatum. The light in which Mbelini was regarded is shown in a paragraph from a memorandum written by Sir Henry Bulwer:

"The King disowned Umbilini’s acts by saying that Umbilini had been giving him trouble, that he had left the Zulu country in order to wrest the Swazi chieftainship from his brother, the reigning Chief, and that if he returned he should kill him. But there is nothing to show that he has in any way punished him, and, on the contrary, it is quite certain that even if Umbilini did not act with the express orders of Cetshwayo, he did so with the knowledge that what he was doing would be agreeable to the King."6

Frere was accused of chicanery by taking deliberate advantage of the length of time it took for correspondence to pass between South Africa and London to conceal his intentions from his political masters, or at least defer giving them the necessary information until it was too late for them to act. The first intimation to the British government of his intention to make 'demands' on the Zulu was in a private letter to Hicks Beach written on 14 October 1878. The letter only arrived in London on 16 November and by then messengers had already been despatched from Natal to the Zulu king to request the presence of a delegation at the Lower Tugela on 11 December for the purpose of receiving the Boundary Commission’s findings. Had Hicks Beach then sent off a telegraph forbidding any action other than the announcement of the boundary award, it might have arrived in South Africa just in time to prevent the ultimatum being presented. No prohibition was sent in time to prevent the delegation for Hicks Beach did not realise the urgency of the events that were in train. Nowhere in Frere’s letter was there anything to indicate how soon he intended to act, nor was there anything to suggest how stringent his demands would be.

In January 1879 Hicks Beach wrote to Bartle Frere:

"I may observe that the communications which had previously been received from you had not entirely prepared them" (Her Majesty's Government) "for the course which you have deemed it necessary to take. The representations made by Lord Chelmsford and yourself last autumn as to the urgent need of strengthening Her Majesty's forces in South Africa were based upon the imminent danger of an invasion of Natal by the Zulus, and the inadequate means at that time at your disposal for meeting it. In order to afford protection to the lives and property of the colonists, the reinforcements asked for were supplied, and, in informing you of the decision of Her Majesty's Government, I took the opportunity of impressing upon you the importance of using every effort to avoid war. But the terms which you have dictated to the Zulu king, however necessary to relieve the colony in future from an impending and increasing danger, are evidently such as he may not improbably refuse, even at the risk of war; and I regret that the necessity for immediate action should have appeared to you so imperative as to preclude you from incurring the delay which would have been involved in consulting Her Majesty's Government upon a subject of so much importance as the terms which Cetshwayo should be required to accept before those terms were actually presented to the Zulu king."7

Hicks Beach had earlier admitted his helplessness with regard to the Frere's actions in a telling note to his Prime Minister:

"I have impressed this [non aggressive] view upon Sir B. Frere, both officially and privately, to the best of my power. But I cannot really control him without a telegraph (I don’t know that I could with one) I feel it is as likely as not that he is at war with the Zulus at the present moment."8

Frere wanted to provoke a conflict with the Zulus and in that goal he succeeded. Cetshwayo rejected the demands of 11 December by not responding by the end of the year. A concession was granted by Bartle Frere until the 11th of January 1879, after which Bartle Frere deemed a state of war to exist. The British forces intended for the defence of Natal had already been on the march with the intention to attack the Zulu kingdom. On the 10th of January, they were poised on the border. On the 11th of January, they crossed the border and invaded Zululand.

**a) The Terms of the Ultimatum**

The terms which were included in the ultimatum delivered to the representatives of King Cetshwayo on the banks of the Thukela River on the 11th of December 1878. No time was specified for compliance with item 4, twenty days were allowed for compliance with items 1–3, that is, until the 31st of December inclusive; ten days more were allowed for compliance with the remaining demands, items 4–13. The earlier time limits were subsequently altered so that all expired on the 10th of January 1879.

1. Surrender of Sihayo’s three sons and brother to be tried by the Natal courts.
2. Payment of a fine of five hundred head of cattle for the outrages committed by the above and for Cetshwayo’s delay in complying with the request of the Natal Government for the surrender of the offenders.
3. Payment of a hundred head of cattle for the offence committed against Messrs. Smith and Deighton.
4. Surrender of the Swazi chief Umbilini and others to be named hereafter, to be tried by the Transvaal courts.
5. Observance of the coronation promises.
6. That the Zulu army is disbanded and the men allowed to go home.
7. That the Zulu military system is discontinued and other military regulations adopted, to be decided upon after consultation with the Great Council and British Representatives.
8. That every man, when he comes to man’s estate, shall be free to marry.
9. All missionaries and their converts, who until 1877 lived in Zululand, shall be allowed to return and reoccupy their stations.
10. All such missionaries shall be allowed to teach and any Zulu, if he chooses, shall be free to listen to their teaching.
11. A British Agent shall be allowed to reside in Zululand, who will see that the above provisions are carried out.
12. All disputes in which a missionary or European is concerned, shall be heard by the king in public and in presence of the Resident.
13. No sentence of expulsion from Zululand shall be carried out until it has been approved by the Resident.9

Cetshwayo had strenuously attempted to avoid war with the British and pre-empted ways to limit its scope and effects. He ordered his troops to defend their country only if attacked and not to carry the war beyond its borders. He directed them to avoid killing any of the invaders other than the regular British soldiers in their red coats.

Cetshwayo had not responded by the end of the year, so an extension was granted by Bartle Frere until 11 January 1879. Cetshwayo returned no answer to the demands10 of Bartle Frere, and in January 1879 a British force under Lieutenant General [Frederick Augustus Thesiger, 2nd Baron Chelmsford](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_Augustus_Thesiger,_2nd_Baron_Chelmsford) invaded Zululand.

**b)** [**Battle of Isandlwana**](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Isandlwana)

[Lord Chelmsford](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederic_Augustus_Thesiger,_2nd_Baron_Chelmsford), the [Commander-in-Chief](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commander-in-Chief) of British forces during the war, initially planned a five-pronged invasion of Zululand composed of over 15 000 troops in five columns, and designed to encircle the Zulu army and force it to fight, as he was concerned that the Zulus would avoid battle. In the event, Lord Chelmsford settled on three invading columns with the main centre column, now consisting of some 7 800 men comprising the previously called No. 3 Column and Durnford's No.2 Column,11 under his direct command.

He moved his troops from [Pietermaritzburg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pietermaritzburg) to a forward camp at Helpmekaar, past [Greytown](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greytown_(KwaZulu-Natal)). On the 9th of January 1879, they moved to [Rorke's Drift](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rorke%27s_Drift), and early on the 11th of January commenced crossing the [Buffalo River](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buffalo_River_(KwaZulu-Natal)) into [Zululand](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zulu_Kingdom).12 Three columns were to invade Zululand, from the Lower Tugela, [Rorke's Drift](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rorke%27s_Drift), and Utrecht respectively, their objective being [Ulundi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulundi), the Zulu royal capital.

While Cetshwayo's army numbered perhaps 35 000 men, it was essentially a militia force which could be called out in time of national danger.13 It had a very limited logistical capacity and could only stay in the field a few weeks before the troops would be obliged to return to their civilian duties.14 Zulu warriors were armed primarily with [Assegai](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assegai) thrusting spears, known in Zulu as [iklwa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iklwa), clubs, some throwing spears and shields made of cowhide.15

The initial entry of all three columns was unopposed. On the 22nd of January, the centre column, which had advanced from Rorke's Drift, was encamped near [Isandlwana](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Isandlwana); on the morning of that day Lord Chelmsford split his forces and moved out to support a reconnoitering party, leaving the camp in charge of Colonel Pulleine. The British were outmaneuvered by the main Zulu army nearly 20 000 strong led by [Ntshingwayo kaMahole Khoza](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ntshingwayo_kaMahole_Khoza). Chelmsford was lured eastward with much of his centre column by a Zulu diversionary force while the main  [Impi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impi) (group of Zulu warriors) attacked his camp. Chelmsford had decided against setting up the British camp defensively, and ignored information that the Zulus were close at hand. The ensuing [Battle of Isandlwana](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Isandlwana) was the greatest victory that the Zulu kingdom would enjoy during the war. The British centre column was wrecked and its camp annihilated with heavy casualties as well as the loss of all its supplies, ammunition and transport. The defeat left Chelmsford no choice but to hastily retreat out of Zululand. It was one of the worst defeats in the history of the British Army. The British had attacked with 1 700 troops while the Zulu brought 24 000. The battle was almost a complete massacre of the British with only sixty British soldiers surviving.

**c) Battle at Rorke’s Drift**

In the battle's aftermath, a party of some 4 000 Zulu reserves mounted an unauthorised raid on the nearby British army border post of [Rorke's Drift](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rorke%27s_Drift) and were driven off after 10 hours of ferocious fighting.

**d) Battle at Inyezane River leads to Siege of Eshowe.**

While the British central column was Chelmsford's command, the right flank column on the coast, under Colonel Charles Pearson, crossed the Tugela River, and skirmished with a Zulu impi that was attempting to set up an ambush at the [Inyezane River](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Eshowe#Prelude:_Inyezane), and advanced as far as the deserted missionary station of Eshowe, which he set about fortifying. On learning of the disaster at Isandlwana, Pearson made plans to withdraw beyond the Tugela River. Before he had decided whether or not to put these plans into effect, the Zulu army managed to cut off his supply lines, and the [Siege of Eshowe](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Eshowe) had begun.

**e) British withdrawal at Tinta’s Kraal**

The left flank column at Utrecht, under Colonel Evelyn Wood, had been charged with occupying the Zulu tribes of north-west Zululand, and to prevent them from interfering with the British central column's advance on Ulundi.

Wood set up camp at Tinta's Kraal, just 10 miles south of [Hlobane Mountain](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hlobane_Mountain), where a force of 4 000 Zulus had been spotted. He planned to attack them on the 24 January 1879, but after hearing about the disaster at Isandlwana, he decided to withdraw back to the Kraal. Thus one month after the British invasion, only their left flank column remained militarily effective, and it was too weak to conduct a campaign alone. The first invasion of Zululand had been a failure.16 The shock of the British defeat led to a desire of the British to crush the Zulu and dismantle their nation.

**f) British army regrouped with re-enforcements over two months and planned next attack.**

It had never been Cetshwayo's intention to invade Natal, but to simply fight within the boundaries of the Zulu kingdom. Chelmsford used the next two months to regroup and build a fresh invading force with the initial intention of relieving Pearson at Eshowe. The Crown ordered the British government to increase their forces, and seven regiments of re-enforcements were rushed to Natal, along with two artillery batteries.

**g) Battle of Intombe**

On 12 March 1879, an armed escort of stores marching to Luneburg was defeated by about 500 Zulus at the [Battle of Intombe](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Intombe), during which the British force suffered 80 killed17 and all the stores were lost.

**h) Battle at Hlobane**

The first troops arrived at Durban on the 7th of March 1879. On the 29th, a column under Lord Chelmsford consisting of 3 400 British and 2 300 African soldiers, marched to the relief of [Eshowe](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eshowe), entrenched camps being formed each night.

Chelmsford ordered Sir Evelyn Wood's troops to attack the abaQulusi Zulu stronghold in Hlobane. Lieutenant Colonel [Redvers Buller](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Redvers_Henry_Buller) led the [attack on Hlobane](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Hlobane) on 28 March.

As the Zulu main army of 20 000 men approached to help their besieged tribesmen, the British force began a retreat which turned into a rout, and they were pursued by 1 000 Zulus of the abaQulusi, who inflicted some 225 casualties on the British force.

**i) Battle at Kambula**

The next day 20 000 Zulu warriors18 attacked Wood's 2 068 men in a well-fortified camp at Kambula, apparently without Cetshwayo's permission. The British held them off in the [Battle of Kambula](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kambula) and after five hours of heavy attacks the Zulus withdrew. British losses amounted to 80, while the Zulu loss included approximately 1 000 killed.19

**j) Battle at Gingindlovu**

While Woods was thus engaged, Chelmsford's column was marching on Eshowe. On the 2nd of April 1879, this force was attacked en route at [Gingindlovu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gingindlovu), the Zulu being repulsed. Their losses were heavy, estimated at 1 200 while the British only suffered two dead and 52 wounded. The next day they relieved Pearson's men. They evacuated Eshowe on 5 April, after which the Zulu forces burned it down.

**k)** [**Battle of Ulundi**](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Ulundi)

The British started a larger, heavily reinforced second invasion20 of Zululand.

With yet more reinforcements arriving, soon to total 16 000 British and 7 000 Native troops, Chelmsford reorganised his forces and again advanced into Zululand in June, building fortified camps all along the way to prevent any repeat of Isandlwana.

One of the early British casualties was the exiled heir to the French throne, [Imperial Prince Napoleon Eugene](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleon_Eugene,_Prince_Imperial), who had volunteered to serve in the British army on behalf of the Crown and was killed on the 1st of June 1879, while out with a reconnoitring party.

Cetshwayo, knowing that the newly reinforced British would be a formidable opponent, attempted to negotiate a peace treaty. Chelmsford was not open to negotiations, as he wished to restore his reputation before Wolseley relieved him of command, and he proceeded to the royal kraal of Ulundi, intending to defeat the main Zulu army. On the 4th of July, the armies clashed at the [Battle of Ulundi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Ulundi), and Cetshwayo's forces were decisively defeated.

**l) Capture of the Zulu King Cetshwayo**

After the battle of Ulundi the Zulu army dispersed, most of the leading chiefs tendered their submission. [Cetshwayo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cetshwayo) was caught by the British during this battle, but escaped.

Wolseley, having relieved Chelmsford after Ulundi, took over the final operations.

A month after the war had ended, on the 28th of August 1879, king Cetshwayo was recaptured (It is said that scouts spotted the water-carriers of the king, distinctive because the water was carried above, not upon, their heads), sent to [Cape Town](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cape_Town) and held as a prisoner of war. His deposition was formally announced to the Zulu by the British military.

Bishop Colenso interceded on behalf of Cetshwayo with the British government and succeeded in getting him released from Robben Island to travel to England and meet with Queen Victoria. While in England he was treated as a public hero for his resistance to Britain.

In 1882 the British government determined to restore Cetshwayo to power, but kept possession of Zululand. The land between the [Tugela River](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tugela_River) and the Umhlatuzi, which adjoins Natal, was constituted a reserve, in which locations were provided for the Zulu nation under rulership of the Basotho chief Usibepu and the British citizen Dunn.

**m) The Zulu Kingdom broken up by British Governance System**

Wolseley discarded Bartle Frere's confederation scheme and drew up a new scheme which divided Zululand into thirteen chiefdoms under rule by the Crown, headed by compliant ‘British loyal’ chiefs, which ensured that the Zulus would no longer unite under a single king. This new scheme made internal divisions and civil wars inevitable. The [dynasty of Shaka](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shaka) was deposed, and the Zulu country portioned among eleven Zulu chiefs, including [Usibepu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Usibepu), [John Dunn](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Dunn_(1833-1895)) - a white adventurer, and [Hlubi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hlubi) - a Basuto chief allied to the British in the war.

The Crown bestowed a Knight Grand Cross of Bath on Chelmsford, largely because of Ulundi, however he was severely criticized by the Horse Guards investigation21 and he would never serve in the field again.22 Bartle Frere was relegated to a minor post in [Cape Town](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cape_Town).

A resident named [Melmoth Osborn](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Melmoth_Osborn&action=edit&redlink=1) was appointed by the Crown to be the channel of communication between themselves and the Zulu chiefs. This arrangement led to much bloodshed and disturbance. Blood feuds engendered between the chiefs [Usibepu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Usibepu) (also known as Zibebu) and Hamu on the one side, and the tribes who supported King Cetshwayo and his family on the other. Cetshwayo's party (who now became known as the Usuthu) suffered severely at the hands of the two chiefs, who were aided by a band of white [freebooters](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filibuster_(military)).

Usibepu, who had created a formidable force of well-armed and trained warriors on the borders of Cetshwayo's territory, viewed with displeasure the re-installation of his former king, and Cetshwayo was desirous of humbling his relative. A collision very soon took place; Usibepu's forces were victorious, and on the 22nd of July 1883, he made a sudden descent upon Cetshwayo's kraal at Ulundi, which he destroyed, massacring such of the inmates of both sexes as could not save themselves by flight. The king escaped, though wounded, into [Nkandla](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nkandla) forest. After appeals to [Melmoth Osborn](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Melmoth_Osborn&action=edit&redlink=1) he moved to [Eshowe](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eshowe), where he died soon after.

Cetshwayo was returned in secret to Zululand on the 10th of January 1883. On the 8th of February 1884, Cetshwayo died (reportedly from poison). His son DinuZulu was proclaimed king on 20 May 1884.

**Footnote 1: Zulu incidents used as an excuse for war by the Crown.**

The first two Zulu incidents in 1879 which the British used as reason for war related to the flight into Natal of two wives of Sihayo kaXonga and their subsequent seizure and execution by his brother and sons, which were described thus:

"A wife of the chief Sihayo had left him and escaped into Natal. She was followed [on 28 July 1878] by a party of Zulus, under Mehlokazulu, the chief son of Sihayo, and his brother, seized at the kraal where she had taken refuge, and carried back to Zululand, where she was put to death, in accordance with Zulu law...

"A week later the same young men, with two other brothers and an uncle, captured in like manner another refugee wife of Sihayo, in the company of the young man with whom she had fled. This woman was also carried back, and is supposed to have been put to death likewise; the young man with her although guilty in Zulu eyes of a most heinous crime, punishable with death, was safe from them on English soil; they did not touch him."

The third incident occurred in September, when two men were detained while on a sand bank of the [Thukela River](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thukela_River) near the Middle Drift. Sir Bartle Frere described this matter in a despatch to Sir [Michael Hicks Beach](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Hicks_Beach,_1st_Earl_St_Aldwyn), who had replaced Carnarvon as Secretary of State for the Colonies:

"Mr. Smith, a surveyor in the Colonial Engineer Department, was on duty inspecting the road down to the Tugela, near Fort Buckingham, which had been made a few years ago by order of Sir Garnet Wolseley, and accompanied by Mr. Deighton, a trader, resident at Fort Buckingham, went down to the ford across the Tugela. The stream was very low, and ran under the Zulu bank, but they were on this side of it, and had not crossed when they were surrounded by a body of 15 or 20 armed Zulus, made prisoners, and taken off with their horses, which were on the Natal side of the river, and roughly treated and threatened for some time; though, ultimately, at the instance of a headman who came up, they were released and allowed to depart."23

**Footnote 2: Correspondence between Bulwer, Cetshwayo and Frere.**

By themselves, the three incidents which Frere reported as aggressive by the Zulu nation were flimsy grounds upon which to found an invasion of Zululand. Bulwer did not initially hold their King Cetshwayo responsible for what was clearly not a political act in the seizure and murder of the two women. He reported:

"I have sent a message to the Zulu King to inform him of this act of violence and outrage by his subjects in Natal territory, and to request him to deliver up to this Government to be tried for their offence, under the laws of the Colony, the persons of Mehlokazulu and Bekuzulu the two sons of Sirayo who were the leaders of the party."24

Cetshwayo also treated the complaint rather lightly, responding as follows:

"Cetshwayo is sorry to have to acknowledge that the message brought by Umlungi is true, but he begs his Excellency will not take it in the light he sees the Natal Government seem to do, as what Sirayo’s sons did he can only attribute to a rash act of boys who in the zeal for their father’s house did not think of what they were doing. Cetshwayo acknowledges that they deserve punishing, and he sends some of his izinduna, who will follow Umlungi with his words. Cetshwayo states that no acts of his subjects will make him quarrel with his fathers of the house of Shaka."25

The original complaint carried to Cetshwayo from the lieutenant-governor was in the form of a request for the surrender of the culprits. The request was subsequently transformed by Sir Bartle Frere into a 'demand'. Frere wrote to Hicks Beach, 30 September 1878, as follows:

"Apart from whatever may be the general wish of the Zulu nation, it seems to me that the seizure of the two refugee women in British territory by an armed force crossing an unmistakable and well known boundary line, and carrying them off and murdering them with contemptuous disregard for the remonstrance of the Natal policemen, is itself an insult and a violation of British territory which cannot be passed over, and unless apologized and atoned for by compliance with the Lieutenant Governor’s demands, that the leaders of the murderous gangs shall be given up to justice, it will be necessary to send to the Zulu King an ultimatum which must put an end to pacific relations with our neighbors."26

In reply, in at least three dispatches, sent on the 17th of October, the 21st of November and the 18th of December, Hicks Beach emphatically states that war is to be avoided and a British invasion of Zululand prohibited. From the 21st of November dispatch, the following is quoted:

"... Her Majesty's Government has arrived, it is my duty to impress upon you that in supplying these reinforcements it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government not to furnish means for a campaign of invasion and conquest, but to afford such protection as may be necessary at this juncture to the lives and property of the colonists. Though the present aspect of affairs is menacing in a high degree, I can by no means arrive at the conclusion that war with the Zulus should be unavoidable, and I am confident that you, in concert with Sir H. Bulwer, will use every effort to overcome

the existing difficulties by judgment and forbearance, and to avoid an evil so much to be deprecated as a Zulu war." 27

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  11. Colenso, pp. 263–264 gives 7,800: 1752 Imperial and Colonial troops and 6054 Native Contingent and 377 Conductors and Drivers for the Number 2 Column under Durnford and the Number 3 Column under Glynn which made up Chelmsford's Main Column. The strength of the entire invasion force is given as a total of 16,506 for the five columns: 6,669 Imperial and colonial troops: 9,035 troops in the native contingent; 802 Drivers, etc.
  12. New History of South Africa (First ed.). Tafelberg Publishers. 2007. pp. 166. [ISBN](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number) [978-0-624-04359-1](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-624-04359-1).
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1. **The Gun War of 1880-1881**.

The Gun War, also known as the Basotho War, was a conflict in the territory of Basutoland (now known as Lesotho). It was fought between the British Crown and indigenous chiefs over tribal rights.

Lesotho is an enclave country just over 20 000km2 within the borders of South Africa, with a population of just over two million people. Lesotho is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. About 40% of the population lives below the international poverty line of $0.88 per day. A third of the population has AIDS, alongside high unemployment, near economic collapse and a weak currency. 30% of all children in Lesotho are orphans with live expectancy of less than 40 years.

The area was formerly inhabited by hunter gathers until around 1600 when Bantu speaking tribesmen began to settle in the area. Speaking Sesotho (South Sotho) they began to be called Basotho, from which Lesotho was [later](http://www.child-sponsorship.com/lesotho_history.html) to take its name as Lesotho means "the land of the people who speak Sesotho".

In 1822, Moshoeshoe1 and his followers, mostly the Bakoena BaMokoteli, some Bafokeng from his maternal side, and other relations as well as some clans including the Amazizi, established his capital city high in the northern Drakensberg mountains at Buthe-Buthe, which was well placed to defend the eventual Kingdom of Lesotho.

Moshoeshoe heard about the guns that had arrived in the Cape colony, and determined that he needed these and a white advisor.

From other tribes, he heard of the benefits missionaries2 brought. Three representatives of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society arrived in the heart of southern Africa: [Eugene Casalis](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Eugene_Casalis&action=edit&redlink=1), Constant Gosselin and Thomas Arbousset, whom Moshoeshoe allowed into his kingdom. They advised him to move his settlement to the [Qiloane plateau](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maseru_District). The name was [later](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moshoeshoe_I) changed to [Thaba Bosiu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thaba_Bosiu) or "mountain of the night" because it was believed to be growing during the night and shrinking during day. It proved to be an impassable stronghold against enemies.

In around 1836 he came into contact with the Voortrekkers who had already settled in what is today known as the [Free](http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/king-moshoeshoe-i) State3.

From 1837 to 1855 Casalis played the role of Moshoeshoe's Foreign Advisor. With his knowledge of the non-African world, he was able to inform and advise the king in his dealings with ‘hostile foreigners’. He also served as an interpreter for Moshoeshoe, documented the Sesotho language, helped to set up diplomatic channels and acquire guns for use against the Boers and the Korana people.

The next 30 years were marked by conflicts in Basotho land.

Casalis arranged several territorial agreements between Moshoeshoe and the Crown, in one of which Moshoeshoe signed a treaty with the British Governor, Sir [George Thomas Napier](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Thomas_Napier). Among the provisions of this treaty was the annexation of a tract of land (now called the [Orange River Sovereignty](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orange_River_Sovereignty)) which enabled the Crown to take over possession of the Free State territory of the Boer Republic in 1848. These outraged Boers were suppressed in a brief skirmish in 1848.

Border disputes nevertheless led to battles between the Basotho and British forces in 1851 and 1852, both of which were won by the Basotho.

In 1851, the Crown controlled the area between the Orange and Vaal Rivers (the Orange River Sovereignty). Due to the border disputes with the Basotho, the British eventually proclaimed the Warden line (after Major Warden).

This line divided territory between British territory and the Basotho under Moshoeshoe, and stretched from Cornet Spruit and the Orange River through Vechtkop to Jammerbergdrift on the Caledon.

The Warden line caused much resentment, as the fertile Caledon River Valley served as a vital area in terms of agriculture for both the British and the Basotho.

This border line was therefore not acceptable to Moshoeshoe, and hostility followed, which led to conflict between the Basotho and the British, who were [defeated](http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/battle-viervoet-basotho-british-war) by Moshoeshoe at the battle of Viervoet in Kolonyama 1851.

After repulsing another British attack in 1852, Moshoeshoe sent an appeal to the British commander that settled the dispute diplomatically, before they defeated the Tlokoa in 1853, after which Moshoeshoe reigned supreme.

In 1854 the Orange Free State (OFS) became an independent Boer republic. The Crown was eager to check Boer advances, and Moshoeshoe, with advice from Eugene Casalis, appealed to [Queen Victoria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victoria_of_the_United_Kingdom), who agreed to make [Basutoland](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basutoland) a British protectorate in 1868. Under the terms of the agreement, the dual legal system was introduced – Roman Dutch Law and Sesotho Customary Law - which is still in operation in Lesotho today. In addition, the present day boundaries of the country were established; Moshoeshoe ceded the western territories, which also included land which belonged to the Boers, permanently to the Crown, which effectively reduced Basutoland to half its previous size.

Following the cession in 1869, the Crown signed a treaty at Aliwal with the Boers on behalf of Moshoeshoe to ensure peace and redefine their borders.

Initially the Crown transferred functions from Moshoeshoe's capital in Thaba Bosiu to a police camp on the northwest border, Maseru, until administration of Basutoland was transferred to the Cape Colony in 1871.

In 1869, the Crown signed a treaty at Aliwal with the Boers. It defined the boundaries of [Basutoland](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basutoland) and later Lesotho; those boundaries have not changed. The arable land west of the Caledon River remained in Boer hands, and is referred to as the Lost or Conquered Territory.

Moshoeshoe died on the 11th of March 1870, marking the end of the traditional era and the beginning of the colonial era. A year after his burial in the graveyard on the summit of Thaba-Bosiu, the protectorate of Moshoeshoe's kingdom was annexed by the Crown, and the administrative control transferred to the Cape Colony despite protests from both Basotho and Boer leaders.

Rule from the Crown saw Cape magistrates interfering with the traditional laws of the Sotho people and even saw part of Basutoland demarcated for white use only.

The Sotho tribes profoundly resented this development, about which they have not been consulted. Rumbling discontentment saw a law introduced in 1879, the Disarmament Act, which ordered all fire arms were to be surrendered to the government. This law provoked open rebellion which culminated in the Gun War of 1880, so called because it began with an attempt by the British administration to disarm the tribesmen.

The Sotho score several notable successes against the British Cape military (most notably an ambush at Qalabani in 1880). The Gun War resulted in more than 8 000 Basotho killed and 2 000 British casualties.

An uneasy truce in 1881 did little to resolve the conflict.

In 1884, Basotuland became a separate British Protectorate of the Crown.

Although peace was eventually established, Cape Colony was unable to establish any effective control over Basotuland and it requested that London re-establish direct control over the territory which it did in 1884. The history of Basotuland after 1884 is discussed further in Footnote 1.

**Footnote 1: The History of Basotuland after 1884**

In 1884, Basutoland was restored its status as a colony of the British Crown, but remained under direct rule by a governor, though effective internal power was wielded by traditional chiefs. The British high commissioners left the tribal structures of the Sotho mostly intact, among who many minor chiefs owe allegiance to a single paramount chief (a role invariably filled by a descendant of [Moshoeshoe](http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?gtrack=pthc&ParagraphID=osf#osf)).

In 1910 the Basutoland Council was established (partly from internal pressure not to cede the protectorate to the newly emerging Union of South Africa) comprising the paramount chief, ninety nine Basotho Members and headed by the resident British Commissioner.

This effectively gave the area self government for the next fifty years.

During the 1950’s, with internal self-government in prospect, two political parties formed - the left-wing Basutoland Congress Party, and the more traditional Basutoland National Party headed by Chief Leabua Jonathan.

In 1960 the Basutoland National Council, an indirectly elected legislative body, was created largely in response to increasing pressure for constitutional change and self determination pursued most aggressively by the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) headed by Ntsu Mokhehle. This year also saw Prince Bereng Seeiso installed as Moshoeshoe II.

A Constitutional Review Commission was appointed by Moshoeshoe II in 1961, reporting two years later with a proposal for an independent nation state with a constitution acceptable to the Crown.

Parties opposed to the BCP had also begun to emerge, the Marerna Tiou Party (MTP) led by S S Matete and the Basutoland National Party (BNP) headed by Chief Leabua Jonathan.

Elections were duly held in 1965 and the BNP, led by Leabua Jonathan, defeated the BCP by a narrow margin in the region's first elections.

On the 4th of October 1966, Basutoland become independent, as the Kingdom of Lesotho, with a constitutional monarchy, senate and national assembly forming the governmental structure - Chief Jonathan as prime minister, the paramount chief Moshoeshoe II, a great-great-grandson of Moshoeshoe I as head of state.

The early years of independence were characterized by continuing tension over the nature of Lesotho's constitutional monarchy. In the very first year, 1966, Moshoeshoe II agitated for greater powers. He was placed [under](http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad49) house arrest by Chief Jonathan. Over the coming decades Moshoeshoe was frequently arrested or in exile, and was still head of state when he is killed in a suspicious car crash in 1995.

In January 1970 the ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) lost the first post-independence general elections, with 23 seats to the Basutoland Congress Party's 36.

Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan refused to cede power to the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), declared himself Tona Kholo (Sesotho translation of prime minister), and imprisoned the BCP leadership.

BCP began a rebellion and then received training in Libya for its Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) under the pretence of being Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) soldiers of the Pan African Congress (PAC).

Deprived of arms and supplies by the Sibeko faction of the PAC in 1978, the 178-strong LLA was rescued from their Tanzanian base by the financial assistance of a Maoist PAC officer, but launched the guerrilla war with only a handful of old weapons.

The main force was defeated in northern Lesotho, and later guerrillas launched sporadic but usually ineffectual attacks. The campaign was severely compromised when BCP's leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, went to Pretoria.

In the early 1980’s, several Basotho who sympathized with the exiled BCP were threatened with death and attacked by the government of Leabua Jonathan.

In September 1981 the family of Benjamin Masilo was attacked. A few days later, Edgar Mahlomola Motuba was taken from his home and murdered.

The BNP ruled from 1966 till January 1970. What later ensued was a "de facto" government led by Dr Leabua Jonathan until 1986 when a military coup forced it out of office. The Military Council that came to power granted executive powers to King Moshoeshoe II, who was until then a ceremonial monarch. But in 1987 the King was forced into exile after coming up with a six-page memorandum on how he wanted the Lesotho's constitution to be, which would have given him more executive powers had the military government agreed. His son was installed as King Letsie III.

The chairman of the military junta, Major General Justin Metsing Lekhanya, was ousted in 1991 and replaced by Major General Elias Phisoana Ramaema, who handed over power to a democratically elected government of the BCP in 1993.

Moshoeshoe II returned from exile in 1992 as an ordinary citizen. After the return to democratic government, King Letsie III tried unsuccessfully to persuade the BCP government to reinstate his father (Moshoeshoe II) as head of state.

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1. Moshoeshoe was the son of Mokhachane, a minor chief of the Bamokoteli sub-clan. He was born at Menkhoaneng in Leribe, Lesotho as Lepoqo. During his youth, he once organized a cattle raid against Ramonaheng and captured several herds. As was the tradition, he composed a poem praising himself where, amongst the words he used to refer to himself, said he was "like a razor which has shaved all Ramonaheng's beards", referring to his successful raid. In Sesotho language, a razor makes a "shoe...shoe..." sound, and after that he was affectionately called Moshoeshoe: "the shaver". He also referred himself as the person of Kali, thus showed that he was a descendant of the Great Kali or Monaheng who is said to be the ancestor of most Bakoena people in Basotho (now known as Lesotho) with the exception of the senior BaMolibeli.

He was popularly known as Moreno e Moholo/morena oa Basotho (Great King/King of the Basotho).

Moshoeshoe was known for his outstanding diplomacy, tolerance, generosity and compassion. According to Casalis (1861) Moshoeshoe learned all this from his mentor, chief Mohlomi, who also remains a very prominent figure in Basotho history because of his unparalleled wisdom during his time. He had taught Moshoeshoe to:

“Deal justly with all, especially the poor; to love peace more than war and never kill anyone accused of witchcraft.”

As a result of this tutoring, Moshoeshoe paid tribute to king Shaka when he learned that he was preparing to attack him. Together with other gifts he sent Shaka ostrich feathers. Moshoeshoe also gave cattle to the cannibals who had devoured his grandfather - because they must have been too hungry - instead of viewing them as enemies. Basotho believe that if there is peace there will be rain and plenty, hence the slogan “Khotso Pula Nala” (Peace, Rain and Plenty or Prosperity).

2. Roman Catholic Missionaries greatly influence on the shape of Basotho History (the first being, Bishop M.F. Allard O.M.I. and Fr. Joseph Gerard O.M.I.).

A great-great-grandson of Moshoeshoe, Archbishop Emmanuel Mbathoana (1904-1966), became the first Black bishop of the Roman Catholic Church in Southern Africa. He was the archbishop of Basotholand from 1952.

3 Voortrekkers had been moving from the north-eastern Cape since British governance took over in 1805, of which there are many records. One such farmer was Pieter Hendrik Venter who settled on the farm ‘Rhenosterhoek’ against the Orange River in 1826, and his four sons settled on neighboring farms Modderbult and Heuningkrans. On 11 February 1837, Pieter Hendrik also acquired the farm Cyfergat, 9km from Molteno on the Sterkstroom road. Information taken from the Archives of the Lieutenant-Governor, LG 558, pg. 8, series 151, KAB.

**(iii) The First Boer War or First South African War. (1880–1881)**

**a) The Crown violated the internationally recognized Sand River Convention Treaty of Independence for the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek**

On the 12th of April 1877, the Crown annexed the independent Boer state named the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek under the pretext of protecting Moshesh and his tribe.

Sir Ryder Haggard (author of such bestselling novels as King Solomon’s Mines and She) was one of a small contingent of Natal Mounted Police who rode into the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek by order of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the Governor of Natal. They took down the Vierkleur flag of the Boer republic and ran up the Union Jack in the capital Pretoria, declaring the South African Republic in the Transvaal as annexed by the British Crown.

This was in violation of the Sand River Convention of 1852, wherein the Crown had recognized the independence of the people north of the Vaal River and their “right to manage their own affairs without any interference on the part of the British government.”

Because of the unpopularity of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek President, T.F. Burgers, who had dared to mint a coin with his own image on it, and had began to tax the local farmers, no one responded to his call for the commandos to resist the annexation. However, when the British began to tax the Boers, resistance developed. Numerous protest meetings and diplomatic attempts by the Boers were ignored by the British. When an ex-president of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek, M.W. Pretorius, approached the British High Commissioner, Sir Garnet Wolseley, in Pretoria, he was immediately jailed.

**b) The Crown claimed reparation fees from the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek after the Britain illegally annexed the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek**

On behalf of the Crown, British leaders calculated that the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek owed the Crown an amount of £301,727 due to the annexation expenses the Crown had experienced. Under British rule this debt was liquidated to the extent of £150,000, but the total was brought up by a Parliamentary grant, a loan from the Standard Bank, and sundries to £390,404, which was labelled the “public debt” of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek on the 31st of December, 1880. This was further increased by monies advanced by the Standard Bank and English Exchequer during the war, and till the 8th of August 1881, (during which time the country yielded no revenue,) to £457,393. To this was added an estimated sum of £200,000 for compensation charges, pension allowances, etc., and a further sum of £383,000 - the cost of the successful expedition against Secocoemi, that of the unsuccessful one being left out of account, bringing up the total public debt to over a million, of which about £800,000 was claimed to be owing to the Crown. This sum the Commissioners (Sir Evelyn Wood dissenting) reduced by a stroke of the pen to £265,000, thus entirely remitting an approximate sum of £500,000 or £600,000. To the sum of £265,000 still owing, was added another £150,000 for sums lately advanced to pay the compensation claims, bringing up the actual amount owing to the Crown to about a quarter of a million pounds.

(See the Report of Assistant Secretary to the British Agent for Native Affairs in Blue Book 3917, pg. 46.)

**c) British taxation of the Boers within their own Republic sparked the First Anglo-Boer War**

The spark that began the first Anglo-Boer War was over taxation. A farmer, Pieter Bezuidenhout, was summoned to pay ₤14 tax. When he refused to pay, the magistrate ordered the seizure and sale of his wagon by public auction.

On the 11th of November 1880, a party of 100 Boers stopped the auction and forcibly returned the wagon to its owner. On the 8th of December 1880, ten thousand Boers assembled at the Paardekraal Farm (what is today Krugersdorp).

**d) The Boers won all four battles against the British Crown in the First Anglo-Boer War**

On the 16th of December 1880, the Boers declared war on the British Empire, known as the first Anglo-Boer War. This was the only war lost by the British Empire during the 19th Century. In each of the four battles of this First War of Independence for the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek, the Boers decisively defeated the British Army: at Bronkhorstspruit on the 20th of December 1880; Laing’s Nek on the 28th of January 1881; Ingogo (Skuinshoofte) on the 8th of February 1881 and Amajuba on the 27th of February 1881. The final battle of Amajuba had great impact on the Crown, and was well remembered while preparing for the Second Anglo-Boer war (See footnote 1 on the Battle of Amajuba at the end of this section).

On the 21st of March 1881, peace was signed at O’Neil’s Cottage within sight of Amajuba. Transvaal’s independence was recognised. It was the only war that Great Britain lost in two centuries. One British officer described it as: “A miserable ending of a miserable war.”

Next to the Battle of Blood River in 1838, the Battle of Amajuba is, for the Boers, the most important turning point in their history. By this very battle, Ian Hamilton wrote: “The future of a huge continent was to be very perceptibly swayed.”

**e) The Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek treasury outgrew the treasury for the British Empire**

In 1885, it became known to the British Intelligence services that the revenue of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek was a little over £177,000. According to the Almanac de Gotha, this rose to £4,400,000 in 1889, thus showing a proportionate growth rate of 1 to 25. The President had a salary of £7,000 - (in comparison, the President of the Swiss Confederation only had £600 at that time) - and besides that, what is called "coffee-money." An amount of nearly £660,000 was allocated to "other expenses." Under this head are included secret funds, which in the budget are stated at a little less than £40,000 (more than England had), but which always exceed that sum, and in 1896 reached about £200,000. A British tabloid asked “What can the chief of a small State of 250,000 inhabitants do with such a large amount of secret funds?”

**f) The Crown prepared to create a second war against the Boer Republics**

Less than a year later, in 1897, Britain publically announced that it was going to annex the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek and the Orange Free State. This led to the Jameson Raid and the Second Anglo-Boer war.

On behalf of the Crown, British leaders employed Chief Montsioa of a mixed tribe - remnant survivors from Mfacane - which became known as the Barolong tribe, and lived to the west of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek border. Montsioa was given four or five thousand pounds in gold by the Crown in payment of their services to the British Military Army, which included the safe keeping of cattle and Government property, such as ammunition, ‘during disturbances’, and his tribe was encouraged to assist the British army in their war against the Boers.

The British leaders also promised the Barolong land ownership inside the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek for their assistance in the extermination of the Boers, and promised them protection from the Boers by the British Sovereignty of the Crown.

In every instance, the property entrusted to their charge, was returned intact. However, the British leaders had no intention of keeping their promises, as plans were being laid for to unify the whole of Africa under their dominion.

When chief Mankoroane heard that the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek delegates were on their way to England to discuss, amongst other things, the issue of the borders of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek, he left Bechuanaland and went as far as Cape Town on his way to England to represent his case there. Lord Derby, one of the British leaders, sent him word that he could not be admitted to the Conference in London. Mankoroane then begged Mr. Mackenzie to be his representative, but was again told that neither personally, nor by representative, could he be recognised at the Conference in Downing Street.

**Footnote 1: Battle of Amajuba.**

After their third military disaster in the Anglo-Boer conflict, General Colley determined to redeem British military honour with a bold strike to seize the heights overlooking Laing’s Nek: Mount Amajuba. On the 23rd of February, the British garrison at Mount Prospect was reinforced by 2,000 men from the 92nd Regiment of Gordon Highlanders. Wearing their khaki jackets and tartan kilts, they arrived fresh from a successful Afghanistan campaign.

Standing at 2,150 metres above sea level Mount Amajuba is clearly visible from a great distance. The Zulus had called it Amajuba – the Mountain of Doves. This strategic triangular shaped mountain dominated the critical point where three states met: Transvaal, the Orange Free State and Natal.

Early on the Saturday evening of the 26th of February 1881, whistles were blown and commands were shouted at the British military base at Mount Prospect. Three companies of the 92nd Gordon Highlanders, two companies of the 58th Regiment, 2 companies of the 60th Rifles and 1 detachment of the Naval Brigade were to get ready to march within the hour. Each was to carry food rations for three days, full water bottles, a Martini-Henry rifle, complete with bayonet and 70 rounds, a military greatcoat, blanket and oilskin sheet. In addition each company was to transport 6 picks, 4 shovels, axes, hammers and pliers. Dr. Mahon and his 50 medical assistants were to transport everything necessary for a field hospital.

The humiliating defeats of Bronkhorstspruit, Laing’s Nek and Skuinshoogte were to be avenged. Mount Amajuba was to be occupied that night. Incredibly, General Pomeroy Colley, the highest commander of all British forces in South Africa, was to personally lead the assault. The 8 kilometres march from Mount Prospect to the foot of Mount Amajuba was undertaken in complete darkness. It was a moonless night.

At the foot of Amajuba two companies of the 60th Rifle were detached to cover the communications links with Mount Prospect. The ascent up the southern slope of Amajuba was described by some of the officers as “a terrible climb”. At one point the Zulu guides lost their way, but by about 3:30am on Sunday morning 27 February, the flat summit of Amajuba was attained. In all, there were 405 British soldiers on the mountain. The 365 men with General Colley were deployed around the triangular edge of Amajuba. General Colley and his staff walked the 1,200 meter perimeter of the edge of the summit. The Gordon Highlanders occupied the north and North West summits, as well as Gordon’s Knoll – one of the three hills on Amajuba. Carter, who was at the battle, wrote the following in his book: “The fight on the Amajuba - a flight for life… “. So assured were the British Military of their plan for victory, wherein Colley used black spies for information that Carter wrote: “The Boers were going to do nothing but run today; and I believe there were more than myself who pitied the miserable fate in store for them, to be accomplished in a few hours.” He adds: “This was the programme for this Sabbath day; and as soon the sun rose above the horizon, we should see the first incident and every detail of the fight, surprise, and rout. This was the train of thought on the Amajuba Hill, and in giving expression to it every man spoke in a whisper; so near appeared the helpless foe to us that we dreaded to speak aloud lest in their tents they should hear our voices. What was the train of thought in the Boer camp at that moment? – cooking their breakfast? Taking thought for the inner man? Had we been as close to them as we imagined we were, we would have heard the sound of many voices singing in praise of the God of the Boers and English alike, and in prayer going up for mercy and a happy issue to the cause of the arms of those who below us were kneeling.”

General Colley positioned about 110 men from all units as reserves in the southern hollow of the Summit. In this area the hospital and commissariat was erected.

A water well was dug and General Colley exclaimed: “We could stay here forever.”

The morale amongst the British was very high and was described by several as a festival atmosphere.

At the sun rose several of the Highlanders shouted down at the Boer camp waving their fists and shouting: “Come up here, you beggar! Ha ha! Got you this time!”

Even before the sun rose, Mrs De Jaager, in the Orange Free State, saw the flare that the British lit on the Summit, to alert their base at Mount Prospect that they had attained their objective. She immediately realised that the British were on Amajuba and mounting her horse galloped off to alert the Boer camp.

At Laing’s Nek, The Commandant General’s wife, Hendrina Joubert, had a bad night. At daybreak she got up, dressed and went out of the tent to put a kettle on the boil. As she stood there in the early morning light, she looked up at the height of Amajuba and saw figures moving about. She had a good look and then called Joubert: “Piet, come here, there are people on the Kop.” He came out and said: “They are the reinforcements I have been expecting.” She looked at him sharply. “But, old man, take your binoculars - since when do our men wear red coats? You must get them off at once.” Then Joubert saw the British and darted to the nearest group of sleepy men. “There are English on the Kop,” he shouted. “Get them off.”

The man who led the assault on Amajuba was again not Joubert, but the gallant General Nicolaas Smit. He had 150 men and divided them into three sections, each to scale the mountain from a different direction. Another commando of 50 men was positioned halfway up the plateau to cover the assault with a barrage of rifle fire.

The Boers made use of dead ground and cross fire. The three storming parties methodically moved upwards making use of the cover of rocks and concealment of shrubs with skill.

In twos and threes they dashed across the open spaces covered by intense rifle fire. With this fast-moving fire and movement they rapidly advanced up the two thousand foot slope. By the afternoon, about 90 men crossed the top crescent, killing their enemies with single head shots. During this assault General Colley seemed unaware of his predicament. He sent off a triumphant flag and heliograph signal to Mount Prospect: “All comfortable, Boers wasting ammunition.”

At about 10:30 am General Colley and his officers were strolling across the south-western corner of Amajuba consulting with Commander Romilly, from HMS Boadicea. As a bullet flew across them they saw a Boer almost a kilometre away “I wonder what the distance is?” asked Colley. Stuart looking through his binoculars estimated the man at about 900 yards.

At that moment the Boer fired again and Commander Romilly was killed. With his second-in-command lying dead at his feet, General Colley should have realised the dramatic reversal in fortunes.

Field Coronet Stephanus Roos led his men to assault the hill where the Gordon Highlanders under Lieutenant Ian Hamilton were positioned. (This was the same Ian Hamilton who, later as a general, would lead allied forces in the Battle of Gallipoli during the First World War).

The Highlanders on Gordon’s Knoll were subjected to extremely heavy and accurate fire, which pinned them down. On the eastern ridge near Hay’s Koppie the Boers under Field Coronet Danie Malan began pouring steady fire into the 58th Regiment. The right flank of the British crumbled before the assault of this commando which included Christiaan De Wet (later to become the world famous General De Wet of the Second Anglo Boer War).

On the western side of Amajuba the men under Commandant Joachim Ferreira reached the southern slope of McDonald’s Koppie.

On the whole one and a quarter kilometre perimeter, the British soldiers were being pinned down by the accurate fire of the Boers. Lieutenant Ian Hamilton, realizing the imminent danger, ran through the enemy fire to alert General Colley to the threat. He found General Colley sleeping. In response to the request for advice, Colley responded: “Just hold the place three days.”

On Gordon’s Knoll Hamilton ordered his men to stand up, bend over the ridge and shoot at their assailants. As they did so a deadly fusillade hit 28 of the 30 Highlanders. Carter, the reporter, wrote: “It was such a fire as had not been heard as yet.”

At that point the Boers stormed up from the ledge and took possession of the hill. From Gordon’s Knoll they could dominate the northern part of the Summit of Amajuba. For the second time Hamilton ran across the Summit, dodging enemy fire, to alert the General to the situation. Colley responded: “We will wait until the Boers advance on us and then give them a volley and charge.”

At this point McDonald’s Koppie was occupied by the Boers. Colley called up his reserves, many of whom had been sleeping. Malan and his commando came up over the ridge and the reserves began to give way. General Colley was described as: “As cool as on parade” as he attempted to steady his men. Ian Hamilton remembered him holding his revolver high over his head and shouting “steady and hold by the ridge.” And as his men began to break and flee his last words were: “Oh my men do not run.” He was then shot through the back of the head.

The Boer who got Colley in the sight of his Westley-Richards rifle could not have possibly realised that he was the most important Englishman in South Africa, a veteran of China, Afghanistan, India and West Africa, High Commissioner of Britain in South Africa and representative of the Crown, Commander-in-Chief of all British forces in Southern African and Governor of the Natal colony. He was only the third British General to be killed in action since the Battle of Waterloo in 1815.

Thomas Carter (1855-1945) was a reporter of the Times, London. Carter provided an eyewitness report of the battle. “I saw His Excellency standing within ten paces directing some men to extend to the right. It was the last time I saw him alive. A sudden piercing cry of terror, which will ring in my ears for many a long day, rose from the line of infantry…parties of men were moving rapidly in twos and threes towards our only line of retreat in the direction of Mount Prospect ...five, six, seven, eight men broke from the ranks in front of us and fled. The rest wavered, and before Cameron and myself could rise to our feet, the whole lot went rushing wildly over us…jumping over the bodies of the wounded…a terrible volley from the stone ridge we had just left, let us know that the Boers were already there. It told horribly on the fugitives, for I saw several in front and right and left of me stopped in their flight. After delivering this first volley, the Boers kept up a terrible fire, and every moment their number increased as they swarmed up the hill…our poor fellows dropped by the score.”

On what became known as McDonald’s Koppie, Lieutenant Hector McDonald and 19 men held this crest to the end. A vertical rock of 15 metres on the western side of this hill made it impossible to be scaled. As they were isolated from the rest of the British force they ask the officer “what shall we do?”McDonald’s reply came back: “Just stand firm.” Only once the entire British line had collapsed and fled did McDonald order his men to escape as best they could.

Lieutenant McDonald was captured. General Joubert read the inscription on his sword mentioning the bravery of this officer in the War in Afghanistan. General Joubert walked over to the prisoners and asked for Lieutenant McDonald. As McDonald saluted, Joubert offered him his hand and returned to him his sword, and declared: “A man who has won such a sword should not be separated from it.”

For the rest of his life Hector McDonald defended the Boers against all negative criticism declaring: “These men are gentlemen.”

Lieutenant McDonald wrote that as soon as the fighting was over the Boers sang Psalms for over an hour and gave all the glory for the victory to Almighty God.

When the journalist Thomas Carter was captured, General Nicolaas Smit issued him with a War Correspondent Permit and safe conduct to return to the military base at Mount Prospect.

One of the soldiers on the Boer side was James Murray, a younger brother of the famous Reverend Andrew Murray. It was James Murray who placed a large white handkerchief over the face of General Colley as he lay slain.

The British losses in the Battle of Amajuba were 92 killed and 134 wounded. The Boers lost 2 men killed and 4 wounded.

When Lieutenant Ian Hamilton was thanking the Boer Commander for their help with his wounded, he added: “This is a bad day for us.” General Joubert responded: “What can you expect from fighting on a Sunday?”

Lieutenant Ian Hamilton had bullet holes through his kilt and coat in several places. He had also been hit in the wrist. It was Lieutenant Hamilton who was brought up by General Smit to identify the body of General Colley.

Hamilton had stumbled and fallen down the mountain and lain exhausted and wounded until his little dog, a fox terrier named Patch had found him, and revived him by licking his face. Hamilton survived to live another 66 years afterwards, dying in 1947 at age 94. He was the Commander of the Allied Forces at the Battle of Gallipoli in the First World War. He also was an on observer of the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Hamilton wrote:“Neither the Russians nor the Japanese could hold a candle to the Boer when it comes to instinctive, deadly, panther-like quickness….a good Boer would have had an enemy on the ground for each of ten cartridges in his magazine within some 20 seconds!” Ian Hamilton was involved in the Second Anglo Boer War (1899-1902) as a general of the British forces.

General Piet Joubert requested a detachment of Highlanders to form an honour guard to carry the body of General Colley to the Boer camp and to keep watch over their General while the best carpenters in the Boer camp were ordered to make decent coffins.

Hendrina Joubert helped nurse the wounded. At one stage her husband wanted to use her apron as a bandage. She inquired if he wanted to use her dress as well. Of the British soldiers, 92 had been killed in action, 134 wounded, and 59 were taken prisoner. Of the Boers, one died in action, and one died from his wounds.

Commandant Joachim Ferreira, who led one of the Boer units, said later that he admits that it was not them who slay the enemies, but the Almighty himself.

The body of Gen Colley lay for three days in a tent with the Boere, until Piet Joubert requested that the British fetch it. Upon receiving his request, the British sent him a letter, addressed to the leader of the rebellions. Joubert refused to hand over the body until he was addressed as the Commandant General of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek. On the 1st of March, the Boers handed the body of General Colley to the British to transport of Mount Prospect for a suitable military funeral.

Piet Joubert became a hero overnight. He sent a long telegram to Lady Colley to express the sympathy of the Boers. He also ensured that the sward of Lieutenant Hector MacDonald (who later became a General) be returned to him.

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**The Jameson Raid**

The Jameson Raid (29 December 1895 – 2 January 1896) was a botched [raid](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raid_(military)) on

[Paul Kruger](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Kruger)'s [Transvaal Republic](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_African_Republic) carried out by a British colonial statesman [Leander Starr Jameson](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leander_Starr_Jameson), aided by his [Rhodesian](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhodesia) and [Bechuanaland](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bechuanaland) policemen, on behalf of the Crown, over the New Year weekend of 1895–96. It was intended to trigger an uprising by the primarily British expatriate workers (known as [Uitlanders](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uitlander)) in the [Transvaal](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_African_Republic) but failed to do so. The workers were called the Johannesburg conspirators. They were expected to recruit an army and prepare for an insurrection. The raid was ineffective and no uprising took place, but it was an inciting factor in the [Second Anglo-Boer War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Boer_War).

**a) Background**

Although there were some abortive attempts to annex the Boer Republics, Britain recognized their independence by the Treaties made at the [Sand River Convention](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sand_River_Convention) of 1852 and the [Orange River Convention](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orange_River_Convention) of 1854, for the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek (which lay within the borders of the Transvaal) and the neighboring Orange Free State, respectively.

After the [First Anglo-Boer War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Anglo-Boer_War), [Gladstone](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Ewart_Gladstone)'s government restored the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek independence in 1884 by signing of the [London Convention](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Convention_(1884)). No one knew there would be the discovery of the colossal gold deposits of the Witwatersrand in the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek two years later.

**b) Economics**

Despite the political divisions, the four territories into which South Africa had been divided by the Crown were strongly linked. Each carried European-African emigrants from the Cape; many citizens had relatives or friends in other territories. As the largest and longest established state in [Southern Africa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Africa), the Cape was economically, culturally, and socially dominant: by comparison, the population of Natal and the two Boer republics were mostly pastoralist, subsistence farmers.

The fairly simple agricultural dynamic was upset in 1870, when vast diamond fields were discovered in [Griqualand West](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Griqualand_West), around modern-day [Kimberley](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kimberley,_Northern_Cape). Although the territory had historically come under the authority of the Orange Free State, the British Cape government successfully annexed the area, taking control of its vast mineral wealth.

**c) Discovery of gold**

In 1886, gold was discovered at an outcrop near modern-day Johannesburg; it became clear there were massive deposits of gold. A huge inflow of ‘[Uitlanders](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uitlander)’ (foreigners), mainly from Britain, came to the region in search of employment and fortune. The discovery of gold made the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek overnight the richest area, and the Boer nation potentially the most powerful in southern Africa. Gold attracted so many Uitlanders (in 1896 approximately 60,000) to the Boer Republic that the Uitlanders quickly outnumbered the Boers (approximately 30,000 white male Boers in 1896).

Fearful of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek losing independence and becoming a colony of the Crown, the Boer government adopted policies of protectionism and exclusion, to include restrictions' requiring Uitlanders to be resident for many years in order to obtain the franchise, or right to vote.

[Cecil Rhodes](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cecil_Rhodes), governor of the Cape, shared the vision to incorporate the Transvaal and the Orange Free State in a federation under British control with the global money elite. Having combined his commercial mining interests with [Alfred Beit](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Beit) to form the De Beers Mining Corporation, Rhodes and he also wanted to control the Johannesburg gold mining industry. They played a major role in fomenting Uitlander grievances. In mid-1895 Rhodes planned a raid by an armed column from [Rhodesia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhodesia) - the British colony to the north which he had established - to support an uprising of Uitlanders with the goal of taking control. The raid soon ran into difficulties, beginning with hesitation by the Uitlander leaders.

**d) Jameson force and the Initiation of the raid**

As part of the planning, a force had been placed at [Pitsani](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Pitsani&action=edit&redlink=1) - on the border of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek, by the order of Rhodes, so as to be able to quickly offer support to the Uitlanders in the uprising. The force was placed under the control of Sir [Leander Starr Jameson](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leander_Starr_Jameson) - the Administrator General of the Chartered Company (of which Cecil Rhodes was the Chairman) for [Matabeleland](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matabeleland). Among the other commanders was [Raleigh Grey](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raleigh_Grey). The force was around 600 men - about 400 from the Matabeleland Mounted Police and the remainder other volunteers. It was equipped with [rifles](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rifles), which included between eight and sixteen [Maxim machine guns](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxim_machine_gun), and between three and eleven light [artillery](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artillery) pieces.1

The basic plan was that Johannesburg would revolt and seize the Boer armory in capital Pretoria. Jameson and his force would dash across the border to Johannesburg to "restore order" and with control of Johannesburg would control the gold fields.

However Jameson waited and waited for the insurrection to move but in the meantime differences arose within the Reform Committee and between Johannesburg Uitlander reformers regarding the form of government to be adopted after the coup. At a point, certain reformers contacted Jameson to inform him of the difficulties and advised him to stand down. Jameson, with 600 restless men and other pressures, became frustrated by the delays, and believing that he could spur the reluctant Johannesburg reformers to act, decided to go ahead. He sent a telegram on the 29th of December 1895 to Rhodes, warning him of his intentions, which read as follows:

"Unless I hear definitely to the contrary, shall leave to-morrow evening,” and on the very next day sent a further message, "Shall leave to-night for the Transvaal". However the transmission of the first telegram was delayed, so that both arrived at the same time on the morning 29th of December, and by then Jameson's men had cut the telegraph wires and there was no way of recalling him.

On the 29th of December 1895, Jameson's armed column crossed into the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek and headed for [Johannesburg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannesburg). It was hoped that this would be a 3 day dash to Johannesburg before the Boer commandos could mobilize, and would trigger an uprising by the Uitlanders.

The British [Colonial secretary](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secretary_of_State_for_the_Colonies), [Joseph Chamberlain](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Chamberlain), though sympathetic to the ultimate goals of the Raid, was uncomfortable with the timing of the invasion and remarked that "if this succeeds it will ruin me. I'm going up to London to crush it".

He swiftly travelled by train to the Colonial Office, ordering Sir [Hercules Robinson](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hercules_Robinson), Governor-General of the Cape Colony, to repudiate the actions of [Jameson](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leander_Starr_Jameson), and warned Rhodes that the Company's Charter would be in danger if it were discovered the Cape Prime Minister was involved in the Raid. Chamberlain therefore instructed local British representatives to call on British colonists not to offer any aid to the raiders.

**e) Arrest of Jameson after the raid**

Although Jameson's men had cut the telegraph wires to Cape Town, they had failed to cut the telegraph wires to Pretoria (cutting a fence by mistake). Accordingly news of his incursion quickly reached Pretoria and Jameson's armed column was tracked by the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek forces from the moment that it crossed the border. The Jameson armed column first encountered resistance very early on the 1st of January 1896, when there was a very brief exchange of fire with a Boer outpost. At noon, the Jameson armed column was abound twenty miles further on at [Krugersdorp](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Krugersdorp), where a small force of Boer soldiers had blocked the road to Johannesburg where they had dug trenches, and prepared their defensive positions.

Jameson's force spent some hours exchanging fire with the Boers, losing several men and many horses in the skirmish. Towards evening the Jameson armed column withdrew and turned south-east, attempting to flank the Boer force. The Boers, however, had tracked the move overnight, and on the 2nd of January, as the morning light broke, a substantial Boer force with some artillery was waiting for Jameson at [Doornkop](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doornkop). The tired Jameson raiders initially exchanged fire with the Boers, losing around thirty men before Jameson realized the position was hopeless and surrendered to Commander [Piet Cronjé](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piet_Cronj%C3%A9).2 The raiders were taken to [Pretoria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretoria) and jailed.

**f) Aftermath**

The Boer government later handed the men over to the British for trial and the British prisoners were returned to London.

A few days after the raid, the Kaiser of Germany sent a telegram ("[Kruger telegram](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kruger_telegram)") congratulating President Kruger and the Boer government on their success "without the help of friendly powers", alluding to potential support by Germany. When this was disclosed in the British press, it raised a storm of anti-German feeling.

Dr Jameson was lionized by the press and London society, inflamed by anti-Boer and anti-German propaganda.

Jameson was sentenced to 15 months for leading the raid, which he served in

[Holloway](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holloway_Prison). The Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek was paid almost £1 million in compensation by the [British South Africa Company](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_South_Africa_Company).

For conspiring with Jameson, the members of the [Reform Committee (in the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_Committee_(Transvaal)), including Colonel [Frank Rhodes](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_William_Rhodes) (brother of Cecil John Rhodes) and [John Hays Hammond](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Hays_Hammond), were jailed, found guilty of [high treason](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_treason), and sentenced to death by hanging. This sentence was later commuted to 15 years’ imprisonment, and in June 1896, all surviving members of the Committee were released on payment of stiff fines. As further punishment for his support of Jameson, the highly decorated Colonel Rhodes was placed on the retired list by the British Army and barred from active involvement in army business.

After his release from jail, Frank Rhodes immediately joined his brother Cecil and the British South Africa Company in the [Second Matabele War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Matabele_War), which was taking place just north of the Transvaal in Matabeleland. Cecil Rhodes was forced to resign as Prime Minister of Cape Colony in 1896 due to his apparent involvement in planning and assisting in the raid.

Jameson's raid had depleted Matabeleland of many of its troops and left the whole territory vulnerable. Seizing on this weakness, and a discontent with the British South Africa Company, the Ndebele revolted during March 1896 in what is now celebrated in [Zimbabwe](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zimbabwe) as the First War of Independence, the First ‘[Chimurenga](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chimurenga)’, - the [Second Matabele War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Matabele_War). The [Shona](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shona_people) joined the Ndebele soon afterwards. Hundreds of European settlers were killed within the first few weeks of the revolt and many more would die over the next year and a half. With few troops to support them, the settlers had to quickly build a [laager](http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/laager) in the centre of [Bulawayo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulawayo) on their own. Against over 50,000 Ndebele held up in their stronghold of the [Matobo Hills](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matobo_Hills), the settlers mounted patrols under such people as [Burnham](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_Russell_Burnham), [Baden-Powell](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Baden-Powell), and [Selous](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_Selous). It would not be until October 1897 that the Ndebele and Shona would finally lay down their arms.

**g) Political impact**

After release from the case of high treason against the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek by the legal system of London, Jameson became Prime Minister of the Cape Colony (1904–08) and one of the founders of the Union of South Africa. He was made a [baronet](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baronet) in 1911, and returned to England in 1912. On his death in 1917, he was buried next to Cecil Rhodes and the 34 British South Africa Company soldiers of the [Shangani Patrol](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shangani_Patrol) (killed in 1893 in the [First Matabele War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Matabele_War)) in the Matobos Hills, near Bulawayo.

**h) Effect on Anglo-Boer relations**

The affair brought Anglo-Boer relations to a dangerous low and the ill feeling was further heated by the "[Kruger telegram](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kruger_telegram)" from the German Emperor, [Kaiser Wilhelm II](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaiser_Wilhelm_II). It congratulated [Paul Kruger](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Kruger) on defeating the "raiders", and also appeared to recognize the independence of the Boer republic and offer support. The emperor was already perceived as anti-British, and a naval arms race had started between Germany and [Britain](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom). Consequently, the telegram alarmed and angered the Crown. The Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek began importing large quantities of arms, and an alliance was signed between the two Boer Republics in 1897.

General Jan C. Smuts wrote in 1906 of the Raid that, "The Jameson Raid was the real declaration of war... And that is so in spite of the four years of truce that followed... [the] aggressors consolidated their alliance... the defenders on the other hand silently and grimly prepared for the inevitable."

Joseph Chamberlain condemned the raid despite previously having approved Rhodes' plans to send armed assistance in the case of a Johannesburg uprising.

In London, despite some condemnation by the print-media, most newspapers used the episode as an opportunity to whip-up anti-Boer feelings. Jameson and his raiders were treated as public heroes.

**i) Bower's account of Chamberlain’s involvement in the Jameson Raid**

In 2002, The [Van Riebeeck](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_van_Riebeeck) Society published Sir [Graham Bower](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graham_Bower)'s ‘Secret History of the Jameson Raid and the South African Crisis, 1895–1902’ (Edited by Deryck Schreuder and Jeffrey Butler, Van Riebeeck Society, Cape Town, Second Series No. 33), adding to growing historical evidence that the imprisonment and judgment upon the Raiders at the time of their trial was unjust, in view of what appeared in later historical analysis, to have been the calculated political maneuvers by [Joseph Chamberlain](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Chamberlain) and his staff to hide his own involvement and knowledge of the Raid.

In his review of Sir Graham Bower's account, Alan Cousins (2004) notes that, "A number of major themes and concerns emerge" from Bower's history,"...perhaps the most poignant being Bower’s accounts of his being made a scapegoat in the aftermath of the raid: 'since a scapegoat was wanted I was willing to serve my country in that capacity'."

Cousins notes of Bower that "a very clear sense of his rigid code of honour is plain, and a conviction that not only unity, peace and happiness in South Africa, but also the peace of Europe would be endangered if he told the truth. He believed that, as he had given [Rhodes](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cecil_Rhodes) his word not to divulge certain private conversations, he had to abide by that, while at the same time he was convinced that it would be very damaging to Britain if he said anything to the parliamentary committee to show the close involvement of Sir Hercules Robinson and Joseph Chamberlain in their disreputable encouragement of those plotting an uprising in [Johannesburg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannesburg)."

Finally, Cousins observes that, "...in his reflections, Bower has a particularly damning judgment on Chamberlain, whom he accuses of 'brazen lying' to parliament, and of what amounted to forgery in the documents made public for the inquiry. In the report of the committee, Bower was found culpable of complicity, while no blame was attached to [Joseph Chamberlain](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Chamberlain) or Robinson. His name was never cleared during his lifetime, and Bower was never reinstated to what he believed should be his proper position in the colonial service: he was, in effect, demoted to the post of colonial secretary in [Mauritius](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mauritius). The bitterness and sense of betrayal he felt come through very clearly in his comments."

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**(v) Pioneer Column**

Although missionaries entered ‘uncivilized’ countries where they introduced some positive developments like schooling, western medicine, a stop to persecutions for alleged witchcraft and such practices as forced marriages and child-pledging, missionaries were also the earliest representatives of the imperial world that eventually violently displaced and conquered the indigenous people of Africa. There were some missionaries who had honest intentions of helping the ‘uneducated’ tribes, but there were also those who abused the trust and confidence of traditional leaders by conniving with concession seekers who represented the expansion leaders of the Crown.

The myth of a second gold Rand lying in King [Lobengula](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/lobengula.htm)'s Kingdom which encompassed both Matabeleland and Mashonaland precipitated the launch of the Pioneer Column that established the country known as Zimbabwe.

[Lobengula](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/lobengula.htm), "He who was sick", was the son of [Mzilikazi](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/mzilikazi.htm), son of [Matshobana](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/matshobana.htm), son of Mangete, son of Ngululu, son of Langa, son of Zimangele; all descendants of the Khumalo Dynasty. Lobengula’s mother was a Princess of the Swazi House of Sobhuza I.

According to [Ndebele](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/ndebele.htm) custom, a new king had to establish his own royal palace and town. Consequently, [Lobengula](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/lobengula.htm) left [King Mzilkazi](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/mzilikazi.htm)'s last capital of Mhlahlandlela to establish his own town, which eventually became known as [Bulawayo](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/byobirth.htm).

[Lobengula](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/lobengula.htm) ruled the [Matebele Kingdom](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/ndebele.htm) from the time of the death of [Mzilikazi](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/mzilikazi.htm) 1868, until the demise of his kingdom by the hands of Rhodes in the mid 1890's.

[Mzilikazi](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/mzilikazi.htm) had very little time for Christianity, but because of his respect for and trust of Robert Moffat, he allowed himself to be persuaded to admit the [Matebele](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/ndebele.htm) mission to his realm. [Once](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/lobengula.htm) established there, he and his successor Lobengula, always gave protection to the missionaries. Lobengula reigned well and entertained Europeans sparingly. One recorded account is that of J.Cooper Chadwick, who described Lobengula as follows in his book ‘Three years with Lobengula’1:

"The King is by far the most intelligent man in the nation and his memory is marvelous".  
[Lobengula](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/lobengula.htm)'s sympathies and soft spot for the missionaries which he had inherited from his Father, [King Mzilikazi](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/mzilikazi.htm), led to the destruction of the [Matebele](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/ndebele.htm) Kingdom.

The Matebele king had extreme pressures from different groups all sent on extracting concessions from him, coupled with internal pressures from pacifists who wanted negotiations and peace, and conservatives who wanted war, among his own people.

With a translator deliberately explaining hazy and incorrect details, missionaries tricked Lobengula into signing treaties like the Moffat Treaty and the Rudd Concession without fully understanding them. The Concession permitted mining and colonization of lands by the Crown between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers, and gave Rhodes the exclusive right to exploit the mineral wealth of Mashonaland, whose attraction at that time rested largely on its reputed riches of gold and silver. In the same agreement, all Boer expansion activity was prohibited. In exchange, the British would pay Lobengula 100 pounds a month, as well as1 000 rifles, 10 000 rounds of ammunition, and a riverboat. Lobengula hoped that this agreement would cut down on other Europeans entering his land.

The treaties ceded land and mineral rights to Cecil John Rhodes. Rhodes used the Rudd Concession to obtain a Royal Charter from the British government.

The grant of a Royal Charter by Queen Victoria to the British South Africa Company (BSAP) on the 29th October, 1889 was the first constitutional step which led to the acquisition of the territory between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers for the Crown, giving it large powers of administration to carry out the terms of the Rudd Concession, secured by Charles Dunell Rudd, on behalf **Cecil John Rhodes** from the Matabele King, Lobengula, a year before.

The Pioneer Column Invasion (1890) was predicated by the want of Cecil Rhodes and the Crown to pursue further land north through Bechunanaland into Matabelaland. Despite numerous envoys and letters from Queen Victoria to [Lobengula](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lobengula), no progress had been made on the opening the “road.”

In December 1889, Cecil Rhodes took matters into his own hands by contracting Frank Johnson and Maurice Haney to recruit 500 mercenaries to overthrow Lobengula. Rhodes wanted to strike the main towns and military posts to cause turmoil in the Matabele (or [Ndebele](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Ndebele_people)) nation. He also wanted to render useless the power of the Amandebele to limit their ability to raid nearby villages, and to send the state into general confusion. Rhodes believed this would give the [British South Africa Company](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_South_Africa_Company) opportunity to begin mining the land in safety. Fred Selous warned Rhodes that this would be a monumental disaster for traders and England itself.

Rhodes decision, based on Selous’ advice, was to move around Lobengalu and make for a different route to [Mashonaland](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mashonaland) from the south around Mount Hampden.

Johnson’s new mission was to find 120 ‘miners’ to travel with Selous as their guide. The plan was approved at the local level, but once London received the report, the plan was seen as an agitation designed to involve Britain in a war with Lobengula. This led to further negotiations with Lobengula in an attempt to open the “road”.

Lobengula complained about having to deal with subordinates and told Jameson to have Rhodes brought before him. In a bit of maneuvering, Jameson told Lobengula that he was going to inform Rhodes of his decision to keep the “road” closed. Lobengalu’s reply to this was that he had “not refused you the road, but let Rhodes come.” Using this and reports that the Boers were making expeditions into Mashonaland, the High Commissioner could not prevent the force from moving into the territory.

Johnson had his “pioneers” preparing at camp to cross. Rhodes insisted that he take prominent Cape members with him in case they were cut off, his reason being that the Imperial Forces would be more likely to rescue well to-do members of the Cape than miners. While the pioneer column moved out of camp and was preparing to cross, false assurances were being sent to Lobengalu about the number of white men in his country. However, Lobengalu did not attack and the column on 12 September, after the 360-mile (580 km) journey arrived at Mount Hampden and named the surrounding area Fort Salisbury.

From 1890 onwards, Rhodes and his BSAC continued northwards, making their own laws and installing their own government.

Rhodes wanted Mashonaland not only for its mineral wealth. He saw the strategical significance of the area. Gold was the attraction by which means he hoped to make the venture viable.

In 1890, Rhodes sent a group of settlers under sovereignty of the Crown, known as the [Pioneer Column](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pioneer_Column), and north into Mashonaland. The 400+ man Pioneer Column was guided by the explorer and big game hunter [Frederick Selous](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_Selous), and was officially designated the ‘British South Africa Company Police’ (BSACP), accompanied by about 100 Bechuanaland Border Police (BBP).

The Shona were not quick to respond to the invasion as they wrongly assumed the column was merely a uniquely large trade and gold-seeking party that would soon vacate.

Soon Rhodes’ invading British South Africa Company established a Native Department that authorized labour and tax raids on the Shona. Henceforth, constant skirmishes between Shona communities and tax collectors and labour raiders ensued as the Shona, who had not been conquered at all, saw no premise upon which the company could demand tax and labour from them. The company also started appropriating and granting land which belonged to the Shona to the settler pioneers.

Rhodes had been distributing land to the settlers even before the royal charter, but the charter legitimized his further actions with the British government. By 1891, an Order-in-Council declared [Matabeleland](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matabeleland), [Mashonaland](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mashonaland), and [Bechuanaland](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bechuanaland) a British protectorate. By 1892, the number of men in the force had decreased and the BSACP was replaced by a number of volunteer forces - the Mashonaland Horse, the Mashonaland Mounted Police and the Mashonaland Constabulary, and later additions of Salisbury Horse, Victoria Rangers, and Raaf's Rangers. The British South Africa Company Police was later renamed the [British South Africa Police](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_South_Africa_Police) (BSAP) and this force stayed together for much of the 20th century.

Of all the concessions, the most critical was the Rudd Concession, which set the stage for the Crown to mastermind the coup dâ grace in the form of the British South Africa Company Police.

The Rudd Concession conferred sweeping commercial and legal powers on Rhodes. Furthermore to in order to weaken any possible resolve on [Lobengula](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/lobengula.htm)’s part, scouts in the Rudd party secretly agitated the neighboring [Shona](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/shona.htm), who believed that the emerging problems were precipitated by the [Matebele](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/ndebele.htm).

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1 **‘**THREE YEARS WITH LOBENGULA’, London, Cassell, 1894, 160pp

**(vi) The First Ndebele War** **1893–1894**

During the second annual meeting of the South Africa Company, Rhodes stated that the company was on friendly terms with Lobengula, **the last king of the Ndebele** people, all the while knowing that war was to come. Ultimately, Jameson gave Lobengula’s commanders an ultimatum to withdraw from Mashonaland. At the end of his meeting with Lobengula, who refused to move from the border, Jameson sent for Captain Lendy and transport riders to find the Ndebele, and if they refused to leave to move them by force. When confronted, Captain Lendy followed orders and fired upon the Ndebele.

After the men returned to Fort Victoria, Jameson sent word to Rhodes and Loch that they must go to war. By October, Jameson had gathered 650 volunteers and 900 Shona auxiliaries.

Jameson continued to send word that Lobengula had troops planning to attack.

In July 1893, a party of Lobengula’s warriors raided a [Mashona](http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/shona.htm) village near Fort Victoria (now Masvingo), threatening a camp of British settlers. The warriors were instructed not to kill any white people, but they did steal a lot and were brutal in their treatment of the Shona.

Rhodes was able to use this attack of the Ndebele against the Shona near Fort Victoria as a pretence for attacking the kingdom of Lobengula with the cover of a legal mandate. The British High Commissioner authorized the then present military force to respond and to continue the advance until all of Matebeleland was occupied and under strict British Control on behalf of the Crown. They attacked the Ndebele and though they were only 1,100 to the 18,000 Ndebele, their superior arms gave them a big advantage.

The war was an easy win for Jameson, for as his troops advanced in the Matabeleland of the Ndebele, they swept over the Ndebele defenders with their machine guns and artillery.

Once defeated, Lobengula and a small remnant of his once powerful Impi destroyed his capital and fled approximately seventy kilometres north of the Zambezi River.

Jameson’s advancing troops followed him reaching Bulawayo on 4 November, but had no luck in finding Lobengula. In a desperate attempt to get away, Lobengula addressed a council of his indunas near the Shangani River, and asked that they give all hidden gold to the white men in order to have peace. Ultimately, the gold was given to men that the messengers came across, and never did reach Jameson or his troops. Matabeleland was ultimately divided among the volunteers and several of Rhodes officials.

**(vii) The Second Ndebele Matabele War** **1896 –1897**

While Jameson’s forces were being defeated by the Boers, the Ndebele saw it as a great opportunity to revolt.

On March 1896, Jameson’s forces were attacked first at outlying farms, mining camps, and stores. As people fled, and when word reached Bulawayo the capital, people began to panic and rush for arms. Since the Ndebele first attacked on the outskirts the element of surprise had passed, and it allowed time for the whites to gather and maneuver. Volunteers arrived, and Rhodes came from Fort Salisbury after naming himself colonel before rode into combat with the troops.

By June, it appeared that the Ndebele forces were falling back in Bulawayo to the Mambo Hills, but the British military were surprised once more, for the Shona had joined in the revolt. By the end of the first week, more than 100 men, women, and children were killed, which was about 10 percent of the white population in Bulawayo.

Eventually there was a deadlock in the Matopo Hills, and assaults continued until Rhodes sent a captured royal widow, Nyamabezana, to the rebels, stating that if they waved a white flag it would be a sign for peace, for the cost of the war was coming too much for the British South Africa Company. Ultimately, Rhodes rode with several others to meet the rebels, after meeting with them and compromising in order to meet their demands Rhodes met with other Ndebele leaders, and the details of the agreement were finished in October.

The Shona were not so lucky, for they were found and killed in caves, and their land conquered.

**(viii) The Second Anglo-Boer War /Second South African War (1899–1902)**

Both the Anglo-Boer Wars, but specifically the second one, was about one thing and one thing only: Control of South Africa, and specifically the gold and diamond mines.

There was a visible split in the attitude of the British government and the Crown with regards to the justification of war against the Boer Republics. Some people felt that the British were coerced into war by the mining magnates of the Crown; others that the British government manipulated the magnates into creating conditions that allowed the war to ignite.

a) **Zuid Afrikaanse Treasury before the Second Anglo-Boer War**

The Crown was well aware of the substantial monetary growth of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek treasury due to the gold found in its reef before the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War. When the Crown occupied Pretoria - the capital of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek - on the 5th of June 1900, Lord Alfred Milner immediately established that gold to the value of approximately 800 000 pounds had been removed from the South African Mint and National Bank between the 29th of May and the 4th of June 1900. The Crown went ahead and confiscated gold to the value of 2,5 million pounds from gold mines on the reef, and according to documentary proof, l 294 000 pounds was removed from the South African Mint and National Bank by the Crown as soon as they took occupation of Pretoria.

Lord Milner sent word out for the capture of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek President, Paul Kruger, only to find he had boarded the Dutch cruiser, *De Gelderland*, from the country now known as Mozambique.

**(i) Invention of Uitlander Grievances**

After the public embarrassment caused through the unsuccessful Jameson Raid, the Crown worried about popular support for the war and wanted to push the Boers to make the first move towards actual hostilities.

The Cape Colony Governor Sir [Alfred Milner](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Milner), Cape Prime Minister [Cecil John Rhodes](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cecil_Rhodes), British Colonial Secretary [Joseph Chamberlain](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Chamberlain), and mining syndicate owners or [Randlords](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Randlord) (nicknamed the gold bugs), such as [Alfred Beit](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Beit), [Barney Barnato](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barney_Barnato), and [Lionel Phillips](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lionel_Phillips) – Crown members of the “City of London” financial institutions who later became famous as the House of Lords, financed negative media propaganda against the Boer government, which the Kindergarten group used to influenced the thinking of people both inside and outside South Africa.

The Boers were painted as illiterate, cruel slave drivers, lazy to work and dirty, the children dressed in skins and the parents owning only one set of clothes. The Africans were painted as cruel cannibals, savages with no humanity or morals.

The disinterest of the Boers in mining the minerals from their land and partaking in alcohol was criticized by the media as holding back the rest of the country in their development. The fact that taking precious stones from under the ground was against the laws in the Bible of the deeply religious Boers, as was also drunkenness, lying, and many other actions the Society of the Elect\* did not adhere too, were never mentioned.

The media criticized the way the “Uitlanders” - people who were not Boers and who worked the mines inside the Boer Republics - were treated. Although sympathy for the cause of the Uitlanders was raised worldwide, they could not stir an uprising by the Uitlanders, who enjoyed a good relationship with the Boers, as can be read in many letters, annuls, newspaper reports and books written by the people living in the mining communities of that time.

Writing both as an Uitlander and an English officer who had fought in the war, Captain March Phillips recorded in his book “With Rimington,” (London, Edward Arnold, publisher, 1901, pp. 105, 106) the following regarding the grievances of the Uitlanders:  
“As for the Uitlanders and their grievances, I would not ride a yard or fire a shot to right all the grievances that were ever invented. The mass of Uitlanders (i.e. the miners and working men of the Rand) had no grievances.   
“I know what I am talking about, for I have lived and worked among them. I have seen English newspapers passed from one to another, and roars of laughter roused by the Times telegrams about these precious grievances.  
“We used to read the London papers to find out what our grievances were; and very frequently they would be due to causes of which we had never even heard. I never met one miner or working man who would have walked a mile to pick the vote up off the road, and I have known and talked with scores and hundreds. And no man who knows the Rand will deny the truth of what I tell you.”

Phillips expanded on the situation as follows:  
“No; the Uitlanders the world has heard of were not these, but the Stock Exchange operators, manipulators of the money market, company floaters, and gamblers generally, a large percentage of them Jews. They voiced Johannesburg, had the press in their hands, worked the wires, and controlled and arranged what sort of information should reach England. As for the grievances, they were a most useful invention, and have had a hand in the making of many fortunes. It was by these that a feeling of insecurity was introduced into the market which would otherwise have remained always steady; it was by these that the necessary and periodic slump was brought about. When the proper time came, “grievances,” such as would arrest England’s attention and catch the ear of the people, were deliberately invented.’” (With Rimington pp.41,42)

Cuan Elgin Michael Davitt, M.P. (who resigned from Parliament in protest over Britain’s actions in the Second Anglo-Boer War, which he witnessed firsthand) in his book ‘The Boer Fight For Freedom’, commented on the media reports concerning the situation of the Uitlanders as follows:  
“Its objects were obvious to the Transvaal government and to all who followed with any attention the movement for ‘the redress of the intolerable grievances’ of the German Jews and the cosmopolitan adventurers which was carried on by the paid agents of Messrs. Rhodes, Beit, Echstein and Company in Johannesburg. One comment upon the “grievances” thus manufactured by a subsidized press - the honest and manly view of an upright British soldier who had been conversant with the whole situation in Johannesburg - will be enough to lay bare the hollow mockery, and the mercenary and mendacious character, of the movement upon  
the existence of which Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Alfred Milner grounded their pretext for a policy of war.”

**Of interest is that there were Irish Uitlanders who sided with the Boers, which are mentioned in Footnote 1 in the end of this section, and American Uitlanders who also sided with the Boers, which is mentioned in Footnote 2.**

Under the pretext to gain improved rights for the “Uitlanders”, and to give protection to the Boer republic neighboring African tribes, influential British colonial figures laid plans for war on behalf of the Crown, with the Boers in order to annex their territories, and espoused support as far away as the Australian Crown colonies by using negative propaganda against the Boer nation. Confident that the Boers would be quickly defeated, they planned and organized a short war, citing the Uitlanders' grievances as the motivation for the conflict.

**b) Concessions made by the Boers to avoid war**

In 1897, representatives of the Crown openly declared that they would annex the two Boer Republics, Orange Free State and Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek.

Paul Kruger tried to negotiate a settlement with the British government, in order to avoid a war. Kruger was never a member of the Kindergarten group under Milner, but some of his senior generals, such as Jan Smuts, were.   
Smuts was the chief legal counsel for Kruger, and was present during the settlement negotiations in Bloemfontein. He wanted to make greater and more concessions to Milner, ostensibly to avoid the war. These concessions could have avoided the war - but it would also have given the Rand Lords (goldmine owners and members of the Crown) political and financial control over the Transvaal - which Kruger wanted to avoid. This desire to give so much away in terms of political freedom was the main thing that Kruger did not like about his young State Attorney.

The British government sent a telegram to Lord Milner (who had succeeded Rhodes as British High Commissioner of the Cape after Rhodes was recalled due to his participation in the Jameson Raid), accepting the terms that Kruger had proposed during discussions with Milner in Bloemfontein.  
  
After the negotiations in Bloemfontein, that Milner, by his own admission, had done everything in his power to derail, Milner went to Britain to canvas the support from within the Brotherhood of the Freemasons in the British government in order to force a war.

Milner was afraid that the British government would accept Kruger's proposal. Despite Milner's efforts, the government did accept Kruger's proposal.  
The British government sent Milner a telegram, shortly after he arrived back in South Africa, instructing him to tell Paul Kruger that they had accepted his offer.

**c) Milner instigated the Second Anglo-Boer War on behalf of the Crown**

Milner, again by his own admission, held back the telegram he had received from the British government in which they had accepted the offer made by Paul Kruger as president of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek, for several weeks, until he could force a war, through amongst other things, the Jameson raid.   
In June of 1900, Milner admitted to Lord Roberts, the then Commander in Chief of the British forces in South Africa and fellow representative of the Crown, his responsibility for being instrumental in precipitating the crises which led to the war against the Boer Republics, in the following statement:

"I precipitated the crisis, which was inevitable, before it was too late ……. It is not a very agreeable and, in many eyes, not a very creditable piece of business to have been largely instrumental in bringing about a big war."   
Milner sped up a crisis to induce war with the Boer Republic before it became public that the British government of the day had accepted Kruger's proposal.

The British government's sentiments to Milner regarding such a war are summed up as follows:  
"A war in South Africa would be one of the most serious wars that could possibly be waged. It would be in the nature of a Civil War. It would be a long war, a bitter war and a costly war…….it would leave behind it the embers of a strife which I believe generations would hardly be long enough to extinguish ……… to go to war with President Kruger, to force upon him reforms in the internal affairs of his state, with which we have repudiated all right of interference - that would be a course of action as immoral as it would be unwise" - Joseph Chamberlain, speaking as the Colonial Secretary in the House of Commons, May 1896.  
After this report by Chamberlain, Milner and others schemed to have Chamberlain removed from office, and convinced other members of the Crown and Britain to go to war - a war that was popularly believed would be a small and short one, in the nature of a three month sport shoot.  
Milner also forced the war because he and the instigators on the Rand (Reef) were losing face and credibility as the truth about the lies spread in their negative media reports surfaced, and it looked as if Kruger would not only be able to avoid a war, but retain the political power as well.

**d) Financing to destabilize the Boer Republics**

Milner was backed and influenced by Crown members with interests in mining the reefs of South Africa, including Wehrner, Barnato, Beit, Rhodes and Fitzpatrick (of Jock of the Bushveld fame). They contributed some £7 000 000 to the initial war effort and the Jameson raid. (In today's terms, at 7% per annum inflation, that is some £ 6 Billion).  
Crown members who had business interests in Vickers also supported war efforts in South Africa. In 1897, Vickers, in which Rothschilds had the largest holding, bought the Naval Construction and Armament Company, as well as the Maxim Nordenfeldt Guns & Ammunition Company. The new Vickers-Maxim Company was able to test its products in the Spanish-American War, which was set off by the J&W Seligman Company to obtain the white gold (sugar) of Cuba; the Boer War of 1899-1901 to seize the gold and diamond fields of the Witwatersrand; and the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 designed to weaken the Czar and make the Communist Revolution inevitable. These three wars provided the excuse for tooling up for the mass production of World Wars I & II.

Representatives of the Crown could not corrupt, nor shift Kruger politically, so they created war with the Boers, even though part of the British government of the day did not want the war, these representatives put the government in a position that it would need to "protect" British citizens and their human rights or lose face - and to the day that the government of South Africa was handed over to the African National Congress in 1994, there was not a single gold mine that belonged to anybody related to the Voortrekkers or the original Brown or Black people of South Africa. (Recently, Anglo - American struck a deal with Black empowerment groups like Naali and others with regard to mines were long worked out and non-profitable - they basically sold a nonexistent asset to these people - took the money, and let them go into liquidation, after which they bought the mines back at a fraction of the cost that they had sold them for.)

On the 9th of October 1898, the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek issued an ultimatum that the British withdraw all troops from their borders and recall reinforcements, or they would “regard the action as a formal declaration of war”.

**e)** **Black people also partook in the Second Anglo Boer War**

Over time, the war has come to be viewed as a "White Man’s War." Recent scholarship has exposed this as untrue. Black people were used on both sides. The Crown employed armed Black men as scouts or dispatch riders. The Boers also employed Black men during the war, which mostly helped with digging defensive emplacements and roads for the transport of weaponry. They served in this capacity primarily during the initial conventional phase of the war.

**f) The three phases of the Second Anglo-Boer War**

* 1. **Quick-hitting mobile style of war**

The Second Boer War consisted of three phases. It began with a Boer offensive push to besiege the garrisons at [Ladysmith](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ladysmith,_KwaZulu-Natal), [Mafeking](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mafeking), and [Kimberley](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kimberley,_Northern_Cape) after a quick mobilization of their commando units from each district, drawing up to between thirty and forty thousand men. The Boers used a quick-hitting mobile style of war based on their experiences fighting the British in the first Boer War, along with lessons learned from studying the [American Civil War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Civil_War).

Early British attempts to relieve these besieged garrisons met with mixed results. The British felt that the war would be ended quickly. They were ill-prepared to face the hardy Boers, losing a large number of men in their first attempts to push into and defeat the Boers at places such as [Magersfontein](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magersfontein), [Stormberg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Stormberg), and [Colenso](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Colenso).

* 1. **Overwhelming numbers phase**

The second phase began with Britain reeling from defeats and deploying the largest British force ever sent overseas to South Africa. The British commander, Sir [Redvers Buller](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Redvers_Buller), and his subordinate Major General Charles Warren, began the British offensive with an attack on the hill of [Spion Kop](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Spion_Kop). While the British won this battle, they belatedly realized that the hill was over-watched by Boer gun emplacements and suffered heavy casualties. Buller suffered another defeat at Vaal Krantz and was relieved as commander of British forces through questions of his management of the war. His replacement was Field Marshal Lord [Frederick Roberts](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_Roberts,_1st_Earl_Roberts).

Roberts managed to win a series of battles against the Boers by committing the overwhelming numbers of British forces against the Boers. He pushed into and captured the [Orange Free State](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orange_Free_State) in May 1900, and then pushed into the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek to capture Johannesburg on the 31st of May 1900. Roberts declared the war over after the capture of the Orange Free State and [Johannesburg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannesburg). It was at this point that the Boers, initially demoralized by the overwhelming numbers of British troops, began the third phase of the Second Boer War: the guerilla campaign.

* 1. **The guerrilla campaign.**

After regrouping into smaller units the Boer commanders started using guerrilla tactics, destroying railways, bridges, and telegraph wires. Their leaders included: [Louis Botha](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louis_Botha) in the eastern Transvaal; [Koos de la Rey](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koos_de_la_Rey) and [Jan Smuts](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_Smuts) in western Transvaal; [Christian de Wet](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_de_Wet) in the Orange Free State.

The British military company was not prepared for this type of tactic, having an insufficient number of mounted troops and no intelligence.

**g) War by the British military against civilians and prisoners of war**

The British military moved against the South African civilian population supporting the Boers, so they introduced the ‘scorched earth policy’. They burned the homesteads and farmlands of the Boers and any surrounding areas in uncontrolled fires. Horses, cows and all other livestock belonging to the Boer people were mutilated, shot, and slaughtered in the cruelest ways possible while the women, whose men and sons which were on the battlefield, had to watch helplessly. To note, the Boer men were farmers and not trained soldiers. Their sons, even as young as ten years old, also joined the ranks of the Boer soldiers.

According to our records, 3997 Boer soldiers died in battle; 2000 Boer soldiers died from sickness; 150 Boer soldiers died from casualties, and the fate of hundreds more are unknown. About 50% of the Boer youth was disposed.

Acts of War against people in South Africa during the Second Anglo-Boer War included the following atrocities by representatives of the Crown:

* **Citizens of the Boer Republics were murdered.**

3 800 citizens of the Boer Republics, of which there were also British citizens – in particular from the ‘National Scouts’ and the ‘Brabant Horse’ - were murdered.

* **Throats of wounded Boer soldiers were slit**

The throats of wounded Boer soldiers and their supporters were slit by British military, the act became known as “swine throats”.

* **Throats of Boer soldiers who surrendered were slit**

The throats of Boer soldiers and their supporters who surrendered to the British military were slit by British military.

* **Wounded Boer soldiers and Boer soldiers who surrendered were sent to prison camps overseas**

Wounded Boer soldiers and Boer soldiers who surrendered, and their supporters, were deported to 47 prison camps overseas. Some of these overseas countries used these prisoners to work as slaves in their plantations.

Of the 25 630 prisoners of war which were deported, more than 1000 did not survive.

**Boer prisoners of war, and their supporters, were tortured to death in British concentration camps.**

There were more than 70 British concentration camps erected in South Africa where they abused and raped women; women, children, babies, the sick and the elderly were tortured to death. The Boer prisoners of war were put into 31 such camps, and about 130 000 Black citizens, including whole families, were put into 40 concentration camps.

Between 1899 and 1902, the Boer nation lost more than 42 400 members through the most severe living conditions in concentration camps.

The ‘Black’ concentration camps took the lives of about 10 000 people. The remarkable difference in victim quantities was especially due to the fact that Black prisoners were provided with fruit and vegetables, in contrast to the White concentration camps, where malnutrition, tinned food spiced with chips of glass inside, inadequate hygienic living conditions and disease were the main reasons of death.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| Killing sheep | Leaving the sheep rotten |

The destruction of the farms prevented the fighting burghers from obtaining food and leaving their women and children homeless on the open veldt demoralized the nation.

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| --- | --- | --- |
| **Before the blast** | **The blast** | **Destroyed for king and country** |
|  |  |  |

Hired soldiers for the British military company raped, murdered and captured the farmers’ wives and children, the sick and the elderly, and anyone else they suspected to be Boer supporters, and forcefully put them into ‘refugee’ camps.

 

Women and children on the run - away Family arrived at the concentration from the English army. camp

To the world, England pretended to act very humanely by caring for the fighting Boers' women and children in "refugee camps". An English school textbook published in 1914 in Johannesburg, but printed in England, titled ‘Historical Geography: South Africa’, by JR Fisher, makes the following claim:

"During the later stages of the war, the relations, women and children, of those

Boers still in the field, were fed and cared for at the expense of Great Britain, a method of procedure which, though humane, postponed the end of the war, at

the expense of many valuable lives and much money."

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| The Cape Argus of 21 June 1900, clearly states  that the destitution of these women and children  was the result of the English's plundering of farms:  "Within 10 miles we (the English) burned not less  than six farm homesteads.  Between 30 and 40 homesteads were burned and  totally destroyed between Bloemfontein and Bosh off.  Many others were also burned down. With their  houses destroyed, the women and children were  left in the bitter South African winter in the open." |  |

Breytenbach discussed this destruction in his book ‘Danie Theron’ as follows:

"The destruction was undertaken in a diabolic way and even Mrs. Prinsloo,

a 22 year old lady, who gave birth to a baby only 24 hours ago in the house of Van Niekerk, was not spared. A group of rude tommies (British soldiers), amongst whom

a so-called English doctor, forced their way into her room, and after making pretence of examining her, they drove her out of the house. With the aid of her sister, she managed to don a few articles of clothing and left the house. Her mother brought a blanket to protect her against the cold. The soldiers robustly jerked the blanket out of her mother's hands and after having looted whatever they wanted to, put the

house to fire. Afterwards the old man was driven on foot to Kroonstad by mounted *kakies* (British soldiers), while his wife and daughter (Mrs. Prinsloo) were left destitute on the scorched farm."

English propaganda by the Crown provided a photograph of a ‘family at the beginning of their stay at the refugee camp’ with tea and bread.



The British Crown's claim of caring for the Boer women is similar to the claim of somebody who boasts to have saved the life of someone he himself has pushed into the water. However, there is one vital difference: The holocaust on the Boer women and children began in all earnest once they had been forced into the concentration camps under the "care" of the British Military.

Claims from the Crown that the concentration camps were "voluntary refugee camps" are illogical in this matter for the following reasons:

* These ‘refugees’ were not fleeing from their own husbands and sons, but from the British military;
* Voluntary refugee camps are not enclosed by barbed wire fences. The Kimberley camp had a five meter high barbed wire fence and some camps even had two or three fences.
* There were armed wardens supervising the actions of the Boers inside the ‘voluntary refugee camps’.

A camp commander make the following statement quoted by Emily Hobhouse: "The wardens were under orders not to interfere with the inmates, unless they should try to escape".

It is clear that these people who lived inside the British ‘refugee’ camps were prisoners of war.

The words of the Welsh William Redmond are closer to the truth: "The way in which these wretched, unfortunate and poor women and children are treated in South Africa is barbarous, outrageous, scandalous and disgraceful."

C. Louis Leipoldt wrote a song wherein the suffering of Boer children during the Second Anglo-Boer War is addressed, from which we offer an excerpt in Footnote 4 - A song for the Boer children.

By October 1900 there were already 58 883 people in concentration camps in Transvaal and 45 306 in the Free State. Camps had also established in Natal and the Cape, and included the following place names: Irene, Barberton, Volksrust, Belfast, Klerksdorp, Pietersburg, Potchefstroom, Vereeniging, Turffontein, Balmoral, Nylstroom, Standerton, Heilbron, Kimberley, Bloemfontein, Middelburg, Kroonstad, Heidelberg, Krugersdorp, Vryburg, Vredefort, Brandfort, Springfontein, Bethulie, Norvalspont, Port Elizabeth, Aliwal North, Merebank, Pinetown, Howick and Pietermaritzburg.

**h) The Crown planned the deaths of their prisoners of war.**

The claim of decent actions towards the Boer women and children, and their supporters, are further contradicted by the location of the concentration camps. The military authorities, who often had to plan and erect camps for their soldiers, would certainly have been well aware of the essential requirements for such camps. Yet the concentration camps were established in the most unsuitable locations possible.

At Standerton the camp was erected on both banks of the Vaal River. It was on the Highveld, which ensured that it was extremely cold in winter and infested with mosquitoes in summer. The fact that Standerton had turf soil and a high rainfall, ensured that the camp was one big mud bath in summer, even inside the tents.

The same circumstances were experienced in camps such as Brandfort, Springfontein and Orange River. At Pretoria, the Irene Camp was located at the chilly southern side of the town, while the northern side had a much more favorable climate. Balmoral, Middelburg and other camps were also located on the south-eastern hangs of the hills to ensure that the inhabitants were exposed to the icy south easterly winds.

Merebank camp was located in a swamp where there was an abundance of various kinds of insects. Water oozed out of the ground, ensuring that everything was constantly wet and slimy.

The amenities in the camps were clearly planned to kill as many of the women and children as possible. They were accommodated in tattered reject tents which offered no protection against the elements.

Emily Hobhouse mentioned the tents of these camps in her book ‘Brunt of War’ on page 169 as follows:

"Throughout the night there was a downpour. Puddles of water were everywhere. They tried to get themselves and their possessions dry on the soaked ground."

There were neither beds nor mattresses and nearly the whole camp population had to sleep on the bare ground, which was damp most of the time.

One person wrote the following plea for aid to the New York Herald: "In the name of small children who have to sleep in open tents without fire, with barely any clothes, I plea for help."

A British physician, Dr Henry Becker, referred to the situation of the Boers inside the British ‘refugee’ camps as follows:

"First, they chose an ill-suited site for the camp. Then they supplied so little water that the people could neither wash themselves nor their clothes. “Furthermore, they made no provision for sufficient waste removal. And lastly, they did not provide enough toilets for the overpopulation they had crammed into the camps."

A report on a Ladies' Committee's visit to Bloemfontein camp stated: "They saw how the women tried to wash clothes in small puddles of water and sometimes had to use the water more than once."

The outbreak of disease and epidemics in the camps were further promoted by, inter alia, the lack of sanitary conveniences. Bloemfontein camp had only 13 toilets for more than 3 500 people. Aliwal North camp had one toilet for every 170 people.

Dr Kendal Frank’s reports on the Irene Camp: "In one of the tents there were three families; parents and children, a total of 14 people and all were suffering from measles."

Ill and healthy people were crammed together into unventilated areas conducive to the spreading of disease and epidemics.

In Springfontein camp, 19 to 20 people were crammed into one tent.

At first there were no medical amenities whatsoever in the camps. Later doctors were appointed, but too few. In Johannesburg there was one doctor for every 4 000 afflicted patients.

A report on the Irene camp states that, out of a population of 1325 detainees, 154 were ill and 20 had died during the previous week. Still this camp had only one doctor and no hospital.

In some camps matters were even worse. The large Bloemfontein camp did not have a single doctor; only one nurse who could not possibly cope with the conditions. During a visit to Norvalspont camp, Emily Hobhouse could not even find a trained nurse.

The later appointment of medical personnel did not improve the conditions. They were appointed for their loyalty towards the British invasion, not for their medical capability. They too were guilty of maltreating the Boere. An example thereof is given in the experience Emily Hobhouse shared when she told tells the story of the young Lizzie van Zyl who died in the Bloemfontein concentration camp:

"She was a frail, weak little child in desperate need of good care. Yet, because her mother was one of the 'undesirables' due to the fact that her father neither surrendered nor betrayed his people, Lizzie was placed on the lowest rations and so

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| ***LIZZIE VAN ZYL*** |
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so perished with hunger that, after a month in the camp, she was transferred to the new small hospital. Here she was treated harshly. The English disposed doctor and his nurses did not understand her language and, as she could not speak English, labeled her an idiot although she was mentally fit and normal. One day she dejectedly started calling: Mother! Mother! I want to go to my mother! One Mrs. Botha walked over to her to console her. She was just telling the child that she would soon see her mother again, when she was brusquely interrupted by one of the nurses who told her not to interfere with the child as she was a nuisance." Shortly afterwards, Lizzie van Zyl died.

Treu, a medical assistant in the Johannesburg concentration camp, stated that patients were bullied and even lashed with a strap.

Ill people who were taken to the camp hospitals were as good as dead. One woman declared: "We fear the hospitals more than death."

The following two reports referred to the inefficiency of the camp hospitals are from a collection of sworn statements by women who were detained in the concentration camps during the Second War of Independence as recorded in the book ‘Stemme uit die Verlede’:

* 1. "Often people suffering from a minor ailment were violently removed from the tents of protesting mothers or family members to be taken to hospital. After a few days they were more often than not carried to the grave."
  2. "Should a child leave the hospital alive, it was simply a miracle."

According to a British journalist, WT Stead, the concentration camps were nothing more than a cruel torture machine. He writes: "Every one of these children, who died as a result of the halving of their rations, thereby exerting pressure onto their family still on the battle-field, was purposefully murdered. The system of half rations stands exposed and stark and unshamefully as a cold-blooded deed of state policy employed with the purpose of ensuring the surrender of people whom we were not able to defeat on the battlefield."

The Boer detainees received no fruit or vegetables; not even milk for the babies. Mrs. Helen Harris, who paid a visit to the Potchefstroom concentration camp, remarked:

"Imagine a one year old baby, who receives no milk; who has to drink water or coffee - there is no doubt that this is the cause of the poor health of the children."

Meat and flour issued to the Boer ‘refugees’ were crawling with maggots. Emily Hobhouse reported on this as follows: "I have in my possession coffee and sugar which were described as follows by a London analyst: In the case of the first, 66% imitation, and in the case of the second, sweepings from a warehouse."

In her book, ‘Met die Boere in die Veldt’ (With the Boers in the field), Sara Raal stated the following concerning the food rations given to the Boers inside the British ‘refugee’ camps:

“There were poisonous sulphate of copper, grounded glass, fishhooks, and razor blades in the rations."

Despite shocking fatality figures in the concentration camps, the Crown did nothing to improve the situation, and the English public remained deaf to the lamentations in the concentration camps as thousands of people, especially children, were carried to their graves.

The Welshman, Lloyd George, remarked on the death statistics as follows:

"The fatality rate of our soldiers on the battlefields, who were exposed to all the risks of war, was 52 per thousand per year, while the fatalities of women and children in the camps were 450 per thousand per year. We have no right to put women and children into such a position."

His remark was endorsed by the Irishman called Dillon, who said: "I can produce an endless succession of confirmations that the conditions in most of the camps are appalling and brutal. To my opinion the fatality rate is nothing less than cold-blooded murder."

One European had the following comment on the British Crown's conduct with the concentration camps:

"Great Britain cannot win her battles without resorting to the despicable cowardice of the most loathsome cure on earth - the act of striking at a brave man's heart through his wife's honour and his child's life."

Without any religious or form of ceremony, the corpses of children were thrown in heaps on mule carts to be transported to the cemeteries. The mourning mothers had to follow on foot. Due to illness or fatigue many of them could not follow fast enough and missed the funerals of their children.

According to PF Bruwer, author of ‘Vir Volk en Vryheid’, all the facts point out that the concentration camps, also known as the hell camps, were a calculated and deliberate effort by the Crown to commit a holocaust on the Boerevolk.

In most cases, the adjoining cemeteries to these concentration camps are still in existence, and are visited as often as possible by Boer people to mentally condition themselves to continue their struggle towards freedom.

  

**The highest sacrifice**

To note: More than 27 000 women and children made the highest sacrifice in the British hell camps during the struggle for the freedom of the Boerevolk. This number does not include the women, children and the elderly who died because of the war outside the British concentration camps.

Should one take note of the fact that it was the Crown who had called for the killing of the Boers' cattle with bayonets, thereby depriving the children of their food sources, the high fatality rate does not seem to be incidental.

In this modern world it seems as if few people realize the hardships the South African forefathers had to endure in order to lose their freedom only, without forfeiting the honour of their people. See Footnote 5 for a poem by AG Visser dedicated to a child who died at these camps; De Wet about a young son, and excepts from a song by Louis Leipold regarding the victims at these camps.

In December 1900, [Herbert Kitchener](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herbert_Kitchener) of Khartoum took over command of the British army on behalf of the Crown, and continued with the scorched-earth policy already implemented by his predecessors against the Boers. He argued that women served as a source of intelligence for the Boers, and set up blockhouses and barbed wire fences around the camps in which the Boers were interned in order to restrict the Boers to a certain area.

In January 1901, Kitchener raided the countryside, putting more Africans and Boer civilians into concentration camps. When he learned that Louis Botha was interested in peace, he jumped at the opportunity, using Botha’s wife and an intermediary. Nothing came of the talks, for Sir [Alfred Milner](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Milner) insisted that nothing but full surrender would be acceptable to the British.

i) **Emily Hobhouse, a friend to the Boer victims**

Emily Hobhouse, a Cornish British citizen, made a trip to Southern Africa at this time, and visited some of these camps. Leading to her visit, she wrote the following:

“It was late in the summer of 1900 that I first learnt of the hundreds of [Boer](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boer) women that became impoverished and were left ragged by our military operations… the poor women who were being driven from pillar to post, needed protection and organized assistance.”

She set up the Distress Fund for South African Women and Children and sailed for the [Cape Colony](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cape_Colony) on the 7th of December 1900 to supervise its distribution. Later she wrote the following:

“I came quite naturally, in obedience to the feeling of unity or oneness of womanhood... it is when the community is shaken to its foundations, that abysmal depths of privation call to each other and that a deeper unity of humanity evinces itself.”

When Emily Hobhouse left England, she only knew about the [concentration camp](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concentration_camp) at [Port Elizabeth](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_Elizabeth), but on arrival found out about the many other camps. She carried a [letter of introduction](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letter_of_introduction) to the governor, [Alfred Milner](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Milner), from her aunt, the wife of Lord [Arthur Hobhouse](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Hobhouse), himself the son of [Henry Hobhouse](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Hobhouse_(MP)), [Permanent Under-Secretary](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_Under-Secretary) at the [Home Office](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_Office) under Sir [Robert Peel](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Peel), and who knew Milner. From him she obtained the use of two railway trucks, subject to the army commander, [Lord Kitchener](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horatio_Kitchener,_1st_Earl_Kitchener)'s, approval. She received Kitchener's permission two weeks later, although it only allowed her to travel as far as [Bloemfontein](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bloemfontein) and take one truck of supplies for the camps, about 12 tons.

Hobhouse arrived at the camp at [Bloemfontein](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bloemfontein) on the 24th of January 1901, and was shocked by the conditions she encountered, and made the following foundings public:

"They went to sleep without any provision having been made for them and without anything to eat or to drink. I saw crowds of them along railway lines in bitterly cold weather, in pouring rain – hungry, sick, dying and dead. Soap was an article that was not dispensed. The water supply was inadequate. No bedstead or mattress was procurable. Fuel was scarce and had to be collected from the green bushes on the slopes of the kopjes (small hills) by the people themselves. The rations were extremely meager and when, as I frequently experienced, the actual quantity dispensed fell short of the amount prescribed, it simply meant famine.”

When she requested soap for the people, she was told that soap is an article of luxury. She nevertheless succeeded, after a struggle, to have it listed as a necessity, together with straw, more tents and more kettles in which to boil the drinking water. She distributed clothes and supplied pregnant women, who had to sleep on the ground, with mattresses, but she could not forgive what she called “Crass male ignorance, helplessness and muddling…,” a description to which she added the following: “I rub as much salt into the sore places in their minds… because it is good for them; but I can't help melting a little when they are very humble and confess that the whole thing is a grievous and gigantic blunder and presents almost insoluble problems, and they don't know how to face it…”

Hobhouse also visited camps at Norvalspont, Aliwal North, Springfontein, Kimberley and Orange River. She set out a report entitled “Report of a Visit to the Camps of Women and Children in the Cape and Orange River Colonies”, which was delivered to the British government in June 1901.

The following extracts from the report by Emily Hobhouse make very clear the extent of culpable neglect by the authorities:

“In some camps, two, and even three sets of people, occupy one tent and 10, and even 12, persons are frequently herded together in tents of which the cubic capacity is about 500 c.f.

“I call this camp system a wholesale cruelty… To keep these Camps going is murder to the children. It can never be wiped out of the memories of the people. It presses hardest on the children. They droop in the terrible heat, and with the insufficient unsuitable food; whatever you do, whatever the authorities do, and they are, I believe, doing their best with very limited means, it is all only a miserable patch on a great ill. Thousands, physically unfit, are placed in conditions of life which they have not strength to endure. In front of them is blank ruin… If only the English people would try to exercise a little imagination–picture the whole miserable scene. Entire villages rooted up and dumped in a strange, bare place.

“The women are wonderful. They cry very little and never complain. The very magnitude of their sufferings, their indignities, loss and anxiety seems to lift them beyond tears… only when it cuts afresh at them through their children do their feelings flash out. Some people in town still assert that the Camp is a haven of bliss. I was at the camp today, and just in one little corner this is the sort of thing I found – The nurse, underfed and overworked, just sinking on to her bed, hardly able to hold herself up, after coping with some thirty typhoid and other patients, with only the untrained help of two Boer girls – cooking as well as nursing to do herself. Next tent, a six months’ baby gasping its life out on his mother’s knee. Two or three others drooping sick in that tent. Next, a girl of twenty-one lay dying on a stretcher. The father, a big, gentle Boer kneeling beside her; while, next tent, his wife was watching a child of six, also dying, and one of about five drooping. Already this couple had lost three children in the hospital and so would not let these go, though I begged hard to take them out of the hot tent. I can’t describe what it is to see these children lying about in a state of collapse. It’s just exactly like faded flowers thrown away. And one has to stand and look on at such misery, and be able to do almost nothing.

“It was a splendid child and it dwindled to skin and bone... The baby had got so weak it was past recovery. We tried what we could but today it died. It was only 3 months but such a sweet little thing… It was still alive this morning; when I called in the afternoon they beckoned me in to see the tiny thing laid out, with a white flower in its wee hand. To me it seemed a “murdered innocent”. And an hour or two after another child died. Another child had died in the night, and I found all three little corpses being photographed for the absent fathers to see some day. Two little wee white coffins at the gate waiting, and a third wanted. I was glad to see them, for at [Springfontein](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Springfontein), a young woman had to be buried in a sack, and it hurt their feelings woefully.

“It is such a curious position, hollow and rotten to the heart’s core, to have made all over the State large uncomfortable communities of people whom you call refugees and say you are protecting, but who call themselves [prisoners of war](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoners_of_war), compulsorily detained, and detesting your protection. They are tired of being told by officers that they are refugees under “the kind and beneficent protection of the British”. In most cases there is no pretence that there was treachery, or ammunition concealed, or food given or anything (By the Boer women to their men, reason for imprisonment). It was just that an order was given to empty the country. Though the camps are called refugee, there are in reality a very few of these–perhaps only half-a-dozen in some camps. It is easy to tell them, because they are put in the best marquees, and have had time given to them to bring furniture and clothes, and are mostly self-satisfied and vastly superior people. Very few, if any of them, are in want.

“Those who are suffering most keenly, and who have lost most, either of their children by death or their possessions by fire and sword, such as those reconcentrated women in the camps, have the most conspicuous patience, and never express a wish that their men should be the ones to give way. It must be fought out now, they think, to the bitter end. It is a very costly business upon which England has embarked, and even at such a cost hardly the barest necessities can be provided, and no comforts. It is so strange to think that every tent contains a family, and every family is in trouble – loss behind, poverty in front, sickness, privation and death in the present. But they are very good, and say they have agreed to be cheerful and make the best of it all. The [Mafeking](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mafeking) camp folk were very surprised to hear that English women cared a rap about them or their suffering. It has done them a lot of good to hear that real sympathy is felt for them at home, and so I am glad I fought my way here, if only for that reason.”

Hobhouse also reported the tents the Boers were held in to her government, in her following statement:

**“**Imagine the heat outside the tents and the suffocation inside! ...the sun blazed through the single canvas, and the flies lay thick and black on everything; no chair, no table, nor any room for such; only a deal box, standing on its end, served as a wee pantry. In this tent live Mrs. B’s five children (three quite grown up) and a little [Kaffir](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaffir_(racial_term)) servant girl. Many tents have more occupants. Mrs. M. ...has six children in camp, all ill, two in the [tin](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corrugated_galvanised_iron) hospital with typhoid, and four sick in the tent. A terrible evil just now is the dew. It is so heavy, and comes through the single canvas of the tents, wetting everything… All the morning the gangways are filled with the blankets and odds and ends, regularly turned out to dry in the sun. The doctor told me today he highly disapproved of tents for young children, and expected a high mortality before June.”

The Crown was advised about the lack of hygiene and its effects on the Boers held inside their camps as follows:

**“**Soap has been unattainable and none given in the rations. With much persuasion, and weeks after requisitioning, soap is now given occasionally in very minute quantities–certainly not enough for clothes and personal washing. We have much typhoid and are dreading an outbreak, so I am directing my energies to getting the water of the [Modder River](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modder_River) boiled. As well swallow typhoid germs whole as drink that water–so say doctors. Yet they cannot boil it all, for – first, fuel is very scarce; that which is supplied weekly would not cook a meal a day…and they have to search the already bare ‘[kopjes](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kopje)’ (hills) for a supply. There is hardly a bit to be had. Second, they have no extra utensil to hold the water when boiled. I propose, therefore, to give each tent a pail or crock, and get a proclamation issued that all drinking water must be boiled.”

Hobhouse advised the British governments that the system they were enforcing on the Boers was a "cruel system", and called for mercy in the treatment of the Boers by the following statement she made:

“Above all one would hope that the good sense, if not the mercy, of the English people, will cry out against the further development of this cruel system which falls with crushing effect upon the old, the weak, and the children. May they stay the order to bring in more and yet more. Since [Old Testament days](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Babylonian_captivity) was ever a whole nation carried captive?”

In Britain, the British war minister, Brodick, on behalf of the Crown, dismissed the complaints of Hobhouse and her supporters in parliament, stating that it was Boer guerilla tactics that had led to the methods currently in use.

The Boers wanted independence, and in June 1901, Boer leaders came together and stated that no proposal would be considered unless it included their independence. Conditions in the concentration camps worsened, and the problem was not brought to public attention until [Emily Hobhouse](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emily_Hobhouse) enlightened the Boer leaders of the condition their families were living in. When the Boer Commandos heard the report from Ms Hobhouse, they decided to enter negotiations for a peaceful settlement with the British Crown.

She sailed back to England with the intention of exposing Kitchener for what he was permitting. For further discussion on Ms Hobhouse after 1903 with the Boers, see

Footnote 3 - The involvement of Ms. Emily Hobhouse with the Boers after 1903.

**j) British citizens who denounced the war cruelties against the Boers**

When Hobhouse returned to [England](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/England) she received scathing criticism and hostility from the [British government](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_government) and many of the media, but eventually succeeded in obtaining more funding to help the victims of the war. The British [Liberal](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_Party_(UK)) leader at the time, Sir [Henry Campbell-Bannerman](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Campbell-Bannerman), denounced what he called the "methods of barbarism". The British government eventually agreed to set up the Fawcett Commission to investigate her claims, under [Millicent Fawcett](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millicent_Fawcett), which corroborated her account of the shocking conditions.

On the 22nd of December 1901, Charles Aked, a Baptist minister in Liverpool, stated the following on Peace Sunday: "Great Britain cannot win the battles without resorting to the last despicable cowardice of the most loathsome cur on earth—the act of striking a brave man's heart through his wife's honour and his child's life. The cowardly war has been conducted by methods of barbarism... the concentration camps have been Murder Camps."  Afterwards, a crowd followed him home and broke the windows of his house.

[Olive Schreiner](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Olive_Schreiner) was an advocate of the Boers. She publically objected to Great Britain's opposition to the small Orange Free State. She addressed the human side of the war by sympathizing with the Boer women, who were forced to send their men off to war despite their lack of military training. Boer men younger than 16 and older than 60 faced a well-trained and supplied British military (England enlisted soldiers from her Canada and Australia colonies as well). Schreiner also admired the Orange Free State’s prolonged resistance to the British occupation.

Other people who spoke out against the barbaric methods of England were: J Ellis (Irish), Lloyd George (Welsh), CP Scott (Scottish), William Redmond (Welsh) and Ramsey McDonald (Scottish).

**k) The British military adjusted their war strategies in 1901 to avoid public disgrace**

The Crown was faced with public disgrace and criticism on the one hand, and on the other hand they realised that the wealth of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek and Orange Free State exceeded the potential wealth of their British colonies, and were afraid that the Cape Settlers may join powers with the Boer Republics, which caused a threat to their authority, as well as their rights to the minerals in the Republics. They had set out to annex the whole of Southern Africa, and secure their newly found wealth, and were not about to lose it to the independent minded Boers.

**1) Blockhouses and Fences**

The military situation for the troops of De Wet, Botha, and De la Rey had worsened, for Kitchener’s blockhouses and fences were posing a serious problem. Their livestock having been killed and taken away, the Boers in the field were struggling to survive.

Though De la Rey captured General Lord Paul Methuen and 600 troops in March 1902, he had to let them go because he had no place to keep them. At this time there were many that decided that it would be best to simply accept British rule, some of them serving as guides. These ‘joiners’, as they were called, disagreed with those Boers who continued fighting at great risk even though they knew there would never be a military success.

By this time Kitchener had built an army of 250,000 troops, built 8000 blockhouses, and had 3,700 miles (6,000 km) of commandos.

**2) Women and children deserted in scorched fields**

Kitchener changed his tactics towards women and children by the end of 1901. Rather than packing them off to concentration camps, he told his troops to leave them where they found them, so that the burden of taking care of them fell on the Boers. Without their homesteads, personal possessions, crops or any means of survival, these women and children were left in the fields, often found by hostile Africans and Colored soldiers enlisted by the British, who raped, mutilated and murdered these defenseless victims.

The concentration camps ceased to receive new families and conditions improved in some camps; but the damage was done.

[Thomas Pakenham](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Pakenham_(historian)) wrote of [Kitchener's](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herbert_Kitchener,_1st_Earl_Kitchener) policy turn:

“No doubt the continued 'hullabaloo' at the death-rate in these concentration camps, and [Milner's](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Milner) belated agreement to take over their administration, helped changed K's mind [some time at the end of 1901]. By mid-December at any rate, Kitchener was already circulating all column commanders with instructions not to bring in women and children when they cleared the country, but to leave them with the guerrillas...”

Viewed as a gesture to Liberals, on the eve of the new session of Parliament at Westminster, it was a shrewd political move. It also made excellent military sense, as it greatly handicapped the guerrillas, now that the drives were in full swing... It was effective precisely because, contrary to the Liberals' convictions, it was less humane than bringing them into camps, though this was of no great concern to Kitchener.

**l) Support for the Boers from the Cape Frontier was growing**

The Boers along the Cape frontier started sympathizing with the inland Boers, and in his position as a commando leader, Jan Smuts rode through to the Cape frontier with his commando to the Western Cape, and found the bond which was forming between the Boers to be a new threat in the battle against the Crown. Already their concentration camps had become questionable in the public eye, and Britain needed to end the situation as quickly as possible or face financial ruin.

**m) The British Crown called for settlement**

The Crown sent word to their double agent Smuts (See Attachment 5 – Key Role Players subsection Jan Smuts to view his position in the political arena at that time) with instructions leave the Cape immediately by ship, and to board the train in Durban for the final leg to the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek to enforce a settlement with the leaders of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek.

On behalf do the Crown, Lord Kitchener boarded the train on which Smuts was travelling at the Kroonstad station, and with great politeness and manners, requested a private discussion with Smuts in his compartment. It was said that Smuts listened to the propositions Lord Kitchener made concerning the proposed terms of surrender with non-commitance. Once Smuts had spoken to his Boer leaders, and heard of their dire circumstances, and the suffering of their families in the concentration camps, he took a leading role in the negotiations between the representatives from all of the commandos from the Orange Free State and the South African Republic.

According to Mark Weber of the Institute for Historical Review, Jan Smuts, the 31 year old Boer general, and future South African prime minister, wrote that for every male Boer killed, four Boer women and children were starved to death in British concentration camps. Smuts described the war as follows:

“Lord Kitchener has begun to carry out a policy in both Boer republics of unbelievable barbarism and gruesomeness which violates the most elementary principles of the international rules of war. Almost all farmsteads and villages in both republics have been burned down and destroyed. All crops have been destroyed. All livestock which has fallen into hands of the enemy has been killed or slaughtered”.

Negotiations for ending the war began in April 1902. Proposals were sent back and forth and rejected by both sides as being unreasonable. At times it looked as if the negotiations would fail and the war would continue.

The Boers were granted some concessions on the treatment of Cape Afrikaner rebels and the rights of the Black Africans. Clause 7 and 8 of the Peace Treaty of Vereeniging stipulated that the Boers would be given back control of their Republics.

Perhaps the most surprising thing to come out of the negotiations was that the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek and Orange Free State would have to recognize [King Edward VII](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/King_Edward_VII) as sovereign over their land during the time period wherein the British governments would do reparations to the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek and Orange Free State. Many of the people of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek and Orange Free State considered this a betrayal of one of their key tenets for fighting in the first place.

Negotiations came to a head after Jan Smuts gave a speech in which he admitted that, from a purely military perspective the war could continue, he stressed the importance of not sacrificing the Boer people for that independence. He felt it would have been a crime to continue the war without the assurance of help from elsewhere and declared, "Comrades, we decided to stand to the bitter end. Let us now, like men, admit that that end has come for us, come in a more bitter shape than we ever thought.”

His opinions were representative of the conference, which then voted by 54 to 6 in favour of peace. Representatives of the Governments met Lord Kitchener and at five minutes past eleven on the 31st of May 1902, Acting President Burger signed the Peace Treaty, followed by the members of his government, Acting President [De Wet](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christiaan_De_Wet) and the members of his government.

**n) A Peace Treaty was signed in Vereeniging on the 31st of May 1902 to cease hostilities**

After more than half the Boer nation children died inside the British concentration camps in South Africa during their war for independence, the Boer Commando leaders signed a Peace Treaty in Vereeniging on the 31st of May 1902 to cease hostilities.

**o)** **The British set up a military government**

The Crown instructed their British representatives in southern Africa to set up a military government after the second Anglo-Boer war. The Boer Generals were court marshalled and imprisoned.

Many of the impoverished Boers sought work on the mines and were looked down upon as a disgrace.

**p)** **Diaspora by Boer Refugees**

Many Boers left South Africa as refugees. Starting in 1902, a large group immigrated to the [Patagonia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patagonia) region of [Argentina](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argentina) (most notably in the town of

[Sarmiento](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarmiento,_Chubut)).

Another group immigrated to British-ruled [Kenya](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenya), from where most returned to [South Africa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Africa) during the 1930’s as a result of warfare there between the British and the indigenous people.

A third group, under the leadership of General [Ben Viljoen](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben_Viljoen), emigrated to Chihuahua in northern [Mexico](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexico), and to states of [Arizona](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arizona), [California](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California), [New Mexico](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Mexico) and [Texas](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas) in the south-western United States of America. Others migrated to other parts of Africa, including German East Africa (present day [Tanzania](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tanzania), mostly near Arusha). Some refugees went to [Angola](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angola), where smaller and larger groups settled on the Bihe and the Humpata plateaus, respectively.

It was a relatively large group of Boers who settled in Kenya. Historian Brian du Toit found that the first wave of migrants were single families, followed by larger multiple family treks. Some had arrived by 1904, as documented by the caption of a newspaper photograph noting a tent town for "some of the early settlers from South Africa" on what today is the campus of the [University of Nairobi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Nairobi). Probably the first to arrive was W.J. Van Breda (1903), followed by John de Waal and Frans Arnoldi at Nakuru (1906). Jannie De Beer's family resided at [Athi River](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Athi_River), while Ignatius Gouws resided at Solai.

The second wave of migrants is exemplified by [Jan Janse van Rensburg](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Jan_Janse_van_Rensburg&action=edit&redlink=1)'s trek. Janse van Rensburg left the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek on an exploratory trip to [British East Africa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_East_Africa) in 1906 sailing from Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique). Janse van Rensburg was inspired by an earlier Boer migrant, Abraham Joubert, who had moved to Nairobi from Arusha in 1906, along with others. When Joubert visited the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek that year, Janse van Rensburg met with him (Du Toit 1998:61). Sources disagree about whether Janse van Rensburg received guarantees for land from the Governor, Sir [James Hayes Sadler](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Hayes_Sadler).

On his return to the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek, Janse van Rensburg recruited about 280 people (comprising either 47 or 60 families) to accompany him to British East Africa. Most came from districts around Ermelo and Carolina. On the 9th of July 1908, Janse van Rensburg's party sailed in the chartered ship ‘SS Windhuk’ from Portuguese East Africa to Mombasa, from where they boarded a train for Nairobi. The party travelled by five trains to Nakuru.

A combination of factors spurred on Boer migration. Some, like Janse van Rensburg and Cloete, had collaborated with the British, or had surrendered during the Boer War. These ‘joiners’ and ‘hensoppers’ subsequently experienced hostility from other Boers. Many migrants were extremely poor and had subsisted on others' property. Collaborators tended to move to British East Africa, while those who had fought to the end (called ‘[bittereinders](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bittereinder)’) initially preferred German West Africa. One of the best known Boer settlements in the British East Africa Protectorate was at [Eldoret](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eldoret), in the south west of what became known as Kenya in 1920.

**q) Ongoing war against people living in Southern Africa by the Crown after the Peace Treaties**

With reference to the Jameson Raid and the Second Anglo-Boer War, England's pretence for the invasion was the rights of the foreign miners. Yet after the war under British rulership, these very same miners were treated so badly by their English bosses and their associate Jewish bosses, that the foreign miners had to resort to general strikes in 1913, 1922 and 1946 (3, 12 and 36 years after the establishment of the British ruled Union), during which many mine-workers were shot dead in the streets of Johannesburg by the British disposed Union government.

The efficient and equitable republican system of government of the Boer Republics was replaced with the unworkable Westminster system of government by the Crown, which led to endless misery and conflict within the nation of South Africa, and the enrichment of the Crown and its associates.

**r)** **The Second Anglo Boer War losses in comparison to the First World War**

The concentration camps were a calculated and intentional holocaust committed on the Boerevolk by the Crown, with the aim of annihilating the Boerevolk and reeling in the Boer Republics.

Comparing the killing of Jews during World War 2, proportionately fewer Jews were killed than Boer women and children during the Second War of Independence. Yet, after World War 2, the Crown mercilessly insisted on a frantic retribution campaign against the whole German nation for the purported Jewish holocaust. For decades, Germany was being forced to pay annual compensation to the Jews, which means that Germans who were not even born at the time of World War 2, still had to suffer today for alleged atrocities committed by the Germans.

Should the Crown subject herself to the same principles applied to Germany, then the Crown must do everything within her power to reinstitute the Boer republics and to pay annual compensation to the Boerevolk for the atrocities committed against the Boerevolk.

**"Their only crime was that they stood between England and the gold of Transvaal."**

**Footnote 1 The Role of the Irish Uitlanders in the Second Anglo-Boer War**

**Irish Manifesto**

At the end of September 1899, a few weeks before the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War on the 11th of October 1899, some Irish nationals living in the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (Transvaal Boer Republic) in South Africa published an ‘Irish Manifesto’ which was circulated among the Irish community of the Transvaal.

The following version of the Irish Manifesto of 13 September 1899 can be read on <http://www.blogstudio.com/woodgnome/irishboerwar.html> :

The Irish Manifesto of September 13th 1899 reads as follows:

“The Government of the Transvaal being now threatened with extinction by our ancient foe, England, it is the duty of Irishmen to throw in their lot with the former, and be prepared by force of arms to maintain the independence of the country that has given them a home, at the same time seizing the opportunity to strike a good and effective blow at the merciless tyrannical power that has so long held our people in bondage. The position in the Transvaal to-day is exactly similar to what it was in Ireland at the time of the Anglo-Norman invasion.  
The memory of the massacre of Drogheda by order of the infamous regicide Oliver Cromwell is still darkly remembered in Ireland, and England of that day applauded and justified the cold-blooded butchery as a righteous judgment executed.  
With the story of Ireland’s wrongs and sufferings before them, no wonder the Boer people refuse to surrender their cherished independence to the hateful sway of Britain. England has been a vampire, and has drained Ireland’s life-blood for centuries, and now her difficulty is Ireland’s opportunity. The time is at hand to avenge your dead Irish. England’s hands are red with blood, and her coffers filled with the spoil of Irish people, and we call upon you to rise as one man and seize upon the present glorious opportunity of retaliating upon your ancient foe. Act together and fight together. Prepare! The end is in view. The day of reckoning is at hand. Long live the republic! Irishmen to the rescue! God save Ireland!”

**The Irish Brigade**

The members of the Irish Brigade were notorious for handling dynamite to blow up bridges and supply trains of the British army during the Anglo-Boer War. Many were mine workers who knew how to get hold of dynamite and how to use is. Others were well versed in sabotage from their days in Ireland fighting against the occupational British forces.  The Boers called them “Het Wrekers Korps” (The Avenging Corps).

After the Irish Brigade was formally introduced on 28 September 1899 in Johannesburg its officers were sworn in on the 2nd of October 1899. Col. John Y. Fillmore Blake (an American Irishman) was elected by his men as their supreme commander. Blake was trained as a professional soldier at the American Military College West Point and he saw action in many battles against the Redskins on the American Prairies. John McBride, one of Blake’s officers, was an exceptionally brave soldier. After the war he went back to Ireland and fought against the English occupational forces. In 1916 he was captured and shot by a firing squad.

Other Irish officers were Maj. Thomas Madden Menton, Capt. James Laracy and Capt. John Joseph Mitchell. They had one Boer officer in the corps, Capt. Charles Francois Coetzee, who organized the arms, equipment and food for the corps. The Irish Brigade consisted of some 200 men.

The supreme commander of the Irish Volunteers, Col. John McBride, formed three commandos from the Irish Brigade:

1.) The first commando, consisting of 300 men, fought in Natal under command of col. John Blake and distinguished themselves at the Battle of Nicholson’s Neck and the Battle of Colenso.

2.) The second commando, under Col. Arthur Lynch from Australia, consisted of 20 men who fought at Ladysmith and Glencoe.

3.) The third commando was actually an ambulance unit consisting of 50 men from America, under command of Capt. O’ Connor. They were part of the Irish-American Ambulance Society ‘Clan-na-Gael’. Ten of these men were highly trained first aid attendants.

During the second phase of the war (called the guerrilla phase) after the occupation of Pretoria and Johannesburg mid 1900, the Irish volunteers joined whatever Boer commando they wished, were thus dispersed and no longer operated as three definite Irish commandos or units.

In 1975 a monument was erected in honour of the 500 Irish Volunteers, the Irish Brigade, who came from Ireland, America and Australia to South Africa to fight alongside the Boer freedom fighters against the professional army from the British Empire during the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902).

**An Irish poem in Gaelic for Boer-heroes**

A poem for the brave Boers who fought against England during the Anglo-Boer War was written in Augustus 1902 by the Irish poet Tomás ó Flannghaile of Mayo. He was a teacher and publisher who lived in England.

Caoineadh na g Curadh

– Tomás Ó Flannghaile (1846 – 1916)

Mo bhrón go deo, mo chreach mo chrádh!

Na leómhain fé dheoidh faoi neart a námhad –

An tsaoirse thíos, ’s laoich á gclaoidheadh,

A dtír fé chíos ’s a ndaoine ag caoidh!

Caoin, caoin, a chinneamhain ghéar,

Is bí go faoidheach ag sileadh dear,

’Na luighe tá mílte groidhe-fhear tréan

’S a sliocht gan bhrígh mo loma léin!

’S bhuaidhir mo chroidhe im’ chlí thar meodhan,

Gan truagh at tsaoighil do shíol na mBóer,

An domhan go dúr, gan rún gan báidh

Gan cabhair gan súil le congnamh d’fhagháil;

Caoin, caoin, an tsaoirse ar lár,

An comhthrom thíos, an claon ar bhárr,

Neamh-shuim ’sa cheart, ’san neart go géar,

Na gaiscidhigh theas, gan reacht gan réim!

Acht bíodh gur buaileadh líon a bhfear,

Is gidh gur chuaidh sé díobh le seal,

D’fhág siad a rian go dian go trom,

I lár na ndiabhal do chiap tré feall;

Cian, cian, bheidheas cumha na nGall

I ndiaidh an ghéar-chrádha fuair siad thall,

Minic do theicheadar le n-a sluagh

Cois abhann is sléibh’ ó faobhar na mBuar.

Tá dóchas fós don laochraidh i ndán –

Ní neart i gcómhnaidhe bhéarfas bárr –

Fulaing fear groidhe don tsaoirse is síol;

Agus muinighin chroidhe ’seadh is treise brígh;

Éistigh le ciall, ní buan droich-riaghail,

Má’s tréan an diabhal, is tréine Dia,

Iad féin, leo féin, le congnamh Dé,

Beidh Bóeir fós saor ’na ndúthaigh féin.

Translation into English:

Lament of the Champions

My eternal sorrow, my strife my torment!

The lions at last put down by the strength of their enemy -

Freedom defeated, the heroes vanquished,

Their land under taxation and their people mourning.

Weep, weep, oh bitter fate,

And patiently be shedding tear,

In their graves lie thousands of strong men true

And their dynasty lifeless, oh my woe!

It worries my heart in my side beyond measure,

The absence of worldly pity for the Boer race,

The grim world, without intention without sympathy

Without help, nor hope of receiving aid;

Weep, weep, freedom absent,

Justice defeated, prejudice victorious,

Disinterest in right, in the bitter strength,

The southern heroes, without regime without power!

But be it that their men were beaten,

And although success evaded them recently,

They left their mark firmly and heavily,

In the heart of the devils which tormented them through treachery.

Sorrowful, sorrowful, will be the homesickness of the foreigners [Englishmen]

After the bitter-torment they received yonder,

Oft they fled with their crowds

By river and mountain from the blade of the Boer.

There is still hope for the heroes –

It is not always strength which brings victory –

Brave men suffer for freedom and race;

And confidence of heart yes and the power of their worth;

Listen to sense, no bad-rule is permanent,

If the devil is strong, God is stronger,

Themselves, alone, with the help of God,

The Boers will be free yet in their own homeland.

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1 Breytenbach J.H.: ‘Gedenkalbum van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog’, Breytenbach, Nasionale Pers Beperk, Kaapstad, 1949, pg. 284-285.

[← From Redemption To Recidivism? Rugby And Change In South Africa During The Rugby World Cup And Its Aftermath](http://newhistory.co.za/from-redemption-to-recidivism-rugby-and-change-in-south-africa-during-the-rugby-world-cup-and-its-aftermath/)

**Footnote 2: American “Uitlanders” sympathized with the Boers.**

**The American Reconnaissance Corps.**

J.A. Hassell, an American who lived in Vryheid, which was then within the borders of the Orange Free State, took it upon himself to organize the American Reconnaissance Corps. He telegraphed this undertaking on the 10th of February 1900 to the State Secretary of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (Transvaal Boer Republic) FW Reitz, and requested arms and equipment should the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek be interested in this corps. His offer was accepted and Hassell was sworn in as commander of the American Scouts.

(See the book by Breytenbach J.H., titled ‘Gedenkalbum van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog Breytenbach’, printed by Nasionale Pers Beperk, Kaapstad, dated 1949, page 296.)

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* Mediadienste. (1995) P 1 - 7.
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* Vyftig Gedigte van C Louis Leipoldt, 'n keur deur WEG Louw. Tafelberg Publishers. (First edition 1946) Pp 19 - 23.
* Gedigte by AG Visser (third print). JL van Schaik. (1928) Pp 57 -61.
* Family narrations as recounted since the Second War of Independence from generation to generation. (Author's great-great-grandmother was detained and tortured in the concentration camp at Heilbron.)

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‘[The Concentration Camps 1899–1902](http://www.boer.co.za/boerwar/hellkamp.htm)’, boer.co.za. Retrieved 23 July 2011;

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**Footnote 3: The involvement of Ms. Emily Hobhouse with the Boers after 1903.**

Ms. Emily Hobhouse set up Boer home industries to teach young women [spinning](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spinning_(textiles)) and [weaving](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weaving) when she returned once more in 1905.

Ill health, from which she never recovered, forced her to return to England in 1908.

She travelled to South Africa again in 1913 for the inauguration of the [National Women's Monument](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Women%27s_Monument) in [Bloemfontein](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bloemfontein) but had to stop at [Beaufort West](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beaufort_West) due to her failing health.

The southernmost town in Eastern [Free State](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_State) is named [Hobhouse](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hobhouse,_Free_State), after her, as is a [submarine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Submarine): the [SAS Emily Hobhouse](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAS_Umkhonto), one of the [South African Navy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_African_Navy)'s three [Daphné class submarines](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daphn%C3%A9_class_submarine), the submarine was later renamed Umkhonto.

The Concentration Camp Memorial remembers those who were interned in the Kimberley concentration camp during the [Second Boer War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Boer_War), and is located in front of the Dutch Reformed Mother Church in Kimberley. The world’s first concentration camp originates here.

**Footnote 4: A song for the Boer children**

An excerpt of a song dedicated to the Boer children by C. Louis Leipoldt is translated as follows:

You, who are the hope of our people;

You, who our people can barely spare;

You, who should grow up to become a man;

You, who must perform your duty, if you can;

You, who have no part in the war;

You, who should sing and jump for joy -

You must perish in a children's camp

You must be eliminated for peace:

Fold your hands tight together,

Close your eyes and say amen!

Whooping-cough and consumption, without milk:

Bitter for you is the fate of life!

There is your place, at the children's graves -

Two in one coffin, a wedding couple!

Al you gain is that we will remember:

Our freedom more precious than woman or child!

With regard to the Aliwal North Concentration Camp, 1901, he wrote:

You are cringing away from the gusts of the wind

The chill seeping through the hail-torn tent -

Your scanty shield against torturing torrents;

The June chill bursts over the banks of the Vaal -

And all you can hear are the coughs from your child, and the

ceaseless patter of rain on the canvas. 

A candle stub, just an inch before death

faintly flickering in a bottle

(a sty offers more comfort and rest)

But here, at night every thought is

a round of torture and tears. 

Here, the early-born child flounders

Here, the aged fades away

Here, all you can hear is wailing and sighs

Here, every second is a lifetime of dread;

Every minute leaves scars

on your soul, sacrifice without end. 

Forgive? Forget? Is it possible to forgive?

The sorrow, the despair demanded so much!

The branding iron painfully left its scar

on our nation, for ages to see, and the wound is too raw -

Too close to our heart and to deep in our souls -

"Patience, o patience, how much can you bear?"

Leipoldt also wrote heartbreaking verses on a soap box to the memory of children who could at least be buried in this luxury:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | They made you in England, little soap box  To serve as coffin for our children  They found little corpses for you, soap box  And I have witnessed you as coffin. |

Equally unforgettable is AG Visser's description of an orphan in the concentration camp in his poem, ‘The Youngest Burgher’:

The camp of women is ruled by silence and darkness

The misery kindly concealed by the night

Here and there a minute light is flickering

Where the Angel of Death is lingering.

In this place of woe and of broken hearts

A young boy's muffled whimpers quiver through the night

Who can count all the tears, who can measure the grief

of an orphan alone in the world

Later on in the poem De Wet describes the struggle to the escaped child who wishes to join the commando:

Freedom demands from our ranks

Men of courage who taunt mortal danger.

But also in the camp, the mother, the nurturer

And the innocent child on her breast.

And the reward? Perhaps on the plains

A lonesome grave doused by no tears.

Sometime, perhaps, posterity might honour our heroes...

Boy, do you feel up to it? General, I do!

**(ix) The Bhambadha**1 **Rebellion** **1906–1907**

In their quest to annex South Africa, the Crown sent missionaries into the country to assess the lay of the land, and the people who dwell in it.

In the area later known as Natal, they came across the Zulu kingdom which had many chiefdoms (towns governed by chiefs), of which DinuZulu was the king at the time of the Bambadha Rebellion.

At first the missionaries appeared friendly and helpful, unarmed and no threat to the locals, making the fact clear that they had their own kingdom across the sea.

Soon the British military entered Natal and the Crown installed their own government in Natal. This government imposed taxes on the indigenous people of the area, and confiscated their cattle if they could not pay these taxes. This led to the ‘Bambadha Rebellion’ during which some of the chiefdoms rebelled against this taxation and war broke out in Natal. Their king DinuZulu was accused of treason against the British Crown, and the land of the Zulu kingdom was confiscated by representatives of the Crown, and its borders were redefined to form a part of the land they incorporated into the “Union of South Africa” in 1910.

Traditionally for hundreds of years, rulership in the Zulu kingdom was determined by succession.

Since representatives of the Crown entered Southern Africa, they immediately set about creating systems whereby they removed all the traditional chiefs, their powers and their land. The traditional chiefs were replaced by ‘British loyal’ chiefs and the indigenous people of South Africa became tenants on their own land.

More than 3000 Zulus died during the ‘Bambadha Rebellion. The death toll was less than half the number of casualties. Many surviving maimed and disfigured Zulu men, women and children were left homeless and starving after the cruelty with which the resistance to Crown imposed taxes had been suppressed.

Dube provided much insight into the condition of Zulu society in the aftermath of the so-called rebellion of 1906 – impi yamakhanda in the Ilanga Lase Natal newspaper, dated November 2nd 1906, as follows:

“This country has recently passed through a critical period, over 3 000 black people have been killed not accounting for burnt homesteads, confiscated cattle, and hundreds who are orphans by reason of this war which has just ended. Blacks are asking the cause of this war. Some say there was no cause, they say the blacks were well treated and that it was their foolishness that led them to rise against the Government. Some say it is due to the blacks having grievances, and had they been ruled well they would not have rebelled.

“For all these reasons therefore the Government has selected a Commission to enquire into and to ascertain the truth of the matter.”

The events of 1906 in Natal and Zululand form part of the pattern of implicit and explicit violence that characterized the Crown Colonial Empire throughout its existence.

The brutality of the colonial state elsewhere in Africa is well illustrated by Ngugi wa Thiong’o who comments about the attitude of Kenya’s colonial officials, was the “reflection of that colonial culture of silence and fear best articulated in a dispatch by an early governor, Sir A. R. Hardinge, on 5 April 1897”, recorded as follows:

“Force and the prestige which rests on a belief in force, are the only way you can do anything with those people, but once beaten and disarmed they will serve you.

“Temporizing is no good … These people must learn submission by bullets – it’s only school; after that you begin more modern and humane methods of education, and if you don’t do it this year you will have to next, so why not get it over? … In Africa to have peace you must first teach obedience, and the only tutor who impresses the lesson properly is the sword”2.

Ngugi argues that brutality was not an individual aberration “but an integral part of colonial politics, philosophy and culture”3.

Colonial policy of the Crown involved not only murdering the defenseless but also the plundering of crops, the seizure of cattle, the burning of homesteads and lastly the arrest, trial and conviction of the father figure of a society.

From the very beginning of contact between the indigenous people of Southern African and the invading British colonialists, the locals were informed about the British monarchy and told that it was an authority above everything else, and had far greater powers than their own chiefly system of governance. As a colonized race the black rulers had to adhere to whatever was being communicated to them on behalf of the Crown. The traditional leaders had to report to British officials responsible for/in charge of their wards/divisions. This is well illustrated by Terrence Ranger, who wrote:

“… in Africa the British made an even greater use of the idea of “Imperial Monarchy” than they did within Britain or India. The “theology” of an omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent monarchy became almost the sole ingredient of imperial ideology as it was presented to Africans.”4

Under the control of the Crown, the colonial governments were largely military in character during these early years. Professor George Shepperson as quoted by Terrence Ranger remarked on this situation as follows:

“The narrowness of the line between the civilian and the military….It was through its forces as much as its missions that European culture was brought to the indigenous inhabitants ….”5

Before the ‘Bambadha Rebellion’, tribal chiefs and their people were shot to death, their cattle and land seized, because they could not afford to pay a ‘head tax’ for living in the land they had been born in to the colonial government of the Crown. This imposition by the colonial British government was equivalent to a challenge for war to the tribal chiefs, who had the responsibility of protecting their people. The war that followed has never been addressed by an impartial court hearing, and reparations have never taken place to restore the losses of the Zulu nation.

No attention has been given to the facts that led up to this war in which the Zulu nation used their traditional weapons of assegais (spears) and knobkerries (wooden clubs) against the horses and guns of the British Army out of sheer determination to regain a means of survival.

There is no evidence that the ‘Bambadha Rebellion’ of 1906 was aimed at overthrowing the Natal colonial government. If the events of 1906 had indeed been an attempt to overthrow the colonial government it would have required the sanction of the Zulu king. The ‘Treason Trial’ of the Zulu king DinuZulu exonerated him from any action pertaining to an attempt to overthrow the Natal colonial government.

There is evidence6 that the ‘Bambadha Rebellion’ was the resistance against the payment of imali yekhanda (head money/tax) - Poll Tax. This is clearly shown by the wording the Zulus used in their understanding of the poll tax.

All the incidents that occurred at this time were driven by the attitude of defiance that Blacks demonstrated to the British colonial magistrates that visited various chiefdoms to collect imali yekhanda.

The Zulu warriors who participated in this rebellion were called ‘impi’ and the resistance was called ‘yamakhanda’.

The participants in the ‘impi yamakhanda’ had a secret code or greeting they used amongst themselves. One would ask: “Utela-pi? – Where do you pay tax?”. The response would be: “insumansumane” (insumansumane means something extraordinary, absurd and incomprehensive, a folk tale or fairy story.7)

By this greeting, they identified themselves as being distinct from those who supported the tax payment, viewed as collaborators of the British Crown ('loyal' Blacks).

The poll tax implemented by the British colonial government also created strained relationships between the Zulu king and his people. Many Zulus realized that there was no manner by which they could survive if these taxes were to be paid, and would rather die fighting for their cause than starve to death.

DinuZulu realized that the traditional weapons of his nation are inferior to the modern weaponry of the British military. He had witnessed the power of the British military against the Boers during the Anglo-Boer war which ended in 1902.

DinuZulu advised his people to pay the taxes the British government called for to prevent bloodshed8. Had DinuZulu, whom the amaZulu looked up to as their legitimate monarchy from the lineage of the Zulu kings9, sanctioned impi yamakhanda, the whole Zulu nation would have been involved.

Most of the ‘British loyal’ chiefs accepted the British imposed taxes; the ‘traditional’ chiefs were compelled to support the will of their chiefdoms and did not accept the British imposed taxes.

In this section of the document we include the chiefs and their chiefdoms which were involved in the ‘Bambadha Rebellion’ and refer to the ‘Treason Trial’ of King DinuZulu as relevant to the attacks on the indigenous people of South Africa by the British Crown with regards to the illegal ‘Union of South Africa’.

The impi yamakhanda started from the ‘isidumo sokulwa e Richmond’ (the brawl of fighting in Richmond) which was the event that preceded the 'Bambadha rebellion', encompassed the saga of Bambadha and the fighting at eNkandla, events in kwaMaphumulo and other areas as well.

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1 Bambadha - Bambata or Bhambatha

“The name should more correctly be spelt Bambadha, and not Bambata”. See H. C. Lugg. Historic Natal and Zululand. Shuter and Shooter: Pietermaritzburg, 1949. p. 72;

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2 Ngugi wa Thiong’o, “Detained: a Writer’s Prison Diary”, in Perspectives on Africa, p. 618.

3 Ngugi wa Thiong’o, “Detained: a Writer’s Prison Diary”, p. 618.

4  Terence Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa”, pg. 597.

5 Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa”, p. 601

6 In 1970 an Africanist historian Shula Marks wrote a thought-provoking monograph about the so-called rebellion of 1906. Her account is a very intense and detailed one regarding every aspect of impi yamakhanda. This book, entitled: Reluctant rebellion the 1906 – 8 disturbances in Natal, was published six and half decades after impi yamakhanda had taken place. Her approach to the events had nationalistic aspirations and was influenced by the winds of change that were sweeping through the continent of Africa at the time. In 1970 it was only Southern Africa, namely the Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, South West Africa and the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique that had not yet won independence from white minority regimes in the whole continent of Africa. Marks asserts that **blacks did not want to rebel but that resistance was imposed upon them by the colonial state**, hence the title reluctant rebellion. She attributed the resistance to a number of factors such as scarcity of resources, in areas such as Nkandla, Nquthu as well as in Greytown, where the Zondi chiefdom was located on what had formerly been their own land but which had been alienated and was now farmland privately owned by whites.

7 See English – Zulu – English Dictionary. p. 600;

Abantu Abamnayma, Lapa Bavela Ngakona. p. 247: “imali yamakhanda” .

8 A first-hand account of the events of 1906 was a book written by Captain Walter Bosman. His book was called The Natal Rebellion of 1906 written in 1907. He was an eyewitness as he was an army officer during the impi yamakhanda. This book describes how the outnumbered settlers/colonists defended the Natal Colony against the overwhelming majority of the black warriors. It is mainly about the military operations. However, he strongly felt that DinuZulu was innocent of leading any resistance, and was loyal to the Natal settler government. He had this to say about DinuZulu, “DinuZulu could have plunged this country into a general rising if he had so chosen. He did not do so. He evidently foresaw the fate of the rebels; and wisely remained loyal to the British”. See W. Bosman: ‘The Natal Rebellion of 1906’. Cape Town: Longmans, 1907.

9 DinuZulu kaCetshwayo, the son of King Cetshwayo DinuZulu’s lineage, was the descended of King Shaka kaSenzangakhona.

**An outline of insumansumane and the Treason Trial of King DinuZulu, with reference to his life after his release in 1910.**

The actual date for the collection of poll tax (imali yekhanda) was the 20th January 1906. On the 17th January 1906, a farmer called Henry Smith was stabbed to death at his home in Umlaas Road because he had forced his workers to pay imali yekhanda in advance.

On the North coast at kwaMaphumulo, Chief Ngobizembe Ntuli's people were reported to have demonstrated defiance at Allen's Store when the magistrate went to collect tax on the 22nd January. Another similar incident took place in the same district at Butler's Store at Insuze on the 29th and 30th January. There was also another incident at Gaillard's Store in eMvoti.

The white colonists were in trouble with the chiefdom of Inkosi (chief) Tilongo Mkhize in Mid-Illovo, and the Ixopho chiefdom of Inkosi Miskofile.

On the 7th of February, Chief Mveli warned Mr. T. R. Bennet - the magistrate of uMngeni Division - who was collecting tax, about the presence of twenty-seven men of his chiefdom who were armed with spears.

On the 8th February, the Natal Police arrested the men they wanted at Trewirgie farm owned by Henry Hosking in the Richmond area. When the crowd demanded their release, a conflict began; one Zulu male adult was shot and died on the scene, which resulted in the killing of Sub-Inspector Sidney Hunt and Trooper G. Armstrong.

The Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, proclaimed Martial Law in the Natal Colony on the 10th of February 1906.

One thousand troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan Mackenzie were sent to the trouble spot in Natal, and on the 13th of February, the area was searched and the homesteads and crops were destroyed.

On the 14th of February, two Zulu male adults were arrested, tried by court martial, found guilty, sentenced to death and were publicly shot.

On the 24th of February, a combined force under Colonel Leuchars1 was sent to the Ntuli chiefdom In Ixopho.

On the 5th of March, Chief Ngobizembe's umuzi (homestead) was burnt down by the British military when the Chief failed to comply with the ultimatum to surrender and hand over the men that were allegedly resisting payment of the poll tax. Chief Ngobizembe was arrested and fined 1 200 head of cattle and 3 500 goats.

On the South coast, Chief Charlie Fynn was charged and fined 1 500 head of cattle because his people staged a demonstration when Magistrate J. L. Knight was on duty collecting tax. Fynn’s izinduna (foreman) was also arrested. Fynn was charged at uMzinto on 15th March.

Another twenty-three male Zulu adults were court-martialled in Richmond between the 12th and 19th of March. Twelve of them were sentenced to death, and they were shot in public in the presence of black people from various chiefdoms on the 2nd of April.

Two days after the public shooting of the twelve black people in Richmond, Chief Bhambadha Zondi, who had been at loggerheads with the Greytown magistrate J.W. Cross for a very long time regarding a variety of issues, including imali yekhanda, unexpectedly attacked the white police force under Colonel Mansel. The police force was travelling from Keats Drift on their way to Greytown, escorting white women and children. Three white men were killed, four wounded and one went missing. Bent on revenge the authorities sent a combined force under Colonel Leuchars to the area.

Bhambadha's umuzi was surrounded and set alight by the British military, but the combined force could not overpower Chief Bhambadha. They found Sergeant Brown's body when they searched the forest and his body was mutilated. Bhambadha had crossed the uThukela River into Zululand.

In Zululand DinuZulu had persuaded his followers to pay tax as early as the 17th of January, whereas the collection was to begin on the 20th January 1906.

A number of other amaKhosi (chiefs) also paid tax. DinuZulu was in a tricky position because amaKhosi both in Natal and Zululand had consulted him about the payment of imali yekhanda. He told them that he had paid and therefore they should also pay. The nation looked up to him as their king although he had been demoted and officially was like any other inkosi - chief.

However, famous amaKhosi and other influential people supported Bambadha. Amongst others were iNkosi Mehlokazulu Ngobese, iNkosi Sigananda Shezi, Mangathi Ntuli, Chakijana Sithole and there were many others.

The terrain where they chose to make a stand was at eNkandla. When the fighting at eNkandla was crushed, the British Natal colonial government believed that the resistance had been put down, but the fighting spread to kwaMaphumulo, south of uThukela River on the soil of colonial Natal.

The British colonial Natal government tried by all means to implicate DinuZulu, which included bribing people to bear false witness against DinuZulu. He was arrested and charged with treason, and his trial continued for a long time. However, the state could not prove that he was guilty of treason.

One of the counts on which DinuZulu was found guilty was of not reporting the presence of Bhambadha’s wife (Siyekiwe) and children (Kholekile, Ndabayakhe and Nonkoboshe) at the oSuthu.

To note that the British colonial officials assumed it was their legitimate right to prevent the free movement of black people. However in black culture it was no crime to move from place to place without a pass. The remarks by Marcia Wright in Ranger’s work help explain the contradictions and limitations implicit in the relationship between the colonizing power and the colonized:

“… terms of the reconstruction were dictated by the colonial authorities in the years after 1895, when pacification came to mean immobilization of populations, re-enforcement of ethnicity and greater rigidity of social definition”1a.

In the end he was found guilty of sheltering Bhambadha's wife. DinuZulu was sentenced to imprisonment for four years and then released to exile in 1910, after the Union of South Africa had been finalized.

When DinuZulu was released from prison, he had become very thin, was suffering from gout, and his mind had become very scattered. We enclose a note by DinuZulu about himself in footnote 1 at the end of this section.

Although he had been released at the time of the celebration at the end of the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, he was not granted a blanket amnesty by the government, as they had done to 4 500 prisoners (including Mesni Qwabe, Ndlovu Zulu, Tilongo Mkhize), and the Union Government, just like the British Natal colonial government, on behalf of the British Crown, did not forgive him and would not allow him to return to Zululand.

Despite various requests from people who believed in the innocence of DinuZulu, the London authorities did virtually nothing to mitigate the harshness of the treatment of DinuZulu and his people by the officials of the Natal colonial government, who demonstrated time and again that they had no respect for the indigenous people of South Africa. The incarceration of the Zulu king DinuZulu was a gross insult, not only to the Zulu nation, but to all black people in South Africa.

Before his release from prison in Pretoria, DinuZulu wanted to see Premier General Louis Botha, and people of all races gathered together in Pretoria to see DinuZulu, who was reported to be very thin.

To note that during the Zulu civil war there had been some co-operation between Boers and Zulus. Botha had been a member of the expedition against Zibhebhu in 1884 to protect DinuZulu, which led to the land given by DinuZulu to the Boers with which they formed the independent Boer Country ‘Die Nieuwe Republiek’.

General Botha awarded DinuZulu a farm in Nylstroom, and the right to own a house and to continue earning his salary of £500 a year.2 In due course the Union Government revised an earlier decision, and a better farm, Rietfontein in Middelburg in the Northern Transvaal, was bought for DinuZulu. It was a big farm, 4231 hectares in extent, and he could cultivate it as he liked. Initially DinuZulu had five wives with him on the farm and twenty-two of them and thirty-seven children were to follow.

Mankulumane continued to serve DinuZulu with loyalty, he and his five wives stayed with DinuZulu on the farm3. However, Mgwaqo (one of DinuZulu’s izinduna) was not permitted to rejoin DinuZulu in his service to the Royal kingdom, and lived with his family in poverty at eMahlongwa Mission Station, to which area he had been exiled by the British colonial state4.

In the mean time, DinuZulu was said to have been suffering from gout and it was incurable5.

His doctor, Dr W. Godfrey recommended that he should go to Carlsbad in Germany to bathe at the spa in the water that might cure him of his disease. The Union

Government approved the application for permission for DinuZulu to go Germany,6 but DinuZulu passed away before that could happen.

On the 24th of October 1913, the Ilanga newspaper lamented the death of DinuZulu who had died at the age of forty three, on Saturday the 18th of October 1913, in his exiled home, as follows:

“The whole of Zululand wept for the death of their son. Zululand had hoped that the government would have had mercy, pardoned him and brought him back to where his roots were, the land of ‘Shaka, Senzangakhona, Dingane, Mpande and Cetshwayo’7.” See Footnote 2 for a report on the last days of DinuZulu.

**Footnote 1: Letter by DinuZulu.**

DinuZulu himself expressed this view to Schreiner:

“‘I ask you’, he wrote, to keep me in your armpit; leave me not in the hand of Mr. Carter, because he hates me exceedingly. …My sole crime is that I am the son of Cetshwayo. I am being killed through ill will; there is nothing that I have done. My trouble is like that of no one else. It beset me when I was a child and my father was taken by the white people and it is still besetting me. I could not bury Cetshwayo, my Father; he died while I was being chased… I did not bury my Mother, Okamsweli; she has died while I have been a prisoner. All our family die of harassing…and now of all our house I am left alone….My children are still small and have not got eyes. There is no one who can take care of them for me. Nkosi, what is grievous to me is to be killed and yet alive. To die outright is nothing, then one rests and does not feel trouble … All the people who do wrong here in Natal are washed by me. I am the soap to wash them .. Remember that I was imprisoned ten years while I was a boy, in spite of words of Manzikofi.519 Those years were death to me…’.

Eric Walker. W. P. Schreiner A South African. London: Oxford University Press, 1937, 299.

DinuZulu’s moving précis of his life story is a commentary on the events reported by

Dube in the weekly Ilanga newspaper in Natal during the unstoppable process of the British in their final destruction of chiefly structure. An essential part of this process was the destruction of the Zulu monarchy, which traditionally had underpinned the social system of the amaZulu.

**Footnote 2: The last days of DinuZulu.**

Dube reflected on the last days of DinuZulu in the Ilanga Lase Natal newspaper, dated August 22nd and October 24th 1913.

He described how the Reverend R. Thwala, who was the one who had always been with DinuZulu, was the one to whom DinuZulu had spoken his last words. Before his death DinuZulu had converted to Christianity. He was no longer taking any liquor and taking no traditional medication. He had been mentally confused but before his death he was able to speak rationally. During his last days he used to request his children to surround him and sing the hymn, “wazi twala izono Jesu” (which translated into English means “Jesus has borne our sins”).

Dube also reported on the various events that followed the king’s death, in touching detail and simplicity. The magistrate of Middleburg visited on the same day and on

Sunday morning Colonel Royston (Zithulele) also paid them a visit. A government cart with a beautiful coffin covered with a black mourning cloth followed Zithulile.

Later two Whites came and embalmed DinuZulu’s corpse. Late on Sunday the

Middelburg magistrate announced that the train would leave Uitkyk at eleven o’clock with the deceased and the royal family to change at Glencoe Junction to go to Vryheid. From Vryheid station a donkey wagon would drive them to kwaNobamba.

The remains of DinuZulu were accompanied amongst others by Colonel

Royston, Miss H. E. Colenso, the Magistrate B. Colenbrander, uNdunankulu

Mankulumane; Falezwe kaShingane kaCetshwayo, three sons of the late Dabulamanzi, kaCetshwayo, cousins of the deceased and his family: widows, children and his mothers (Cetshwayo’s wives), Reverend Reuben Thwala (Wesleyan Church Pretoria), legal advisor P. ka Isaac Seme (Johannesburg) and many others. The government had prepared two wagons for transport but Royston added a third one and slaughtered a cow for the amaZulu as provisions on their way to kwaNobamba.

They left Vryheid station on Wednesday morning to travel to the Babanango Division, which was 70 miles from the town of Vryheid. They slept at Lanjane halfway between Ntabankulu and Luyathi on the first day, on the second day they slept at eNhlopheni and lastly at eMpembeni. They arrived on Saturday at 10h00 at kwaNobamba. The ministers Thwala and Mndaweni led the wagon with the remains of DinuZulu. The concourse of grieved blacks sang this song (as translated by Dr. Thokozani Nene):

“He is tacit, quarrelling no one the son of Ndaba,

His whole empire accords with him,

Whoever might attempt to raise violence/quarrel let him come forward we will deal with him or permit us to deal with enemies/vagabonds

Yes – yes give us the vagabonds.

“Uzitulele akaqali muntu okaNdaba,

Izwe lonke loku uzitulele,

Sidedele siminye abamfo,

Aho – aho – sidedele abafo”. See Ilanga Lase Natal. October 31st 1913.

DinuZulu was buried on Monday and there were thousands of people that attended the funeral and many arrived later in the day. The Ministers that were in charge of the funeral service were R. Thwala (Pretoria), J. L. Dube (Ohlange), Makhanya (Durban).

To note: Harriet Emily Colenso worked tirelessly in connection with the treason trial of DinuZulu. She believed implicitly in DinuZulu’s innocence of treason and she stood by him throughout. She also incurred a financial burden in connection with the cost of the defense of DinuZulu.

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John Wright and Andrew Manson: ‘The Hlubi Chiefdom in Zululand-Natal: A History. Ladysmith.’ Ladysmith Historical Society, 1983 for sections ‘The Langalibalele rebellion’ 187324; ‘Anglo Zulu War’ 187925; ‘Zulu Civil War and impi’; “DinuZulu and the Bambata Rebellion.”;

Benedict Carton: “Blood from your Sons:” African Generational Conflict in Natal and Zululand, South African, 1880 – 1910, Unpublished PhD dissertation, Yale University, 1996;

Michael Robert Mahoney: ‘Between the Zulu King and the Great White Chief: Political Culture in a Natal Chiefdom, 1879-1906’. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, 1998.

1 With reference to thenature of Colonel Leuchars,a letter written by a reader, Josiah Maphumulo, was printed in the Ilanga Lase Natal newspaper dated October 12th 1906, in which he attacked the colonial government for trusting Colonel Leuchars, as follows:

“This good for nothing white man. He is harsh, cruel, and remorseless. It would have been well had he been killed by Bambata’s bullets in Nkandla. The country would be better if white men such as Leuchars, a wizard of the worst, were removed.”

514 “Kaku mulungu waluto u Leuchars lona. He is harsh, cruel, and remorseless. Kwaku fanele adhliwe izinhlamvu zao Bhambata e Nkandhla. Izwe lingaba ngcono nxa benga sudukiswa abelungu abanjengo Leuchars, umtakati wezi godo”.

1a Ranger: ‘The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa’, pg. 603-4.

2 Additional to the newspaper report, Dube also thanked Dlwedlwe (Miss Colenso) for all her support for DinuZulu. Ilanga Lase Natal. June 17th, June 24th, November 18th 1910.

3 Ilanga Lase Natal. November 25th 1910, August 15th 1913.

4 Ilanga Lase Natal. May 17th 1910.

5 Ilanga Lase Natal. January 3rd 1913.

6 Ilanga Lase Natal. April 18th 1913.

7 “..lawoTyaka, noSenzangakhona, noDingaan noMpande noCetshwayo”. See Ilanga Lase Natal. October 24th 1913.

**The Zulu chiefs and their chiefdoms.**

One of the most complicating factors in the relationships of the chiefs at the turn of the 19th century was the existence of the colonial state itself. From the mid-nineteenth century the traditional boundaries of the chiefdoms had been radically disrupted, some more than others, and similarly the choice of incumbents of the position of chief had been tampered with in pursuance of the policies of the colonial government.

The effect of this engineering, among others, was to impose magisterial authority over the chiefdoms, which in itself was an assault on the traditional role of the chief, who had to adjust his rule to fit in with the magistrate’s overarching authority.

More serious still was the effect of including the area of a chief within two or even more magisterial divisions, possibly straddling Natal and Zululand, as the chief had thus to adjust to the differing modes of operation of several magistrates, e.g. the amaQwabe people were in Maphumulo, Lower uThukela, Inanda, and Ndwedwe.

Even more complex was the effect of placing more than one chiefdom within a magisterial division, which gave rise to rivalry between chiefdoms vis-à-vis magistrates, whereby some magistrates purposely exploited divisions amongst various chiefs in order to divide and rule.

Rivalry for scarce land and resources was no doubt a gradually unfolding long-term result of Shepstone’s land policy1, and this was further complicated by the creation over the years of acting chiefs by the colonial authorities. By 1906 some of the acting chiefs were still not secure in their positions, and some believed that loyalty to the colonial cause was an opportunity to entrench themselves in a permanent chiefdom.

The sometimes conflict-ridden relationships amongst the chiefs must be seen in the context of longstanding rivalry for land, land being the crux of the conflict particularly due to the expansionist policy of the British colonial state. This situation was aggravated by factors such as natural disasters (rinderpest, drought) and the impact of political interaction within white settlements (both Boer and British colonist), especially in more fertile areas such as Nquthu and Nkandla. **There had been an escalation of economic pressures such as hut tax, dog tax, farm tax, and now there was poll tax.**

These economic pressures which had gradually forced more and more of the younger men in the chiefdom to seek work in the urban areas of Natal and elsewhere also led to the social imbalance inevitably associated with migrant labour. The absence of many young men, even though they maintained close links with their rural roots, disrupted the power base of the chiefs, who no longer had a full generation of young men readily at their disposal2.

For the purposes of understanding the complex nature of the events of 1906, the historical background of the kwaMaphumulo division should be given before attempting to look more closely at its various chiefdoms.

**References:**

1 David Welsh: ‘The Roots of Segregation Native Policy in Colonial Natal, 1845 – 1910’. Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1971.

2 Benedict Carton: ‘Blood from your Sons: African Generational Conflict in Natal and Zululand, South, 1880 – 1910’. Doctor of Philosophy, Yale University, 1996. Source: Reluctant Rebellion. pp. 408-9.

**a) KwaMaphumulo Division**

KwaMaphumulo division was in north-eastern Natal and south of the uThukela River. The village of Maphumulo is 40 km from the sea and less than 40 km from Stanger, lying half way between Kranskop and Stanger.

By 1906, Maphumulo was an almost entirely African division, regionalized by the Crown to consist out of two areas, the main Reserve area and the Mission Reserve land.

Maphumulo was one of the most densely populated areas in the British colony of Natal. 35,000 Africans and seventy-eight whites lived on the 390 square miles of the district – a population density of over eighty–nine to the square mile, on land which was, for the most part, rugged and ill-watered.

Long before 1906, land disputes and faction fights between and within chiefdoms revealed the underlying tension over land.

The Rinderpest outbreak of 1897 also hit this area very severely – 97 per cent of the cattle owned by Africans in this area were wiped out. Not surprisingly, the Africans of Maphumulo bitterly resented the new tax1.

**b) Ngobizembe, prince of the Zulu Royal family and prime minister/principal induna of the village of Maphumulo**

In the northern area of the kwaMaphumulo division, adjacent to Chief Ndlovu Zulu’s chiefdom, lay the chiefdom of chief Ngobizembe kaMkhonto, who was the head of the Ntuli people2.

Ngobizembe belonged to historically famous lineages and princes of the Zulu Royal family3. He ruled over 1,652 huts4.

His brother Sambela was his undunankulu – prime minister / principal induna5.

In January 1906, long before there was talk of rebellion, Ngobizambe was amongst the first reported to have disobeyed the magistrate about the payment of the poll tax.

As a result of this reported defiance, a contingent of police was sent to the area at the beginning of February.

Rumors circulated that people of different chiefdoms in kwaMaphumulo had doctored themselves for war. A second column of the Field Forces, the ‘Umvoti Rifles’, was mobilized to the kwaMaphumulo area under British Colonel George Leuchars on 16 February.

Leuchars sent an ultimatum to Ngobizembe to hand over, within six days, three hundred of his men who had disobeyed the magistrate during the collection of the poll tax in January.

It was impossible for Ngobizembe to gather all the wanted men within that time, and he managed to hand over only twenty men.

On 5 March, Leuchars surrounded and burnt the umuzi (kraal/homestead) of Ngobizembe, who was not there, and his people surrendered.

**Half of Ngobizembe’s land was seized by the colonial Crown government** **and handed over to neighboring chiefdoms** **under control of acting chiefs which they placed in charge, and who supported the English government.**

Additionally, Ngobizembe was fined 1,200 head of cattle and 3,500 sheep and goats6.

**Chief Ngobizembe was tried by court martial despite the fact that “martial law did not confer powers on officers to ‘punish or try by Courts Martial … any acts committed prior to the proclamation of Martial Law’”7.**

Martial Law was proclaimed later, by the Governor Sir Henry McCullum on the 9th of February 1906.

Colonel Leuchars’ actions were reported to have had a “splendid effect’’. Leuchars, a former Secretary for Native Affairs, was congratulated on his superb understanding of the ‘native mind’ by the Crown, and throughout the region ‘the natives’ were reported to have “changed their attitude of studied insolence to one of thorough submission’”8.

Ngobizembe had been severely punished by the British authorities for expressing his discontentment about the poll tax. The authorities believed that they had quelled the ill feelings amongst the blacks about poll tax, but at the end of April some of Ngobizembe’s men joined Bambadha in the Nkandla forests”9.

During impi yamakhanda in kwaMaphumulo, Sambela led Ngobizembe’s followers against the British colonial forces10.

After the impi yamakhanda**, the colonial Crown government seized and gave the Ntuli chiefdom of Ngobizembe to Sibindi of the Ngubane chiefdom a reward for his ‘loyalty’ to the colonial government during impi yamakhanda11**.

**References:**

1 Shula Marks: ‘Reluctant Rebellion, the 1906 – 1908 disturbances in Natal’. Oxford, The Claredon Press, 1970. p. 198.

2 ‘The James Stuart Archive.’ C. De B. Webb and J. B. Wright, (eds.) Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2001, Vol 5. p. 266.

3 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 227 and p. 313.

4 NAD, NCP, 8/2/5, Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1904, p. 124: Census.

5’ Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 313

6 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. pp. 198-199;

James Stuart: ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, 1906; and

‘DinuZulu’s Arrest, Trial and Expatriation’. New York, 1913, p. 149.

7 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 198.

8 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 199.

9 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 226.

10 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 230.

11 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 319.

**c) Ndlovu kaThimuni Zulu**, **prince of the Zulu Royal** **family and Chief/induna in kwaMaphumulo division**

Like Ngobizembe, Ndlovu was a prince of the Zulu Royal family.

Ndlovu was the grandson of Mudli, whose brother was Senzangakhona (King Shaka’s father) 1.

Ngobizembe was related to DinuZulu, and “a Chief with considerable influence in Maphumulo division”2.

Although his jurisdiction extended only over 435 huts3 he was a person of enormous influence as he was so closely related to the Zulu royal house.

Ndlovu was amongst the chiefs that were severely punished in kwaMaphumulo district for showing dissatisfaction with the poll tax in January 1906.

As a result **Chief** Ndlovu was arrested in February 1906 **“and detained in prison without trial for several weeks”** by Leuchars on behalf of the colonial Crown government. The punitive measures were carried out “in full accord with the wishes of the Minister for Native Affairs, H. D. Winter”.

In mid-1906, Ndlovu’s followers attacked and killed a shopkeeper, a Norwegian named Sangreid, and a trooper at Thring’s Post. In a related incident, at Otimati River, Ndlovu’s followers “fell upon sixty-six members of the Natal Mounted Rifles who were escorting wagons across the river”. Fighting broke out and the colonial forces killed “variously estimated at forty and a hundred and fifty” of Ndlovu’s followers.

In July, Ndlovu was arrested in Chief Hashi’s chiefdom in Zululand and handed over to the Commissioner for Native Affairs at Eshowe. He was later taken to kwaMaphumulo where the **chief** Ndlovu was **tried by court martial and was found guilty of High Treason. The death sentence was imposed on him**, which was later commuted (by the Governor) **to a life sentence with hard labour.**

In June 1907, Ndlovu and twenty-five other **‘ringleaders’ were deported to St. Helena.** The Colonial Office through Lord Elgin failed to persuade the Natal colonial government to treat them as political prisoners and not as ordinary criminals.

Like that of iNkosi Ngobizembe’s, **Ndlovu’s chiefdom was** also **given to Sibindi of the Ngubane chiefdom by the Crown** for the role he had played during impi yamakhanda.

Looking ahead**, towards the end of 1910, the eighteen survivors amongst the twenty-five prisoners who had been sent to St. Helena were granted parole: there were only eighteen of them, as seven had died in prison. Ndlovu was amongst those who were released because of the ‘kindness’ of the Governor-General of the Union of South Africa, Lord Gladstone.** This ‘kindness’ was part of the general amnesty that was granted to all prisoners by the Governor General during the formation of the Union of South Africa. There were 4,500 prisoners that were freed4.

The parole became effective on the day of the arrival in South Africa of the Duke of Connaught (brother to King Edward VII).

Two of the eighteen Zulu prisoners were carried on stretchers because they were seriously ill.

A newspaper reporter remarked that the prisoners looked very wasted although they had only served three years of their prison sentences. Most of them looked very old and could not even be recognized. They no longer looked like chiefs but looked like commoners.

As follows are the names of the twenty five Zulu prisoners who had been sent to St. Helena, and their sentences are shown in brackets next to their names:

Those who died in prison were: Thobazi (10); Ntelezi (15); Lunyana (15); Mcondi (10); Mdlekazi (15); Fogothi (life imprisonment) and Magcwaneka (life imprisonment).

Those that survived the three years in the St. Helena prison were:

Sikhukhukhu (10); Mahangana (10); Fava (10); Goloza (10); Tilongo (10); Dede (10); Nyamana (10); Ndondoza (10); Mamfinyongo (10); Nhlonhlo (20); Mbazwana (20); Mbeni (6), Ngadini (15) and Siyonga (15).

Meseni, Ndlovu and Ndabaningi were given life imprisonment5.

**References:**

1 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 4. p. 233;

‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 227 and p. 313;

Robert C. A.: ‘Long, Long ago’. Durban, 1929, p. 157, ‘His grandfather Mudli played a prominent role in public affairs in the Zulu chiefdom in the time of Senzangakhona’, see The James Stuart Archive. Vol. 4 p. 233.

2 ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’. p. 346.

3 NAD, NCP, 8/2/5, Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1904, p. 124: Census

4 Ilanga lase Natal. December 23rd, 1910.

5 Ilanga lase Natal. November 18th, 1910.

**d) The amaQwabe chiefdom**

The area between Stanger and the Maphumulo magistracy was mainly the amaQwabe territory.

The amaQwabe chiefdom was “one of the most ancient and famous tribes in Natal and Zululand”. Qwabe was son of Malandela, who “flourished probably at the beginning of the sixteenth century”1.

Although Malandela indicated his wish that Qwabe should be his successor as chief, a dispute arose between Qwabe and his younger brother Zulu, who moved to a new umuzi (kraal/homestead) near Babanango. Eventually Zulu became the more prominent chief, and from his lineage came Shaka, effectively the founder of the Zulu royal house.

The dispute between Zulu and Qwabe filtered down the generations, and the Qwabe and Zulu chiefdoms were traditionally hostile.

The survival of the amaQwabe chiefdom was threatened through the aggravation caused by the colonial government of the Crown intervention in the governance of this chiefdom.

The colonial government kept close record of this chiefdom because of its large population, which like other chiefdoms was scattered across various magistracies, as described below, and its political allegiance to and blood ties with the Zulu royal chiefdom.

Despite their meddling with the domestic affairs of this chiefdom, the effects of the events brought about by the English government on the Zulu nation re-united the amaQwaba by 1906 through their resistance to the payment of the poll tax.

**(i) INkosi Meseni, chief of the amaQwabe.**

By the early 20th century, Chief Meseni was the head of the amaQwabe chieftaincy in kwaMaphumulo, Lower Thukela, iNdwedwe and Inanda divisions2.

Meseni’s chiefdom was one of the largest chiefdoms in the Colony but it experienced a “highly complicated succession dispute” between the English government and Meseni after the death of his father Musi (1890’s). Although Meseni contended that he was the rightful heir3, **the amaQwabe kingdom of Chief Meseni was divided into two sections by the Crown in 1897.**

Meseni presided over one section, **and the other section was placed under a British local magistrate Mr. F. P. Shuter** of Lower Thukela4.

Shuter was appointed as an acting regent for the “minor heir of the chiefdom”, which accounted for much of the tension and bitterness in the area.

Meseni had jurisdiction over 2,231 huts that spread over Maphumulo (940 huts), Inanda (238 huts), Lower Thukela (979 huts) and Ndwedwe (74 huts) 5.

5 Inkosi Meseni’s principal umuzi (homestead/kraal) was eMthandeni (the place of love), which was situated at the junction of the uMvoti and iNsuze Rivers6.

The relationship between Meseni and the magistrate Shuter was a bitter one long before the poll tax. For the amaQwabe, the issue of participation in impi yamakhanda was greatly influenced by this hostility. The Natal government’s intervention in the succession dispute of amaQwabe chiefdom pre-determined their position during impi yamakhanda.

In 1905, the amaQwabe under Meseni attacked Chief Swayimane’s chiefdom, which Qwabe had accused of 64 stealing their cattle.

Shuter the magistrate, ordered the arrest of the amaQwabe attackers, and Meseni was extremely bitter towards the colonial authorities and the magistrate in particular on this account7.

In January his people refused to pay the poll tax and as a result he clashed with colonial forces. The Maphumulo division was the first to display discontentment over the payment of the poll tax in 19068.

The uMvoti Mounted Rifles under Colonel Leuchars was dispatched to the kwaMaphumulo division when the incidents of Meseni’s dissatisfaction were reported.

Like Ndlovu in February**, chief Meseni was also arrested by the English government and detained for a number of weeks without trial** on Leuchars’ instructions. These steps also had the blessings of the Minister of Native Affairs, H. D. Winter9.

Meseni’s son was Mtshingwa10, and one of his izinduna was Macabacaba, who was also implicated in impi yamakhanda10.

In the middle of March, Leuchars’ column was demobilized in the region of

Maphumulo – Lower Thukela, and only a few of the uMvoti Mounted Rifles were

retained. Owing to the continued rumors of unrest in that area the Natal Mounted Rifles and Durban Light Infantry were sent there12. The number of troops at kwaMaphumulo were further increased in May and June. Meseni, fearful that they were about to attack him, called upon an impi to protect himself13.

McKenzie, Woolls-Sampson, Leuchars and Mackay were all dispatched to the

uMvoti Valley where Meseni’s homestead was to be closed down on him in the first week of July. A clash took place during which more than 400 amaQwabe were massacred.

Meseni fled to Zululand, where he and Ndlovu were arrested in Chief Hashi’s ward, and Macabacaba was captured on 26 July in Ndwedwe.

**Chief Meseni was tried by a court martial at Maphumulo and convicted of High Treason14. He was given the death sentence, which was “commuted by the Governor to terms of life imprisonment with hard labour” 15.**

The Natal colonial government refused to treat him and the other ‘ringleaders’ as political prisoners, rather than as ‘ordinary convicts’.

Meseni and other leaders were expatriated to St Helena in June 190716.

**The amaQwabe chiefdom of Meseni, like those of Ndlovu and Ngobizembe, became part of the Ngubane chiefdom under the ‘British loyal’ Sibindi17.**

**Lord Gladstone released iNkosi Meseni in 1910 together with the other ‘ringleaders’18**

**References:**

1 ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 345.

2 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 5. p. 22;

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3 ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 228.

4 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 3. p. 140

5 NAD, NCP, 8/2/5, Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1904, p. 128: Census.

6 T. V. Bulpin: ‘Natal and the Zulu Country’. Cape Town, Books of Africa (Pty) Ltd, 1966. p. 433.

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10 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 227;

A. T. Bryant: ‘Olden times of Zululand and Natal: Containing Earlier Political History of the Eastern – Nguni Clans’. London, 1929, p. 201.

11 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 231.

12 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 227.

13 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 226.

14 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. pp. 231 - 2.

15 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. pp. 236 - 7.

16 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. pp. 250.

17 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 319.

18 Ilanga lase Natal, December 23rd, 1910.

**e) INkosi Mashwili of the Mthethwa kingdom**

The Mthethwa chiefdom was exceptionally important in Zulu history as it was descended from Dingiswayo, one of the progenitors of the Zulu royal house.

The once mighty Mthethwa kingdom, governed by the Zulu chiefdom, suffered irreparable damage during 1906 when the English colonial authorities wiped it out.

The Crown feared that the survival of this chiefdom might encourage and strengthen the other prominent chiefdoms in the Maphumulo area to challenge the authority of the state. The destruction of the Mthethwa chiefdom was a major blow to the social and political network which underpinned traditional Zulu society.

Mashwili was the Chief (iNkosi) of the Mthethwa people1. He was closely

connected to the Zulu Royal family because he was the “grandson of the famous

Dingiswayo (Shaka’s patron2), initiator of the modern Zulu military system” 3. His

father was Mngoye kaDingiswayo kaJobe Mthethwa4.

In an interview he had with James Stuart in November 1903, INkosi Mashwili asserted that his family tree was as follows: Jobe kaKayi kaXaba kaMadango kaMthethwa kaNyambose kaKhubazi Mthethwa.

INkosi Mashwili belonged to the uDloko regiment5 and had his principal ‘umuzi’ (house) called oYengweni, named by his father, after King Shaka had given him land for settlement. This umuzi was situated on the IziNsimba stream, a southern tributary of the Lower Thukela6. This is where **the English colonial forces massacred chiefMashwili, his chief induna, his chief son, and five hundred and forty seven followers7.**

His chiefdom had spread over Lower Thukela which carried 118 huts, and Maphumulo which carried 138 huts8.

**The Crown handed the Mthethwa chiefdom over to the newly colonial constituted Ngubane Tribe made up of Ndhlovu ka Timuni, Ngobizembe9, under the Regent Sibindi**. The English colonial government had compensated Sibindi for the loyalty he displayed during impi yamakhanda.

With the help of the acting chiefs like Sibindi (and others), the Natal British colonial government continued to destroy the traditional chiefly institutions, and this is the legacy that has continued to haunt the present KwaZulu Natal traditional political landscape.

**References:**

1 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 3. p. 46.

2 ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 228.

3 ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 346;

‘The Natal Rebellion of 1906’, pg. 149. London, 1907.

4 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 4. p. 234.

5 James Stuart: ‘UBaxoxele’. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1924. p. 14.

6 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 4. p. 60.

7 Ilanga Lase Natal

8 NAD, NCP, 8/2/5, Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1904, p. 128: Census.

9 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 319.

**f) Sigananda Shezi and the amaChube chiefdom in the Nkandla division**

Chief Sigananda kaZokufa kaMvakela2, “now about one hundred years old and recognized by some colonial officials as the ‘king’ of his small territory”3, ruled the Shezi people in the amaChube chiefdom in the Nkandla division. Sigananda had ‘personal knowledge of the reigns of the old Zulu kings Tshaka, Dingana, Mpande and Cetshwayo’3a.

One of his izinduna (ministers) was Polomba4, who became a key role player during the treason trial of Dinuzlu.

The traditional Shezi ruling lineage had never been broken up because King Shaka had never conquered them5.

Sigananda was connected to the Zulu monarchy because his grandfather Mvakela had married a sister of Nandi - King Shaka’s mother6.

In 1870, King Cetshwayo recalled Sigananda from Natal to assume the chieftaincy from his father who was aged about one hundred years old7.

Sigananda had taken part in King Shaka’s wars as udibi (mat and luggage bearer) 8.

The abakwaShezi were “traditionally workers in iron and principal spear makers to the Zulu royal house, to whom they were intensely loyal”9. The AbakwaShezi “lived in the forest and their particular stronghold was in the Mhome gorge, where Sigananda had his capital kraal at the foot of the waterfall.10” The name of his principal umuzi (home/kraal) was called eNhlweni (‘the pauper’s retreat’) 11.

On the 2nd of December 1856, Sigananda sided and fought on the side of Cetshwayo’s uSuthu against Mbuyazi’s iZigqoza during the great battle of iNdondakusuka. He also fought for Cetshwayo during the Anglo-Zulu War in 1879, after which King Cetshwayo fled and was given refuge by Sigananda in iNkanlda during 188312. After the Anglo-Zulu War, Sigananda was once given refuge by Chief Mancinza (Bhambatha’s father) while the Shezi chiefdom suffered the after effects of this war for about fourteen or fifteen years13.

In 1884 during the battle of Kotongweni, he fought on the side of DinuZulu in a war against Zibhebhu kaMaphitha.

After the Boers helped DinuZulu in battle, he gave them land which they called ‘Die Nieuwe Republiek’ between the Zulu Kingdom and the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek of the Boers, and asked them for their protection against the colonizing British Empire.

The creation of the Nieuwe Republiek in 1884, and the planting of Natal chiefs in southern Zululand in the eighties and nineties by the British government, had led to the pressure building up in the Nkandla division.

The Shezi people had lived in the Nkandla area for many years, long before the advent of white settlement in the area, and pre-dating the establishment of the Zulu kingdom. A brief history of impoverishment of this area is well captured by Marks14:

“The lands the colonists eyed most longingly were in the Nkandla and Nquthu districts in Southern Zululand. Both these divisions were densely populated, because it was good cattle country, and because severe inroads had already been made in this area by the Boer ‘New Republic’ of 1884”.

In addition, Africans from Natal and the neighboring Boer territory had removed to Nkandla and Nquthu under pressure from the British colonial settlers at different times. After the Anglo-Zulu War it had been deliberate policy to settle ‘British loyal’ Natal chiefdoms as a buffer in this area.

Amongst Sigananda’s Shezi, (also known as the amaChube), their main concern was the shortage of land. Sigananda’s people lived in their own lands, unlike Bhambadha’s people who lived in farms, and the area became densely populated. Sir Charles Saunders (Commissioner for Native Affairs in Zululand) remarked on the temperament of the Sigananda’s people regarding their land issue as follows:

“...who had been hurtled off lands taken up by the European settlers …were the people who might have been expected to revolt and yet they gave not the slightest trouble”.

“However, their present poverty and insecurity contrasted most strongly with their long tradition of independence – they were probably the oldest in the Nkandla – and their memories of a glorious past were very different to their present humiliation”14a.

In 1888, Sigananda refused the government’s call to ‘furnish a levy’.

Already in the 1890’s population pressure in these districts was showing itself in the number of boundary disputes and fights between and within chiefdoms. **The British Commission used these tribal disputes and fights as a reason to claim another 81,000 acres of land in Nkandla and 27,00 acres of land in Nquthu** to ‘stabilize the politics of the area’ by importing British settlers15.

The 1897 Rinderpest further aggravated impoverishment of Nkandla division16. The results were devastating: “between 1897 and 1898 six-sevenths of the cattle owned by Africans were wiped out” 17.

Both Nkandla and Nquthu divisions also suffered severely from the invasions of Boers searching food and shelter during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902)18.

The impoverishment was made worse by the dramatic rise in Hut Tax arrears between 1902 and 1905.

By 1905, Sigananda presided over 462 kraals in the Nkandla magisterial district.

The lack of resources of the chiefdom was well known by the Crown, as Sir Charles Saunders (Commissioner for Native Affairs in Zululand) reported that “poverty and insecurity over land appear to have been among the root causes of the Cube discontent”, and he also confirmed that Sigananda and “his chief son and heir, Ndabaningi, were ‘paupers’”19.

In January 1906 during the collection of the poll tax, Sigananda’s people maintained that they could not afford to pay the tax. This was interpreted as defiance by the British colonial authorities.

In 1906 Sigananda (despite his great age) threw in his lot with Bambadha against the Natal colonial government forces and their demand for tax monies in an attempt to regain and restore the independence of his people.

The system of loose alliances and informal friendships amongst these chiefdoms became more closely cemented as Sigananda and Bambadha led their followers in an attempt to protect their traditional lands20.

In the aftermath of the so-called rebellion, **Sigananda’s principal son and heir Ndabaningi was sentenced to life imprisonment and sent to St Helena with the other twenty-five ‘ringleaders’. The Governor General of the Union of South Africa granted him parole in 191021.**

**References:**

2 ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 209;

‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 5. p. 13;

Ilanga lase Natal, September 17th-19th, 2001.

3 Benedict Carton: ‘Blood from your children, the colonial origins of generational conflict in South Africa’. Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 2000. p. 135.

3a ‘The Natal Rebellion of 1906’. p. 110

4 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 5. p. 153.

5 ‘The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom’. p. 34.

6 ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 208;

‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 210.

7 Ilanga lase Natal, September 17th-19th, 2001;

‘The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom’. p. 34.

8 Donald R. Morris: ‘The Washing of the Spears’. London: The Cauar Press, 1966. p. 611.

9 ‘Natal and the Zulu Country’. p. 427.

10 ‘Natal and the Zulu Country’. p. 427.

11 ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 187. eNhlweni means: ‘the place of the pauper’, see ‘Natal and the Zulu Country’. p. 427.

12 ‘Sigananda ‘sheltered Cetshwayo’: see Jeff Guy: ‘The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: The Civil War 1879 – 1884’. University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg, 1994, p. 251.

13 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol 4. p. 31;

‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 209 – 10.

14 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 211.

14a ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 211-12.

15 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 128.

16 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 211.

17 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 128.

18 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 211.

19 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 211.

20 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 171.

21 Ilanga lase Natal, May 4th, 1906;

‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, pp. 184 and 226;

‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 182.

20 Ilanga lase Natal, December 23rd, 1910.

**g) The Ngobese of the Nquthu district**

Leadership of the Ngobese (amaQungebe) people were drawn into the opposition against the colonial authorities after the boundaries of the Nquthu district had been redefined by the Crown.

(i) **Mehlokazulu kaSihayo Ngobese**

Sihayo and his son Mehlokazulu remained loyal to the Zulu kingdom from King Cetshwayo, and later to his successor King DinuZulu.

The name Mehlokazulu means the eyes of the Zulu nation. They (Sihayo and Mehlokazulu) rendered a valuable military service to the Zulu nation.

Mehlokazulu became inkosi of the Ngobese people in 18931. Like his father Sihayo, Mehlokazulu was very loyal to the Zulu monarchy but “had a long history of conflict with the colonial authorities”2. The conflict had culminated in the Anglo – Zulu War because of Mehlokazulu’s ‘conduct’3.

**In 1906 the AmaQungebe in Nquthu district was under the chieftaincy of Mehlokazulu kaSihayo Ngobese4. A large part of this land had originally belonged to Chief Sihayo, but was seized by the English government and given to the ‘British loyal’ chief Hlubi of the Molife chiefdom.** Hlubi had been awarded land for the services he provided to the British military during the Langalibalele rebellion (1873) and during the Anglo-Zulu War (1879).

Although Mehlokazulu had lost most of his traditional land to Hlubi following the intervention of the colonial authorities, as an important chief in the Nquthu division he made his intentions clear as being against the poll tax2. In 1906 he failed “to pay the Poll Tax” on the appointed day.

There were rumors circulating that he was planning to take up arms against the British. Other rumors that circulated among the British were that he had been sending messages to Chief Khula Majozi in uMsinga division to join forces against the British3.

In the uMsinga division and its surrounding areas, the Majozi chiefdom was one of the most powerful polities. There were close ties of kinship and friendship between Chief Mehlokazulu of the Ngobese, and Chief Khula of the Majozi.

The colonial authorities knew that there were close ties between the two chiefdoms. Mehlokazulu’s behaviour made it clear that he was not intimidated, and his stand strengthened other lesser chiefs in their opposition to the government.

Mehlokazulu had been sending messages to both Khula and DinuZulu consulting them about the poll tax. The arrest of his friend and neighbor Khula on 8 May by the British forces, was not a good sign to Mehlokazulu and his chiefdom4.

In May, the Nquthu division experienced a lot of troop movements as forces moved to Nkandla from Dundee. On the 16th of May, Mehlokazulu refused to take instructions from Lieutenant – Colonel Mackay (Officer in Command at Helpmekaar) to attack Nondubela and Mnteli. He fled with his wives, cattle and a few of his followers to the bushes.

The British Nquthu magistrate failed to persuade him to go back to his home5.

On the 18th of May, Mehlokazulu joined Mnteli and marched to the Qhudeni Mountains at Nkandla6.

On his way, members of the Faku chiefdom - who were under Lubudlungu - joined Mehlokazulu. They had been armed, as ‘loyal’ to the government, on the instructions of the magistrate, the plan being that they would guard Nondubela and Mnteli on their way to Zululand.

However**, the homesteads of Faku’s people were set alight by the British troops, who also fired on Lubudlungu’s men.** Thus they were pushed to join the so-called rebels, and joined Mehlokazulu without the knowledge and permission of their chief, Faku.

This incident illustrates the problems created by the attempt of the colonial authorities to use armed, black ‘loyal’ forces, as the suspicion and the distrust of the black people on the part of the average white colonist made co-operation of the white and black defenders of the colony very difficult.

At the end of May a combined force of Mnteli, Nondubela, Lubudlungu and Mehlokazulu had taken up a position in the Qhudeni Mountains (Nkandla).

By the 9th of June there had been scattered skirmishes as a result of which Mehlokazulu and other prominent leaders of impi yamakhanda were killed.

The commander of the combined forces was now Babazeleni (Faku’s chief induna) who led his men against uMvoti Mounted Rifles (under Colonel Leuchars) which were assisted by the ‘loyal’ iNkosi Sibindi’s levies.

Subsequent to this, fighting broke out at Mpukunyoni.

**References:**

1 He was the “eldest son of Sihayo, an independent and aggressive Usuthu supporter: killed, Mome, 1906”, see The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, p. 249.

2 Reluctant Rebellion. p. 219.

3 “In July 1878 Mehlokazulu led a party of men into Natal, seized two women who had fled from Sihayo’s territory, took them back, and put them to death. The incident was magnified by Sir Bartle Frere.

4 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p.220 – 21.

5 ‘Reluctant Rebellion;, p.220 – 21.

6 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p.220 – 21.

**h) The Ntuli chiefdom**

The ancient and influential families of the Ntuli chiefdom were fragmented and their leaders of whom belonged to the lineage of Ndlela (Dingane’s induna), were dethroned in the process of the destruction of the traditional power structures.

The chiefdom as a whole had a long-standing association with the Zulu kingdom dating from the time of Senzangakhona.

(i) **Mangathi kaGodide kaNdlela**

Mangathi kaGodide kaNdlela had been the ‘most important personage in the Zulu nation’1 at the time he acted as King Cetshwayo’s Induna.

Ndlela was the son of Sompisi2 kaKuguqa, kaMsalela kaNomatshingila Ntuli (of emaBheleni) 3, and although not a chief of the Ntuli people, he was one of the most influential people in the Ntuli chieftaincy4.

The Ntuli (the abasemaBheleni) had throughout their long existence, loyally served the Zulu Royal House, even prior to the formation of the kingdom.

Mangathi’ kaNdlela’s significant role within the Ntuli chiefdom was clearly demonstrated by the number of people who supported him when he joined up with Bambadha in 1906.

**(ii) Mphumela kaNdlela**

The section of the Ntuli people known as amaBhele, were the subjects of Mphumela kaNdlela, who had succeeded his brother Godide who had died in 18835.

Mphumela was appointed acting chief of the important Ntuli chiefdom6, which was in the Nkandla division7, by the English government against Ntulizwe’s “candidature to the chieftaincy”.

Mphumela was a chief at KwaMagwaza near Melmoth8. There were allegations however that Mphumela was in fact a secret rebel, although he openly supported the colonial forces or the levies at times9. Wherever his true loyalties lay, he was shot and killed on 20 November 190710.

**(iii) Ntulizwe**

Those who had supported Ntulizwe (of the house of Godide) years before had not forgotten these events, and on the outbreak of the impi yamakhanda, the former Ntulizwe faction supported Mangathi when he joined Bhambadha’s fight against the British at Nkandla11.

**(iv) Mavumengwana kaNdlela**

Chief Mavumengwana kaNdlela led yet another section of the Ntuli people at Eshowe12. He was described as “a great man and subordinate only to Mnyamana13.” (Mnyamana kaNqengelele of the Buthelezi people was Cetshwayo’s Ndunankulu (Prime Minister) 14.

Mavumnengwana was induna of the major section of the Thulwana regiment, and an associate of the king, Cetshwayo.” 15

Although he had strong ties with the Zulu royal household, one of his sons, chief Mfungelwa Ntuli, was a ‘British loyal’ chief during the 1906 disturbances.

His chief son and heir was Mfungelwa who took over the chiefdom after him16, having as his imbongi (praise singer) Manxele kaMbanjana of the Khandampevu regiment. 17

**(v) Mfungelwa Ntuli**

Based at Mpaphala, chief Mfungelwa Ntuli18 fought on the side of the colonial forces during impi yamakhanda. On 5 May he assisted the Natal Police under Colonel Mansell operating from Fort Yolland in their first major encounter with Bhambadha’s forces at Mome Ridge. Mfungelwa had four hundred followers in that fighting and they killed about sixty of Bhambadha’s people. 19

**(vi) Mbuzo**

In the Nkandla division there was a section of the Ntuli people under chief Mbuzo20 who was not a descendant of Sompisi, but they shared a common ancestor with

Sompisi.

Mbuzo was the son of Mngeni kaMenyelwe kaMahawule kaMlomo21. His chief son was Maphoyisa who was very loyal to the British colonial government during the 1906 impi yamakhanda, and he “was very much hated by the rebel members of his chiefdom who said that ‘he was the one who told the authorities who were the rebels’”.

Chief Mbuzo “was very old, deaf, and almost blind” at the time of the 1906 impi yamakhanda, and he fled with many of his supporters to Sibindi. 22

**(vii) Fogoti and Wohle**

Mbuzo’s brother, Fogoti, supported and led the ‘rebels’ in chief Mbuzo’s chiefdom, and Maphoyisa’s chief son Wohle, who did not share the loyalty his father had for the British Crown, led the anti-government forces in the area, finding followers from among the supporters of his father. 23

The complex response of the Ntuli clan to the uthuli and the conflicting loyalties that were evident can be largely attributed to the effective long-term manipulation of power by the British colonial state. This process, in varying permutations, can be seen in various other chiefly families who were disrupted and displaced, in such a way that indigenous people became refugees in the country of their birth.

The above analysis of the network of Ntuli chiefdoms indicates the effectiveness of the British colonial authorities which acted on instructions of the Crown in using existing rivalries and tensions within traditional Zulu society to promote a strategy of divide and rule.

**References:**

1 Ndlela kaSompisi was the Prime Minister of King Dingane. See ‘The Olden Times of Zululand and Natal’. p. 59 – 60.

2 The other name of Sompisi was Nkobe because he used to prepare izinkobe (‘mealies of sorghum grain when boiled: one of the staple foods of the Zulu’. See English – Zulu, Zulu – English Dictionary.

Compiled by C. M. Doke, D. M. Malcom, J. M. A. Sikhakhane and B. W. Vilakazi (Witwatersrand University press: Johannesburg. p. 395) for Senzangakhona.

3 ‘UBaxoxele’. p. 192.

4 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 207.

5 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 2. p. 219.

6 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 294 - 5.

7 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 4. p. 104.

8 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 2. p. 279.

9 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 326.

10 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 294.

11 Reluctant Rebellion, p. 294.

12 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 2. p. 204; Vol. 4. p. 154.

13 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 4. p. 367.

14 ‘Paul la Hausse de Lalouviere: ‘Restless Identities’. Pietermaritzburg, University Press, 2000. p. 185.

15 The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 4. p. 367.

16 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 5. p. 209 and Vol. 4. p. 404.

17 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 4. p. 95.

18 ‘Olden times of Zululand and Natal’. p. 60.

19 ‘The Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 216.

20 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 5. p. 134 and 187.

21 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 2. p. 204.

22 ‘The Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 258.

23 ‘The Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 311.

**i) Matshana kaMondise of the Sithole chiefdom**

Chief Matshana kaMondise kaJobe headed the Sithole chiefdom in Nkandla and Nquthu divisions1. He had been a refugee in Zululand having escaped from Natal to avoid arrest by the colonial authorities.

Since the removal of Matshana to Zululand2, his Sithole chiefdom was situated in the Qhudeni Mountains, where he ruled over three hundred people.

Despite his controversial history, Matshana was regarded as one of the ‘British loyalists’ as early as 1884 by the authorities, although he was generally believed to be anti-white.

In 1906, the majority of his chiefdom aligned itself with the British colonial forces, but five of his sons broke away from him with their followers, and joined the ‘rebels’, which strained the relations between iNkosi Matshana and his sons.

Towards the end of June, Colonel Mackay fined every ‘rebel’ in Mantshana’s chiefdom five cattle, which Matshana eventually handed over. Notwithstanding the chief’s compliance, in the first week of July, the British infantry ‘Royston’s Horse’ raided Matshana’s chiefdom and collected almost all the cattle they could find.

Matshana appeared before Saunder, the British Commissioner of Native Affairs but he was acquitted when his case was heard and the Commissioner assured Matshana that his people’s cattle would be restored to them. This had not been done by the end of 1906. 3

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**References:**

1 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 5. p. 355, Vol. 4. p. 387, Vol. 3. p. 236;

‘The Destruction of the Zulu kingdom’. p. 249.

2 “In 1858 John Shepstone was sent by a Natal government to arrest Matshana kaMondise, chief of the Sithole in the Msinga region of the colony, for an infraction of the law. Shepstone’s attempt to arrest him ended in violence, and Matshana escaped to the Zulu kingdom. In 1875, at the insistence of Bishop John Colenso, the Natal government held an official enquiry into the affair. Shepstone was largely exonerated”, see ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 5. p. 324.

3 ‘The Reluctant Rebellion’. pp. 233 - 235.

**j) Sishishili, Chief of the Sibisi people.**

The Natal government undermined the traditions of chiefly rule and the indigenous hereditary system by assuming the right to appoint chiefs. A case in point was that of Sishishili who was “a prominent and conspicuously loyal Chief” at eNkandla

during 19061. He was chief of the Sibisi people2. He had been “Osborne’s messenger as early as 1882, and was responsible in hunting out rebels in Nkandla with great ferocity”.

He had once granted DinuZulu “refuge during his struggles with Zibhebhu in

the eighties” 3 in 1883 when his father Cetshwayo kaMpande was defeated by Zibhebhu kaMaphitha4. Notwithstanding this act of kindness to the young prince, Sishishili’s loyalty to the colonial state was an open secret. He showed this when leaders of the different chiefdoms were summoned to a meeting with the authorities about the Poll Tax.

His ostentatious loyalty to the British Crown is well captured by James Stuart:

“All to begin with, were nervous and averse to paying until Sitshitshili came forward in the presence of others and made his tribe pay, remarking as he did so, that having always obeyed the Government, he was not going to be afraid of doing so on that occasion5. INkosi Sishishili was among other things, “a splendid specimen of a brave and loyal Zulu” 6.

During the impi yamakhanda of 1906, he “materially assisted the Government to the utmost of his ability”7, as a result of which he acquired many enemies and understandably he felt increasingly insecure amongst his black kinsmen.

Sishishili was killed on 8 August 1907. Other ‘loyal’ chiefs immediately attributed it to DinuZulu and they claimed that there was “jubilation among the fugitive rebels at the Osuthu when Sishishili was murdered.

By 12 August, within four days of Sishishili’s murder, Sir Charles Saunders claimed that DinuZulu was guilty of the murders of the ‘loyal chiefs’8. Saunders wanted the Natal government to arrest DinuZulu and remove him from Zululand.

**Because Mjombolwana refused to implicate his king DinuZulu with the murder of Sishishili, he was sentenced to death**

The fallout of Sishishili’s death extended into 1908 when Mjombolwana was arrested for the murder. The trial took place on November 1908 in a Special Court in the Greytown Town Hall, a ‘curtain-raiser’, with many trials to come. The British authorities had hoped that Mjombolwana might implicate DinuZulu in the killing of Sishishili. They offered him inducement to incriminate DinuZulu but he refused to do so. One of the detectives, Willie Calverly who was “securing evidence against DinuZulu for his trial, and was also a shopkeeper in Zululand”, tried to persuade him to lay the blame on DinuZulu in return for his freedom. Mjombolwana refused to implicate his king. He was found guilty and sentenced to death and executed in December 19089.

**References:**

1 ‘The Zulu Rebellion’. p. 430.

2 ‘The destruction of the Zulu Kingdom’. P. 203.

3 ‘The Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 257.

4 ‘The Zulu Rebellion’. p. 15.

5 ‘The Zulu Rebellion’. p. 184.

6 ‘The Zulu Rebellion’. p. 238

7 ‘The Zulu Rebellion’. p. 430.

8 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 257.

9 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’. p. 275 - 276.

**k) The amaQadi chiefdom with reference to John Langalibalele** **Dube, the founder of Ilanga Lase Natal Newspaper.**

J. L. Dube was not only an ikholwa but he also a politician, journalist, educationalist,

author, interpreter (of the desires and ambitions of his people), businessman and

nationalist; the roots of this highly complex man were traditional, a highly significant

factor in understanding his philosophy. The importance of this to himself becomes clear in his damning criticism of the colonial state for undermining and finally destroying the traditional social system.

The strong ties that J.L.Dube had with traditional institutions helped him enormously in his relationship with, and understanding of, the Zulu monarchy, of which ultimately he became one of the chief protagonists.

The historical facts and knowledge which J.L.Dube has shared with the public has been, and is, of incalculatable value.

A brief summary of his lineage and kinship follows:

John Langalibalele Dube’s uncle was Mqhawe Ngcobo who ruled the amaQadi people of the INdwedwe division.1 Mqhawe was born in the late 1820’s and Mqhawe was the son of Dabeka kaDube.

Mqhawe’s son and heir was Mandlakayise, who ‘stayed in America about seven years’. 2

Mandlakayise was John Langalibalele Dube’s cousin; they went together to the United States of America.

The attitude of the British colonists towards Dube and Mqhawe is well captured in Shula Marks book ‘Reluctant Rebellion’ as follows:

“On his return from his second visit to the States, Dube was watched by special detectives. He and his uncle, Chief Mqawe, whose son was also studying in the United States, were said to be harboring treasonable designs against the state as early as 1898.

During the Second Anglo Boer War, Dube was detained for some time by the British government for alleged seditious statements3.

Mandlakayise’s mother was Ntozethu, daughter of chief Phakade Mchunu.

Chief Phakade had gathered around him remnants of various chiefdoms and welded them into the largest chiefdom in Natal, centered on the Weenen district. He had marched with government troops against Langalibalele’s Hlubi in the late 1840’s4.

Madlukana acted as regent in his stead5. He became chief in the 1840’s and erected his principal umuzi – homestead called eKumanazeni, described by Hughes as a “Place of quibbling” 6. He ruled over 3,000 huts, more than 523 being in KwaMaphumulo division7. His people were also in the uMngeni, Lower Thukela, Inanda and Impendle divisions8.

The amaQadi people are the Ngcobo people, and it is said that the Ngcobo house “has many tribes from it”.

Mqhawe was “the junior brother (mnawe) of the house of Ngcobo”, and the Ngcobo people “are descended from the amaFuze”. 9

Mqhawe’s father was Dabeka kaDube kaSilwane kaNjila kaNgotoma (iQadi). 10

Though the bulk of the amaQadi lived in the troubled Maphumulo division, his people had not participated in the impi yamakhanda. Although they “were restless over the Poll Tax”, four hundred Qadi aided Colonel McKenzie in the Maphumulo district. 11

The non-involvement of the amaQadi in impi yamakhanda was attributed to Dube, who himself realized and successfully communicated the impossibility of fighting the British modern weaponry with traditional black weapons. 12

Through his Ngcobo lineage, Dube was also linked to the amaNyuswa people in the kwaMaphumulo, uMvoti, and New Hanover divisions under iNkosi Swayimane. 13

Despite his close relationship with the Zulu monarchy, his focus and support base were initially not confined to the amaZulu, as is demonstrated by his appointment in absentia in 1912 to the presidency of the newly established SANNC, the forerunner of the African National Congress. He was ousted from this position in 1917, and his political views and alliances underwent various changes during his later years. A friend and advisor to Solomon kaDinuZulu14, he became closely identified with Zulu nationalism and was involved with the establishment of the first Inkatha movement in 1922 – 23.15

**References:**

1 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol 2. p. 44.

2 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol 2. p. 47.

3 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 75.

4 “Politics and society in Inanda, Natal…”. p. 101

5 Hughes, Heather. “Politics and society in Inanda, Natal: The Qadi under Chief Mqhawe, c1840-1910”, Unpublished dissertation, University of London, 1995. p. 81.

6 “Politics and society in Inanda, Natal…”. p. 86.

7 NAD, NCP, 8/2/5, Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1904, p. 124.

8’ ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 3. pp. 48 and 282.

9 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 3. p. 32.

10 ‘Olden times of Zululand and Natal’. p. 482.

11 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 334.

12 Ilanga lase Natal, February and March 1906.

13 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 5. p. 252.

14 Nicholas Cope: ‘To bind the nation Solomon ka DinuZulu and Zulu nationalism 1913 – 1933’. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1993.

15 Shula Marks: ‘The ambiguities of dependence in South Africa class, nationalism, and the state in twentieth-century Natal’. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986. p. 69.

**l) Swayimane of the Swayimane chiefdom**

Swayimane was the son of “Ziphuku kaNtuli kaMavela – of the Ngcobo people”1 and was one of the three very important chiefs in kwaMaphumulo. The other two, Ngobizembe and Meseni, had refused to pay tax when summoned by the local magistrate to do so in January 1906. 2

In 1905 the Swayimane chiefdom had been attacked by amaQwabe under chief Meseni, but in 1906 both Swayimane and Meseni were united in the rejection of the poll tax. 3

**(i) Chief Swayimane was severely punished together with Ngobizembe, Meseni and Ndlovu by British Colonel Leuchars. 4**

At the end of June, some of Swayimane’s followers joined Meseni in the impi yamakhanda5, and at the beginning of 1907 Swayimana’s rebels were placed

under the ‘British loyal’ Chief Mahlube. 6

Most of the acting chiefs, who were British colonial government appointees, formed the bulk of the collaborators in 1906. With their help the colonial government continued to destroy the traditional political landscape.

**References:**

1 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 3. p. 32.

2 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 198.

3 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 228.

4 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 225.

5 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 230.

6 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 325.

**m) Sibindi, acting inkosi of the Ngubane people**

The first chiefdom that offered to help the colonial government against their fellow Zulus were led by chief Sibindi1, who was an acting inkosi of the Ngubane people. His chiefdom was in the uMsinga division of the Ngubane (abasemaBomvini / amaBomvu) people2, and the principal umuzi was Enhlonga. 3

During the first encounter between the colonial forces and the blacks at Nkandla, Sibindi’s people had been involved, and they were active on the government side until the end of impi yamakhanda4.

Sibindi’s participation in the war was supported by amakholwa (Christians) of the Norwegian Mission Society in his chiefdom5, the Greytown Gazette called Sibindi as “the most loyal chief in the country” 6.

The relationship between Sibindi’s amaBomvu chiefdom, and the Zondi chiefdom

under Bhambadha, were very strained.

Similarly, as Sibindi’s chiefdom had been involved in many boundary disputes7 with the Majozi (amaQamu) chiefdom under Khula. 9

It has been said that his pro-government attitude in 1906 was because of the old rivalry which existed between the chiefdom and his neighbors8.

Sibindi was different from other loyal chiefs for he had become aware of the sufferings of his people, and expressed his concerns during a farewell interview with the Governor Sir Henry McCallum in mid 1907. One of the things he spoke about was that during the impi yamakhanda, he had allowed the Hermannsburg Lutheran missionaries into his chiefdom. His concern for the welfare of his people was presumably also behind his request for “representation and the franchise as the best method of changing the political position of Africans in Natal” before the Natal Native Affairs Commission (1906 -1907).

Lastly on the positive it should be noted iNkosi Sibindi was keen for his people to get education and Christianity. It was said that:

“Chief Sibindi, who became convinced during his fighting on the government side that God was with him, after the rebellion allowed schools to be built in his ward for the first time, and a large number of his Bomvu people came to the missionaries for instruction in Christianity”10.

Unlike some of the other ‘British loyal’ chiefs who benefited very little from their loyalty, and whose lives had been threatened or who were killed, Sibindi’s loyalty was relatively profitable. He got concessions from the government, and his appointment to a ‘permanent full chieftaincy’ was a reward for his services during impi yamakhanda.

His jurisdiction was “considerably extended over portions of tribes in Mapumulo

district” of Ndlovu, Ngobizembe, Meseni, Mashwili and Ngqokwana. 11

Sibindi died in December 1911, in a Durban hospital. He was buried on 20

December 1911, and Rev S. Clement-Johns (of the Wesleyan Church) conducted the funeral service according to Christian rites, as Sibindi had requested before he died.

His death was reported by Clement-Johns to the Ilanga Lase Natal12.

**References:**

1 ‘Ilanga lase Natal’, April 13th, 1906.

2 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 57.

3 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 5. p. 343.

4 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 223.

5 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 331.

6 As quoted by Marks see ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 318.

7 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 218.

8 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 319.

9 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 218.

10 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 357.

11 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 319.

12 ‘The nation had lost a leader who was of great help to the Wesleyan Church and other churches in his chiefdom’ – See the letter written by S. Clement-Johns in Ilanga Lase Natal. December 27 1911.

**n) The independent chiefdom - EmaChunwini chiefdom**

The emaChunwini chiefdom had a tradition of animosity with the house of Senzangakhona long before it had achieved the status of the Zulu royal house in its own kingdom.

Chief Macingwana, who ruled the emaChunwini chiefdom during the reign of Senzangakhona (King Shaka’s father), was ill treated by Shaka and by Mpande. Macingwane decided to remove himself and his chiefdom to Mpondoland where he died at eNsikeni, and although his descendants returned to Natal, they remained enemies of the Zulu monarchy.

When asked by the colonial authorities, the chiefdom agreed to participate alongside the colonial forces in wars such as those against Sikhukhuni and amaZulu (1879).

Chief Gabangaye, the grandson of Macingwane, was killed in the battle of iSandlwane (Anglo-Zulu War, 1879)1.

(i) **Chief Silwane of the ubukhosi bamaChunu, the largest chiefdom in Natal before the Union of South Africa.**

The colonial documents alleged that Silwane (the son of Gabangaye) was ‘loyal’ to the English colonial government in 1906, and there were also rumors that he was secretly in sympathy with DinuZulu. However, new evidence suggests that he was, in fact, neutral.

Though the Chief was requested to participate in 1906 in the action against Bhambadha his chiefdom did not in reality participate. A contingent of Amabutho were indeed sent to Helpmekaar, but because of their aggressive attitude they were regarded with such suspicion by the British army officials who had recruited them, that they were released from their commitment the following day, and sent back to their chief without having fought.

On their way back they plundered and looted the white shops and farms, an action that might have created some doubts in colonial circles about the loyalty of Silwane’s followers2.

In fact Silwane’s Mchunu people were forced to remain neutral: they could neither help the colonists (the memories of the death of Gabangaye were still fresh in their minds), nor Bhambadha (because of the allegations that DinuZulu was on his side, and the Mchunu harbored an ancient grudge against the royal house) 3.

Silwane was the son of Gabangaye kaPhakade kaMacingwane kaLubhoko4, and took over the chieftaincy in the early 1880’s5. Silwane was said to be the “the most powerful Natal Chief”. 6

Silwane Mchunu had been closely related to Bhambadha, but despite this there was a lot of stick fighting between their followers.7 Although Silwane and his chiefdom paid the Poll Tax, 8 and offered his assistance to the colonial government during the impi yamakhanda in 1906, he was unable to carry all his people with him in his collaboration with the state. 9

Silwane was chief of the large amaChunu chiefdom (ubukhosi baseChunwini) which was located in the six magisterial districts in the Natal midlands, namely the Estcourt, Lion’s River, New Hanover, Umsinga, Umvoti, and Weenen divisions10.

The ubukhosi bamaChunu (Chunu chiefdom) Consisting of 30,000 people11, and was the largest chiefdom at the turn of the century in Natal12.

Despite the great size of his chiefdom, allegedly the home of 10,500 men of fighting age13, Silwane failed to send 1000 men to the colonial government as he had promised. He managed to muster only six hundred men14, which suggests that he had little support within the chiefdom to fight on the government side.

**The English government annexed Chief Silwane’s amaChunu land in 1902, just before the Union of South Africa, and in 1910 his former chiefdom was divided into four sections.**

In 1909 the government deposed Silwane because he quarreled with the local magistrate who was alleged to be in favour of induna15.

Chief Silwane died in exile in March 1912 at emaBhaceni in the Harding district (in Mavundla chiefdom16). Dube, the editor of Ilanga Lase Natal, expressed his concern about his death, as the hereditary chiefs were declining in number, whereas the number of the government appointed chiefs was increasing tremendously. Dube had believed that Silwane would not live much longer because he had led the life of a commoner as a result of the ill treatment he received from the British authorities. 17

**References:**

1 Interview with iNkosi Simakadeni (popular known as Simakade) Mchunu, on 3 December 2002, at Mchunu Tribal Authority by Muziwandile Hadebe and Dr. Thokozani Nene. INkosi Simakadeni Mchunu has been ruling the chiefdom since

8 April 1945. He is the grandson of Silwane, his father Mzochithwayo died in 1927 when he (iNkosi Simakade) was only four. INkosi Mchunu is tremendously resourceful – he has a lot to tell, not only about the amaChunu chiefdom, but with other various chiefdoms.

2 Interview with iNkosi Simakadeni Mchunu

3 Interview with iNkosi Simakadeni Mchunu.

4 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 3. p. 26.

5 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 5. p. 282.

6 ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 456.

7 ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 318. Bhambadha’s mother was a ‘daughter of Pakade, a well known Chief of the Cunu tribe, now for the most part living in Weenen division’;

‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 157: ‘Bambata’s boundaries about on the area occupied by his cousin Silwane’s people’;

Bosman, Walter: ‘The Natal Rebellion of 1906’. p. 18.

8 Ilanga lase Natal, March 2nd, 1906.

9 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 3. p. 280.

10 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 3. p. 280.

11 ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 106.

12 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 316.

13 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 355.

14 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 318.

15 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 321.

16 Interview with iNkosi Simakadeni Mchunu (3 December 2002).

17 Ilanga Lase Natal. March 22nd 1912.

**(ii) Chief Ngqamuzana and the abaThembu chiefdom, second largest chiefdom in Natal before the Union of South Africa.**

The leadership of the abaThembu chiefdom was ‘loyal’ to the colonial government during impi yamakhanda. The second largest chiefdom after the amaChunu, straddling Weenen1 and uMsinga in Natal, the abaThembu were under the authority of chief Ngqamuzana2. He was the son of Mganu, KaNodada kaNgoza (he was not one of Sir Theophilus Shepstone’s appointed induna) 3 and he presided over 28,000 people.

Like chief Silwane’s people, most of Ngqamuzana’s people lived on land privately owned by British colonists. Although Nqgamuzana was one of the loyalists, he was unable to secure the support of all his people during the 1906 disturbances 4. He had promised to provide the Natal government with six hundred fighting men but only managed two hundred men.

Some of his izinduna and his brothers were not prepared to fight on the government side against the amaQamu under chief Khula Majozi, even though the two chiefdoms had a long history of animosity between them over a territorial border dispute. Nqgamuzana tried to excuse the shortfall in the supply of soldiers but the Governor was not prepared to listen to excuses 5.

**References:**

1 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 2. p. 293.

2 John Lambert: ‘Betrayed Trust. Africans and the State in Colonial Natal. Pietermaritzburg’, University of Natal Press, 1995. p. 182.

3 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 3. p. 281.

4 ‘Betrayed Trust’. p. 182.

5 “In an interview with the Governor, Ngqmuzana attempted to excuse his people on the grounds that they were too ill-prepared to fight, as they were no longer allowed to drill regiments. To this McCallum retorted drily, ‘He who excuses himself, accuses himself’ ” - See ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 317.

**(iii) Acting chief Mveli and the senior house of the Ngcobo chiefdom (amaFuze)**

The acting chief of the amaFuze, Mveli kaHemuhemu1 was ‘loyal’ to the English colonial government. Mveli was dependent on the government for his status as the Nadi chiefdom of the amaFuze because they had appointed him as regent for the small child named Langalakhe kaDlomo 2.

Although he remained loyal to the colonial state throughout the 1906 impi yamakhanda, his amaFuze people “refused to accept Chief Mveli’s orders that they pay their poll tax”3 after the Richmond Incident (7 February 1906) which preceded the Bhambadha Rebellion.

Mveli adhered to his promise of assisting the British colonial forces by capturing the so-called rebels, who were handed over to the court martial. 4 Mveli’s area of jurisdiction, located thirty kilometers south – east of Pietermaritzburg, was called Elandskop but later it became known as Swartkop location. Later the deposed and exiled chiefs (amakhosi) were sent to this area by the Natal colonial government.

**References:**

1 Mveli was appointed as a regent for Langalakhe kaHemuhemu kaMadlenya kaMahawule kaNonyanda kaDlomo:

Ilanga lase Natal, February 16th, 1906: ‘Mveli was the eldest son of iNkosi Hemuhemu. He was appointed to be a regent for Langalakhe who was a child between two and three years of age. The appointment took place in the presence of 126 men of amaFuze before the uMngeni division magistrate in Pietermaritzburg on 16 November 1900. His appointment dated from 24 November 1900, and he was entitled to a salary of ƒ15 per annum. Prominent people from amaFuze chiefdom like the relatives of iNkosi Hemuhemu, some of his sons and brothers, his izinduna (including military izinduna – these are known as amagoso in isiZulu) and others were present’. See SNA 1/1/290;

2 ‘Olden times of Zululand and Natal’. p. 482.

3 ‘Betrayed Trust’. p. 182;

Ilanga lase Natal, March 6th, 1906.

**o) Mkhize chiefdoms of the Natal Midlands**

Faction fighting was the order of the day between the two sections, but Ngunezi kaSiyingela Mkhize1 died in 1895 without having nominated his successor. This led to a dispute between his sons Tilongo and Sikhukhukhu over chieftaincy. The Natal government intervened and enforced a settlement contrary to a Zulu custom by dividing the fertile land of the Mkhize chiefdom (ubukhosi) into two sections between Tilongo and Sikhukhukhu. This action caused faction fighting which continued for many decades afterwards. In 1906 both sections showed signs of being dissatisfied with the poll tax and as had happened elsewhere, old enemies were drawn closer together through their common opposition to the authorities. However, the two chiefs paid the tax but were both penalized by the government for the actions of their followers.

**(i) Tilongo of the uMngeni and uMlazi divisions**

Tilongo was a chief of the section of amaMbo (Mkhize people) in the fertile uMngeni and uMlazi divisions in the Natal Midlands2. Tilongo and his people paid their tax in April 19063.

Although Tilongo played no part in the impi yamakhanda, he was tried by court martial in Pietermaritzburg and found guilty for sedition and public violence. Tilongo was fined five hundred head of cattle, which was later commuted by the Governor to two hundred and fifty. He was deported together with other ‘ringleaders’ to St Helena in 1907 and his chiefdom was divided into three sections.4

Harriet Colenso tried very hard for the reduction of his sentence and a number of appeals were made to the Supreme Court (Natal), Colonial Office and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. All these attempts were futile5.

Both Tilongo and Sikhukhukhu were granted parole by Lord Gladstone in 1910 after having served three years of their ten-year sentences6.

In due course their sons, Nkasa and Thimuni, succeeded Tilongo and Sikhukhukhu respectively.

Ngunezi’s full young brother Bubula Mkhize, and Ngunezi’s distant cousin chief Mguqula Mkhize remained loyal to the British colonial government in Natal during the impi visit to Zululand.

**References:**

1 Tilongo was the son of Ngunezi kaSiyingile kaZihlandlo kaGcwabe

kaKhabazela kaMavovo kaMkhize kaGubhela. Tilongo’s ancestor iNkosi Zihlandlo had been on “friendly terms with King Tshaka” - in fact King “Tshaka called him his younger brother (mnawe)”. INkosi Ngunezi was the senior of the iNkosi Mqolombeni Mkhize and iNkosi Mguqula Mkhize;

‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 3. p. 46;

‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 2. p. 279;

‘Olden times of Zululand and Natal’. p. 407;

‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 2. 279;

‘Olden times of Zululand and Natal’. p. 407.

2 INkosi Siyingela was the one who provided shelter and food to Henry Francis Fynn in 1825 on his first yamakhanda in 1906. Bubula was appointed iNkosi over a small section of abaMbo (Mkhize people) by the Natal colonial government.

2 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 3. p. 142.

3 Ilanga lase Natal, March 2nd, 1906;

‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 197.

4 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 354 - 355.

5 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 196.

6 Ilanga lase Natal. December 23rd, 1910.

**(ii) Miskofili Dlamini of the amaKhuze chiefdom in the Upper Natal Midlands**

Chief Miskofili Dlamini ruled the amaKhuze chiefdom in the Ipholela, Ixopo and Upper uMkhomazi (Midlands, Natal) divisions1,his domain was the sub-chiefdom of the main Dlamini chiefdom (eKunene) in the Natal. The other sub-chiefdoms of the Dlamini in the Colony were eSiphahleni and eNhlangwini1a.

Miskofili was the son of Khukhulela kaMmiso kaNomagaga who had passed away on 19 November 18882. His mother was an elder daughter of chief Langalibalele3 and she encouraged the people to pay the taxes called for by the English Natal government.

Since1897, when he assumed chieftaincy, he had been very unpopular with the local magistrate F. E. Foxon, who called for the destruction of his chiefdom4. Dube in his newspaper tried to encourage black people to go and pay the Poll Tax since chiefs like Tilongo had paid5.

Although Miskofili, like Tilongo had not participated in the fighting and he had complied with the government order of handing over all the men demanded by the British military, his chiefdom was seized and divided into three sections after impi yamakhanda. One section was given to the Ixobho magistrate F. E. Foxon’s foreman, Msiwakeni Shezi. Msikofini retained one section, while the third one was given to his brother Pata6.

Msikofini was fined cattle as well7. Msikofini died on 14 December 19218.

**References:**

1 ‘The James Stuart Archive’ Volume 3. p. 191, and ‘The James Stuart Archive’ Volume 4. p. 30 and Volume 5 : 251.

1a ‘Olden times of Zululand and Natal’. p. 367.

2 ‘Olden times of Zululand and Natal’. p. 367;

‘The James Stuart Archive’. Volume 4. p. 4.

3 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Volume 4. p.13 and p. 26. On his mother’s side he was the grandson of the amaHlubi Chief Langalibalele who clashed with the Natal colonial government in 1873. His mother’s name was Nkomose. ‘This woman’s influence during the 1906 was directed to inducing her son’s tribe to pay the poll tax’, see A History of the Zulu Rebellion, p. 141; also see a letter from Colonel MacKenzie to the Commandant of Militia, February 25th, 1906 in The Natal Rebellion of 1906. p. 9: “I have a reliable information that Msikofeni’s mother (who is a daughter of the late Chief Langalibalele) has great influence over the tribe, which influence she is using for a good purpose in trying to induce the young men to pay the poll tax”.

4 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 193 – 194.

5 Ilanga lase Natal, March 2nd, 1906.

6 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 321 – 322.

7 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 196.

8 ‘Olden times of Zululand and Natal’. p. 367.

**p) Bhambadha of the Ngome area**

Bhambadha kaMancinza kaJangeni kaMangenge kaNomashumi1 kaNondaba kaTetane kaGasa1a was known as the protagonist in the 1906 saga.

Bhambadha was the chief of a section of abakwaZondi (Zondi people) in the Umvoti, New Hanover, Eugenia, Lions River and Krantzkop divisions2.

Bhambadha’s people were based in Ngome area3, which is about 25 km away from Greytown. Born around 1861,4 he took over the reins of the amaZondi chiefdom on 6th, June 1890,5 and he was in constant conflict with his neighboring white farmers.6 Most of his people lived on white farms and as a result he had problems with mainly white landlords. The tension is well illustrated by Marks: “between 1901 and 1906 Bambadha was involved in thirty separate and financially crippling criminal and civil cases, actions, many of them over his failure to pay rent”.7

His chief advisor was Nhlonhlo, (who after the uthuli was sentenced to serve a term of twenty years and was amongst the twenty-five ‘ringleaders’ that were sent to St Helena and subsequently granted amnesty by Lord Gladstone towards the end. 8

The name of his chief umuzi was eMkhontweni (place of the spear).

Another small section (462 huts) of the Zondi people moved and settled in the

Nquthu and Nkandla districts after the Anglo-Zulu War. This group was under chief Nongamlana who remained loyal to the local English government for Crown throughout the rebellion though some of his people joined the rebels9.

Bhambadha’s lieutenant in impi yamakhanda was known as Chakijana10, his full names were uSukabekhuluma, uSigilamkhuba, uShayinja kaGezindaka kaNomaqongqotho kaJobe Sithole.

Chakijana was one of the prominent leaders of the 1906 impi yamakhanda10a.

At the end of March 1906, Bambadha visited DinuZulu at his palace of oSuthu and on his way back to eNgome, Chakijana who was one of DinuZulu’s personal attendants, accompanied him11. It was alleged by many people that he incited abakwaZondi under the leader chief Bambadha to rise against the colonial state12.

Chakijana participated in all the major battles from the time of Bhambadha’s attack on the magistrate at Keate’s Drift on 3 April, until the battle of Mome Gorge, when he escaped to Zululand”13.

**References:**

1 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Volume 4. p. 2.

1a ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Volume 4. p. 12. Mancinza died in 1883 when Bhambadha was very young.

‘In 1884 Magwababa, a trustworthy Induna and brother of Mancinza was appointed Regent’ - ‘The Natal Rebellion’ of 1906. p. 18.

2 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Volume 4. p. 59.

3 This area is also known as Mpanza valley north-west of Greytown. See ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Volume 2. p. 78.

4 Harry C. Lugg: ‘Natal and Zululand’ - Containing a series of short Sketches of the Historic Spots, Game Reserves, Fishing Resorts, and Places of Scenic Beauty, etc. to be Found in the Province, Together with Some Notes on a Number of outstanding Characters, both European and Native, Associated with its Past History and development. Pietermaritzburg, 1948. p. 72.

5  ‘The Natal Rebellion of 1906’. p. 18;

‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 201.

6 ‘Betrayed Trust’. p. 2.

7 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 204.

8 Ilanga lase Natal. December 23rd, 1910;

C. T. Binns: ‘The last Zulu King: the life and death of Cetshwayo’. London, Longmans, 1963. p. 189.

9 ‘The Natal Rebellion of 1906’. p. 2.

10 The meaning of his name is “the cunning weasel who shares the honors with Unogwaja, the hare, as the trickster of Zulu folk-lore. See T. Cope: ‘Izibongo, Zulu Praise Poems’. Cleredon, 1968. p. 74.

10a Andreas Z. Zungu. ‘Usukabekhuluma’. Pietermaritzburg, Shuter and Shooter Book and Stationary Specialist, 1933. p. 5. His real name was uSukabekhuluma but he was better known as Chakijana.

11 ‘Reluctant Rebellion; p. 237. OSuthu was the principal umuzi of Cetshwayo’s chief son, DinuZulu. See ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Volume 3. p. 206.

12 ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 168.

13 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 276.

**q) Prime Minister Mankulumane Ndwandwe, principal induna/chief advisor to King DinuZulu**

DinuZulu’s Ndunankulu1 (principal induna / prime minister / chief advisor) was

Mankulumane Ndwandwe2, son of Somaphunga kaZwide3.

Mankulumane was a direct descendant of Zwide, Shaka’s most formidable opponent in the days of the Zulu expansion4. It has been said that Mankulumane instigated the 1906 impi yamakhanda5.

Mankulumane was an intelligent man, as is shown in Lugg’s monograph: “he was probably one of the ablest and most astute men the Zulu people have produced”6.

He assisted OkaMsweli (DinuZulu’s mother) who carried out the duties of chieftainship for eight years while DinuZulu was exiled in St Helena, and during that time he took over much of the actual work of civil and minor criminal cases7. Mankulumane was outstandingly loyal to DinuZulu during the trial and he accompanied DinuZulu to exile, and to the last maintained DinuZulu’s innocence”8. **On 9 March 1909, shortly before the final “union of South Africa’ was concluded, the Prime Minister of the Zulu Kingdom, Mankulumane Ndwandwe,, was found guilty of high treason and sentenced to nine months imprisonment9. High treason carried the death penalty. A sentence of 9 months proves that there was no real evidence against him.**

Much later Dube wrote a moving article about his death on the 18th of December 1926.

He lamented that Mankulumane kaSomaphunga kaZwide kaLanga Nxumalo of the once prominent Ndwandwe kingdom, which came to an end when King Shaka defeated Zwide, had died. He had been the only person alive who witnessed the independence of the Zulu kingdom as well as its demise. He had been father of the Zulu kings. All in Zululand had trusted him. All the hardships that DinuZulu had experienced were shared between the two of them. After DinuZulu’s death he continued to act as father to the heir and successor of DinuZulu, Solomon kaDinuZulu. He died an untimely death, after contracting an illness in Johannesburg. He had accompanied Solomon who had to consult doctors there, and Mankulumane himself became ill. He had been an intelligent person and he had served the Zulu royal house successfully, faithfully and with determination. His death was a great loss to the Zulu nation and the whole of Zululand10.

**References:**

1 Ilanga lase Natal, May 4th, 1906;

James Stuart: ‘UHlangakhula’. Longmas, green and Co., London, 1924. p. 11 – 12; ‘Olden times of Zululand and Natal’. p. 213.

2 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Volume 3. p. 120;

‘Olden times of Zululand and Natal’. p. 213.

3 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Volume 4. pp. 318, 357;

‘UBaxoxele’. p. 196.

4 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 97. He was ‘the grandson of the prominent Ndwandwe Chief Zwide, see ‘Restless Identities’. p. 226.

5 ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 495.

6 H. C. Lugg: ‘Historic Natal and Zululand’. Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1949. p. 151.

7 Binns: ‘The last Zulu King’. p. 164.

8 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 290.

9 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 293.

10 Ilanga Lase Natal. 24 December 1926.

**r) The English government-created chiefdom in the amaQamu in uMsinga and Dundee districts.**

**(i) Chief Khula of the uMsinga and Dundee divisions**

The amaQamu people were located to the uMsinga and Dundee divisions1 under chief Khula kaLuntshungu, who was the grandson of Ngoza Majozi2.

Khula traced his family’s claim to the chiefdom back to the mid 1850’s when his ancestor, Ngoza kaLudada was one of principal induna for Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal3.

Ngoza was an appointed iNkosi and as a result the chiefdom always considered itself as the ‘government’s tribe’.

His chiefdom was the largest of all the ten that existed in 1906 in the uMsinga district4.

However, by 1906 Khula’s relationship with the uMsinga magistrate had become very bad and the magistrate sent frequent complaints to the Minister of Native affairs but without valid charges5.

The large section of the Majozi (amaQamu) chiefdom openly supported Bhambadha by sending amabutho to Nkandla.

In January and February 1906, the amaQamu had shown unwillingness to pay the poll tax and therefore Khula was summoned to appear before the minister. He was cautioned about what the British government had done to other amaKhosi such as Ngobizembe, Meseni, Ndlovu and others.

In May Khula was **detained by the English colonial government and later deposed6.**

**(ii) Acting chief Nqgamuzana of the abaThembu in the uMsinga and Dundee divisions**

The abaThembu under the Acting Chief Nqgamuzana refused to fight against amaQamu when requested by the British Natal government, despite their long-standing animosity between his people and their neighbors due to border despures7.

The Acting Chief Nqgamuzana ruled over more than 4,500 huts that roughly comprised the village of more than 18,000 people. The huts of the other nine chiefdoms could not even amount to 4,000 put together8.

**(iii) Regent Sibindi and the Ngubane chiefdom**

The Ngubane chiefdom under the regent Sibindi was not on good terms with the Majozi chiefdom because of boundary disputes after the English Natal government redefined their borders9.

The chiefdom of regent Sibindi was very powerful and influential. His uncle was Mnteli kaNgoza, who was also his uNdunankulu (chief advisor) at Elands Kraal10. One of his izinduna was Nondubela, who also participated in impi yamakhanda11. Another induna was Mabulawa who also armed against the colonial forces in 190612. Mnteli was one of the prominent leaders in the 1906 uprising13.

**References:**

1 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Volume 3 pages 141-2, 236 and Volume 4 pages 11, 30.

2 Jeff Guy’s Seminar paper, 2001, UND.

3 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 4. p. 151 and Vol. 5. p 320.

4 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 217; and

‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 319.

5 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 218.

6 Ilanga Lase Natal. 24 December 1926.

7 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 317.

8 ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 319.

9 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, pp. 219, 319.

10 ‘The James Stuart Archive’, Volume 3. p. 236;

‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 313;

‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 322. The history books (like Stuart, Marks) use the name Mtele yet the newspaper Ilanga lase Natal, spell the name as Mnteli and Magema Fuze spell it as Mntele, in this work the form Mnteli will be used. In conversation with people on the ground in uMsinga and Weenen this spelling is more generally used.

11 Natal Mercury. May 19th 1906.

12 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 218.

13 Ilanga lase Natal, October 19th, 1906.

**s) Chief Gayede in the Krantzkop devision**

The amaKhabela people in the Krantzkop division were under chief Gayede

kaMakhedama1. He was regarded as one of the ‘British loyal’ chiefs of the government.

According to his son and heir Mkhuzangwe, chief Gayede was unable to join the rebels because he was a “mere dog of the Government – umgodoyi ka Rulumeni” 2.

**References:**

1 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 3. p. 191.

2 ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 315;

‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol 5. p. 161.

**t) Acting chief Mahlubi of the Gcwensa chiefdom**

The Gcwensa experienced a succession dispute, and it led to the interference of the British colonial government on behalf of the Crown, who split the chiefdom during 1906. Regent Mahlubi was made acting chief on behalf of the colonial government in the kwaMaphumulo division1. Nkosana Gcwensa, who was the heir to the chieftaincy, joined the ‘rebels’ while the regent joined the colonial government.

Nkosana was arrested and deposed while the ‘British loyal’ Mahlubi was appointed to a permanent full chieftaincy of the chiefdom for his services. Furthermore, he was given a section of amaNyuswa who had been under Xhegwana2.

**References:**

1 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 4. p. 59.

2 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 314

**u) South Coast**

**(i) Henry and Charlie Fynn**

On the South Coast there were Henry Francis Fynn’s black supporters known as

iziNkumbi.

Charlie was the nephew of Henry F. Fynn (junior)1. Charlie Fynn succeeded his mother as chief of the iziNkumbi2. His people settled in the Alexandra and Lower uMzimkhulu divisions3. Charlie has been referred as “a half-caste and Chief of a large tribe” at eMthwalume area4.

Chief Charlie was unsuccessful in urging his people to pay the poll tax. His induna had sympathized with the popular feeling of the people who were prepared to defy the payment. MacKenzie had sentenced five participants to death (later commuted by the government) and others were given severe sentences (later reduced by the government). Fynn was fined fifteen hundred head of cattle5.

**Chief Jack**

The Duma people who were under Chief Jack in the Alexandra division6 were mainly based in the uMzinto area at a place called Dumisa named after iNkosi Jack’s grandfather Dumisa.

**References:**

1 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 3. p. 95. Mr. Henry F. Fynn was the son of the earliest pioneer of Natal - see ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion,’ p. 210.

2 ‘The James Stuart Archive’. Vol. 4. p. 261.

3 ‘The James Stuart Archive’, Vol. 3. p. 46 and Volume 5 pp. 18, 235.

4 ‘A History of the Zulu Rebellion’, p. 143. It should be noted that: “Despite their virtual exclusion from white society the Colored of Natal saw themselves as part of the white group. They resented being ‘practically stigmatized as natives’, were dissatisfied with their status under the native law, their lack of political rights, the failure of the government to make adequate provision for the education of their children, and their expulsion from the defense forces of the colony”. See ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 8.

5 ‘Reluctant Rebellion’, p. 197.

6 Ilanga lase Natal. March 16th 1906;

‘The James Stuart Archive’, Vol. 3. p. 219, and Vol. 5. p. 252.

**v) The Zulu Royal House**

The structure of the chiefdoms was to a large extent dependent on the overall structure of the kingdom, and to the existence of the monarch to whom the chiefs owed their allegiance. Effectively the last of the kings who had any hope of unifying the chiefly structure, albeit within the parameters of severely diminished powers, was DinuZulu.

The Zulu royal house suffered more than fifty years of oppression by the British government on behalf of the Crown, during which their kings and chiefs were deposed, their land annexed and then rented back to their people. This behaviour of the English government made it impossible for the last Zulu king, DinuZulu, to maintain the traditional Zulu structures, despite his lineage and background.

The name given to DinuZulu at his birth at eZinhlendlane (homestead) in Mahlabathini1 was Mahelana-avela-o-Ndini (abbreviated to Mahayana).

Mahayana was five or six years old when his grandfather Mpande died in 1872. His

mother Nomvimbi Somakoyisa Msweli, was not from a prominent family like other wives of King Cetshwayo. When he was a boy King Cetshwayo named him DinuZulu, which means “the one the Zulu nation hates – lo udinwa nguZulu”2. Although division and rivalry were features of the history of the amaZulu clans from early times, the division that was caused by the divide and rule policy of the British Natal authorities ensured that by the time of DinuZulu’s death the “one that the Zulu nation hates” was indeed seen by some as the cause of division rather than a rallying centre for unity.

Although the Natal colonial government reduced his power to that of ‘Government Induna’, the Zulu people as a whole looked on him as more than the mere head of the Usutu tribe3. A number of chiefs visited and consulted him on various political issues coming from Zululand, Natal and other provinces. DinuZulu was believed to have magical powers even in other colonies. After Bambadha had attacked the white people, the amaSwazi, amaZengele and amaShangane began to talk about war.

However, DinuZulu’s umuzi when he lived in exile in the Northern Transvaal was called kwaThengisangaye (the place where the Zulu people sold him out) 4.

The forces that ultimately destroyed DinuZulu were part of the same process that undermined the fabric of the chiefly tradition, which in pre-colonial days had underpinned amaZulu society. Forced off the most fertile land by violent means (e.g. in Nkandla, Nquthu and Maphumulo), obliged by taxation to become part of the migrant labour system, and in some cases moved from their traditional chiefdoms to newly created polities, the amaZulu were generally impoverished and demoralized.

Blacks were even beaten for not saluting minor British officials with a royal salute that according to the tradition of the amaZulu was solely used for hereditary leaders.

Even the chiefs appointed by the colonial state received little reward for their loyalty.

T**he appointment of Manzolwandle as a chief–**inkosi was the British colonial government’s attempt to create division amongst the amaZulu, and finally to undermine the position of DinuZulu.

Dube, always loyal to his Royal family, completed his report on the death of king DinuZulu by looking to the future, and moving Prince Solomon into focus alongside his late father, describing how on an occasion in the past, at a function when Solomon had danced DinuZulu had praised him (Dr Nene also assisted with the following translation):

“Dance openly you who drank with a straw.

Indaba’s feather,

Which was the strongest in the dynasty of Msweli household,

It was so strong that everybody feared how to challenge it5.”

Prince Solomon Maphumuzana Nkayishana kaDinuZulu was announced the successor of DinuZulu5a.

Although a framework of traditional leadership survived to be further manipulated by the South African government in their implementation of the apartheid homeland policy, and although the traditional leaders of today are still a complex force to be reckoned with6, the political and social landscape mapped out in this chapter was profoundly changed by the events of 1906 and their aftermath.

**References:**

1 ‘UBaxoxele’. p. 209.

2 Magema M. Fuze: ‘Abantu abamnyama, lapa bavela khona’. City Printing Works, Pietermaritzburg, 1922 . pp. 212 – 214.

3 Binns: ‘The last Zulu King’. p. 167.

4 ‘Abantu abamnyama, lapa bavela khona’. p. 250.

5 Dhlala nyoni epuzumlaza ngameva.

Upape luka Ndaba,

Lumi lodwana pezu kwendhlu yoka Msweli,

Luntule lwaze lwantula noyedwana onga lutintayo - See Ilanga Lase Natal, November 21st 1913.

5a Ilanga Lase Natal. October 31st, November 21st 1913.

6 Mary de Haas article entitled: ‘Perverting tradition’- The Natal Witness, 3 April 2003

1. **Walvis Bay (1914–1915)**

Also known as the **South-West Africa Campaign,** which was the conquest and occupation of [German South West Africa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_South_West_Africa), [now](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South-West_Africa_Campaign) called [Namibia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Namibia), by forces from the [Union of South Africa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_of_South_Africa) acting on behalf of the Crown, at the beginning of the [First World War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_World_War).

**a) Background**

The outbreak of hostilities in Europe in August 1914 revitalized the desire of the Crown to annex the German colony of South West Africa. When the British government asked their leadership in South Africa to employ their forces to invade German South-West Africa, the reply was that they could and would.

Many people living in South West Africa had South African origins and families, and objected to a war against their neighbors. Further sympathy stemmed for the German cause stemmed from the fact that only twelve years had passed since the end of the [Second Boer War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Boer_War), in which Germany had offered the two tiny [Boer republics](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boer_republics) moral support against the armed might of the world-straddling [British Empire](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Empire).

Lieutenant-Colonel Manie Maritz, heading commando forces on the border of German South-West Africa, declared that the former South African Republic and Orange Free State as well as the Cape Province and Natal are proclaimed free from British [control](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South-West_Africa_Campaign) and independent, and every White inhabitant of the mentioned areas, of whatever nationality, were called upon to take their weapons in their hands and realize the long-cherished ideal of a Free and Independent South Africa.

Agreements were made and concluded between and by the Governor of the Kaiser of German South West Africa as representative of his esteemed Majesty, the Kaiser of Germany, and General S.G. Maritz, on behalf of a number of officers and men wishing to declare the independence of South Africa, in which they acknowledged the following:  
• 1. Said General S.G. Maritz having declared the independence of South Africa and declaring war against England;  
• 2. The Governor of German South West Africa acknowledges all ‘Afrikaans’ forces engaged against England as being forces of war and after further discussions to support them in their war against England.  
• 3. In the event of British South Africa being declared partly or fully independent, the Governor of the Kaiser of German South West Africa will apply all means to have the State or States acknowledged thus and have them included in the general signing of peace.  
• 4. In consideration of such assistance the newly formed State or States will have no objection to the German Reich annexing Walvis Bay and the islands adjoining German South West Africa.  
• 5. The centre of the Orange River will in future form the boundary between German South West Africa and the Cape colony.  
• 6. The German Reich will have no objection if the above named States annex Delagoa Bay.  
• 7. Should the uprising fail, any dissidents present in German territory will be considered to be German subjects and treated as such.

**b) The War**

South African troops were mobilized along the border between the two countries under the command of General [Henry Lukin](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Lukin) and Lt Col[Manie Maritz](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manie_Maritz) early in September 1914. Shortly afterward another force occupied the port of [Lüderitz](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%BCderitz).

Maritz and several other high ranking officers rapidly gathered forces with a [total](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South-West_Africa_Campaign) of about 12,000 rebels in the [Transvaal](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_African_Republic) and [Orange Free State](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orange_Free_State), ready to fight for the cause in what became known as the [Boer Revolt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boer_Revolt) (also sometimes referred to as the Maritz Rebellion).

A first attempt to invade German South-West Africa from the south failed at the [Battle of Sandfontein](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Sandfontein), close to the border with the Cape Colony, where on 25 September 1914 the German fusiliers inflicted a serious defeat on the British troops, although the survivors were left free to return to British territory.

The government declared martial law on the 14th of October 1914, and forces loyal to the British Crown under the command of Generals [Louis Botha](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louis_Botha) and [Jan Smuts](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_Smuts) were employed, which amounted to about 67,000 of the South African Defense Force and 1600 of the Portuguese Forces in southern Angola.

To protect the South West African border, were about 3,000 ‘Schutztruppe*’* plus 7,000 male settlers and 500-600 South African Boers.

**c) Combat with German forces**

To disrupt British South African plans to invade South West Africa the Germans launched a pre-emptive invasion of their own. The [Battle of Kakamas](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kakamas) took place over the fords at [Kakamas](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kakamas), on the 4th of February 1915. It was a skirmish for control of two river fords over the [Orange River](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orange_River) between contingents of a German-Boer ‘invasion’ force and the British loyal South African armed forces. The British employed South Africans succeeded in preventing the German Boer contingency from gaining control of the fords and crossing the river.

Botha split his command in two with Smuts commanding the southern forces while he took direct command of the northern forces.

Botha arrived at the coastal German colonial town of [Swakopmund](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swakopmund), on the 11th of February to take direct command on the northern contingent, and continued to build up his invasion force at [Walfish Bay](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walfish_Bay)(or Walvis Bay) – the harbor along the South West African border which had been annexed by Britain on the 12th of March 1878, to prevent the Boer republics independent access to the sea.

By March he advanced his assault from Swakopmund along the [Swakop valley](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swakop_River) with its railway line, where his forces took [Otjimbingwe](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otjimbingwe), [Karibib](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karibib), Friedrichsfelde, Wilhelmsthal, and [Okahandja](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Okahandja) and entered the colony's capital [Windhuk](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windhuk) on the 5th of May 1915.

The Germans then offered terms under which they would surrender, but they were rejected by Botha under British authority and the war continued.

On the 12th of May, Botha declared martial law and, having effectively cut the colony in half, divided his forces into four contingents under Coen Brits, Lukin, Manie Botha and Myburgh.

Brits went north to [Otjiwarongo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otjiwarongo), [Outjo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outjo) and [Etosha Pan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Etosha_Pan) which cut off German forces in the interior from the coastal regions of [Kunene](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kunene_Region) and [Kaokoveld](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaokoveld). The other three columns fanned out into the north-east.

Lukin went along the railway line running from Swakopmund to [Tsumeb](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tsumeb). The other two columns advanced on Lukin's right flank, Myburgh to [Otavi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otavi) junction, and Manie Botha to Tsumeb and the line's terminus. The men who commanded these columns, having gained their military experience fighting in Boer commandos, moved very rapidly.[[2]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South-West_Africa_Campaign#cite_note-FOOTNOTECrafford2005102-1) The German forces in the north-west made a [stand at Otavi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Otavi) on 1 July, but were beaten and surrendered at [Khorab](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Khorab&action=edit&redlink=1) on 9 July 1915.

While events were unfolding in the north, Smuts landed with another South African force at the South West Africa colony's naval base at [Luderitzbucht](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luderitzbucht) (now called Angra Pequena). Having secured the town Smuts advanced inland, capturing

[Keetmanshoop](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keetmanshoop) on 20 May. Here he met up with two other columns that had advanced over the border from South Africa, one from the coastal town of [Port Nolloth](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_Nolloth) and the other from Kimberly.

Smuts advanced north along the railway line to [Berseba](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berseba) and after [two days fighting](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Battle_of_Gibeon&action=edit&redlink=1) captured [Gibeon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibeon,_Namibia) on 26 May. The Germans in the south were forced to retreat northwards towards their capital and into the waiting arms of Botha's forces. Within two weeks the German forces in the south, faced with certain destruction, surrendered.

Casualties and losses by the South West African soldiers were 1 131 and the casualties and losses of the South African forces under British rulership was 113.

More attention to the politics of this battle is given in Attachment 9: Objections to the formation of the Union of South Africa.

**d) Aftermath**

Before an official declaration of [war](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portugal_in_World_War_I) between [Germany](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Empire) and [Portugal](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portuguese_First_Republic) (March 1915),

[German and Portuguese troops clashed](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_campaign_in_Angola) several times on the border between

[German South West Africa](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_South_West_Africa) and [Portuguese Angola](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portuguese_Angola). The Germans won these clashes and were able to occupy the [Humbe region](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cunene_province) in southern [Angola](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angola) until the successful South African British assault South-West Africa Campaign defeated them and Portuguese control was restored.

After defeating the German force in South-West Africa during [World War I](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I) South Africa initially occupied the colony and then administered it as a de facto ‘fifth province’ [League of Nations](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/League_of_Nations) [mandate territory](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandate_territory) from 1919.

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* [Tucker & Wood’ 1996](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South-West_Africa_Campaign#CITEREFTuckerWood1996), p. 654;
* [Crafford’ 2005](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South-West_Africa_Campaign#CITEREFCrafford2005), p. 102;
* ‘[Burg & Purcell’ 2004](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South-West_Africa_Campaign#CITEREFBurgPurcell2004), p. 59;
* Burg, David F.; Purcell, L. Edward (2004): ‘Almanac of World War I’ (illustrated ed.). University Press of Kentucky. p. [59](http://books.google.com/books?id=FV_i8P0ZSWQC&lpg=PR1&pg=PA59#v=onepage&q&f=false). [ISBN](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number) [978-0-8131-9087-7](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-8131-9087-7);
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* Tucker, Spencer; Wood, Laura Matysek (1996). Tucker, Spencer; Wood; Murphy, Justin D.. eds. ‘The European powers in the First World War: an encyclopedia’ (illustrated ed.). Taylor & Francis. p. [654](http://books.google.com/books?id=EHI3PCjDtsUC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA654#v=onepage&q&f=false). [ISBN](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number) [978-0-8153-0399-2](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-8153-0399-2).
* ["Namibian War of Independence 1966–1988"](http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/november/namibia1966.htm). Armed Conflict Events Database. Retrieved February 2012.

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BUNDLE 10: Brief <https://www.createspace.com/4437109>

BUNDLE 11: Brief Concordance <https://www.createspace.com/4497991>

BUNDLE 12: Attachment 15b, update of

genocide records, 2013 will be available

during April 2014 on <https://www.createspace.com/4498007>